THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

THE WORLD'S

CRISIS.

By L. B. WOOLFOLK.

"Quo, quo scelesti ruitis? aut cur dexteris
Aptantur enses conditi?
Parumne campis atque Neptuno super
Fusum est . . . . sanguinis?
[HORACE.

CINCINNATI:
MIAMI PRINTING AND PUBLISHING CO., PRINT.
CORNER BEDINGER ST. AND MIAMI CANAL.
1868.

JK246
.W9

Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1868,
By L. B. WOOLFOLK,
In the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio.

164202
10

TO

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE—

WHEN

EXCITEMENTS ARE ALLAYED, PASSIONS LULLED, AND ENMITIES APPEASED—
WITH UNFALTERING CONFIDENCE IN THEIR
RETURNING CONSERVATISM,

AND

THE EXALTED DESTINY OF OUR COUNTRY—

THIS WORK,

AS A TRIBUTE TO REPUBLICANISM,

AND AN

OFFERING AT THE SHRINE OF PATRIOTISM AND PHILANTHROPY,

IS DEDICATED,

BY

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

This volume has been written during the last two years, amidst the pressure of constant and imperative engagements, and with several long interruptions caused by absence from home and by protracted attacks of disease. The fact is not mentioned to excuse the faults which the critical reader may observe; but because it cannot escape notice that different portions were written at periods separated by wide intervals of time.

The second "Book," giving a view of the political state of Europe, was completed early in the fall of 1866: the entire Manuscript was ready for the press in the spring of 1867. Consequently, the view of European events is nearly eighteen months old; and the political condition of our own country is depicted from the standpoint of nine months ago. In one point of view, this is a defect. But the rapid movement of events forbids the delay necessary for such a revisal, as would bring the work up to the standpoint of the present. The author, however, is the chief sufferer from the lapse of time since different portions of the work were written; for much that he predicted has become history; and many tendencies outlined in this work long before they had been suggested elsewhere, have now been perceived by the general public, and are no longer novel suggestions. Events have moved faster than the pen, and the author, in many instances, finds himself behind the status of the time, where he hoped to lead the van of thought. This, however, will not be esteemed an unmitigated misfortune, if the prognostications already fulfilled shall

cause a candid examination of the suggestions respecting events yet lying in the future.

In justice to himself and others, the author must disclaim any wish to be considered the exponent of the views of any political party. Responsibility for the opinions and the policy suggested in this work rests with him alone. Political expediency and the rally words of the moment have not been considered in it. The range of thought is too broad for a merely political work; and many of the views presented, clashing with prejudices and views of present expediency, may perhaps prove unpalatable to persons of all parties, and all sections.

The author is not, nor does he propose to become, a politician. He has not written from a party, nor from a sectional, but from an American standpoint. If he advocates Conservatism, he does so because the principles of Conservatism constitute, as he conceives, the only hope of America and of mankind: If he assails Radicalism, it is not from party spirit, but because Radicalism is destructive of our prosperity, of Republicanism, and of the best hopes of man. He does not aim to discuss the questions involved in such a manner as to fall in with the views, passions, and prejudices of the time: his sole aim is truth; his object discussion from the elevated philosophic point of view the future historian will occupy when the parties of the past and present, with their principles and their policy, shall be regarded with calmness, and the dispassionate verdict of posterity pronounced upon them. His aim is not the advocacy of partisan or sectional issues; but the development of the true principles of Republican government; the presentation of the momentous world-important issues involved in the existing crisis; and the suggestion of the policy necessary to save from impending ruin the prosperity of Our Country and the cause of Human Progress.

THE CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION.

OUR AGE A TRANSITION PERIOD FROM AN OLD TO A NEW ERA.

Feudalism worn out, and must give way to a new form of social order. Two principles struggling for the mastery of the new era:—Liberal monarchy verging upon Republicanism, toward which it is tending—Absolute despotism aspiring, under Russia, to universal dominion—These principles have long been struggling for the supremacy in Europe, and their struggle is approaching a crisis which will give to one or the other a definitive victory.—The United States holds the scales, and upon its policy, as determined in the next Presidential election, will depend the issue of the struggle, and the destiny of the earth for generations to come. This fact constitutes this "THE WORLD'S CRISIS."

2. This work will discuss the questions that come within its scope, under the three following propositions:

PROP. I. *The Government of the United States has, almost throughout its entire career, maintained* A SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION *in violation of* THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION: *with the effect upon* HOME AFFAIRS OF TARNISHING THE NATIONAL HONOR; *dwarfing our* INDUSTRIAL PROSPERITY; *warping our* SOCIAL LIFE; *and plunging the country into frightful* POLITICAL EVILS.

PROP. II. *These past* VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION *have reacted most injuriously upon Foreign Nations: fostering a false* INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM *throughout the World; gendering dangerous* SOCIAL EVILS; *and strengthening the cause of* ABSOLUTISM, *rescuing it from ruin, and giving birth to a political reaction eminently dangerous to the cause of Liberty and Advancement.*

PROP. III. THE PRESENT IS A CRISIS *in which the Government of the United States may, by a wise and conservative policy, enable the country to enter upon a course of* UNEXAMPLED PROSPERITY; *and exert an influence upon* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *that will arrest the* INDUSTRIAL AND POLITICAL EVILS *now menacing the World with ruin: But where an ill-advised policy will involve the* COUN-

TRY *in* FINANCIAL RUIN; *and suffer the* WORLD *to drift without restraint into a* CHAOS OF CONVULSION, *threatening with overthrow the cause of* HUMAN ADVANCEMENT.

These Propositions attribute to the United States an extent of influence which requires that we show, in an

INTRODUCTORY DISSERTATION,

THE UNITED STATES A NATION OF PROVIDENCE.

CHAPTER I.

FORESHADOWINGS OF AN EXALTED DESTINY.

SEC. I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE COLONIZATION OF AMERICA.

I. The reservation of the country from French and Spanish Catholic adventurers.

II. Its settlement by fugitives from religious persecution.

III. The circumstances which preserved the hardy virtues of the Colonists.

SEC. 2. THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR.

I. THE PREPARATORY ERA—THE OLD FRENCH WAR. Preparative for the success of the struggle:—The increase of the military spirit of the Colonies—The preparation of the maritime States of Europe to make common cause with the revolted Colonies.—Inaugurating the collisions which brought on the struggle.

II. THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE. The advantages of Britain:—Her superiority in wealth and power, and in the quality of her troops—Her superiority of position, having command of the sea.—The means by which her superiority was prevented from being decisive: Three plans of operations open to the British, either of which would have proved decisive:—First plan: to move upon the Colonies from Boston—Means by which the plan was rendered abortive. Second and third plans: to sever the Colonies on the line of the Hudson; and to assail the South:—Why they failed of success: Contrary winds—Escape of Washington from Long Island and New York—Campaign in the Jerseys—Howe's failure to co-operate with Burgoyne—Burgoyne's dilatory tactics—His fatal error. Other Providential events: The storms which prevented decisive engagements of French and English fleets—the contrary winds which saved American army at Newport—the detection of Arnold's treason—The Battle of King's Mountain—the Providential escape of Greene from the pursuit of Cornwallis—The Providential events which resulted in the capture of Cornwallis.—Washington's opinion.

CHAPTER II.

THE PROVIDENTIAL MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES—THE ESTABLISHMENT OF REPUBLICANISM THROUGHOUT THE EARTH.

SEC. I. THE UNEXAMPLED EXCELLENCE OF OUR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.

I. ORGANIC DEFECTS OF FORMER REPUBLICS. *The want of a representative system;* and of a proper *distribution* of the *powers of government.* Exemplified in Athenian Republic.—*The clashing of rival classes.* Exemplified in Greek republics and in Rome.—*The lack of the Federal principle.*—The evil of Leagues:—The Amphictyonic Council—The Swiss Confederation.—The evils of Centralizations:—The Achaean League.

II. OUR SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT AVOIDS ALL THOSE ERRORS. *Manner in which principles of Republican government were slowly evolved during centuries. The evolution of the principle of popular representation:*—Its birth and development in England—*The evolution of the distribution of the powers of government.—The evolution of the Federal principle*:—Providential direction of preliminary events—No example in history—The outline of the proper system suggested:—On the one hand by the relation of the Colonies to the mother country, which was a centralization—On the other by the evils of a disjointed League, as experienced under the old Confederation.—The causes which impelled the States to establish a better government.—*The labors of the Constitutional Convention.* The outline of governmental powers.—The limitations of Federal power—Giving it entire control over foreign relations—Leaving internal administration in the control of the States. Additional safeguards in constructing the government upon a federal basis:—The Federal Congress—Divided into two branches—The Senate representing the State governments—The House of Representatives representing the people of the several States.—The Senate the conservative branch of the legislature:—The long term of its members, the better enabling it to control the temporary ebullitions of passion in the popular branch of the legislature.—The Federal Executive:—The Representative of the state governments, and the people of the states jointly—His veto power a restraint upon Congress.—The Supreme Court:—Removed from political excitement—Its power to annul Unconstitutional laws.

III. FEDERAL REPUBLICANISM THE ONLY STABLE FORM OF GOVERNMENT. *Instability of all other forms of government.—Instability of monarchy*:—Necessarily dependent upon force—It is founded upon the support of a limited class: either of—An imperial nation rallying round the throne and holding in subjection conquered provinces; or—A favored aristocratic class.—It has always been exposed to revolution and revolt.—The

instability of monarchy increased with the enlightenment of the age:—Absolute monarchy no longer practicable under existing conditions—Nor is Aristocratic monarchy:—Evident from the French Revolution—From the course of events in England.—Nor is liberal monarchy; because—Monarchy is of necessity a centralization, and a centralization can only be maintained by force.—The time is coming when monarchy, as it now exists, can rule by force no longer.—The only possibility of a much longer continuance of monarchy lies in some nation attaining Universal Dominion. *Instability of all other systems of Republicanism.* Instability of all Confederations of states, united either in Centralizations or Leagues.—Instability of republics consisting of a single state; arising from—Their exercise of all powers of administration, domestic as well as foreign—This causes neglect of governmental duties and abuses of administration, leading to discontent and revolution—The only remedy for this is the distribution of power, as in a federal republic. *The stability of our system of government.* Centralization of power is the prime cause of the downfall of republics:—It causes the convulsions, whatever form they assume, which subvert republics—The only remedy is the distribution of power—In the American Constitution the distribution of power carried almost to perfection:—The internal administration left with the states—The internal administration is so complex and so important that, if deposited in a single hand, it would inevitably lead to convulsions—But, divided among all the states, it produces no excitement whatever.—The Federal government having control of foreign affairs—Its powers distributed between the three departments of government—All elections quiet except the presidential, which shows that the power exercised by the executive is too extensive—The powers of the office more extensive than were contemplated by the framers of the constitution.—The evils that have troubled the country have been caused by the unconstitutional centralization of all powers of administration, domestic as well as foreign, in the hands of the Federal government.—The excellence of our system of government when constitutionally administered:—It is the most efficient government—It secures the most perfect equity of administration—It maintains perfect domestic tranquillity.—Such a system of government capable of maintaining tranquillity in any country, even though the population be little advanced in civilization.—Such a government capable of indefinite expansion, becoming more stable as its boundaries are enlarged.

SEC. 2. THE PAST CAREER OF THE UNITED STATES EVIDENCE OF ITS PROVIDENTIAL MISSION.

I. THE UNPRECEDENTED PROGRESS OF THE COUNTRY. The causes of this unexampled progress:—A new age of industry—Caused by striking and novel inventions.

II. The political influence of the country. In the past:—In giving a new impulse to liberty—In giving direction to popular aspirations.—Our influence has almost effected the overthrow of feudal monarchy.—We are destined to yet greater political influence in the future:—Proved by the analogies of past history.

BOOK I.

EVILS INFLICTED UPON OUR OWN COUNTRY BY OUR VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Prop. I. *The Government of the United States has, almost throughout its entire career, maintained* a system of administration *in violation of* the fundamental principles of the Constitution: *with the effect upon* HOME AFFAIRS of tarnishing the National Honor; *dwarfing our* Industrial Prosperity; *warping our* Social Life; *and plunging the country into frightful* Political Evils.

PART I.

EVILS OF THE CARRYING TRADE.

CHAPTER I.

THE ERA OF FEDERALIST RULE.

Sect. I. Policy of the Federalists.

The industrial condition of the country.—The establishment of the Bank:—A policy of Centralization.—Motives which influenced Washington to sign the bill—The first false step, from which we have never recovered.—Hamilton's scheme of power.—The French Revolution:—Its influence upon American politics.

Sect. 2. Humiliations arising from the policy of the Federalists.

The annihilation of the French marine.—The Bank precipitates the country into the Carrying trade.—Deteriorating effects of the trade upon the national character.—Complications with France.—British aggressions:—Jay's treaty—Its shameful conditions.—Antagonism with France.—Adams' administration—French insults to our envoys—Popular indignation.—Alien and Sedition laws.—Division of sentiment among the Federalists—The policy of Adams—Alienation of members of his party—Treaty with France—Election of 1800—Intrigues which weakened the Federalists—Triumph of the Republicans.

CHAPTER II.

THE ERA OF REPUBLICAN RULE.

Peace of Amiens—Renewal of the war—Violations of our flag—Defensive measures—British paper blockade—British policy—The position of the United States—British restrictions—The Berlin decree—British orders in council—The Milan decree—The Embargo—Impropriety of the measure—Repeal and passage of non-intercourse act—Negotiations—Declaration of war with England—Resume.

PART II.

EVILS OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM.

CHAPTER I.

NORMAL CAREER OF THE UNITED STATES.

SECT. I. THE NORMAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

I. THE NORMAL INDUSTRIAL CAREER OF THE UNITED STATES AT THE INAUGURATION OF THE GOVERNMENT. *The true industrial sphere of the United States,—to become the manufacturer for the world.* We excel all other countries in the conditions essential to manufacturing success:—An energetic and enterprising population having adaptation to mechanical industry—An abundant home supply of raw material—An abundant home supply of provisions for operative population.—Nature has marked the United States as the great world-manufacturing site. Obstacles that had prevented our engaging in manufactures before the adoption of the Federal constitution:—In the Colonial period—Under the old Confederation. Advantages for manufacturing at the inauguration of the Federal Government.—The new government put an end to all previous disadvantages:—The industrial condition of the country was eminently favorable to manufactures—Immense advantages of the American manufacturer, at that era, over British competition.—These advantages and the condition of the country would necessarily have turned the enterprise of the country into them, if industry had been left to its natural course:—But Hamilton's United States Bank changed the course of industry.—It made manufactures impossible:—By inflating the currency and enhancing all prices; thus increasing the cost of production—By embarking the enterprise of the country in the speculations of the carrying trade.

II. Normal industrial career of the United States after the peace of 1815. Once again the state of the country presented the necessary conditions of manufacturing success, and would have forced us upon a career of manufacturing greatness. The state of the country directing emigration toward the South.—This rush of emigration would have glutted the cotton market, and caused the South to be self sustaining, as regards the necessaries of life.—The influence of general stagnation in forcing the West to engage in manufactures:—Without a market in the South, or in the East, the West, being unable to import, would have been driven to manufactures to supply the home demand.—The cheap cost of manufacturing in the West.—Far cheaper than in England:—It had an abundance of labor, raw material, and provisions, all at the lowest rates.—Prices of all were low on account of—The state of the currency—The want of demand—The low rate of taxation.—While the cost of manufacturing was low beyond example, the difficulty of transportation from the seaboard made the price of all manufactured articles extravagantly high.—Cheap production and high sales would have given birth to Western manufactures, especially when there was no other opening to enterprise.—Vast superiority of the West, then, over Great Britain as a site for manufactures:—The Western manufacturer had a cheaper power than the English—The Western manufacturer had cheaper raw material—Provisions cheaper in the West—Labor cheaper in the West.—These advantages would have made the West the seat of manufactures for the world.—We should have had a world-wide commerce.—The natural features of the West point it out as the destined seat of the world's manufactures.—Its destiny must yet be attained.

Sect. 2. Normal Social state of the United States.

Our normal industrial career would have reacted upon our social life.

I. We should have escaped social excitement.

II. No oppression of the laboring classes:—Of the factory operative population—Nor of the slave population of the South.—Slavery, from industrial causes, would have been a mild institution:—No slave trade between the States—No excessive exaction of labor—Natural causes would have gradually brought about emancipation.—Virtuous simplicity of manners would have characterized the social life of the whole country.

Sect. 3. The normal political destiny of the United States.

I. Political agitations avoided. Party passions could not have arisen:—No sectional bitterness—No Tariff agitation—No Slavery excitement.—We should have been an united, harmonious people—one in interest, in aim.—Then we might have exerted an unalloyed and irresistible influence for freedom.

II. Our prosrerity perpetual. The Constitution prevents the fomentation of political agitations, by governmental action.—Our social condition would have prevented the social demoralization so dangerous to states.—Our geographical position would prevent the centralization of commerce and wealth, which generates corruption and leads to decline.

CHAPTER II.

INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IN WARPING OUR INDUSTRY.

Sect. 1. Rise of the American * System.

General depression at the close of the war with England.—Bank and Tariff as relief measures.—Bank (for obvious reasons) did not afford the desired relief:—The inflation of the currency by the Bank enhanced the cost of production, and made manufactures impracticable—Ruinous effect of an inflated currrency upon national industry.—Manufactures being impracticable, owing to the Bank, industry continues to languish, except in the South—Flourishing condition of the South, and large emigration to that section.—Efforts to force manufactures by means of a high protective Tariff.—Mr. Clay's plan of Tariff and Internal Improvements—Defeated during Monroe's administration.—The Tariff of 1824.

Sect. 2. Ruinous influence of the American system upon the development of our manufactures.

I. *The Bank and Tariff dwarfed our manufactures by locating them in New England.* The manner in which this was effected.—The West, by this means, diverted from manufactures, to supply the other sections with produce.—The disadvantages of a New England location.

II. *The Bank and Tariff dwarf our manufactures through the abnormal system they originate.*—A vast system of interchange between the sections.—Its injury to industry:—Rendering vast resources nugatory—Levying charges upon productive industry—Enhancing the scale of prices by promoting a spirit of speculation—Withdrawing a vast amount of capital and population, otherwise engaged in manufactures, and embarking them in internal traffic.

III. *The Bank and Tariff dwarf our manufactures by their own direct influence in raising the standard of prices.* The inflation of the currency an injury to productive industry.—The injurious influence of currency inflation not compensated by a Tariff:—The enhancement of prices

---

* By a latitude of expression, the phrase American System, is used as including the Bank, the Tariff, and Internal Improvements.

increases the cost of production in the ratio of the increase of prices—This causes combinations to force down labor and agricultural produce to an inadequate price.

CHAPTER III.

INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IN PERVERTING OUR SOCIAL LIFE.

SECT. 1. SOCIAL EXCITEMENT RESULTANT FROM OUR ABNORMAL, FORCED INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM.

Influence of commerce in quickening the springs of social life:—An excessive commercial activity causes abnormal social excitement.—Effect of our excessive internal traffic upon our social life:—Lowered the scale of intellect in public life—Promoted social demoralization—Abnormal state of Southern society.

SECT. 2. OPPRESSION OF THE INDUSTRIAL POPULATION, THROUGH OUR ABNORMAL INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM.

Oppression of the laboring class. Oppression of Northern labor:—The farming population—The city laborers—The factory operatives.—Oppression of Southern labor:—The poor whites—The negro population—The slave trade between the States—The severance of family ties—The subversion of the old relation existing between master and servant—Excessive exaction of labor.

CHAPTER IV.

INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IN EXCITING POLITICAL ANIMOSITIES.

SECT. I. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM, THE PROLIFIC SOURCE OF POLITICAL EVILS.

Original good-feeling between the sections.—Alarm of the South.—Tariff of 1824.—Tariff of 1828:—Extreme Southern excitement—Election of Jackson.

I. THE CONTEST OVER THE AMERICAN SYSTEM DURING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JACKSON. The balance of parties.—Tactics of the opposing factions—Jackson's policy of rotation in office:—Its ruinous effects.—Attack on the Bank of the United States.—The breach with Mr. Calhoun.—*The contest over the Tariff:*—Caution of Jackson—Nullification—The Compromise Tariff.—*Contest over the Bank:*—Jackson's motley party—Advantages of the Bank—The removal of the deposits.—Summary.—Character of Jackson.

II. Subsequent Contest over the American System. Whig triumph of 1840:—Death of Harrison prevents the definitive success of their measures—Tyler's course—Veto of Bank.—Tariff of 1842.—Election of 1844.—Tariff reduced to revenue standard.

Sect. 2. The Slavery Agitation.

Sectional animosities growing out of tariff agitation:—Anti-slavery agitation—Uneasiness of the South—Annexation of Texas—The blunder of a war with Mexico—Sectional strife over the annexed territories—Compromise of 1850—The Kansas-Nebraska Act—Anti-slavery party formed—Furious agitation—The Kansas strife—The excitability of the public mind—All moderate measures fail—Fatal termination of agitation in war.

BOOK II.

Prop. II. *Our past* violations of the Constitution *have reacted most injuriously upon* FOREIGN NATIONS: *fostering a* False Industrial System *throughout the* WORLD; *gendering dangerous* Social Evils; *and strengthening the cause of* Absolutism, *rescuing it from ruin, and giving birth to a political reaction eminently dangerous to the cause of Liberty and Advancement.*

PART I.

OUR VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION HAVE INJURED FOREIGN NATIONS BY FOSTERING A FALSE INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.

CHAPTER I.

BRITISH MONOPOLY OF COMMERCE.

Sect. 1. The Elements and Principles of Commerce.

Sect. 2. British Centralization of Commerce.

This centralization of commerce based upon our industry.—Extent of the British centralization of commerce.—Its injury to the industry of the world.

CHAPTER II.

BRITISH CENTRALIZATION OF WEALTH.

Profits of British mercantile traffic in the products of other countries.—Profits of manufactures.—The expenditure of the country—Prevalence of

economy—Balance of trade explained—Growth of all branches of British enterprise—Loans to foreign nations—Britain ruining the world—Crafty utterances of British statesmen—Crafty policy of British capitalists—British imperialism of capital—Present prosperity of the nations delusive.

PART II.

OUR VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION HAVE INJURED THE WORLD, BY GENDERING SOCIAL EVILS DANGEROUS TO CIVILIZATION.

CHAPTER I.

SOCIAL EXCITEMENT.

Origin of the prevailing social excitement.—Forms of social excitement:—No repose—Continual agitation.—*Mental Deterioration of the Age.*—The golden mean suited to the germination of Genius.—Great men of former ages.—The decay of poesy—Of oratory—Of literature—Of statesmanship.—*Socialistic mania.*—Various classes of visionaries:—Political visionaries—Social monomaniacs—Religious monomaniacs—Christian apostacy.—Menacing ruin.

CHAPTER II.

THE OPPRESSION OF POVERTY.

Necessary result of abnormal system of commerce:—The poor of all countries oppressed by it—Especially the poor of Great Britain.—GRADES OF ENGLISH SOCIETY.—Aristocracy—Middle Class—Working Class.—Suffering of the impoverished scions of Nobility—Of Middle Class—Of Working Class.—Prevalence of economy:—The Lodging-house system—Hunger—Mutual insurance—Burial customs—Petty pilfering—"Tramps"—Destitution—Poverty unpitied.—Governmental legislation:—Licensed Drunkenness—Pawnbrokers—the Poor-house system.—Class subordination.—Moral condition of English poor:—Cheating and pilfering universal—Drunkenness and crime increasing—Irreligion—Heathenism—Degraded vice.—Inadequacy of all measures of amelioration:—Only remedy the overthrow of the industrial system out of which it arises.

PART III.

OUR UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSE HAS INJURED THE WORLD POLITICALLY: STRENGTHENING ABSOLUTISM; RESCUING IT FROM RUIN; AND GIVING BIRTH TO A POLITICAL REACTION EMINENTLY DANGEROUS TO THE CAUSE OF LIBERTY AND ADVANCEMENT.

CHAPTER I.

POLITICAL CONDITION OF ENGLAND.

The British government in sympathy with Absolutism:—Not a government of the people—Rule of Aristocracy.—*Historical review*:—Origin of the House of Commons—Falls under the control of the Nobility—Reform Bill of 1832.—Object of the Whigs in framing it—A compromise.—*Whig and Tory contests.*—The balance of parties—Triumph of the Whigs in 1846—A motley party—Conservative Whigs—Liberals—Liberals hold balance of power—Administrative reforms—Reform agitation:—Demand of administrative reforms—Parliamentary reform.—*Whig and Tory intrigues.*—Both try to use Reform, to increase party strength. Tory intrigue with Liberals:—Its failure.—Whig coalition and intrigue—Failure.—Tory accession to power:—The party policy—Its certainty of success—Tory triumph definitive.—England, under Tory rule committed to Absolutism.

CHAPTER II.

POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE.

SECT. 1. GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION.

Disquieting elements of the European system.—Dynastic ambition:—Balance of Power.—Restlessness of Nationalities:—The oppressed Nationalities of Europe.

SECT. 2. CAUSES WHICH BROUGHT ABOUT THE PRESENT CONDITION OF EUROPE.

1. Conquest. 2. The Feudal system.—Feudalism.—Decline of royal authority.—(1.) *Course of events in France*:—Wars with English Plantagenets.—Increase of royal power—Consolidation of French territory—Loss of the Flemish provinces—(2.) *Course of events in England*:—Consolidation of power.—(3.) *Course of events in Germany*:—Decline of imperial authority—Nobility become sovereign princes—Rise of feudal house of Austria—Rise of feudal house of Prussia.

SECT. 3. FORCES IN CONFLICT TO OVERTHROW AND MAINTAIN THE OLD ORDER OF THINGS.

I. FIRST EPOCH: WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. Monarchs assail France—Revolution triumphant under Napoleon—The conqueror embraces the policy of Absolutism—Overthrow, by outbreak of national patriotism.

II. SECOND EPOCH: THE RULE OF ABSOLUTISM FROM 1815 TO 1848. The treaties of 1815:—Holy alliance—Russia the champion of Absolutism.—Revolutions of 1830:—Absolutism still dominant.

III. THIRD EPOCH: THE SUCCESSFUL AGGRESSION OF FRENCH PROGRESSIVE IDEAS FROM 1848 to 1866. (1.) *First Period: The Revolutionary outburst.*—French Revolution of 1848:—Agitations throughout Europe—Timidity of France—Supremacy of British influence—Suppression of popular ebullitions.—Policy of Napoleon III for restoring the Nationality.—Policy of the despots.—(2.) *Second Period: Napoleon emerges from isolation.*—Russian ambition:—Crimean war.—(3.) *Third Period: Napoleon's Restoration of Italian Nationality.*—Preliminary measures—Victor Emanuel's intrigues—Austrian menace—Napoleon's intervention—Italian war—Napoleon's cautious policy—Results of the war—Conquest of Naples.—Italian excitement against Austria—Napoleon's treaty respecting Rome.—German war:—Cession of Venetia. (4.) *The Napoleonic programme for effecting the national unity of Germany.* German agitation upon the Holstein-Schleswig question:—Interference of the German Diet—Intervention of Prussia and Austria—Danish war—Napoleon's policy.—Ambition of Prussia:—Opposed by all the German states—Favored by Napoleon.—Russo-Italian alliance.—Napoleon's programme.—German war:—Prussian triumph—Intervention of France—Treaty of peace.

CHAPTER III.

FOURTH EPOCH IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN ABSOLUTISM AND PROGRESS: THE IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM.

SECT. 1. THE FORCES AT WORK IN EUROPE.

I. THE IMPENDING OUTBREAK OF THE NATIONALITIES.—Germany progressing toward revolution.—Causes which inspire National enthusiasm.—Effect of German outbreak—Universal revolution.

II. THE POLICY OF ABSOLUTISM:—To establish the unity of Germany under Prussia.—Russia committed to this policy—(1.) By a wish to avert revolution:—Absolutism then safe from revolution. (2.) By ambition:—Will of Peter the Great—Past Russian policy—Its Austrian

alliance—Its French alliance—Its Prussian alliance.—Danger to Europe of this coalition.

III. The Present Posture of Affairs. Prussian policy:—Its absolutist principles—Coerced by Napoleon.—Ruinous effect of Tory ascendancy in England.—Preparations for war.—Dangerous ascendancy of Absolutism.

Sect. 2. The Impending Struggle; and the Triumph of Absolutism. Certainty of an approaching struggle.—Understanding between Russia and Prussia:—The aims of this alliance—The Tory Government of England a party to the understanding—Its devotion to Absolutism.—Craft of the despots:—Their ostensible aim the union of Germany.—The contest imminent.—The attitude of England fatal to the Liberal cause:—The triumph of Absolutism assured—Napoleon overmatched.—The despots will abuse victory:—France overrun—Britain subjugated—War with America.—Universal dominion a necessity to despotism—Its practicability.

BOOK III.

THE CRISIS.

Prop. III. The present is a CRISIS *in which the Government of the* United States *may, by* a wise and conservative policy, *enable Our* COUNTRY *to enter upon a course of* Unexampled Prosperity; *and exert an influence upon* FOREIRN AFFAIRS *that will arrest the* Industrial and Political Evils *now menacing the World with ruin: But where an ill-advised policy will involve the* COUNTRY *in* Financial Ruin; *and suffer the* WORLD *to drift, without restraint, into a* Chaos of convulsion, *threatening with overthrow the cause of* Human Advancement.

INTRODUCTION.—THE CRISIS.

Dangers on every hand:—Industrial—Social—Political.—All have their origin in British centralization of industry:—This causes industrial evils—Social evils—Political dangers.—Necessity of its overthrow:—This the only remedy for all evils.—We alone can do it.—Means of effecting it:—We must monopolize the cotton manufacture.

PART I.

THE SITUATION; AND ITS CAUSES.

CHAPTER I.

A RESUME. Review of the line of causation thus far traced.—First Line of causation.—Second line.—Third.—Fourth.—Fifth.—Sixth.—Seventh.

CHAPTER II.

EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR—1. NEGATIVE EVILS.

SECT. 1. THE INFLUENCE OF THE OVER-SUPPLY OF THE COTTON MARKET UPON THE INSTITUTION OF SLAVERY.

I. EFFECT UPON SLAVERY IN THE BORDER STATES. Effect upon slavery in Maryland and Virginia.—Effect in Kentucky and Missouri.

II. EFFECT UPON SLAVERY IN THE COTTON STATES. The extinction of slavery inevitable from two causes:—The want of space for slave plantations—The want of sufficient demand for slave products.

SECT. 2. THE EFFECT OF THE SUPPLY OF THE COTTON MARKET UPON OUR MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY.

The West, the seat of manufactures:—Its superior advantages—Britain unable to compete.—The United States the manufacturers for the world.—Blessings of this:—To ourselves—To the world.

CHAPTER III.

EVIL RESULTS OF THE WAR: Continued.—2. POSITIVE EVILS.

SEC. 1. THE WAR HAS ENABLED ENGLAND TO FORTIFY HER CENTRALIZATION OF INDUSTRY.

The production of cotton in new fields:—Danger of their superseding the South.—Their advantages:—Brazil—The countries around the Mediterranean—Egypt—India.—Danger of our losing the cotton production.

SECT. 2. THE WAR HAS WEAKENED US.

I. BY DEVASTATION OF THE SOUTH AND PROSTRATION OF SOUTHERN INDUSTRY.

II. BY THE NATIONAL DEBT IT HAS ACCUMULATED.

III. BY SEATING THE LATITUDINARIAN CONSTRUCTIONISTS FIRMLY IN POWER.

CHAPTER IV.

POSITIVE EVILS. Continued.—RUINOUS RADICAL POLICY.

SECT 3. POLICY OF RADICALS, SUBVERSIVE OF REPUBLICANISM.

I. ESTABLISHING A CENTRALIZATION. Reaction against them in the North.—Their aim to subject the South.—They crush all opposition:—Intimidation of Executive—Of Supreme Court—Subversion of State Governments—

Confiscation—Universal negro suffrage—Elections in all the States to be controlled by Federal bayonets—Subversion of the Constitution.—Combination of New England manufacturers and Southern negroes.—Sway of a faction imminent.—Rule of the sword.—Danger of the West.

II. RADICALISM—LIKE ALL CENTRALIZATIONS—ADMINISTERS THE GOVERNMENT IN THE INTERESTS OF ITS TWO CONSTITUENCIES,—THE SOUTHERN NEGRO, AND THE NORTHERN CAPITALIST: TO THE RUIN OF THE NATIONAL INDUSTRY; AND THE OPPRESSION OF THE NORTHERN INDUSTRIAL CLASS.—*They are ruining the country in the desire to court the Negro.*—Demoralization of Southern labor—Class antagonisms fomented—Radical emissaries—Vagrancy promoted—Confiscation promised.—This misrule ruining the country. 2. *Their Revenue System is ruining the country for the benefit of the Northern Capitalist.*—Reckless appropriations.—Extravagant expenditure.—Odious and unjust revenue system:—Taxes levied exclusively upon industry and the laboring class—The tariff a bonus to the capitalist.—Oppression of industry:—Oppression of the laboring class—Reduplicated taxation of the poor.

SECT. 2. RADICAL SYSTEM OF FINANCE IS PROMOTING AN EXCESSIVE RISE OF PRICES, AND IS RUINING OUR PRODUCTIVE INDUSTRY.

I. RISE OF PRICES—Caused by:—Inflation of currency—Oppressive Tariff—Ruinous system of internal taxation.—Operation of these causes.

II. THE INFLATION OF PRICES RUINOUS OF EVERY BRANCH OF PRODUCTIVE INDUSTRY. *It oppresses every industrial class:*—The capitalists engaged in mechanical production—The agriculturist—The laboring class.—The inflation of prices is ruining our productive industry:—Our manufactures unable to compete with foreign industry—Our shipbuilding interest almost annihilated—Improvements stopped—Our agriculture depressed—Breadstuff trade declined—The growth of cotton unprofitable—Will be abandoned.—We cannot compete with foreign industry—Policy of the Radicals ruining the country.—Carlyle.

PART II.

OUR TRUE POLICY.—ITS ADVANTAGES.—ITS NECESSITY.

CHAPTER I.

OUR TRUE POLICY.—OUR OBJECT—TO WREST THE COTTON MANUFACTURE FROM GREAT BRITAIN.

SECT. 1. MEASURES NECESSARY TO PROMOTE THE GROWTH AND MANUFACTURE OF COTTON.

I. MEASURES NECESSARY TO MAKE THE GROWTH AND MANUFACTURE OF COTTON SAFE BRANCHES OF BUSINESS. *A reliable Labor System for the South.*—

Negro labor adapted to cotton culture.—The indolence of the race:—Negroes in Jamaica—South America—St. Domingo—Our Northern States—These instances not a fair test.—Superior advantages of negro in the South.—Ruinous policy of the Radicals:—Its influence upon the negro population—Their demoralization.—A change of policy necessary.

II. Measures necessary to make the Growth and Manufacture of Cotton profitable. Two ways of making a business profitable: to increase the price of commodities; or to diminish the cost of production.—The price of commodities limited by British competition—We must diminish the cost of production. 1. *The first essential to cheap manufactures is the location of our manufactories in the West.*—Advantages of the West over New England.—State aid. 2. *The prime essential to cheap production is the reduction of the entire rate of prices prevailing in the country.*—To this end.—(1.) *We must remodel the Tariff, and change altogether our system of protection:*—Objections answered.—Full discussion deferred.—(2.) *The public revenue should be raised chiefly by a tax upon property.*—Justice of a property tax.—Expediency of a property tax:—It will embark capital in productive industry—It will tend to lower the standard of prices.—(3.) *The excessive issues of Paper Money must be withdrawn from circulation, and a Specie Currency or its Equivalent* be established.—[1.] The *necessity* of establishing a specie currency:—All measures useless without it.—Errors confuted. [2.] Measures necessary for the establishment of a Specie Currency—A bank note currency objectionable—A specie currency or its equivalent essential.—Difficulties of our position:—Specie drain—For interest—For commercial balance;—The National Banks.—The proposed plan:—Its freedom of objection—Its advantages.—3. *We should give peculiar advantages to our cotton interest.*—Cotton lands and factories should be exempt from taxation.

Sect. 2. Measures necessary to prevent Great Britain from destroying our Cotton Industry.

I. Financial Measures necessary for Self-Protection. 1. *We must stop the exportation of Specie.*—Our immense exportation of specie—Its ruinous influence—The basis of English prosperity.—2. *We must forbid the further exportation of bonds:*—The balance of trade against us—Rapid exportation of bonds—$1,450,000,000 now abroad.

II. The Government must Regulate our Commerce with Foreign Nations. 1. *Change of the Warehouse System necessary.* 2. *A Discriminating Tariff against England necessary.*—Constitutionality of such a Tariff.—Justice of such a Tariff:—British selfish policy—Her Tariff against our industry.—Expediency of such a tariff:—A general Tariff nugatory—Discriminative tariff effective against British competition.

CHAPTER II.

BENEFITS OF THIS POLICY.

SECT. 1. THE RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF OUR MANUFACTURES WOULD SOON WREST THE COMMERCIAL SUPREMACY FROM ENGLAND.

I. FIRST ERA: ADVANTAGES OF OUR MANUFACTURES IN OUR OWN MARKET UNDER THE MEASURES PROPOSED.—Little foreign competition.—Cotton manufacture.—Its benefits to other branches of manufacture.

II. SECOND ERA: ADVANTAGES OF OUR MANUFACTURES IN THE MARKETS OF THE WORLD.—Superiority of the West:—Cheaper raw material—Cheaper labor—Cheaper provisions—Lower taxes—A lower scale of profits.

SECT. 2. ADVANTAGES OF OUR INDUSTRIAL SUPREMACY.

I. ADVANTAGES TO OURSELVES.—*Industrial benefits:*—Benefit to agriculture—Breadstuffs—Cotton.—Benefits to the West—The East.—*Social advantages:*—Tranquillity—Elevation of labor.—*Political benefits:*—No sectional antagonisms—No bickerings respecting constitutional interpretation.

II. ADVANTAGES TO THE WORLD. 1. *Advantages derived to Industry.* The overthrow of British centralization—Fair commercial principles.—We should benefit the world by establishing free trade:—Free trade impossible with British monopoly—Our commerce a blessing.—We should stimulate the industry of the Tropics:—Vast consumption of tropical luxuries.—2. *Benefits to social life:*—Excitement quelled—Elevation of labor—3. *Political benefits:*—The dangers from Absolutism averted.

CHAPTER III.

RUINOUS CONSEQUENCES OF OUR PRESENT POLICY.

SECT. 1. THE RUIN OF AMERICA.

I. THE POLITICAL RUIN OF THE COUNTRY. 1. *The political ruin of the South:*—Negro rule—Confiscation—Ruin of the negro population. 2. *Political ruin of the West:*—Subjection to New England—Negro bayonets—Dr. Bacon's views—Daniel Webster—Danger of convulsions.

II. THE INDUSTRIAL RUIN OF THE COUNTRY. Overthrow of Southern industry:—Loss of the cotton planting.—Destruction of the export and import trade.—Depopulation of cities.—Stagnation of agriculture.—Ruin of the shipping interest.—Extravagance.

III. THE SOCIAL RUIN OF THE COUNTRY.—Social demoralization:—Corruption in public life—Demoralization in the South—In the North—The laboring poor.—Danger of social convulsion.

SECT. 2. THE RUIN OF CHRISTENDOM.

The political reaction in Europe.—The Tory policy.—The Luxemburg imbroglio.—The coming conflict.—Overthrow of Liberalism.—This the World's Crisis.

INTRODUCTION.

The attention of the student of history is frequently arrested by crises in human progress, which give to events a new direction, and prove the pivots on which advancement hinges.

The great eras of history usually have their origin in revolution, and give birth to new forms of social order, which continue until the movement of the age, progressing toward a new era, hastens their decline. In each successive era some nation is the recognized leader in the career of progress. The circle of its influence is all-embracing; its policy determines the course of events; either diffusing blessings by its wisdom and beneficence, or wrecking progress by its blunders, and spreading desolation and ruin by its crimes.

The influence of the country that leads the march of advancement is most potent in one of those crises when an era is approaching its close. The periods of transition, when the scepter is passing from the grasp that has long swayed it, to the hands of a young and vigorous nation, are especially pregnant with destiny to the world. Our age is such a transition period.

The Europe of the Middle Ages is rapidly passing away. Feudalism, with its singular mingling of tyranny and freedom, is worn out, and has, for three-quarters of a century, been convulsing Europe with the throes of approaching dissolution. Two hostile principles are struggling for the supremacy, each ambitious of seizing the scepter falling from the palsied grasp of Feudalism. On the one hand is Liberal Monarchy, seeking to combine the principles of monarchy and republicanism, vesting in the people all legislative authority, while the executive functions are exercised by an hereditary sovereign. On the other, is Absolute Despotism, aiming to crush the liberal aspirations of the age by military force, and re-establish Absolutism unalloyed by admixture with freedom.

The struggle between these two principles has been progressing for three-quarters of a century. The crisis of this struggle is now

rapidly approaching, which will finally decide whether Europe shall be ruled by Liberal government, or by unmixed Despotism, flushed with victory, and aspiring to universal dominion. The next few years will determine this question so pregnant with destiny to the world. The present is the most important crisis that has ever occurred in the history of nations.

The conflicting principles are even now arraying their forces for the final and decisive conflict. The balance of power and of influence rests with our own country. If we are true to ourselves and to our destiny, our weight in the doubtful scale will determine the issue in favor of advancement. If we continue the policy which has of late years marked our national existence, we shall continue to be a cipher in the list of nations, and Absolutism will triumph in the impending struggle, dominate Europe with autocratic sway, and menace our country with the power of the combined world. The political and industrial policy of the United States, in the present exigency, will determine the destiny of the world for ages to come. We are now in THE WORLD'S CRISIS.

It will be the aim of the following pages to show that the past policy of our country has been destructive of our own best interests, and has brought the nations of Christendom into a condition dangerous to enlightened progress; that it has marred our own industrial and political destiny, has warped the industry of the world, and retarded the political advancement of the nations, until a crisis has risen which threatens to prostrate mankind beneath the sway of Despotism; and that, if the operation of the same causes be continued yet a little longer, the financial ruin of our own country will be consummated, and Despotism will dominate Europe with absolute sway, and force us to engage in a long and doubtful struggle for liberty and religion.

The subject will be discussed under the following propositions:

PROPOSITION I.

The Government of the UNITED STATES *has, throughout almost its entire career, maintained* A SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION *in violation of* THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION: *With the effect upon* HOME AFFAIRS OF TARNISHING THE NATIONAL HONOR;

dwarfing our INDUSTRIAL PROSPERITY; *warping our* SOCIAL LIFE; *and plunging the country into frightful* POLITICAL EVILS.

PROPOSITION II.

These past VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION *have reacted most injuriously upon Foreign Nations: fostering a false* INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM *throughout the World; gendering dangerous* SOCIAL EVILS; *and strengthening the cause of* ABSOLUTISM, *rescuing it from ruin, and giving birth to a political reaction eminently dangerous to the cause of Liberty and Advancement.*

PROPOSITION III.

THE PRESENT IS A CRISIS *in which the Government of the United States may, by a wise and conservative policy, enable the country to enter upon a course of* UNEXAMPLED PROSPERITY; *and exert an influence upon* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *that will arrest the* INDUSTRIAL AND POLITICAL EVILS *now menacing the World with ruin:* BUT WHERE AN *ill-advised policy will involve the* COUNTRY *in* FINANCIAL RUIN; *and suffer the* WORLD *to drift without restraint into a* CHAOS OF CONVULSION, *threatening with overthrow the cause of* HUMAN ADVANCEMENT.

The foregoing propositions attribute to the United States a most important influence upon the destinies of the world. Though Americans are obnoxious to the charge of national vanity, yet very many will, no doubt, be disposed to withhold credence from propositions which seem to declare our country the great world-radiating center of influence.

Before entering upon the discussion of these propositions, we will prepare the way by an Introductory Dissertation.

INTRODUCTORY DISSERTATION,

THE UNITED STATES A NATION OF PROVIDENCE.

The facts which demonstrate our country to be the favored instrument of a benign Providence, are so numerous and striking, as to arrest the attention of every thoughtful student of our history. At the close of the Revolutionary war, a philosophic observer of our career must have been impressed with the thought that a country, whose past history presented such signal marks of divine favor and protection, was destined to some great work. Only subsequent events, however, developing more clearly the sphere of our influence, marked us the predestined leader of the nations in the path of Republican Liberty.

The two following chapters will be devoted to the development of the remarkable circumstances in our career which point us out as destined to an exalted influence upon the course of future events.

CHAPTER I.

FORESHADOWINGS OF AN EXALTED DESTINY.

Section I.—The Circumstances of the Colonization of America.

Among the many facts which point to the United States as a favored nation of Providence, destined to exert a powerful influence upon the destinies of the world, not the least remarkable are the circumstances attending the planting of the Colonies upon the American coast.

The two great events of modern times—the Discovery of America, and the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century—filled the same generation with astonishment. The nations of Northern Europe were so profoundly agitated by the great Religious movement, that they gave little heed to the new career of discovery opened to the enterprise of the Old World. The preponderant power of the Papal nations of Southern Europe, and their aggressive temper, occupied the Protestant states with measures of self-defense, to the exclusion of commercial enterprise. For nearly a century, the Papal states enjoyed a monopoly of Colonial enterprise, and were busily engaged taking possession of the newly-discovered regions of the Eastern and Western hemispheres. While the Portuguese turned their attention to the East Indies, America became the theater of French and Spanish enterprise.

It is remarkable that the adventurers of those nations were turned aside from the most valuable regions in the New World, leaving it for the colonization of Protestant races. They were impatient of immediate returns. The mineral wealth of the Tropics tempted the Spaniards far to the southward; the French traders were attracted to the inhospitable shores of the St. Lawrence, and the frozen lakes of the North, by the abundant peltries of the natives. Between the Colonies of the two adventurous nations lay a broad wilderness tract, stretching from the Lakes to the Gulf of

Mexico, unoccupied by either, except a feeble colony of each upon its extreme Southern border.

The declaration that this territory remained unoccupied because it was the finest region on the continent, may seem paradoxical—yet such was the fact. The immediate commercial advantages sought by these adventurers, were found in the luxurious productions of the Tropics, and the furs of the frozen regions. For these commodities Europe afforded a ready market. The intermediate region, blessed with the same salubrious climate as Europe, was adapted only to the productions of the temperate zone. Of these, the teeming soil of Europe yielded an abundant supply. Adventurers turned aside to the frozen zone and the tropics, for whose productions they found an European market, and for almost a century the finest region in America lay an unexplored wilderness.

The world-roving avarice of the Spaniard, indeed, penetrated its wilds in search of gold; but the disasters of De Soto, and the repulse of Ponce de Leon, warned them away to regions more enticing to avarice, and less vigorously defended by native courage. The attempts of Spain to effect a lodgment upon the Carolina coast, and to establish a colony in Georgia, were frustrated in a manner strikingly providential.

Thus did Providence reserve the chosen land for nobler colonists than swarms of bigoted, avaricious adventurers. The region remained unoccupied until the Papal nations, having spent their energies in commercial enterprise, and wasted their strength in bootless religious wars, suffered the Protestant states to rest in peace. The wilderness between the Lakes and the Gulf was now the only region open to their occupation. So little inducement, however, did it offer to commercial enterprise, that few were willing to forsake the comforts of civilization for a waste, peopled by daring savages, and yielding no products marketable in the Old World. A single colony (Virginia), formed on the coast, served to establish the claim of England, and to display, in the ruin of its founder, and the abject misery of the settlers, the hopelessness of the colonization enterprise. The country remained unsought, until intolerance in Protestant countries rendered necessary an asylum for the objects of religious persecution. Then the desert region, from which

Papal adventurers turned aside, remained the only place of refuge; and the Frank and the Scandinavian, the Hollander and the Briton, the Norman, the Saxon, the Celt, all fled to the asylum of persecuted virtue. The Scotch Covenanter and the French Huguenot, the Welsh Baptist and the English Quaker, the Swedish Lutheran and the Dutch Calvinist—all fugitives for conscience' sake—mingled with the Puritan and the Episcopalian, each flying in turn from the persecution of the other. All planted their colonies, side by side, on the desert coast.

The first settlers of other countries, both in ancient and modern times, have been adventurers in search of wealth, or expatriated criminals and degraded beings gladly spared at home. The emigrants to America alone were composed of the best material of their respective countries. Only the courageous would brave the dangers of new settlements surrounded by treacherous savages. Only generous spirits could so appreciate the blessings of freedom as to prefer the hardships and self-denial of the free wilderness, to the comparative ease they left behind, in lands of intolerance and oppression. Only deep piety and sterling independence of character would have foregone all advantages of worldly position for the sake of civil and religious liberty.

The same commercial disadvantages of a temperate climate and productions similar to those of Europe, which reserved the region for the exiles of persecution, preserved the hardy virtues of the colonists during the entire Colonial era. The Colonies had no extraneous advantages to force their growth. Colonial life was an existence of patriarchal simplicity. There was little inducement to enterprise, no opening for speculation. The country attracted few adventurers in search of wealth—the severe, even stern character of the colonists repelled the dissipated and the frivolous. The growth of the Colonies was slow; the virtue of their inhabitants was preserved by the ordeal of hardship and danger. During a century and a half they slowly developed from infancy to vigorous adolescence. Their development was sufficiently rapid for healthy growth, but slow enough to prevent the hardy virtues of poverty from being supplanted by the hot vices of prosperity. The people were the healthy growth of a temperate clime—neither stunted by

wintry poverty, nor forced into the rank, noxious growth of tropical luxuriance. Only such a people—too poor for luxury, but rich enough for hardy independence—were fitted to meet the great crisis they were approaching,—to emerge triumphant from the sufferings of an unequal struggle, and to plant deep and enduring the pillars of Constitutional Liberty.

Sect. II.—The Revolutionary War.

The footprints of Providence are distinctly visible in our war of Independence—both in the preparatory era, and in the fluctuations of the conflict.

(I.) The Preparatory Era.

Twenty years before the American Revolution, a successful revolt would have been impossible.

In the middle of the Eighteenth Century, the English Colonists were eminently loyal to the British crown. Nothing seemed more improbable than an attempt to free themselves from the sway of the mother country.

If the attempt seemed in the highest degree improbable, its success appeared a manifest impossibility. The colonists were destitute of the martial spirit, and of military training; their mutual isolation, varied only with antagonisms, rendered them incapable of concerted action.

Even the removal of these disabilities would not have rendered successful revolt more practicable. The united strength of the Colonies was wholly inadequate to a contest with the power of Britain. Foreign aid seemed hopeless. France, Spain, and England were the three great Colonial Powers of Europe. France and Spain were the only maritime Powers that could render any assistance to the Colonies in a struggle with England. But their Colonial policy rendered their interest identical with that of Britain. Self-interest must have induced both those powers to discountenance any Colonial revolt, which, however it might weaken a rival, was a precedent to be imitated by their own dependencies.

To bring about successful revolution, it was necessary that the Colonies should be brought into concerted action, animated with martial ardor, and inspired with confidence by military training, and

the consciousness of their united strength; that events should take such a turn as to influence the two great Colonial Powers, France and Spain, to lend their aid to the revolted Colonies of Britain; and finally, all things being prepared for the result, that the Colonies, remarkable for their loyalty, should be driven into revolt.

All these ends were effected by the Old French War, the grand prelude to the Revolution, and which may be termed the cradle of Independence.

Pressed by the necessities of the contest, England was compelled to abandon the astute policy which suffered the military spirit of the Colonies to slumber. She was forced to summon them to her assistance, and rely on their active co-operation for the success of her arms on the American continent. The feeble efforts put forth by England, and the inefficiency of the royal commanders and troops, caused the colonists to depreciate the prowess of the Mother Country; while the efficiency of the Colonial auxiliaries served to exaggerate their estimate of their own power. Their awakened martial ardor, and the consciousness of new found vigor, roused their courage to a pitch that would, upon occasion, nerve them for a contest with the power of Britain.

In this war also the public eye was attracted to the great qualities of Washington. And the only British general whose promptitude and ardor might have crushed the incipient revolt of the Colonies, fell in the arms of victory on the heights of Quebec.

In this war, moreover, Great Britain stripped France of her American possessions, and thus reversed the policy of her great colonial rival. The motive was removed, that would have secured to Britain the sympathy, and, perhaps, the assistance of France, in a struggle with revolted Colonies, and that power was inspired with the jealous desire of humbling, in every possible manner, the too aspiring supremacy of her ancient rival. The ascendancy acquired by Britain in this war awakened the jealousy of Europe. Spain, in the hope of curbing her imperial aspirations, was influenced to act in opposition to the principles of her own Colonial policy, and was ready to unite with France, in virtue of a family alliance, to aid the Colonies in their struggle for independence.

When everything was thus prepared for a successful revolution,

the haughty Aristocracy which ruled the government of Britain began, with singular blindness, a course of oppression which alienated the affections of the Colonies, and gradually prepared them for revolt. Conceiving that they ought to share the burdens of a a war from which they derived great advantages, they proceeded to levy taxes upon them at the will of Parliament. Taxation without representation was the system of Roman Imperialism, by which the Provinces were made to bear the exclusive burdens of public administration. A system which would have converted Britain into a military empire, swayed by an aristocracy as haughty as that of Rome, occasioned much discontent. Appeals for redress, beginning in humble petition, and progressing to remonstrance, first calm and then indignant, were made in vain. The policy of the British aristocracy at length outwearied the patience of the Colonies, converted their devoted loyalty into resentment, and led to outbreaks of popular violence, and finally to systematic revolt.

II. The War of Independence.

Never were combatants more unequally matched, than in the American War of Independence.

The British officer who boasted that with five regiments he would march through the Colonies, quelling all opposition, undervalued the courage of the Americans. But no military man, in view of the position and comparative resources of the belligerents, would have believed that the Colonies could offer any continued resistance to the power of England. Imperial power, against Colonial dependence—sixteen millions, against three—unlimited resources, against barrenness of wealth and all material of war—disciplined soldiers, against raw militia—seemed to render the idea of a successful struggle improbable in the highest degree.

Even the extent of territory, so far from being advantageous to the Colonies, as has sometimes been supposed, was an important advantage to the invader. The sparsely-peopled territory, and the impracticable roads, rendered supplies difficult of obtainment for the Americans. The immense distances to be traversed, embarrassed all military operations of our army, whose movements were embarrassed with inefficient wagon trains; while the British, mas-

ters of the sea, might transfer their operations from point to point at will, availing themselves of the numerous deep bays to penetrate the narrow settlements wherever they chose, and every where finding an abundant source of supplies in their fleet.

The Continental troops were never equal to the British veterans in the open field. They were never able, at any period of the war, to prevent the invaders from traversing the country at will. With their superiority in resources, in position, and in the discipline of their troops, the British leaders had only to conduct their movements upon some intelligent plan, steadily adhered to, and the subjugation of the Colonies was not of difficult achievement.

Three plans were open to adoption. The simplest in design, and easiest of execution, was a march across New England from Boston to New York, driving the Continental forces before them, and suppressing resistance in their rear by military posts to keep the country in subjection. Their command of the sea would have enabled them to force a retreat by flank movements from the Sound in rear of the American forces; but even before an attack in front, Washington must have retreated from Boston, as he was afterward forced to do from New York. New England paralyzed, the other Colonies could have offered but a feeble resistance; and a southward march from New York would have reduced the disheartened insurgents to submission in a single campaign.

A movement from the extreme Southern Colonies would have been equally effectual. No resistance worthy of the name could have been made south of Virginia; New England would not have cooperated heartily at a point so remote from her borders; the royal authority would have been restored in the Southern states, almost without resistance. Then the Middle states, discouraged, and overawed by assaults from the South, and from the deep bays on the seaboard, must soon have been overrun. Then New England, standing unsupported, and vital at every point, could have made no prolonged resistance.

The third plan was to pierce the Colonies at some point, so as to dissever them, and then subdue the detached portions in detail. No force of the Americans could have prevented the British commander from seizing and fortifying the line of the Hudson, when either

New England, or the Middle states might have been overrun in detail, without the possibility of concentrating the Colonial forces for the common defense.

The British commander first made Boston his base of operations. But intimidated by the skirmish at Lexington, and the defense of Bunker Hill, he suffered himself to be cooped up in the town, for months, by an army destitute of ammunition, and was at length forced to evacuate the place. The next Spring, when the arrival of large reinforcements had given Lord Howe an overwhelming superiority of force, instead of resuming the enterprise from the original base, the British commander resolved to transfer the seat of war to New York. This decision was an abandonment of the first, and best plan of overrunning the Colonies. It proved the salvation of America; for if Washington had been driven from Boston as disastrously as he afterward was from New York, the catastrophe must have proved fatal to the American cause. Lexington and Bunker Hill saved America by their effect upon the minds of the invader.

In abandoning the first plan of overrunning the Colonies by a march across New England from Boston, Lord Howe adopted the plan of piercing them on the line of the Hudson, with a view to their subjugation in detail. The vicinity of the point to Canada, and the ease with which it might be held by a line of posts, determined their choice. This was the plan of campaign for 1776. With it was combined a movement against the Southern states. The loyalists were numerous in North Carolina, and were ready to rise in arms upon the appearance of a British force upon the coast. A powerful force was to be sent to occupy North Carolina, paralyze the Colonies to the South, and move against Virginia at the head of the loyal strength of the Southern Colonies.

The plan was a good one.

But the movement against the South failed through the prevalence of contrary winds! The loyalists of North Carolina, weary of awaiting the arrival of the expected British fleet, rose in arms; and the expedition arrived on the coast only in time to witness the suppression of the movement. Disappointed here, the British fleet turned their arms against South Carolina. Charleston was protected

only by a fort at the entrance of the harbor. This fort passed, the city had no alternative but surrender. But instead of passing the fort into the open harbor, as might easily have been done, the fleet engaged it and were eventually repulsed. Thus, by a series of mishaps and blunders, the campaign of 1776, against the Southern states, resulted in total failure.

The same prevalence of contrary winds, which frustrated the campaign against the South, prevented the complete success of the British movements upon the Hudson. The arrival of reinforcements was delayed so long that the campaign was not opened until the last of August.

The first movements of the British were completely successful. Washington was driven from Long Island, and compelled to retreat from New York, narrowly escaping capture, and the broken remnant of his army was forced to retreat precipitately across New Jersey.

The retreat of Washington left the Hudson open, and the British had only to ascend it, take possession of the heights, and the object of the campaign was accomplished, and the Colonies hopelessly severed.

But their easy triumph tempted them to turn aside from the prime object of the campaign. Neglecting to seize the heights of the Hudson, the British pressed in pursuit of the American army across the Jerseys, in the hope of annihilating it, and terminating the war at a blow. Had the campaign commenced two months earlier, they might have succeeded, and the flight of Washington across the Jerseys, vigorously pressed, might have resulted in the disbanding of his army. But the advance of winter arrested the operations of the enemy, and afforded Washington the opportunity to strike the blows of Trenton and Princeton, and to move with impunity upon the line of British advance—events which raised the declining hopes of the Colonies, and encouraged them to prepare with vigor for the campaign of 1777.

Withdrawn from their design of seizing the line of the Hudson by the inviting prospect of utterly crushing the fugitive army of Washington, when this aim had failed, it was clearly the policy of the British commander to resume, in 1777, the design of the pre-

vious campaign, and bend all his energies to the accomplishment of the plan of penetrating the country along the line of the Hudson. This was the plan of campaign devised by the British Ministry, and General Burgoyne was sent to Canada with a fine army, to co-operate with Howe by descending from Canada to meet the British army ascending the Hudson from New York. These combined operations seemed to menace the Colonies with almost inevitable ruin.

But, with a fatuity that looks like judicial blindness, Howe, instead of moving up the Hudson to co-operate with Burgoyne, at the moment when that general began his southward march from Canada, left New York, abandoning the movement on the line of the Hudson, and transferred his army to the Chesapeake for a movement upon Philadelphia. He was successful, as might have been expected. He beat the American army in every encounter, and took possession of Philadelphia. But his blows were not aimed at a vital point; and while he was winning barren victories, Burgoyne was left to execute alone the grand operation of the campaign on which the success of the contest depended.

With ordinary celerity of movement, Burgoyne might have reached New York, and achieved, at least in part, the objects of the campaign. But his dilatory march gave the militia time to rally in his front; the defeat of detachments, injudiciously exposed to disaster, encouraged raw troops to resist his veterans; and his blunder in crossing to the right bank of the Hudson allowed the Americans to check his march, and enabled them finally to capture his army.

Thus two of the plans for the subjugation of the American Colonies miscarried through the blundering incapacity of the British generals. They were almost always successful in the field, but victory only enticed them into injudicious situations, and exposed them to disasters worse than would have resulted from defeat. Their superiority of strength was frittered away in purposeless enterprises.

But superiority of force, however unskillfully directed, must press with crushing weight upon the feebler combatant. The blundering prowess of the British repeatedly reduced the Americans to extremities, from which they escaped so narrowly, and by chances so singular, that we must regard them as providential interventions.

In the first place, if the British had remained in Boston until reinforcements arrived, they must have driven Washington from Boston and across New England, as they afterward drove him from New York and across the Jerseys. Such an event must have been fatal to the American cause. The course of events which issued in their evacuation of the place, and the consequent abandonment of their original plan of operations, was singular in the extreme. They were besieged in Boston for months by an army destitute of powder, and, strange to say, never felt the position of their inactive adversaries by a sally. And when Washington, having received reinforcements, took possession of Dorchester Heights, a storm arose, to suspend the attack of the enemy until the works were rendered too strong to be assaulted—leaving them no alternative but to evacuate the city.

But it is especially remarkable how their campaign of 1776, which threatened the colonies with ruin, was thwarted by contrary winds. The Southern campaign miscarried from this cause, and their victories in the North were rendered fruitless by the delay thus caused in opening the campaign. The circumstances attending the retreat of the beaten army of Washington from Long Island are especially remarkable. The prevalence of a northeast wind prevented the British fleet, for two days, from entering the bay, and cutting off the retreat of the Americans across the bay to New York. The same wind, which prevented the entrance of the British vessels, was unfavorable to the retreat of the Americans from their dangerous position. But when they were ready to execute the movement, the wind suddenly veered round to a favorable quarter; a dense fog—extraordinary at the season of the year—vailed their embarkation; and a loyalist, who sought to convey to the enemy intelligence of the movement, was detained, upon his arrrival at their camp, by a Hessian guard who could not understand his eager statements, until it was too late to prevent the escape of the army. The retreat of the army from New York Island might have been easily intercepted; but the strange delay of the enemy allowed Washington to extricate himself, though by the narrowest chance. A few days after, the dispirited army lay in the grasp of Howe at White Plains; but incessant rains came on, which compelled the British general to

defer his intended attack, and gave Washington an opportunity to retire to a stronger position. When, later in the campaign, Washington was driven across the Delaware with the broken remnants of his army, and a single effort would have enabled the enemy to cross the river, and complete the overthrow of the American cause in the dispersion of the little army which alone sustained it, the advanced season induced the British to wait the freezing of the stream—a delay which resulted in the subsequent turn of fortune that robbed the British of the fruits of all their victories.

Washington availed himself of the respite to summon to his standard the forces left on the Hudson, without which he was too weak to strike a blow. General Lee, however, who commanded that detachment, instead of promptly obeying orders and advancing to the aid of Washington, was meditating some rash adventure, when the fortunate capture of his person by the British placed Sullivan in command of his army, who promptly effected a junction with the commander-in-chief, and enabled him to take the offensive against the extended British cantonments, and electrify the public mind by the brilliant success of Trenton. Soon afterward Washington was placed in a position of supreme peril: the Delaware River was in his rear, and the superior army of Cornwallis in his front, separated only by an insignificant stream. It was impossible to hold his position, and seemed equally impossible to move his army through muddy winter roads. A sudden freeze enabled him to move round the position of the enemy, and make that bold march which rescued his army, and saved the cause of Independence.

These providential events, together with the failure of Howe to co-operate with Burgoyne—the slow movements, and the injudicious route of the latter general—and the failure of Clinton to move to his relief while waiting reinforcements from England, caused the failure of the British arms in two campaigns, which, according to every human probability, ought to have issued in the overthrow of the American cause.

The capture of Burgoyne's army encouraged France and Spain to intervene in behalf of the Colonies. Still, so great was the disparity of resources, that even the assistance of those Powers would not have

availed to save the cause of Independence, had not a series of events, which must be regarded as providential, contributed to further the result. Want of space will not allow any connected narrative of events, and will only permit brief allusions to the singular providences which repeatedly saved the cause of Independence from ruin.

The French were always inferior to the English in naval skill. A single decisive naval defeat would have deprived the Americans of all the benefits of the French alliance; and it is remarkable how invariably tempests arose to separate the hostile fleets, when on the point of a decisive engagement. This occurred repeatedly during two or three years. A decisive naval engagement was in this manner prevented until the crisis of the war was past; then the signal victory of Rodney, in the West Indies, forever broke the naval power of France in the American waters.

After the capture of Burgoyne, the war languished in the Northern states. On two signal occasions, providential events saved the languishing cause of the Colonies from blows, which would have probably involved irreparable disaster.

When the American army was engaged in prosecuting the siege of the British post upon Newport island, a British fleet was hastening to the point to prevent its retreat. Fortunately a contrary wind delayed it. The Continental army succeeded, by the narrowest chance, in effecting a retreat to the main land before its arrival.

The success of Arnold's treason would have exposed a large force to capture, thrown the line of the Hudson into the hands of the British, and exposed the whole American army to disastrous attacks in detail. A singular combination of incidents led to the capture of Andre, and nipped the treason in the bud.

After the surrender of Burgoyne, the British transferred their active operations to the Southern states. The colonies were now almost exhausted. In those states, a large portion of the population was loyal to the British crown. The aim of the British was to organize this element, and lead it against Virginia, and the exhausted Middle states. After achieving signal successes, Lord Cornwallis, the British commander, sent a strong force into the mountain region of North Carolina, the headquarters of loyalism, for the purpose of

rallying the population to the British standard. The movement threatened the most serious danger to the American cause. The chance by which it was defeated involved the most remarkable combination of incidents that occurred during the war. Three detached bands of mountaineers assembled in arms at their homes in Virginia, East Tennessee and Carolina, and happened to unite without any definite object. As they were strong enough to attempt something, and as nothing else offered, they decided to march against the British detachment operating in the Tory region of North Carolina. Their attack annihilated the detachment at King's mountain, and struck the southern Tories with such terror that they could never after be induced to lend efficient aid to the royal cause. The battle of King's mountain was the first check to the British career of victory in the South.

The blow was severe, but it still seemed possible to achieve the object of invasion, and suppress all resistance in the Southern states. Gates had been defeated, and General Greene was at the head of the last army the Americans could bring into the field. Resistance was suppressed in Georgia and South Carolina, and Cornwallis resolved to destroy the army of Greene, and place himself in a position to carry out the plan of a movement upon Virginia. He detached Colonel Tarleton, at the head of his cavalry, against General Morgan, who commanded a large detachment of Greene's force. The defeat of Tarleton by Morgan, at Cowpens, was an unexpected blow, and deranged all the plans of Cornwallis, by demoralizing his splendid cavalry, so necessary in the movements he was contemplating. Nothing discouraged, however, Cornwallis, with characteristic enterprise, destroyed his heavy baggage, and threw himself upon the army of Morgan, now in hasty retreat to effect a junction with Greene. Morgan escaped only by the fortunate rise of a stream on the night after he had crossed, which interrupted the pursuit for two days. Again Cornwallis pressed on in pursuit of Greene, and came up with him at the Yadkin, in time to drive the rear-guard across the river, with the loss of a great part of the baggage. Again a sudden rise in the river interrupted the pursuit; and while Cornwallis made a detour for the purpose of heading the swollen stream, Greene pressed forward toward Virginia, and succeeded in

crossing the Dan with his rear-guard as the van of the pursuing army came in sight. The defeat of Tarleton's cavalry, and the fortunate rise of the two rivers just after his army had crossed, alone saved the army of Greene from ruin.

By great efforts, Virginia sent forward reinforcements to the army of Greene, with the avowal that these were the last levies that could be raised. Thus reinforced, Greene again advanced into North Carolina, where he was attacked and beaten by Cornwallis at Guilford Court-house.

And now the British General adopted a singular resolution. Instead of bringing up reinforcements from South Carolina, and holding the territory he had won, he determined to make a flank movement, and advance on Virginia, leaving Greene to advance again upon South Carolina. This decision of Cornwallis proved the salvation of the American cause.

In 1781 the American armies seemed on the eve of disbanding. The troops were without pay, ill-clad, and famishing. Several mutinies occurred, which were with difficulty repressed. The most extraordinary efforts were necessary to place the army in a position to take the field.

For three years no success had attended the American arms. No military operations of importance had occurred in the North, while disaster after disaster befel us in the South. French co-operation had resulted in nothing. Exhaustion was telling surely, upon the Colonial cause. General discouragement prevailed. It was become evident that unless some signal success were achieved in the campaign of 1781, the cause of Independence was desperate. So thoroughly satisfied was Washington of this, that he had resolved upon the desperate venture of assailing the British army in New York, in conjunction with the fleet and forces of France. Just at this juncture, Cornwallis, at the head of all the British forces in the Middle states, placed himself at Yorktown, where a decisive blow might be struck against him. It was resolved to make a combined movement of the French and American forces against his army.

The accurate and extensive combinations necessary to insure its success, rendered the siege of Yorktown one of the most critical

movements of the war. With the resources at their command, the British commanders ought to have defeated it, and converted the crowning triumph of the Revolution into irretrievable disaster.

In accordance with the plan of campaign, the French Admiral, De Grasse, steered from the West Indies for the American coast. Had the British Admiral upon that station followed him, his fleet, united with the British squadron in New York harbor, would have driven the French Admiral off the coast, and disconcerted the entire movement. But instead of adopting this obvious policy, the British Admiral in the West Indies contented himself with detaching a sufficient number of vessels to overmatch De Grasse when joined by the fleet stationed at New York, and sailed with the rest of his fleet to England. Fortunately, Admiral Graves, who commanded the New York fleet had met with a storm, in a recent cruise off the New England coast, which disabled several of his ships. Reinforced by the West India ships, he left these at New York to refit, and sailed for the Chesapeake; but his inferiority of force prevented any interference with the preparations for the siege of Yorktown.

Still, Cornwallis might have held out until, the fleet being repaired, sufficient reinforcements might arrive to raise the siege. But having received the promise of relief at an early day, he was only anxious to maintain his position with the least possible loss, and withdrew from his outworks, which he had ample force to hold efficiently. But the siege was pressed with unexampled vigor by the allies, who knew the importance of time; and, before the reinforcements arrived, Cornwallis found his position untenable. With characteristic vigor, he resolved to cross York river to Gloucester Point, and cutting his way through the weak lines on that side, make his escape to New York. His first division of troops had crossed the river, when a storm arose and prevented the passage of the rest of his army. No alternative was left but surrender.

Five days after the British laid down their arms, the English fleet arrived at the mouth of the Chesapeake, from New York, with large reinforcements, for the purpose of raising the siege.

The British were, providentially, always too late during the entire war. In 1776, a storm prevented the British troops, in Boston,

from crossing Boston Harbor, until it was too late to attack the American works on Dorchester Heights. A contrary wind prevented the British expedition against the Southern states from arriving, until it was too late to second the rising of the Carolina loyalists. The same contrary winds delayed the arrival of British reinforcements and compelled the British commander-in-chief to delay the commencement of his attack upon New York, until it was too late in the season to reap the full fruits of his victories. When the Americans were routed on Long Island, a contrary wind detained the British fleet, until it was too late to intercept their retreat. On the same occasion, the detention of a Tory by a Hessian guard, prevented the British commander from obtaining intelligence of the movement, until it was too late to attack them in the confusion of embarkation. A short time after, when the British army had already felt the position of the Americans and obtained decisive advantage, a storm arose which induced Howe to defer his assault until it was too late—Washington having availed himself of the respite to retire to a stronger position. Burgoyne was influenced by the defeat of his detachment at Bennington to stop a whole month at Fort Edward, until the country had time to rally; then, apprehensive that it was too late to reach New York by the left bank of the Hudson, he crossed the stream, and met with impassable obstacles at Saratoga. The delay of the expected reinforcements from England, prevented Clinton from moving from New York to the relief of Burgoyne until too late, and his army had surrendered. The opposition of the elements prevented the arrival of the British fleet and army at Newport, until it was too late to intercept the retreat of the American army from the island. Andre inadvertently prolonged his midnight interview with Arnold, until it was too late to return to his vessel, which led to the detection of the treason, and saved the American cause. Opportune rains delayed the headlong chase of Cornwallis after Greene, until he was twice only a little too late to crush the flying army of his adversary. A storm shattered the ships of Admiral Graves, and delayed them so long in repairing, that the expedition arrived off the Chesapeake only a little too late to raise the siege of Yorktown and save the army of Cornwallis.

And then the many instances where, in critical periods, the action of the elements favored the American arms: the unusual fog, and the sudden shift of wind which favored the escape of the Americans from Long Island—the sudden freeze which enabled Washington to execute his movement around the British army at Trenton—the storm which, after the battle of Brandywine, separated the opposing forces, when, with his habitual daring, Washington was about to risk a decisive battle in defense of Philadelphia—the storm which prevented the escape of Cornwallis—the repeated tempests which, during several years, separated the French and English fleets whenever they were about to engage in decisive action. And then the fatuity of the British commanders: the error which caused them to attack New York, when Boston, evacuated by the Americans, was open to occupation—the strange delay in hemming Washington in New York island—the failure to seize the line of the Hudson, when the defeat of the Americans left it open to occupation—the strange want of enterprise which suffered the American army to remain in a defenseless condition for months without an attempt to assail it—the fatuity of Howe, in striking at Philadelphia, instead of co-operating with Burgoyne—the strange delay of Burgoyne's march, and his fatal blunder in crossing to the right bank of the Hudson—the fatal error of Cornwallis (his first blunder during the war), in leaving the Carolinas and marching into Virginia—the blunder of the admiral of the British West India squadron, in not following De Grasse to the American coast—the error of Cornwallis in abandoning his outer works. Surely, all these display the intervention of that Being who swayeth the councils of man, no less than the elements, at his will.

In reviewing the events of the War of Independence, we may use the language of Washington: "The hand of Providence has been so conspicuous in all this, that he who lacked faith must have been worse than an infidel; and he more than wicked, who had not gratitude to acknowledge his obligations."

CHAPTER II.

THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES.

At the close of the Revolution, a philosophic and devout mind, in tracing the past history of the Colonies, must have been impressed with the belief, that a people so favored were destined for some great career. But events had not yet developed the mission, to which destiny pointed the country. Subsequent events have developed the fact, that the Providential mission of our country is

The Establishment and Diffusion of Republican Liberty.

Various converging lines of cumulative inference force this conclusion on the mind.

Sect. I.—The Unexampled Excellence of our System of Government.

The mission of the United States, as the destined promoter of Republican Liberty, may be inferred from the excellence of our matchless Constitution. The excellence of this instrument appears in a striking light, in contrast with the faulty constitutions of all former republics.

Many persons, judging from past experience, have reached the conclusion that Republicanism is a radically defective system of government. They regard it as an impracticability, beautiful in theory, but impossible of successful execution. These views are derived from the history of republics whose constitutions were radically defective. A brief examination of their organic defects will show that their failure must be attributed to other causes than any radical inefficiency of Republicanism as a system of government. Let us briefly glance at some of these.

I. Organic Defects of Former Republics.

1*st. Former Republics had no proper Republican Organization.*

In this age, certain principles of government are regarded as fundamental, without which popular government can not exist. Among these are:—

1. The powers of government must be exercised by the people through representatives, not by democratic assemblies of citizens.

2. The legislative, executive, and judicial functions of government, should never be vested in the same body, but must be kept wholly distinct from each other, as separate branches of administration.

These two principles, which to us seem so simple, and so essential to the success of government, are discoveries of modern times. The simple republics of antiquity embodied no such subtleties. In the earliest form of government—the Patriarchal—the Chief was the leader of his tribe, its lawgiver, and its judge. When the patriarch became merged in the sovereign, the monarch continued to exercise all these powers, and thus centered in his own person, legislative, executive and judicial functions. In states which dethroned their kings, the people seized upon the functions of sovereignty, and exercised them as a matter of course. The entire powers of government were lodged in Assemblies of the people, and were exercised with that rash and ill-advised precipitancy, always characteristic of democratic assemblies. The populace, under the influence of turbulent demagogues, passed hasty and injudicious laws; and, as the supreme executive authority, appointed executive agents; and in angry mobs passed unjust sentences upon the best citizens.

This want of the Representative system, and of a proper distribution of the governmental power, caused the downfall of the Athenian republic, where the form of government was an unmixed democracy. While such statesmen as Themistocles and Pericles swayed the national councils, bringing forward wise and salutary measures, and obtaining the appointment of judicious executive officials to carry out their policy, the evil tendencies of these democratic assemblies were held in abeyance. But when the Athenian people yielded themselves to the control of weak and turbulent orators, the republic rushed headlong to ruin.

2nd. Former Republics were convulsed by the clashing of Rival Classes.

In many republics another fact combined with the organic defects of the government to work their downfall. They were all

originally monarchies, with the aristocratic element which is always gathered about the throne. The dethronement of the king left the aristocracy and the people to struggle for supremacy. In the absence of any constitutional balance of powers between these rival orders in the state, their jealousies led to civil broils, which continually agitated the unskillfully organized republics.

The contests between the aristocratic element and the democracy, more than once involved all Greece in civil war. Athens and Sparta were respectively the champions of the opposing factions, and their conflicts divided Greece into hostile camps, and set in operation the train of causes which led to the overthrow of Grecian liberty.

Rome presents a still more memorable example of the ruin consequent upon the collisions of rival orders in the state, and the abuses of democracy arising from the want of the representative principle. When monarchy was abolished at Rome, a Senate was already in existence, and at once assumed control of the state. It enacted all laws. Members of the patrician order were alone eligible to the public offices, especially to the consulate, the executive office of the republic. The only political right originally vested in the people consisted in their privilege of choosing the consuls from among the patricians.

The uncontrolled domination of the patricians became at length so intolerable as to lead to a revolt of the people, who extorted from the nobility the institution of the tribunate. The tribunes were chosen by the people from the plebeian ranks. Their persons were sacred from violence, and the vote of a single tribune imposed an authoritative veto upon the legislative proceedings of the Senate. Step by step the people gained accessions of political power, until their Assemblies acquired the right to make laws for the Commonwealth.

Rome now presented the singular spectacle of a republic with two rival classes, both possessed of independent legislative authority. A tribune of the people, unless bribed or intimidated, might arrest the passage of an unpopular law of the Senate. Against the adoption of factious laws by the Assemblies of the people, the patricians were under the necessity of securing the veto of a bribed or subservient tribune; or of calling in the aid of superstition to delay

its passage; or, failing in this, of rushing into the Comitium where the Assemblies were held, and dispersing the people by force of arms. This anomalous political condition gave rise to a factious and anarchial administration, which, in the absence of constitutional remedy, could only result in violence and bloodshed whenever the matter in dispute was sufficiently irritating to stimulate mutual passions into activity.

The decline of the republic, caused by the want of balance in the constitution between rival classes, was hastened by the manner in which the legislative power of the people was exercised. Like Athens, Rome had no representative assembly. While the republic was limited to the environs of a small town, the people met in popular assembly to deliberate and act upon public affairs; the practice was continued when the population of Rome numbered millions, and the political franchise had been extended to all the inhabitants of Italy. The millions of citizens could have no voice in the direction of affairs. A few thousand persons, generally the dregs of the populace, and followers of some popular and ambitious leader, controlled the republic. The natural result soon followed: all measures were carried by violence. Armed factions fought in the Comitium, and political power inured to the fiercest. The respectable class of citizens could not attend such assemblies. Public affairs were left at the disposal of any faction bold enough to assume the reins of government, or rather to keep possession of the Comitium; and Rome was governed by factious leaders, parading the streets with armed bands of gladiators, and filling the Comitium with legislators whose hands were red with fratricidal slaughter.

The Assemblies of the people at length interfered with the executive department of government, and, in violation of the constitutional functions of the consuls, bestowed extraordinary commands upon favorite leaders, thus arming them against the liberties of the commonwealth. The republic could no longer exist; and Cæsar, the foe of the Senate, the idol of the people, defeated Pompey, the champion of the aristocracy, upon the battlefield, and became the sovereign of Rome.

That such riotous democracies, engrossing all the functions of

government, should have fallen, is not surprising: especially when the populace was opposed to a rival order in the Commonwealth, whose policy kept the people in a continual ferment of inflamed passions. The failure of such governments militates nothing against Republicanism as a system. The statesman, perceiving their defective organization, is not surprised at their fall, but rather wonders how governments so constituted should have been able to work at all.

3d. Former Republics lacked the Federal Principle.

Yet another fault of constitution conduced to the instability of all Republics of ancient or modern times: Confederation of states were established upon improper principles. All former Confederacies belonged to one of two classes: they were either LEAGUES OF INDEPENDENT STATES, or CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENTS, in which the general Congress was endowed with supreme power over states reduced to the exercise of merely municipal rights.

1. The evil of Leagues.

In Leagues, where each of the confederated states retained all the rights of sovereignty—raised armies, built navies, and exercised the power of peace and war—the loose confederation was only a league of allies, and served only to foster jealousies, and excite commotions.

We find in the Amphictyonic Council of Greece, the first example of a league of independent states. In this league the several states preserved their absolute independence. They waged war against foreign powers, or the members of the league; made peace; attended to all their political relations, domestic and foreign; and exercised all the functions of nations, independent, though in alliance with others. Each state was entitled to an equal number of votes in the Amphictyonic Council. This general Council, or Congress, was vested with legislative and judicial powers. It had the right to decide all controversies between the members of the league; to fine the aggressor, and to call out the entire force of the Confederation against a contumacious state. It was vested with unlimited power to take any legislative action judged necessary for the public welfare; it was the guardian of the national religion; and was empowered to declare, and carry on war.

With powers so extensive, had the Confederation possessed an organized Executive, with a national army and navy to execute its decrees, it would have constituted an efficient government, and might, perhaps, have eventually made Greece a consolidated Republic, depriving the allied states of their independent governmental powers, and restricting their authority to municipal regulations. The crowning defect of the league was its want of executive power. This prevented it from assuming the functions of a government, and restricted it to the office of an advisory Council of the Grecian states. It served to establish a public law for Greece, and for a great while, preserved the states in tolerable concord. But during the Persian war, having no national army and navy, the Council subsidized the Athenian state, which had a powerful navy, to prosecute the war. Athens thus became the executive of Greece, and built up an empire at the expense of the allies, attaining a dangerous ascendancy. A combination was formed, under the lead of Sparta, to break down her overgrown power, and succeeded, after years of desolating war, in accomplishing its aim. Sparta, in turn, was humbled by an alliance headed by Thebes; and Greece was rent by civil convulsion, until a fatal interference of the Amphictyonic Council, with one of the states of the league, precipitated a civil war, which gave Macedon a footing in Greece, and caused the downfall of liberty.

The Amphictyonic Council was the prime element of discord in the Grecian republics. Its decisions, enforced by a majority of the states, continually embroiled Greece in civil wars. The history of the period proves that its existence was a calamity. The states had far better maintained their isolated independence, than become involved in an alliance of jarring elements, whose electrical activity desolated the country with continual tempests.

The League of the Swiss cantons is an example of similar constitutional defects. It is inadequate to preserve harmony among the cantons, or to secure efficiency in the government; but the isolation of the country, and the simple habits of the mountaineers, have usually counterbalanced the evils of the constitution, and prevented them from inducing the perpetual intestine discords, generally attendant upon leagues of confederated states.

2. The evils of Centralization.

The opposite fault—Centralization—has proved equally ruinous to confederated republics. An imperial centralization, like Rome or Athens, whose power is derived from conquest, is a mere despotism over the provinces. It matters not that the imperial state is a republic; its rule over its dependents is as absolute as that of Austria, and more oppressive, inasmuch as a democracy is the most heartless of all tyrannies.

A different form of centralization, where the deputies of all the states assembled in general congress, have unlimited power over all the interests of the republic, though apparently more just in the exercise of its authority, has always resulted in abuses which issued in the overthrow of liberty. This abuse of power is sure to occur where a diversity of interests exists. Under such circumstances, a majority of states combine to control the republic, and use the government for the advancement of their own interests. The aggrieved minority seize an opportunity to revolt against the oppressive rule; civil war ensues; foreign alliances are formed; and either the republic falls, or, resting its power on the sword, degenerates into a despotism beneath the control of some military leader.

Of such a centralization the Achæan League is the most memorable example of ancient times. Though occupying a district so small and secluded as to preclude the rise of antagonistic interests, yet the domination of the majority, uncontrolled by constitutional limitations, proved so intolerable, that the Republic was the prey of ceaseless strife. Its history is the narrative of continual discords, ending only with the existence of the Republic.

It is remarkable that leagues and centralizations, though representing, in respect of their organization, opposite principles of confederation, have run the same career. Both were vested with jurisdiction over the internal interests of the republic; both, by the injudicious exercise of their authority, came in collision with some of the allied states: the Centralization, employing the national forces to maintain its authority; the League summoning to its aid the armies of the several states. Their policy equally resulted in civil convulsion; leading either to the disruption of the republic, or to the

establishment of imperialism. The downfall of every confederated republic that has ever existed—whether league or centralization—may be traced to the unwise interference of the general Congress with the domestic interests of the Commonwealth.

These faults in the constitution of former republics—the want of a proper republican organization—the clashing of class interests—or the lack of the Federal principle—caused the downfall of them all. Their ruin may invariably be traced directly to the lack of a system of representation; to the want of a proper distribution of the functions of government; to the clashing of rival orders; or to the abuses arising from an improper system of confederation. They fell before the abuses of riotous assemblies of the populace, assuming all the functions of administration; or from the civil discord of clashing orders; or from the Congress of the confederation abusing its vested power over the individual states.

II. Our System of Government avoids all these Errors.

In tracing the means by which the framers of the American Constitution were enabled to avoid the organic defects which wrecked former republics, and to establish a Constitution perfect in its outline, and almost faultless in respect of details, the mind is impressed with the conviction that our system of government owes its origin to the care of a benign Providence.

1*st. The overruling care of Providence discerned in the manner in which principles of government, essential to Republicanism, were slowly evolved during the lapse of centuries previous to the Colonization of America.*

1. The Evolution of the principle of Popular Representation.

No ancient republic ever conceived the idea of a representative government. In some of the confederated republics, *States* were represented by their delegates; but the idea of the *People* delegating to representatives their governmental powers, instead of exercising it in person, never occurred to the citizens of ancient republics. Indeed, had some sage statesman conceived the idea, and suggested it to the people, the proposition to yield to an elective body the powers of government, belonging to the citizens, would have been

rejected with disdain. It involved an abdication of power to which its possessors would by no means consent. The Representative system could not have arisen in the state of society existing in ancient times.

We find its germ in the social state of the free barbarians who overran the Roman empire. Patriarchism was the mould which gave form to all the ancient governments. The Patriarch, ruling his tribe with mild but absolute sway, bequeathed his prerogatives to the monarch. The sovereign was absolute. His prerogative extended to the power of taxation. And, in some states, the governments which displaced monarchy, succeeded to these prerogatives. But in the barbarism of the north of Europe this power of the national leader was lost. The chief might demand the military service of his tribe; but he had no power over the property of his followers. When they overran the Roman empire, these free barbarians retained their original privileges, especially that of exemption from taxation at the will of the sovereign. When his military service was paid, the vassal was free from the requisitions of his king. The royal revenues were at first chiefly derived from lands belonging to the crown. At length, however, the monarch began to obtain revenue from his feudal dependents by accepting money in lieu of personal service, which the feudal chief obtained from his vassals upon the same conditions. Thus the custom gradually arose, of the nobles granting to the sovereign certain sums levied upon their vassals, to defray the expense of his wars. But the principle obtained that these pecuniary grants were not taxes levied at the will of the sovereign, but free gifts of his loyal nobles.

In the progress of industry, however, burghs or towns arose, whose citizens were, by charter, free from the levies of the nobles. Revenues could only be derived from them by their own free consent. In the Saxon Witenagemote, or Parliament, beside the nobility and clergy, the magistrates of the burghs attended, as representatives of the burghs. It would appear from a stipulation of Magna Charta, that no taxes could be imposed by the monarch, except by the consent of the Great Council; that in the Saxon times, this was the custom of the realm, violated by the tyrranical rulers of the Norman line, and sought to be revived. The Witenagemote lapsed into disuse

under the early Norman sovereigns. It was not until Magna Charta prohibited the monarch from levying taxes at his arbitrary will, that the burghs were again represented in parliament. But the principle once established, that taxation could only be levied by the consent of the people, the increasing wealth of the middle class, and the constant necessities of the English monarchs prevented the representation of the Commons from falling into desuetude. The Scottish wars of Edward I, and the French wars of Edward III, compelled the monarchs to apply regularly to the commons for subsidies, and they could not always deny the petitions with which the grants were accompanied. The representatives of the Commons thus gradually attained greater political consequence, and, after many contests with the crown, obtained the recognition of their claim that no law should be passed without their consent. Still the Parliament passed no enactments. It petitioned the king, who, if he chose acceeded to its request; but, in issuing the statute, he modified the petition of Parliament as he saw fit. But the usurpation of Henry IV, and the French wars of his successor, enabled the Parliament to strengthen its position, and under the weak reign of the Sixth Henry, it changed the form of its proceedings, and, instead of presenting petitions to the monarch, it framed measures in the form of bills subject to his approval. The fierce Wars of the Roses, in breaking the power of the nobles, greatly increased the relative importance of the Commons. They soon after became a ruling power in the Commonwealth, and the British constitution approximated its present form.

It may seem strange that the Representative principle never occurred to any philosophic statesman, as a remedy for the evils of unbridled democracy. That it did not, evinces the want of originality in the human mind. No advance in government has ever been elaborated by human reason. Man only elaborates systems which the course of events has germinated. The manner in which the Representative system took its rise, exemplifies the fact that divine Providence prepares the gradations of human progress, by so directing events as to evolve systems essential to the political advancement of the race. Adopted first for the sake of convenience, without any eye to consequences, the representation of the boroughs gradually ex-

panded into the English House of Commons. It is interesting to observe the manner in which it was fostered. Originating in the free barbarism of the German nations, it was germinated by Magna Charta, and fostered into vigor by the profusion, the usurpations, the weakness of monarchs, by ambitious foreign wars, and desolating civil strife, until, from the most feeble beginning, it developed into the most important branch of the English government. Every event favored its development. It is the great principle of advancement which has been evolving during a thousand years. This is the single great gift of the Middle Ages to modern times. The sea-girt shores of insular Britain were severed from the Continent of Europe by some geological convulsion, long ages ago, that the principle might have a home where its infancy might be cradled, and where, free from external violence, it might, during the course of centuries, be fostered into maturity. Its development affords the key to the tangled skein of English history; the wars, the tyrannies, the usurpations—every event of a dark and turbulent career, while crushing industry and bringing wretchedness to millions, all afforded aliment to this heaven-cherished principle.

2. Distribution of the Powers of Government.

Originally, the monarch was the possessor of all the powers of government. Legislative, and judicial, as well as executive authority, vested in him. This was very nearly the condition of the English government during the century after the Norman Conquest. The powers of Parliament were restricted to the granting of supplies; the royal judges who administered justice were merely the delegates of the sovereign, in whom he vested his judicial authority, to be exercised according to his will, and resumable at his pleasure. The sovereign engrossed all the functions of government.

But as the Parliament gradually wrested from the king, and concentered in itself, the legislative functions, it became necessary to wrest from his hands judicial power also. When finally, after many struggles, the Parliament as a legislative body became free from royal control, the next step was to secure the independence of the Judiciary. Unless this were accomplished, the legislative power of

Parliament was a nullity; for while the sovereign might impose his own construction upon its enactments, he remained the virtual legislator for the realm. After another contest, the Judiciary was rendered independent of the crown. The sovereign remained possessed of executive authority only, with the power to protect himself against parliamentary encroachment by imposing a veto upon its enactments.

It became a recognized principle among all Englishmen, that the powers of government should be distributed among three departments, mutually independent—the legislative, judicial, and executive.

During the Colonial period, the Colonies had been ruled by governments framed in accordance with these principles. The Representative system, to which they were accustomed in the mother country, was generally adopted: the legislature of each colony was composed of delegates elected by the people. This feature, so essential to republicanism, was the groundwork of the Colonial governments. The English principle of the distribution of the powers of government between three co-ordinate departments, was also generally adopted.

The adoption of these principles—the Representative system, and the distribution of the powers of government—gave to the Colonial governments a stability and dignity, for which we may look in vain among former republics. The government of a single state was established upon proper principles, and may be said to have approached perfection.

2nd. The care of a benign Providence evident in the Evolution of the Federal principle.

1. Providential direction of preliminary events.

Though the colonies were able, from the example of England, to educe the plan of government necessary for a single state, the history of the past presented no model, on which might be formed a system of confederation. The records of the past might be searched in vain, for an example of a confederacy of states, united under a government at once efficient and harmonious. All past

confederacies were either leagues or centralizations, and their history only served to warn the framers of the constitution against adopting the organic faults which wrecked them.

Yet even here, though history presented no example of a confederation to be copied, the position the Colonies had occupied toward each other, and toward the mother country, suggested to the minds of reflective statesmen the system of government adapted to their wants.

The Colonies had been always mutually independent of each other, and united only by their common connection with the mother country. This independency of the several colonies the people were attached to by centuries of use, and were resolute in maintaining. But their common connection with the mother country suggested the possibility of a plan which might unite them in a general confederation, while the independency of the several Colonies should be still maintained.

The struggle against the pretensions of England had even suggested the principles on which the confederation might be based. The pretensions of England, arrogating an absolute supremacy over the Colonies, placed the common government in the attitude of a Centralization, having supreme control over all the affairs of the Colonies, foreign and domestic. It claimed the right not only to control their foreign relations, through trade regulations and by assuming the power to involve them in war at will; but also to control their internal affairs, regulating their industry, and modifying their governmental action at will. The English government claimed the right to interfere with the industry of the Colonies by an absolute prohibition of traffic with other nations, and by imposing restrictions on all branches of manufacturing industry. It claimed the right to annul the acts of their legislative assemblies by the vetoes of governors of royal appointment, or by refusal of the royal sanction. It claimed the right to change their chartered forms of government, and impose upon them such governments as England deemed most fitting; in fine, to subject them in every respect to the legislation of the British government.

The Colonies were so much disgusted with the arrogant claim of centralization, set up by the British government, that, when it be-

came necessary to combine their strength during the Revolutionary war, they erred in the opposite extreme, and refused to constitute a general government, but, under the "Articles of Confederation," formed themselves into a league of sovereign, and mutually independent states. They carefully restricted the Congress of the Confederation from the exercise of the powers which had seemed so odious in England. The right to levy taxes, and to regulate commerce were absolutely withheld from Congress. It was not suffered to declare war, enter into treaties, regulate the currency, nor incur expenditure, without the concurrence of nine, out of the thirteen states. Indeed, the jealousy of centralization prevented the states from vesting in the Congress of the Confederation any of the important functions of government. The Confederation was designed to be a "League," in which "each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence." It had neither an Executive nor a Judiciary; and, indeed, in the narrow sphere allotted to its action, neither was necessary. The bitter experience of the evils attendant upon centralization drove the colonies to the opposite extreme, and induced them to form a League, instead of a Government, and to debar the Congress from the exercise of powers essential to the common welfare.

Providentially, the condition of the country was such as to expose the evils of this system in a glaring light. England, France, and Spain, the three great Colonial powers of Europe, from a desire to engross the traffic of their colonies, had each framed a system of restrictive trade regulations, known as "the colonial system." Under this system, each country prohibited its colonies from all traffic with any foreign country, or colonies. During the colonial era, the American colonies of England enjoyed a traffic with the British West India possessions; but, now, the colonial system of England, and the other European powers, shut them out altogether from the tropical trade. This was felt the more severely, since, from their locality in the temperate zone, their products generally were unsuited to the European market, and marketable only in those tropical dependencies of the European powers. A stagnation of trade, affecting both the agriculture, and the commerce of the states, was the necessary consequence, reducing them to a condition of

industrial depression greater than had been known during the Colonial era.

These evils were attributed to the want of an efficient government. It was believed that, if Congress had the power to adopt retaliatory trade regulations, the European powers might be induced to relax their prohibitory regulations. The public welfare imperatively demanded that Congress should have the power to regulate trade with foreign countries.

It was peculiarly fortunate that this stagnation of industry urged the states to modify the system of confederation at the juncture when it was accomplished. Had not the Constitution been framed when it was, the probability is, that it never would have been. The French revolution soon opened first the French, and afterwards the Spanish and Dutch colonies to American trade. Had the Constitution not been framed when this occurred, the states, relieved from the stagnation which induced the change of government, would have continued under the old Articles of Confederation, until diversity of character and interests would have impelled them to separate and follow out their destiny on different paths. At this juncture, however, the evils of stagnation had reached an unbearable height, and seemed to call imperatively for a change of the Articles of Confederation, and an increase of the power of the general Congress.

Another fact also created general dissatisfaction with the narrow limitation of the powers of the confederation. The public creditors were clamoring for payment of the debts incurred during the War of Independence. Congress had no power to raise a national revenue, and the states, suffering from a general stagnation of industry, failed to raise the sums assessed upon them. Even the obligations of the country to the veterans of the War of Independence remained unliquidated. Unable to pay its debts, or to protect its foreign interests, the League failed to command the respect of foreign nations, or the confidence and attachment of the American people. It was falling into contempt at home and abroad, and indications were not wanting, to show that, unless the defects were promptly remedied, the Confederation would soon fall to pieces.

This state of things induced the several states, in 1787, to send

delegates to a convention, with authority to amend the Articles of Confederation.

2. The labors of the Constitutional Convention.

The states had now experienced the opposite evils of a Centralization, and a League with inadequate governmental powers. The Convention was authorized to amend the Articles of Confederation, so as to give efficiency to the confederation while avoiding the evils of centralization. In appointing delegates to the Convention, the states did not contemplate the surrender of their sovereignty and independence. Hence, they were only authorized to amend the Articles of Confederation, retaining the distinctive features of a league. But the powers especially needed,—the power to raise a national revenue, and to regulate the foreign commerce of the country, were most important functions, which could be properly exercised only by a GOVERNMENT. And if a *Government* were to be formed, instead of a *League*, it was necessary to establish it upon a proper basis, having three departments—the legislative, executive, and judicial. It should also be vested with all other powers necessary to give it stability and efficiency; while it should be hedged round with such limitations as to prevent it from trenching upon the cherished sovereignty and independence of the states. The oppressiveness of English Centralization, and the inefficiency of the Confederation, were the Scylla and Charybdis providentially placed as landmarks, between which the Convention must steer. The centralization of England was its Scylla, skirting which, it avoided widely the dangers of an inefficient league.

Guided by this landmark, the Convention readily traced the powers, proper to be vested in the new government. It must have the powers experience had proved to be essential to the public welfare, as the right to raise revenues, and to regulate foreign commerce; and such further powers as the colonies had conceded to England; but none of the oppressive claims which they had contested.

This train of reasoning would lead the Convention to trace some such outline as the following, to guide their labors:—

(1.) The powers essential to be exercised, render it necessary to organize a *government*.

(2.) Every government should have three departments—the legislative, executive, and judicial.

(3.) The government must have the power to raise revenue.

(4.) It must have the power to regulate the commerce of the country with foreign countries.

(5.) It must have the power of peace and war, and, consequently, to maintain an army and navy.

(6.) It must have the power to coin money.

(7.) It must have the power to regulate the intercourse and comity of the several states.

These powers are inherent in every government, from the exigency of foreign relations and internal comity, and the resolution to establish a *government* necessarily involved their bestowal.

But the functions of the government were to be carefully restricted within these limits. The rights claimed by Great Britain over the colonies, involving the principle of centralization, were to to be withheld. England had claimed the right to impose laws upon the colonies; to control and restrict their industry; to annul their legislation; to modify their governments; and in all respects to regulate both their foreign relations, and their internal affairs. All control over the internal affairs of the states was carefully withheld from the new government. It was proposed to bestow upon it the power to annul state laws in contravention of its enactments, and to coerce a factious state by force of arms; but these features were rejected, and the Constitution presents no suggestion of the possibility of a state and federal collision. Indeed, the convention, in framing the Constitution, exercised the most watchful care to guard against the possibility of such a collision. No powers were granted to the general government whose exercise would bring it into antagonism with the states. It was designed to exercise functions which could not be efficiently exercised by the several states; leaving altogether to them the administration of their domestic concerns. Hence, in the Constitution, the powers conferred were most jealously guarded. Every safeguard was thrown round the reserved rights of the states; every precaution was taken to debar the general government from trending upon their reserved province.

This object was sought to be accomplished in two ways: first, by

specific limitations of the power of the federal government; second, by the balances of the Constitution, and the federal features of the government.

The Limitations of Federal Power.

Two instances will illustrate the careful limitation of the powers of the general government. In time of peace, the general government could only trend upon the reserved province of state administration, in the exercise of two of its vested powers,—and both these were most jealously guarded.

(1.) The right to raise revenues by import duties, when viewed in connection with the power to regulate commerce, might have been supposed to confer the right to impose duties for the purpose of affording protection to the domestic industry of the country. This construction would allow the government to interfere with the internal development of industry, fostering the interests of one section of the country at the expense of other interests. The convention guarded against this construction by providing that duties should be imposed for revenue only,—"to pay the debts, etc., of the United States." So far from granting Congress the power to levy duties for the purpose of giving it power over the internal interests of the country, the power was granted for the purpose of preventing Congress, as far as possible, from coming in contact with the province of the states. Raising revenues by direct taxation does unavoidably bring the Federal government into contact with the reserved province of state legislation,—the internal interests of the country. To prevent this, as far as practicable, it was deemed expedient to permit the government to raise its revenues by duties, which, being levied at the ports, avoided the undesirable contact with the province of state administration incident to direct taxation. It is true that the imposition of duties does regulate commerce, and is a legitimate means for that end. But when the regulation of commerce is the aim of the government, the power must be exercised for the objects contemplated by the framers of the constitution. And they certainly never contemplated the establishment of a monopoly, by the imposition of duties upon the goods of all foreign countries.

The power to regulate commerce is essentially a retaliatory power. It was bestowed in order to vest in the government the power to employ retaliatory legislation against nations which excluded our products from their home, or colonial ports. If any country would not permit us to traffic with its dependencies, Congress might so "regulate our commerce" with it as to exclude its products wholly, or in part, from our ports. If any nation adopted a policy adverse to our interests, Congress might retaliate by the imposition of discriminating duties upon its commodities. Congress might also regulate our commerce with any country which seeks to use its preponderance of capital for the purpose of crushing our industry, in such a manner as to thwart its injurious policy, and to maintain an advantageous system of commercial exchange. But this retaliatory legislation is very different from general duties laid upon the imported products of all foreign countries for the purpose of securing a monopoly to some favored interest. The intention in conferring this power on the Federal government, was not to give it power to foster any particular branch of domestic industry by hostile legislation against the industry of all foreign countries, but to retaliate upon any foreign country that wished to foster their industry by a policy hostile to us. The policy of the Constitution was to secure to our industry an equal competition in the ports of the world, untrammeled by adverse legislation. In a word, the regulation of commerce was designed to *promote* intercourse, on equal terms, with foreign countries, not to impose barriers to it; to free the entire industry of the country from foreign oppression, not to oppress almost all its branches for the benefit of a few favored interests; to secure our industry free course, not to trammel it; to obtain for it the privilege of flowing in its natural channels, not to warp it into abnormal development.

While the government restricted its action within the limits fixed by the Constitution, while it imposed duties only for revenue, and regulated commerce only to retaliate hostile foreign policy, it could not interfere with the internal interests of the country, nor come in contact with the reserved province of state jurisdiction.

(2.) The power over the currency, might have been made to vest in the government the power to establish banking corporations in

the several states. This power was exercised by all the European governments. But it would have brought the government at once within the province of the states,—the internal interests of the country. It was withheld, and the power of the government over the currency was restricted to coining money and regulating its value.

The framers of the Constitution went even further than this. The evils of an inflated paper currency had been severely felt. The paper currency of the colonies during the colonial era had depreciated into absolute worthlessness. The currency issues of the Revolution were of no greater value. The people were disgusted with the entire system which substituted paper for coin. In consequence of this state of feeling, the framers of the Constitution not only withheld from the general government the right to charter a bank that might issue paper money; but prohibited the states from making anything but gold and silver a legal tender in the payment of debts. The evident purpose of the framers of the Constitution was to make specie the exclusive circulating medium of the country. "Now," said Oliver Elsworth, "is the favorable moment to shut and bar the door against paper money." The convention acted* upon this principle.

In no other point could the government interfere with the internal administration of the country.—The only power granted respecting internal improvements is the permission to establish post roads. In time of war, indeed, the government might impress property if the exigency demanded it; but the value of the impressed property was always to be paid.

It would seem that a government, with powers so carefully limited, could not prove dangerous to the sovereignty and independence of the states. With the sole exception of the power of taxation, it was not suffered to intrude within their sphere. Its jurisdiction was restricted to the administration of the foreign relations,and domestic intercourse, with only so much power over the internal concerns of the country as was necessarily incident to the discharge of its appropriate func-

* In carrying out the same policy, the first revenue act of Congress made all revenue dues and duties payable in specie.

tions. Except this incidental right, the entire control of the domestic interests was carefully reserved to the several states.

Additional Safeguards.

Still the representatives of the states in the Convention, were distrustful. The idea of a *Government*, instead of a *League*, filled them with apprehension. Conscious of the tendency of power to aggregate and consolidate itself, they feared that the vast superiority of power possessed by the general government might tempt it to extend the limits of its authority into the reserved province of state jurisdiction, and engross in its own hands the entire administration of the country, domestic, as well as foreign. They thought it necessary not only to deny the general government the power to trench upon the reserved province of state jurisdiction, but to constitute it with such a system of balances and equipoises, as to oppose insuperable obstacles to its unconstitutional action. They even aspired to more than this; and labored to construct the government upon such a basis as to array all the functionaries of the general government in zealous support of the reserved rights of the states, and resolute opposition to any usurpation of unconstitutional power.

The Legislative body was constituted in two branches. The House of Representatives was made, as far as possible, the representative of the several states. Its members were not national, but state representatives. The People of the several states, not the nation, were their constituencies. The Constitution recognized them as state representatives, in allowing each state a certain number of representatives in ratio to the population, and in providing that any fractional excess of population, in any state, should be lost. The districts from which they were elected were apportioned by the state legislatures, and they were chosen by the people of each state in accordance with state regulations. It was naturally supposed that the lower House of Congress, as composed of state representatives, would jealously guard the rights of the states against unconstitutional usurpation.

But, lest a majority of the people of the states should be carried away with gusts of excitement, or be swayed by sectional interest,

a co-ordinate branch of Congress was established. The Senate was designed to be the great conservative branch of the government. It was composed of representatives of state Governments, as the lower house was composed of representatives of the People of the states: they were elected by the state legislatures, and responsible to them for their acts. In the Senate, the state governments, being equal in dignity, were allowed an equal representation, irrespective of size or population. It was an assemblage of state delegates, representatives of their sovereignty, to carry out their will in the councils of the general government. If the House of Representatives should transcend the limits of constitutional powers, surely the conservative Senate would impose its negative in behalf of the rights of the state governments which were its constituencies.

An additional barrier against legislative usurpation was erected in the veto power of the President. It was supposed that one who had attained the highest station in the republic, would be removed from the sphere of popular excitements, and henceforth live for history. The electors who choose him are the representatives, partly of the people of the several states, and partly of the state government; the states, and not the nation, are the constituency of the President, and it was supposed that he, in view of his exalted position, would guard the rights of the states, if necessary, against the action of both branches of the Federal legislature.

The jealousy of federal usurpation, entertained by the framers of the Constitution, induced them to impose yet another barrier against legislative usurpation of power. A law transcending the limits of authority bestowed in the Constitution might be brought before the Supreme Court, and be annulled by the decision of that body. The constitution of the Supreme Court rendered it eminently conservative. The class of men from whom its members are selected are more impressible by legal principles than popular excitement; their appointment removes them from the clash of political agitation; and the mode of their selection, rendering them indirectly the representatives of the several states, would incline them to watch jealously against federal encroachments. They are to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Senate being the especial representative of the state

governments, the presumption was that, as a rule, its advice and consent would be given to the appointment of those only who were known to be the determined advocates of the rights of the states.

Thus the Senate, the representative of the state governments, was made the balance-wheel of the legislative department. The state governments, through their senatorial delegates, might prevent any unconstitutional legislation attempted by the Lower House. The length of the senatorial term was designed to protect it from temporary gusts of passion which might disturb the conservatism of the other branch of the legislature. Should, however, the Senate itself assent to encroachments, and the President yield to the sway of the general impulse, then the Supreme Court would stem the tide of usurpation, and, by its firmness, give vigor to a reactionary movement.

The conservative Senate was also made a restraint upon the Executive. Executive appointments to office were to be made only with its advice and consent. Treaties with foreign nations were to be made only with its sanction; and a vote of two-thirds was necessary to sanction business so important. Thus the sovereign states administered the most important business of the government through their delegates in the Senate.

It would seem that, in a government thus constituted, the reserved rights of the states were safe from encroachments of the general government. Every safeguard was thrown around them human ingenuity could devise. Either house of Congress, the President, or the Supreme Court, could arrest unconstitutional action; and the government, in all its departments, was constructed on a federal basis. The states, severally, were the constituencies of its Legislature, its Executive, its Judiciary; the lower house of Congress represented the people of the several states; the Senate, the state governments; the President and the Judiciary, both the state governments and the people of the states. It was not a national, but a federal government, constituted by the states to exercise functions to which they were incompetent in their several capacity. It was not a government over the states; it was not an agent of the states; it was the representative of the states, invested by them with powers to administer their foreign relations, and regulate their

mutual intercourse. The states were not merged in one *under* the government; they were allies united *in* the government. It was their bond of union, and their representative agent. They stood to each other in the relation of representative and constituent; the constituent retaining all original powers except those vested in perpetuity in the representative. Neither could be pronounced superior to the other; their spheres of power were distinct—each being sovereign in its own sphere and possessed of no power in the sphere of the other. The Federal Government was vested with absolute control of the foreign relations of the states in union; the states retained the entire control of their domestic concerns. The states, individually, had no right to interfere with their foreign relations; the Federal Government was equally powerless to interfere with the domestic interests of the states.

It is remarkable that an instrument which, in its grand outline, embodies the perfection of government, was regarded by its framers as exceedingly imperfect. When the convention had completed its labors, not a member of the body was satisfied with the Constitution which had been framed. Embodying a compromise of opposing views and clashing interests, it was generally regarded as full of imperfections—an improvement, perhaps, upon the old Articles of Confederation, but far inferior to the ideal systems severally framed by the theorists of opposing schools.

The advocates of centralization thought that the states retained too much power in their own hands, and asserted their influence so strongly through the federal features of the government, that their vigorous vitality would reduce the Federal Government to a nullity, and ultimate in the disintegration of the Union. On the other hand, the advocates of state sovereignty, from the tendency of power to accumulate authority in its own hands, were apprehensive that the aggregated power of the Federal Government being so vastly superior to that of the several states, would tempt it ultimately to assert a supremacy over them that would lead to centralization and imperialism. The Constitution was a compromise of these conflicting parties. The one party secured a *government*, instead of a *league*, which the other preferred; the other carried their point in

having the government based upon the sovereignty of the states. The one succeeded in establishing a vigorous Executive as a counterpoise to the federal features of the Constitution; the other labored to secure the rights of the states by vesting the most important functions of government in the conservative Senate, the immediate representative of the state governments. Each party believed that it had yielded too much to the other, and that the imperfections of the Constitution must secure the downfall of the government; the one believing that it would end in disruption through the power and jealousy of the states; the other that the tendency to centralization would destroy the reserved powers of the states, and engross all authority in a centralized imperialism.

It is strange that the clashing of discordant views should have given birth to a constitution which, in its general outline, strikes the golden mean between centralization and a disjointed league. In respect of details, the philosophic theorist may suggest amendments. Some of the granted powers might be conferred in phraseology more explicit, so as to debar the possibility of a dubious construction; the power and patronage of the Executive might be advantageously restricted to the limits contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, with the effect of diminishing the periodical excitements of the Presidential election; but, in its grand outline, the system of federal union is perfect. The idea of dividing the powers of government between the States and the Federal Government, allotting to each its sphere in which it is supreme, is a conception too brilliant for human genius to originate; it could only arise from the suggestion of events, overruled and guided by divine Providence to that end. This idea, properly elaborated in its details, embodies the perfection of government. It avoids the evils attendant upon every other system, and combines, in an eminent degree, efficiency of administration with the surest guaranties of liberty.

III. Federal Republicanism the only Stable Form of Government.

1*st. Instability of all other Forms of Government.*

1. Instability of Monarchy.

In the present state of the world, monarchy is, perhaps, the most

unstable of all governments. It involves an abnormal social state, which nothing but force can uphold. Force is the foundation of monarchy. It is the violent rule of one, or the few, over the many. It had its origin in violence, and when the masses will no longer be oppressed by armed force, the day of monarchy is over.

The conditions, under which monarchy had its origin, are those most favorable to its continued existence. The chief of a warlike tribe subdued adjacent tribes, and subjected them to his sway. Here the oppression of subjected tribes bound his own people to the conqueror by the ties of pride and advantage, and the support of a favored portion of his subjects enabled the monarch to hold the rest of his dominions in unwilling and enforced subjection. Thus, monarchy owed its origin to the loyalty of the few, bribed by advantage, and seduced by pride to support the monarch in the oppression of the many.

In the first age of monarchy, territorial position distinguished the loyal subjects of the monarchy from the oppressed: the population of the conquering tribe aided the monarch in keeping the conquered in subjection. But gradually monarchies became consolidated. The recollection of conquest was erased from the minds of the subjected population, and a sentiment of loyalty became generally diffused throughout the extent of the kingdom. The support of the throne by the population of a limited territory was now exchanged for the support of a limited class. The leaders of the conquering tribe became the nobles of the realm, holding extensive possessions throughout the kingdom, and enjoying exclusive privileges. This class, linked to the throne by the ties of interest, enabled the monarch to maintain his sway over the unarmed and oppressed masses.

But, whether maintained by the support of a limited territorial population, or of a favored aristocratic class, monarchy has always been the rule of violence, the few oppressing the many. The Roman dominion is the most memorable example of domination maintained for ages by the swords of the conquering nation. Persia, the kingdoms of modern Europe, and almost all other monarchies, are examples of royal sway maintained by the loyal devotion of a favored class.

Monarchy, however, has never been a stable form of government.

It is always menaced with revolutions,—explosions of general discontent. In oriental despotisms, where the sluggishness of the masses leaves the populace out of view, monarchy is often convulsed by dynastic revolutions, arising out of court intrigues or ambitious rivalry. European monarchy has always been threatened with popular revolution, arising out of the oppression of the masses. Here, from the earliest ages, popular outbreaks have compelled the sovereign to trust his power to the guardianship of the sword.

The instability of monarchy increases in the ratio of the advancement of the age. The uninquiring loyalty of a dark age of general ignorance and debasement, patiently acquiesces in the rule of the sovereign, however oppressive his sway. Advancing civilization renders the subject impatient of oppression, and it becomes necessary to reinforce loyalty with priestcraft, in order to secure tolerance of oppression and wrong. At length advancement reaches a stage where Absolutism is no longer practicable: the sovereign must appeal to force to maintain his power, and must ally the aristocracy to the throne by taking them into copartnership in the government, or at least exempting them from the oppression under which the masses groan. Monarchy now passes from unlimited despotism to the second stage,—aristocratic monarchy.

But Aristocratic Monarchy is as impracticable in modern times as absolute despotism. Heavy taxation is a necessity of the existing order of things. The first aim of a dominant aristocracy is to secure and advance its material interests. It monopolizes the patronage of government, and exempts the property of the aristocracy from bearing its proportion of the public burdens. Taxation is so levied as to bear exclusively upon the industrious classes. At first this does not press insupportably upon industry. It is strong, and able to bear the heavy burden unflinchingly; but gradually, by the natural law of accumulation, property aggregates more and more in the hands of the wealthy and unburdened class; the circle of exemption grows wider and wider; the burden of taxation presses more and more heavily upon the diminishing means of the industrial class. The privileged aristocracy profits by the sufferings of industry to increase its possessions, so that the poorer the people become, the richer the aristocracy grows; and the richer the aris-

tocracy grows, the heavier presses the burden of taxation upon the impoverished masses. This process is continually going on until the pressure of taxation and poverty becomes unendurable, and the people rise against their oppressors, and revolutionize the government.

This was the course of causation which led to the French revolution. The nobility refused to be taxed, and finally engrossed so much of the property of the country that the people could no longer support the burden of taxation necessary to meet the public expenditure. The government was under the necessity of assembling the States General to coerce the refractory nobles; the deputies of the nation, once assembled, imposed a constitution upon the government, and, step by step, France became a republic.

The only escape an aristocratic monarchy has from revolution and republicanism is, to widen the circle of privilege, and admit a greater number to share in the government. The British government has resorted to this alternative.

Since the revolution of 1688, the Aristocracy has obtained entire control of the Parliament, and ruled the country with uncontrolled sway. But, in 1830, the general discontent reached such a height that the Aristocracy could not carry on the government alone, and were compelled either to face revolution, or to take the wealthy Aristocracy of Trade into copartnership in the government. This extension of political privilege has enabled the British government to go on for thirty years. The Nobility, supported by the Aristocracy of Trade, have been enabled to rule the country, in spite of the discontent of the suffering masses.

But it cannot stop here. Now the educated mechanics are clamoring for a share of political power. It is denied them by the aristocratic classes. Excitement is already running high; and only a period favorable to convulsion is needed to precipitate England into the vortex of revolution.* The governing classes in England must maintain their monopoly of government by violence. The Working Class once admitted to a share in the government, monarchy and privileged aristocracy are doomed.

---

*This was, of course, written before the passage of the recent English Reform Bill.

Such is the tendency of the age. The stability of monarchy is past. The absolute sway of a king is no longer possible. The day of irresponsible despotism is over. Aristocratic monarchy is equally impracticable: royal oppression, even supported by a privileged aristocracy, can no longer silence the demands of an oppressed people, awake to a sense of injustice, and panting for redress. The throne and the aristocracy will concede as far as concession is consistent with the existence of their privileges; when concession ceases, then revolution will precipitate the monarch from his throne, and establish a republic.

European monarchy can not exist half a century longer. Every throne in western Europe has been compelled to make concessions to popular discontent. Europe is even now tottering on the verge of general convulsion. Monarchy has but one hope,—to attain universal dominion. Could a nation like Russia once master the world, the ruling nation, bound to the throne by pride and privilege, might rule the earth for ages, as Italy governed the Roman empire. Monarchy can no longer maintain itself by the support of a privileged class; it must rest upon national support; and the support of a nation to a throne can only be secured by the pride of conquest, and the plunder of a conquered world. Universal dominion, or extinction, are the alternatives of monarchy.

But it will be asked, why cannot monarchy adapt itself to the movement of the age, and base its sway upon popular affection? Because as a system of government it is radically defective. Centralization is a necessary part of the monarchical constitution. A monarchical government must necessarily exercise control over the internal administration, as well as the foreign relations of the country. Enacting laws for the internal, as well as the external administration of the country, and enforcing them by executive authority, the monarchical government comes continually in contact with the people. It thus becomes the object at which discontent spits its venom. It is responsible for the unpopular acts of its agents: injudicious legislation brings reproach, and favoritism excites indignation. Even when unmerited, popular clamor attributes to the government the disasters of every financial crisis, and all the evils under which a population labors. No government which takes under its control the

internal affairs of a country can maintain its popularity. And monarchy when unpopular must abdicate, or maintain its rule by the sword. Monarchy, being a centralization, can be maintained only by violence.

Monarchy can not exist without having control of the internal concerns of the country: it can not exist without a privileged aristocracy. Neither of these is consistent with popularity. Popular consent would not long suffer a nobility to exist; and a throne unsupported by an aristocracy could not co-exist with a democratic government. The first gust of discontent would overturn it; and the control of the internal administration could not but breed discontent.

Monarchy, founded in violence, can be perpetuated only by force. And the time is rapidly approaching when monarchy, as at present constituted, can be maintained by force no longer. Monarchy can only continue to exist by changing its form, through some powerful nation attaining universal dominion.

2nd. Instability of all other Systems of Republicanism.

History has rendered its verdict against the stability of a Confederation of Republics united in either a Centralization or a League.

A Republic, consisting of a single state, is equally incapable of stability. The concentration of all the powers of administration, foreign and domestic, in a single hand, is even more objectionable, here, than in a monarchy. It leads equally to neglect of the duties of government; it equally causes abuses of administration, oppressing one portion of the country to foster the interests of another, or one branch of industry to promote another. In a monarchy these evils are borne until they become intolerable and induce sedition. They equally cause outbursts of discontent in a republic. This first seeks redress at the ballot-box. Every election is an attempt to revolutionize the administration, engendering animosities which ultimately find vent in an appeal to arms.

Even where the government does not provoke sectional discontent, the excessive concentration of power leads to agitations which end only in the subversion of republicanism. Elections are exciting in ratio to the importance of the office to be filled. No government

can stand the shock of periodical elections where the powers of government are unlimited. Opinions will always differ respecting the policy of government, especially as regards the internal administration. Here the government touches the dearest interests of every individual. Every commercial crisis, every period of financial disaster, is traced to its influence; and opposing factions, assailing and defending its policy, will eventually come to blows.

Republicanism has always been menaced by two great and opposite dangers: popular excitement, tending to revolution; and governmental usurpation, leading to tyranny. Both these evils take their rise in the centralization of power, and find their only remedy in its proper distribution. The concentration of power, vesting too much authority in a single hand, increases the excitement of elections to a point dangerous to the stability of government. Were the government an absolute centralization, with all power vested in a single officer, the election of the ruler of the state would shake the republic to its center; and the excitement of elections is intense in precise ratio to the degree of centralization. As centralization endangers a republic by gendering popular excitement, so the distribution of the powers of the government diminishes the importance of the respective offices, until elections cease to be the occasion of popular fervor. Again, the concentration of power suggests temptation to usurpation by the facility of its achievement; but the distribution of power renders combination at once necessary and hopeless, and withers disorderly ambition in the bud.

The Distribution of Power is the only talisman to insure tranquillity and secure the stability of government.

The past experience of the world demonstrates the justice of this reasoning. All former republics have centralized in the hands of the government, both the foreign and domestic administration; and all have fallen from the convulsions induced by this concentration of power. All the simple, unconfederated republics of former ages fell through popular turbulence, the fruit of the concentration of power in the hands of the people; or through usurpation, induced by the concentration of power in the hands of the government. The representative system is no safeguard against the evils of centralization. The factions which convulsed the French Republic,

derived their passionate energy from the magnitude of the stake; the government was possessed of all power, and the factions struggled in blood-stained conflicts for its control, until the nation sheltered itself from their fury beneath the shadow of despotism. The passions, which have so long convulsed Mexico, and at last led to the establishment of imperialism, arose from the unlimited power of the government over domestic as well as foreign relations.

The concentration of all power in a single government—whether monarchy or republic—leads inevitably to convulsion. It is unavoidably incident to monarchy. That form of government was stable while it was the simple rule of force. But since the people are awake to their rights, monarchy has come to partake of the instability of centralized republics. The old system of a single government, in which all the powers of administration were centralized, would answer in a former age; for then, if a republic fell, the people might find repose beneath the shadow of monarchy. But now monarchy gives no repose. Force can no longer rule. Populations have learned their rights, and have been taught their power. Oppression now always provokes revolt, and populations fly from the oppression of monarchy to republicanism. In our age a centralized government is no longer possible. The old system of a centralization of power, would keep the nations oscillating between monarchy and republicanism, and finding repose in neither.

The French nation is a striking instance of the working of the old system of government—a nation flying from tyranny to republicanism, taking shelter from the convulsions of a centralized republic in the power of a despotic throne; again, wearied of oppression, unseating the monarch and establishing a republic; and finally forced again to seek shelter from the factions, gendered by centralization, beneath the strong arm of imperialism. In another century every civilized nation would be in the position of France, balancing between the evils of despotism and centralized republicanism, and oscillating, in periodical convulsions, from one extreme to the other.

There are but two forms of stable government now possible for the world. The one is the sway of imperial despotism, subjecting the world to the rule of a conquering nation; the other is the sys-

tem of federal republicanism, outlined in the Constitution of the United States. Russia is preparing to subject the world to the one: Providence raised up the United States to give to the world the other.

3d. The Stability of our System of Government.

Just at the crisis when the political progression of mankind had completed its cycle, and Russia was preparing to carry back the course of progression to its beginning by subjecting mankind to the sway of a conquering despotism, divine Providence interposed to give to mankind, in the American Constitution, the system of government which alone is possible in the present state of the world.

The Centralization of Power has been the cause of the downfall of all popular governments. No popular government has ever been able to stand which centralized in its hands both the foreign and the domestic administration. This centralization was the great primal cause of their ruin. The minor defects of their constitutions, as the want of the representative principle and of the division of the powers of government into three departments, exercised only a minor influence in bringing about their downfall. These were secondary causes. The ruinous defect of all former republics,—the prime cause of their downfall, was the centralization of all the powers of administration in the same government. Where this defect has existed, it mattered not whether the people exercised their sovereign powers in democratic assemblies or through a representative body; it mattered not whether all the powers of government were lodged in the same hands, or distributed into three departments,—the government has invariably trodden the same road to ruin. Fallen man is too imperfect to be trusted with unlimited power. The errors, the delinquencies, the misdemeanors of officials, sooner or later, ruin every government which is possessed of too extensive jurisdiction. The only security lies in so distributing power that little shall anywhere be lodged in the same hands.

The downfall of republics has been invariably brought about by centralization, as the prime cause, and by civil convulsion and violence in some form, as the means. The forms of civil convulsion are various:

1. Sometimes it is the collision of the several states of a confederation.

2. Sometimes the revolt of states against the centralized government.

3. Sometimes the struggle of rival factions to obtain possession of the government.

Centralization leads to civil convulsion by various paths; but one follows the other as surely as death brings decay.

1. Sometimes the inefficiency of the government injures the public interest, causing discontent, which ultimates in revolution. This is a frequent incident to centralized government, where the multiplicity of interests under its charge almost necessarily causes the neglect of some.

2. Sometimes the injustice of the government, displaying local favoritism or a partiality to special interests, excites the resentment of states, or classes of men, and leads either to the insurrection of masses of individuals, or to the revolt of states.

3. Sometimes the clashing of parties, advocating adverse lines of policy, begets a political excitement which issues in civil strife.

4. Sometimes the magnitude of the power and emoluments of office excite disappointed partizans to attempt to seize the government by violence.

The cause of the excitement of passions, in every instance, is the centralization of all departments of administration in the hands of the government. The government is so oppressed with business that it performs its functions negligently; or it has power enough to become oppressive; or its course of administration becomes so important as to excite factious struggles between the advocates of opposite lines of policy; or the prize of power and emolument is so alluring as to excite defeated factions to an appeal to arms.

The only safety to republicanism lies in the distribution of power. This alone can prevent the strife of angry passions, and secure the tranquillity and perpetuity of government.

In the American federal system the distribution of power is carried to perfection.

The original powers of government, inherent in the people, are vested in two depositories: the internal administration is left to the

states; the management of foreign relations, and of inter-state comity, is vested in the Federal government.

And each of these departments of the public administration is so intimately subdivided, that no important powers are lodged in any single office.

The internal administration is so complex and so important that, if its entire control were vested in a single government, it would lead to the most violent political contests, resulting either in violent disruption, through popular excitement, or in the aggregation of all power in the hands of the government of internal administration. The danger of turbulence on the one hand, and of oppression on the other, is avoided through the subdivision of this power among the various states, and the distribution of the power of each state among three departments of administration. Through this minute subdivision of power the internal administration causes no excitement whatever. State politics are almost entirely devoid of excitement.

The powers of the Federal government are also similarly distributed among the several departments; no powers of extreme importance being lodged in any branch of the administration. Consequently, the elections to federal offices are, with one exception, generally unattended with passion. The election of representatives and senators to Congress, and the appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court never convulsed the country. And had the Federal government always restricted its action to the foreign relations of the country, Congressional elections would have proved still less exciting, and would have been attended with as little passion as elections of state legislators.

The single exception is found in the election of the Federal Executive. Presidential elections have always profoundly agitated the country. But this is not owing to any constitutional defect in the structure of the government. The fact shows that too much power inures* in the presidential office. This is true, but it is power

* What follows upon the power of the President, appertains not to our Government, as administered in the past, but to the Government as framed in the Constitution. The power of the Executive is too great, but it will not answer to diminish it while unconstitutional legislative authority is assumed. It has fre-

with which the Constitution did not vest the Executive. The exaltation of the executive authority is owing to the unconstitutional encroachments of the Federal government upon the internal administration of the country; and to the fact that Congress has never imposed the restrictions upon Executive patronage which the Constitution contemplated.

The power of the President is two-fold,—legislative and executive.

The veto power vests the President with legislative power, and his voice is equal to the vote of one-sixth of Congress. While the government restricted itself to the foreign relations of the country, this would not vest the executive office with excessive importance. But when Congress assumes power over the internal administration also, the veto power of the President invests his office with transcendent importance. In a nearly balanced state of parties he holds the balance of power, and can sanction or annul the action of Congress at will. The party which is in a minority in Congress strains every nerve to elect a President devoted to its views, since his veto can arrest the legislation of its opponents. The result is periodical contests of unexampled violence. The struggle to secure the legislative power of the President is rendered the fiercer from the fact that the usurpation of Congress, in transcending the limits of its constitutional jurisdiction and trenching upon the internal administration, has invested federal legislation with excessive importance. The laws of Congress touch the dearest interests of the people, and the President's power to sanction or thwart them renders him a most important legislative functionary, whose election cannot but be attended with the most passionate excitement.

The executive power of the President, also, is increased much beyond the limits contemplated by the Constitution. That instrument authorized Congress to limit the patronage of the executive

---

quently occurred in our past history, that the great power of the President, being the only counterpoise to the unconstitutional action of Congress, has saved the republic from disaster. What we need is the restriction both of executive and legislative power, to their constitutional limit. To diminish one without diminishing the other, would destroy the balance established by the Constitution.

by vesting the appointment of sub-officials, either in the heads of departments, or in the courts of law. Vesting this power in the courts of law would have removed public offices from politics; but instead, political parties, desiring to increase the power of the Executive for party aims, have left patronage in the hands of the President, and that monstrous innovation—Rotation in office—has exalted executive patronage until every presidential election agitates the country as with the throes of a political earthquake.

The remedy lies in the distribution of power, for which the constitution has provided. Let the executive be stripped of its patronage by vesting the appointment of sub-officials in the courts of law, and let the Federal Congress abandon the course of unconstitutional usurpation of power over the internal administration,—and the power of the President will no longer be so great as to agitate the country in presidential elections. In a government administered in accordance with the principles of the Constitution, a presidential election would excite no greater passion than the election of the governor of a state.

The evils that have afflicted our republic arise, not from defects in the Constitution, but from violations of the Constitution. The unconstitutional centralization of power in the Federal Congress, and in the President, has proved the Pandora's box whence issued all our woes. Let not the reproach due to unconstitutional usurpation be heaped upon our system of government. The distribution of power for which it provides, is perfect.—Such a government presents the surest guarantees of stability, in its efficiency, its justice, and its freedom from excitement. Let us briefly notice its excellence in these particulars.

1. It is the most efficient government that can be devised; providing for the best administration, both of foreign relations and domestic interests.

The Federal Government, occupied exclusively with foreign relations, need neglect no department of the public interest. Embodying in itself the power of all the states, it commands the respect of foreign nations. The states, sheltered beneath the ægis of Federal protection, and withdrawn from the excitements of

foreign affairs, turn their undivided energies to the domestic administration. Thus, neither of the grand departments of public administration can suffer from neglect. No exigency of foreign politics can withdraw the state governments from a judicious internal administration; no domestic crisis, industrial, or financial, distracts the Federal government from its watchful oversight of foreign policy.

This system secures the most perfect equity of administration.

Under this system, every state, and every interest, is secure of equal justice and equal rights. A general government that controls the internal affairs of a country must afford undue advantages to some sections, and some interests, to the detriment of others, giving rise to a sense of grievance and begetting alienation. But here domestic concerns are left entirely to the control of the states; and in the Constitution, the states mutually agree not to further their several interests by legislation adverse to the interests of others. Each state manages its own affairs without external influence, and the industry of all sections is left alike to the action of the laws which govern industrial development. The influence of the Federal government is never felt within the province of the states. Its power can never become oppressive of the people, or injurious to their interests.

This system maintains perfect domestic tranquillity.

The efficiency and equity of the Federal government are sufficient guarantees against agitation arising from popular discontent.

The limitation of Federal power prevents the government from becoming an object of such supreme importance as to induce factious bitterness in elections, and civil war for its control between excited parties. A crisis would rarely occur when the foreign policy would possess sufficient importance to cause excited strife; and such crises never continue long enough to admit of opposing parties consolidating in support of adverse lines of policy. In quiet times such a government would be entirely free from political agitation; no issues would exist on which parties could be organized: worth and merit would be* the only title to political position.

* It is evident that the framers of the constitution did not anticipate exciting party contests. Had they expected such a state of things they would not have

This system carefully guards against the convulsions which have caused the downfall of all former confederations. Leagues have fallen from the collision of rival states arraying all the members of the confederation beneath their hostile banners: Centralizations have fallen from the revolt of insurgent states against the oppression of the central government. Here, both these evils are carefully guarded against.

The states can not come into antagonism with each other. The limits of their several jurisdictions preclude a collision of the governments; antagonism of their citizens is prevented from involving the states in controversy, by the intervention of the Federal judiciary, which alone has jurisdiction of such cases. Rivalry of interest may excite individual emulation; but, when neither state has land and naval forces, it can never lead to armed collision. The federal system secures uninterrupted harmony between the state governments.

Nor can a collision occur between the states and the Federal government. Each moves in a separate and distinct sphere. The Federal government can not interfere in the reserved province of state sovereignty: the states can not intrude into the sphere allotted to federal jurisdiction.

The entire system moves forward in harmonious adjustment under the constitution, without the possibility of collision. The Federal government is only known to the states and the people as the dispenser of benefactions. Its judiciary is the arbiter of their differences; its power is their shield against foreign violence; its voice, its arm, is the powerful interposition of all the states to allay irritation, to appease discord, in any one. As the peacemaker and promoter of friendship between the states, and the common executive of them all to administer foreign relations, the Federal government must endear itself by the experience of its benefits.

---

arranged the presidential elections as they did. They provided that the second candidate on the list should be Vice President. This was a good arrangement if a presidential election was merely a choice between distinguished citizens, to determine which should be elevated to an honorable office. But, when parties sprung up it was very inconvenient; for the Vice President might belong to a different party from the President, when the death of the President would give the administration into the hands of his political antagonists.

The system is so simple, so beautiful, so harmonious, that it seems wonderful that it was never discovered before: the internal administration, ever the fruitful source of faction and discord, withheld from the Federal government, and retained in the control of sovereignties too small for their interests to become the subject of factious discord; the foreign relations committed to the exclusive control of the federal agent of the state governments.

Were such a government as this established in France, republicanism would become possible among that mercurial people. If each geographical "department" of France were organized into a state, with a local government having exclusive jurisdiction of its internal affairs, while the general government of the nation was restricted to the foreign administration, the cabals, intrigues, and outbreaks of factions, which have repeatedly wrecked the republic, could never occur.

The last French republic fell before the fanaticism of the Red Republicans, who sought to control the government for the establishment of their leveling principles. The property classes, in alarm for their interests, sought protection in Imperialism from the schemes of these fanatics. But Red Republicanism could have no aim in a government having no jurisdiction of domestic affairs. Such a government could take no cognizance of their schemes. Their agitation would be restricted to the local governments of the "departments;" here they would be no longer dangerous; and the Federal republic, released from all agitating questions, would move quietly on in its sphere.

The same disquieting control of the internal affairs of the country has caused all the convulsions which have shaken the Mexican republic ever since its establishment.

It has been the fashion to affirm that Mexico and the European nations are not sufficiently advanced for self-government. But the difficulty lies in the machinery of government. If a government becomes oppressive—as every government does which arrogates to itself the internal administration of a great country—enlightenment will never render the people submissive. On the contrary, their restiveness will be in the ratio of their advancement. No people are, or ever will be, too enlightened to resist oppression: any nation in Christendom is sufficiently advanced to rest contented under a government which neither contravenes their prejudices, nor infringes their rights.

Not advancement, but a proper governmental system, is needed. A constitution properly framed so subdivides the powers of administration, that there is not power enough lodged at any point to induce agitation in the public mind, or to enable unbridled ambition to precipitate revolution and seize upon the administration. Such a government, restricted within its constitutional limits, may be harmoniously conducted by a people but slightly advanced in civilization. It is the only form of government which will not be continually shaken by discord, and eventually overthrown by revolution. The past experience of republics does not apply to a government constructed on the principles of the American Constitution. That instrument provides against the evils which wrought their ruin. It is destined to solve the grand political problem of a government of THE PEOPLE, combining in itself the merits of freedom, efficiency, and stability.

A republic, founded upon the division of power established in the Constitution of the United States, is not only stable, and capable of perpetuity; it, furthermore, has the capacity of indefinite extension. Other forms of government become too unwieldy by enlargement of boundaries. The internal administration becomes too complicated for management. The interests of some sections are neglected, or are sacrificed by bargain and intrigue for the furtherance of other national interests. "Log-rolling" is reduced to a system, and corruption or neglect reaches a point where the promptings of self-interest compel the dismemberment of the republic. But this is obviated in the division of the powers of government. Where the several states attend each to its own local interests, each can adopt necessary measures without neglect, and without the bargain and compromise necessary in a broader territorial sovereignty. So far as the internal administration is concerned, it does not matter how extensive the boundaries of a Federal republic.

Nor does the enlargement of boundaries increase the difficulties of the foreign administration. On the contrary, the difficulty of foreign relations diminishes in ratio to the enlargement of the republic; until, should it embrace the whole earth, there would no longer remain foreign relations to administer, and the powers of the government would be restricted to promoting the intercourse be-

tween the states. Thus, such a government presents the singular anomaly, of having the sphere of its powers narrowed as the field for their exercise is widened. Every enlargement of its boundaries renders the task of administration lighter: its energy may be diminished with every extension of the area of its sway.

A federal republic grows more stable with every enlargement of its boundaries. No danger can arise from the internal administration, for this is under the control of the states. The only danger that threatens it arises from foreign wars. While the world is at peace, foreign affairs are too tranquil to excite the public mind: no question of foreign policy can arise, upon which party lines may be drawn. But when foreign nations are at war, the question of neutrality or intervention agitates the public mind; and when the republic is itself engaged in war, its administration undergoes an instantaneous change. Its task is, then, to organize and direct the energies of the nation. War brings it into immediate contact with the people. The necessity for energy in its sphere compels it to impose burdens not always patiently borne. Moreover, military chieftains arise, whose battle-won popularity enables them to usurp an influence, to which their habits prompt them to aspire. War is the only rock upon which a Federal republic, whose government is administered under a states-rights constitution, can break. And the more powerful the republic, the less the danger arising from war. Every accession of power diminishes the chances of war; and, in the event of its occurrence, the increased strength of the republic enables it to bear the burdens it imposes without trending dangerously upon the internal administration; as the effort which cracks the sinews of a pigmy is scarcely felt by a giant's arm.

An extensive Federal republic is more stable than one confined within narrow limits. The stability of such a government will only reach its maximum when it embraces all the nations of the earth.

The destiny of Republicanism is peace. Its genius is unsuited to the stern conflicts of war. The rocking of the earthquake dislocates the machinery which revolves with easy, noiseless motion while resting upon the tranquil earth. Republicanism was designed for peace, not for the din of arms. Justice and beneficence are its blessed agencies of influence; gratitude, reverence, and affection

are the golden links which bind the willing subjects of its sway. Its destiny will only be realized when our noble Constitution, the best gift of Providence to the nations, shall link the world in the bonds of amity. May that destiny be realized in our own republic. With its government at length administered in accordance with the principles of the Constitution—inflicting wrong upon none, conserving the rights of all—may it at length unite mankind in the bonds of a common patriotism, and, maintaining peace and good will among men, usher in the Millennial era of peace and blessedness, and strong in the affections of mankind endure forever.

Sect. II.—The Past Career of the United States, evidence of its Mission as the Promoter of Republican Government.

The strongest argument in support of the Providential mission of the United States, ought to be found in the past history of the country. And had the administration of the government faithfully exemplified the principles of the Constitution, such would be the fact: the grandeur to which we should ere now have attained, and the immense influence we should have exerted, would exhibit the manifest destiny of the country in so clear a light as to place the subject beyond the necessity of argument. But our unfaithfulness to our institutions has no parallel, except that of Israel. The administration of our government, as will appear in the following pages, has been almost continually in violation of the Constitution. These violations of the Constitution have dwarfed and warped our growth, and marred our influence; and, consequently, our past career bears very imperfect testimony in support of the fact that divine Providence has marked out for us a path nobler than any nation has ever trod. Still, through our marred career, glimpses of what we might have been, appear. Even in its present fallen state, our country appears

> 'Not
> Less than Arch-angel ruined, and th' excess
> Of glory obscured."

What we might have been, it boots not now to inquire. But even in what we have been, and are, the traces of a glorious destiny appear.

I. The Unprecedented Progress of the Country.

Many considerations point to the conclusion that Republicanism is the form of government destined to prevail in the earth. Monarchy is not of divine appointment, but is the offshoot of ambition and violence. When the Almighty gave a government to his chosen people, a Theocratic Federal Republic was the form established. But perhaps the most significant fact of all is the remarkable manner in which republics have, in every age, been the most favored nations of the earth,—foremost in wealth, in arts, in influence.

It is one of God's laws in governing the world to center the attention of mankind upon the nation whose elevated institutions mark it as the destined leader of advancement, by bestowing upon it extraordinary prosperity.

Thus the attention of the world was attracted to the institutions of Israel—political and religious—by the extraordinary prosperity of the nation,—a prosperity the nation might have enjoyed ages before, if it had been imbued with the spirit of its institutions. Afterward, Babylon was raised up, to lead guilty Israel into captivity, and to transfer the trade of the world from Tyre to the free states of Greece. For centuries, the glory of republican Greece attracted the attention of mankind to its Thought, and its Free institutions. When Greece withered—as all nations wither, in the glare of prosperity—Rome, with greatness born of Grecian thought, and Grecian institutions, became the center of power and wealth. In the Middle Ages, wealth and commerce centered in the Italian republics, and the free cities of Germany. The Dutch Republic next became the great commercial center; until England having become a republic by the Revolution of 1640, and having conserved her free institutions by the revolution of 1688, the scepter of commerce passed to her hands.—The singular way in which prosperity has always clung to republics, making them the leaders of progress, is profoundly significant. Something is doubtless due to the energy of character which free institutions develop. But a history of commerce, showing the causes through which commerce has passed from nation to nation, will show that, not in the operation of the regular laws of industry, but in events directed by super-human

design, must be recognized the causes which, in every age, have given into the hands of republics the scepter of progress.

But nothing in history is so remarkable as the line of causation, which has enabled the United States to condense into half a century the growth of five hundred years. Six years ago, every ocean was covered with our sails; innumerable vessels plied upon our internal waters; canals and railways supplied artificial communication in every quarter; cities have sprung up, as if by magic, in the heart of the wilderness: in all the elements of wealth, of development, we stand abreast of the oldest and richest nations on the globe. Though dwarfed and warped by the unconstitutional legislation of the government, and far short of what it might have been, our growth is without a parallel in the history of the world. Its history seems more like a creation of the oriental imagination than the realization of sober fact.

Whence this unparalleled growth? What is the origin of this almost preternatural development, not only in population, but in all the elements of wealth? It is not attributable to population and energy merely, but to capital. We have had an unlimited command of capital which, though not wisely used, has wrought wonders,—capital derived from a system of industry which sprung up contemporaneously with our national existence, as if expressly for our benefit.

The American Constitution and a new Industrial Era had simultaneous birth,—twin blessings, with which Providence designed to crown the same nation. The obligation and the recompense were conferred together,—and our reward has been proportioned to our faithfulness. Had we have been true to our institutions, the prize of the industrial era would have been ours. Our governmental derelictions have caused us to fall short of the glorious prosperity within our grasp, and have suffered European nations to partake the feast, while we have only gathered the crumbs that fell from the table. Still, our portion has advanced us, as nation never advanced before.—Let us trace the rise of this era of manufactures and industry which has so wonderfully fostered our growth.

The perfection of the steam-engine was the first step in the wonderful course of invention that has revolutionized the industry of

the world, and multiplied its commerce and wealth. The next step was the perfection of the 'spinning jenny,' which spun yarns by machinery without the employment of manual labor. These inventions created a demand for cotton, greater than the whole world could supply while the staple was picked from the seed by hand. Next, the cotton-gin was invented, and America readily supplied the limited demand by her seaboard production. The cheap and abundant supply of cotton stimulated ingenuity to invent some machine which would enable manufacturers to weave the cloth more rapidly and cheaply than by means of the hand-loom. The power-loom was at length perfected,—and now the manufacture of cotton goods was only limited by the demand, and the supply of raw material. The seaboard of America could no longer meet the growing demand of the cotton market, and flatboats bore the staple down the interior rivers to the sea. But this involved great labor and expense; and without the discovery of some new mode of navigation, the cotton manufacture must have languished, and the finest lands on the Western Continent remained unproductive. But, lo! as soon as needed, steamboats plow the waters of our streams, and readily convey the products of the teeming soil to the ocean. Still the cycle of invention is incomplete: the manufacture of cotton is restricted by the difficulty of conveying the raw material from English ports to the mills in the interior; by the difficulty of access to many interior markets for cotton goods; and by the impossibility of producing the raw material in interior districts remote from river transportation. Then railways are invented: and the planter in the interior conveys his cotton to market without difficulty; the manufacturer transports it with facility to his mill; and railways open up markets in the remotest districts for the new and grandest manufacture of the age.

America suddenly becomes the center of the world's industry. The whole nation enters with ardor into the production of cotton: the South, furnishing the soil and the industry; and the North supplying stock, farming implements, food and clothing for the operatives, and the means of transportation to market. The population is insufficient for the demands of industry,—and millions of industrious foreigners swarm upon our shores, to make our railways, to build

our cities, and fill the thousand avocations to which enterprise invites. The wealth of the world flows in upon us, enabling us to command the industry of all nations, to speed our progress. The earth yields its hidden treasures: the gold of California fills our coffers, and is diffused among the nations to stimulate industry, awaken commercial life, and open new markets for our products; and, finally, the wheels of commerce are lubricated with the *oil* distilled in the laboratory of nature millions of ages ago, and now first brought to light,—a new and unexpected gift of a bountiful Providence to its favored child.

Our growth has not kept pace with our advantages. The grand benefactions of Providence are more wonderful than our progress. A new Era, born of new inventions and novel modes of industry, springs into existence to bless our birth. New inventions are made, to entice us into a new course of industry, for want of which the colonies had languished nearly two hundred years. No new invention is needed to further our interests, but it is instantly made. The human mind, suddenly, as by inspiration, seeks new channels of practical thought, unknown, undreamed of since the world began,—and of it all we derive the benefit. The new era makes comparatively little change in the Old World, already developed by a thousand years of plodding industry;—but it nerves us for our career as with a Titan's vigor.

We claim to ourselves the credit of our advancement; but our energy has not surpassed that of our fathers while the country languished through its colonial existence.—Not to us the honor belongs, but to Him who has given his chosen, richest blessings to us, the last and noblest of the republics. Let us be humble: not we, but our institutions are honored of God, that mankind may revere the liberty which attracts to us the smiles of heaven.

II. The Political Influence of our Country.

Compare the present political condition of the world with its state when the American Declaration of Independence startled monarchs, and aroused oppressed nations by its bold enunciation of principles,—and how great the change. Then, except the Swiss Confederation, not a really liberal government existed in the world.

Absolutism prevailed upon the continent of Europe: there did not exist a single constitutional throne. Aristocracy and crown alike oppressed degraded populations, who had scarcely heard the name of Liberty. The professedly free government of England was a sham: the aristocracy had robbed the monarch of his power and appropriated it to themselves; and the country groaned beneath the sway of an oligarchy as absolute and oppressive as the government of Russia.

Now all seems changed. Absolutism has been declining ever since our War of Independence. The English oligarchs have been deposed from power; France is governed by a parliament elected by the vote of the whole population; every sovereign of Central and Western Europe occupies a constitutional throne: the light has even penetrated Russia, and forced the Czar to make concessions to the aggressive spirit of the age. Europe seems slowly tending by a regular course of progression toward republicanism. Monarchy has been compelled to propitiate Republicanism by admitting it to a partnership in the throne. But monarchy and free representative assemblies cannot coalesce. The partnership between incompatibilities cannot much longer endure. Unless through our fault a reaction occur in favor of despotism, progress must continue, and Republicanism, dissatisfied with existing concessions, will topple its gray-beard partner from the throne, and sway alone the scepter of government.

How came this great change about? Philosophers had declaimed against existing evils, and indulged in many speculations with reference to the best remedy for the growing corruption of the body politic;—but neither their complaints nor their speculations had been productive of benefit. The people, stung by misery to insurrection, had risen again and again upon their oppressors; but their objectless struggles had proved fruitless, and, after every effort, they sunk into more abject slavery than before. The American Revolution changed all this in a moment. It shone, a bright beacon, to light the oppressed to the haven of liberty; and henceforth, in periods of political tempest, every eye was strained upon it; and now strong arms are nerved, and longing hearts are cheered, by perceiving that, despite

the adverse buffetings of a rough and stormy sea, they are gradually nearing the goal of their hopes.

The French Revolution transplanted a shoot of American liberty to the soil of Europe. The torch which lighted Europe with conflagration was kindled at our altar.

The outbreak in France was an inevitable result of overgrown and intolerable abuses; but it would never have attained the rank of Revolution had not our example given it intelligent direction. The tendency to Republicanism was given by minds influenced by observation and contact with American institutions. The Revolution failed;—but it left Constitutional Monarchy as its legacy to posterity. To it was owing the partial reform of the English government relieving the country from the domination of a feudal aristocracy, and the establishment of constitutional government in all the states of Central and Western Europe.

Had we been true to our Constitution, the prolonged struggle going on in Europe between Absolutism and Progress would, ere now, have been decided in favor of the latter. The cause of liberty would now be safe, and Europe, on the highway toward republicanism. But we have done very little to forward republicanism by direct influence. Our example gave the impulse, but when the crisis came to complete our work, the violations of our Constitution by the Federal Government had brought us into a position which rendered our influence nugatory, and left events to take a course adverse to liberty. Had we been true to our Constitution, the world would now be free. As it is, we may be said to have abdicated our place as the leader of republican progress. France has become the standard-bearer. Reaction, through our fault, has set in! Absolutism is arming itself to crush out liberty in Europe and the world! France stands unsupported in the breach! Unless we return without delay to the abandoned principles of the Constitution, all that has been won will be lost, and we shall be left to fight the battle of Freedom alone against a world in arms!

We have done much for liberty: we have left more undone.

III. The Analogies of Past History.

The present condition of the world is truly alarming. In Europe

the wave of republicanism that rose so high upon the battlements of monarchy and threatened to sweep thrones away, is receding. A violent reaction is setting in, which threatens to establish despotism on a firmer basis than during centuries before. We might well tremble for republicanism, were it not for our hope in the God of providence. Our faith is strengthened by the analogies of past history. Despite our derelictions, we shall yet fulfill our destiny. Awakened to our errors before it is too late, we will return to the path from which we have strayed, and assuming our rightful position marshal the nations on in the career of liberty and advancement.

Nature and history are the records of the working of the same Infinite Mind. As the phenomena of the material universe display the outworking of the great laws of material development, so in the political world, the great eras of history present the embodiment and the development of the principles which govern human progress. And as every great convulsion of Nature inaugurating a new geological era is marked by features which assimilate it to those that preceded it, so each grand era of political convulsion cradling a new era of progress presents marks to identify it with similar epochs in former ages.

The great transition periods of the world's progress offer striking points of analogy. The grand eras of history, like successive waves rolling from the ocean to the shore, present strong features of resemblance, even in minor points. The student of history need not greatly err in reasoning from the past to the present.

Some facts are so universally true, that they may be stated as historical axioms. Among them are the following:—

1. An effete civilization is the sure indication of the decline and approaching ruin of the institutions in which it has embodiment: it has performed its office in the course of human advancement, and must give way to a higher form of social, governmental, and intellectual life. A declining Civilization is never revivified into the freshness of a second youth. It flowers but once, and when its petals wither, and its leaves fade and fall, it languishes in exhausted

vitality until the plowshare uproots it, to give place to a new and more vigorous plant.

2. In the absence of any fresh embodiment of the principle of advancement, the decadence of the old institutions continues to undergo new modifications in endless progression; until the principles of progress, having taken root in a new soil, give birth to a new form of political life, which in its progress shall overthrow and displace the institutions whose vitality is exhausted.

3. The existence of an effete state of society, side by side with new and vigorous elements of progress, is an indication that the Old era is about to give place to the New.

History bears unalterable testimony to the truth of these axioms.

No effete civilization has ever renewed its vigor. Oriental despotisms, once so powerful, have been languishing for centuries. They never have, they never can revive their pristine vigor. The state of society to which they were adapted, and which gave them their energy, is worn out, and its vitality can never be restored. They will continue to stand powerless and inefficient, until some fresh form of social life, embodied in young and vigorous institutions, shall come into contact with and supersede them.

Such has always been the course of human advancement.

The idolatrous Sabianism had run its course, and Chaldean Magianism had developed its highest form of civilization, when Persian Magianism appeared on the scene.

The Iconoclasm of Persia in its triumph overturned the idol temples of Babylon, and established in their stead the worship of the spirit God of Magianism. The glory of the Persian empire disseminated among the nations the noble system of philosophy, based on the idea of one Supreme Being. But soon the force of the idea was spent. The Persian empire sunk into the decline consequent upon its decaying civilization.

Meantime the sages of Greece had seized upon the new thought which the grandeur of Persia had disseminated. The schools of learning had elaborated it into systems of philosophy which roused the national mind from the slumber of ages. The freshness of intellectual ardor gave birth to an exalted virtue and a patriotism

unknown before. Old ideas were discarded. The development of new thought led to astonishing political changes. Honored dynasties fell, and in the establishment of republics upon their ruins, the world beheld with wonder the development of democratic institutions,—an unheard of innovation in politics.

The coexistence of Grecian freedom and philosophy with the inert despotism of Persia might have indicated to the philosophic mind that the decaying life of the latter was about to give place to the fresh vigor of Grecian institutions. The conquests of Alexander fulfilled the presage.

But soon the philosophy of Greece lapsed from its influence over national thought. Corruption and decay marked the decline of Grecian virtue. Grecian power only remained until a more vigorous form of national life should come in contact with and supersede it.

Meanwhile Rome was ripening for its mission. The results of Greek philosophy had been transplanted into Italy, where Rome engrafted upon its Etruscan civilization the elevated institutions of its polished neighbors. Greek philosophy molded into law, cast the Roman character into a form of stern, stoical virtue, without precedent or parallel. As Greece declined, Roman civilization was assuming a form which fitted it to seize the abandoned scepter of progress, and marshal the world on in the career of advancement.

But the virtues do not flourish beneath the shadow of power. The stern dignity of the Roman character was tarnished by the prevalence of luxury: Lust of dominion bound Patriotism to its chariot, and dragged it in chains behind the triumphal car. The power of a new and holy religion then proclaimed to the world, failed to arrest the decay and infuse fresh life into the decrepit frame of Roman civilization.

But when Roman virtue faded, no successor occupied the field ready to seize the abandoned scepter of progress. The Barbarians who issued from the Northern wilds might overturn the tottering empire, but they could substitute nothing better in its stead. They destroyed the decaying temple of Roman grandeur, and used its materials, to rear rude structures on its site with barbarian hands. The civilization of Modern Europe is Roman civilization, modified

by Christianity and the rude customs of warlike barbarians, and developed in the course of ages into its present form. This civilization has, in turn, become effete. The structures of Power erected upon it are tottering and clashing in convulsions which betoken their fall.

Judging from the analogies of the past, the effete Roman civilization of Europe is about to fall into ruins. Will it continue under new modifications? or will it give place to a higher form of social and governmental life? Russia is aiming to sweep it away, and replace it with a despotism. She would succeed were not a power in the field ready to supersede effete institutions with the noblest system of government. The contest is approaching, which is to decide whether Europe is to be Cossack or American. The analogies of the past pronounce us victor in that contest: no effete system of government has ever been restored to vigor through an infusion of new life, when a higher order of government was in existence and ready to take its place.

A new Power has risen to seize the scepter of empire, and the voice of the Past announces that it is about to plant the standard of Higher Progress upon the ruins of European Monarchy and Medieval Tradition. As the Babylonian despotism sunk before the march of the free Persians: as the Persian empire fell before the assault of Greece under the lead of the martial chief of the free Macedonians: the Macedonian kingdoms before the onset of Republican Rome: the Roman Empire before the free Barbarians of the North; so must the tottering thrones of Europe fall before the rising Power, bearing the standard of Liberty, inscribed with the rights of man.

The mystic voices of the past hail us with no inauspicious omen,

"King that shall be hereafter!"

THE WORLD'S

CRISIS.

BOOK I.

PROPOSITION I.

The GOVERNMENT *of the* UNITED STATES *has, throughout almost its entire career, maintained* A SYSTEM OF ADMINISTRATION *in violation of* THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION:—*With the effect upon* HOME AFFAIRS OF TARNISHING THE NATIONAL HONOR; *dwarfing our* INDUSTRIAL PROSPERITY; *warping our* SOCIAL LIFE; *and plunging the country into Frightful* POLITICAL EVILS.

BOOK I.

EVILS INFLICTED UPON OUR COUNTRY BY OUR VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.

THE stormy character of our political career, and, latterly, the prevalence of political corruption must strike every student of American history.

The observer of our social life cannot fail to remark the decay of republican simplicity of manners, coupled with a social excitement unparalleled in the annals of the world.

Monarchist statesmen have inveighed against these irregularities as the spawn of Republicanism: Philosophers more favorable to our institutions would charitably account them the wild offshoots of a too rapid growth. But neither the genius of Republicanism, nor prosperity, however great, is responsible for these evils. They are the spawn of political pruriency. Radicalism, stealing with Tarquin step to its design, has debauched our Government, and engendered a misbegotten brood of Shame, and Vice, and Crime.

The insults which shamed our flag during the early period of our national career, and the social demoralization and political troubles which mark our later history, may all be traced directly to violations of the Constitution. A strict adherence to the principles of that instrument, would have induced a healthy development, combining simplicity of manners and social tranquillity with a grand, steady and permanent prosperity, free alike from foreign insult and domestic vicissitude. The abnormal development we behold is the consequence of the action of a government wrested from its constitutional moorings.

The evils which have afflicted our country are divided, in the order of time, into two eras:

1st. The evils arising out of the Carrying Trade, staining our early history with dishonor, and ending only with the disasters of the War of 1812.

2d. The evils arising out of the American System, dwarfing our industrial development, corrupting our social and political life, and ending only in the calamitous Civil War from which we are just emerging.

The subject will be presented under these natural divisions.

PART I.

EVILS OF THE CARRYING TRADE.

CHAPTER I.

THE ERA OF FEDERALIST RULE.

ADHERENCE to the principles of our Constitution would have caused us to avoid all the evils which beset our early, as well as our later history. But, almost cotemporaneously with our national birth, an evil fate precipitated the government into an unconstitutional course of administration.

Two antagonistic Theories of constitutional construction arose immediately upon the inauguration of the Federal government. These Rival Theories, advocated by successive political parties, have ever since been wrestling for the mastery. The fierce political contests which have rendered the history of America one long turmoil, took their rise in the ceaseless antagonism of these conflicting systems of constitutional interpretation.

As we have seen, the Constitution was a compromise of opposing views in the Convention. Its adoption only transferred the conflict between the advocates of these conflicting views from the hall of the Convention to the arena of the nation.

TWO RIVAL PARTIES arose under the administration of Washington.

In the Convention, the advocates of State rights thought that the Constitution established a government so powerful as to endanger the reserved rights of the states. But they gave their adhesion to it as much preferable to the weakness, the adverse interests, and, perchance, the military antagonism of separate nationalities. When the instrument had been adopted by the states, the State-Rights party accepted it in good faith, adhering to its letter, and its spirit.

They cheerfully acquiesced in the assumption by the Federal government of all the powers vested in it by the Constitution; but they were disposed to resist to the uttermost any attempt of the government to exercise powers beyond the limits of its constitutional jurisdiction.

It had been well for the country, had the advocates of a strong central government in the Convention accepted the Constitution, with its careful limitations of Federal power, in equal good faith. Had they been willing to acquiesce in the simple literal meaning of the instrument, taken in the sense designed by its framers, America would never have been a prey to political agitation and the numberless evils of our past career. But, unfortunately, they contemned the Constitution as organizing a government too feeble to sustain itself, and too narrow in its range of powers to foster domestic interests. They had accepted it, not cordially, but as the best instrument the prejudices of their opponents would concede. They now resolved to bestow upon the government, *by construction*, those powers, which the Convention that framed the Constitution had refused to confer.

Alexander Hamilton was the leader of this party. He had been a member of the Convention; but he had retired from the body in disgust weeks before its labors terminated. He was now resolved to amend the Constitution at will, by subjecting its articles to a construction so broad as to make it confer upon the government any powers he deemed it necessary to exercise. Thus the government might free itself from obnoxious limitations, and placing its own interpretation upon the charter of its powers, extend its functions as expediency or ambition might dictate.

Many who believed with Hamilton that powers more extensive should have been conferred, yet shrank from his scheme of construction, as enabling the Federal Government to usurp authority without limit or control. They had wished the Convention to confer powers more enlarged; but now, dreading unlimited usurpation, they contended for a strict construction as the only security against unbridled autocracy. When Hamilton broached his scheme of constructive powers, all these, under the lead of Madison, separated from his party, and united themselves with the advocates of state's

rights in endeavoring to restrict the Federal government to the exercise of those powers only, which the Constitution actually conferred.

Thus, at the very outset of the government, the country became divided into two opposing parties. In strict nomenclature, these parties should have been styled, the one, *Latitudinarian Constructionists*, the other, *Strict Constructionists*. But political parties rarely assume a cognomen which designates their principles. The former assumed the title of FEDERALISTS; the latter styled themselves REPUBLICANS. The political strife then inaugurated has ever since distracted the country. Since that age the struggle has assumed various phases; issues have changed; parties have fallen, and risen again, with new names, to renew their ceaseless struggle under new banners; but, in every era, the Constitution has been the bone of contention,—the party of Latitudinarian Construction struggling for power with the party maintaining a strict construction of the Constitution. Whatever names they have assumed, the one party has been *Latitudinarian Constructionists*, the other *Strict Constructionists*. And violations of the Constitution by the Latitudinarian Constructionists, during the periods of their temporary triumph, have gendered all the evils that have afflicted the country.

SECT. I.—THE POLICY OF THE FEDERALISTS.

In the mind of Hamilton the stability of the government was the first object to be secured. Every other consideration must yield to this. He believed Republicanism, at best, a weak system of government, to which only the best and surest safeguards can give stability. A close and practical observer of human nature, he placed little confidence in the power of mere sentiment. Observation had taught him that the patriotism which springs from self-interest is the surest support of a government. In monarchical countries, government is pillared upon the attachment of privileged orders, whose privileges depend upon its stability. As the gewgaws of rank and title had no place in Republican America, Hamilton proposed to secure the stability of the Federal government, by

attaching to it powerful property classes with the solid ties of interest. He never paused to inquire whether the measures he proposed were constitutional. He consulted expediency only. The declaration of the preamble, that the instrument was designed to promote the public welfare, was the only clause in the Constitution which he regarded. In his view whatever would promote the public welfare was constitutional. The formula which satisfied his scruples was similar to that which has become fashionable at a later period: "The Government must live: to this end it must conciliate the attachment of wealth and influence: if the Constitution does not suffer it to adopt a policy that will secure this end, the life of the Government is superior to the Constitution, and that instrument must give place to the necessity of self-preservation."

He saw, as he believed, grave dangers arising to menace the stability of the government. His comprehensive and statesmanlike intellect grasped every point of the situation, and conceived the measures necessary to avert the dangers he apprehended, and impart to the government the requisite stability and strength. Thus satisfied that his measures were expedient for the general welfare, he gave no further thought to the question of their constitutionality.

A brief retrospect will show the dangers he apprehended, and display the sagacity of the statesman who grappled them with a boldness, which, whatever our opinion of his principles, must challenge our admiration.

The climate and productions of the Southern states gave them an immense advantage over those of the North. Their products constituted almost the entire exports of the country. Their tobacco, rice, and indigo found ready sale in the markets of Europe, and cotton now began to be exported. But Europe afforded no market for cereals and live stock, the only products of the North. During the Colonial era, the West Indies had afforded a limited market for rum, live stock, and vegetables; but Independence had cut off this only market, and, at the inauguration of the government, the trade of the Northern states languished in absolute stagnation.

The advantages of the Southern colonies had caused them to outstrip those of the North during the Colonial era. Though all

except Virginia of more recent planting, and, at first, of slower growth, yet, in 1790, their population was almost equal to that of the Northern states. If the two sections should continue to grow in the same ratio, the South would soon be the stronger. The apprehension that the South might in a few years attain entire control of the government, the North sinking into a provincial condition, caused much hesitancy in the latter section in adopting the Constitution, unless such advantages were secured to their industry as would enable them to maintain an equality in the Union.

The comprehensive mind of the astute statesman who was about to give direction to the policy of Federal government grasped this state of affairs. He beheld in it grave cause of alarm. The country was already divided by sectional lines; and it had been disturbed by sectional jealousy even during the War of Independence. Should the South attain the decided predominance which its greater prosperity rendered probable, Hamilton might fear that the North would be impelled by jealousy to separate from the Union. He resolved to avert the danger by giving to Northern industry such advantages as would maintain the equilibrium, and attach that section to the Federal government by the ties of gratitude and interest.

With an eye to this end, the great statesman sought to place himself in a position that would enable him to mould the policy of the government. The unbounded confidence of Washington permitted him to select his position in the cabinet. As Secretary of the Treasury he had jurisdiction of the entire internal policy of the infant Republic.

It needed not his influence to secure the passage of a tariff law giving incidental protection to American manufactures, and a navigation act for the protection of the shipping interest. These were carried with the support of Madison. But these measures, in the existing state of affairs, afforded scarcely any special advantage to Northern interests. Manufactures were in their infancy; the shipping of Virginia rivaled that of New England: while the North was crippled for want of capital, there seemed a probability that the proceeds of Southern exportations might be invested in these new channels of enterprise, and give that prosperous section the same superiority in manufactures and shipping as in agriculture.

The pressing want of the North was capital. While the labor of the South was profitably directed toward agricultural staples which found ready sale in the markets of the world, only so much industry was diverted from these products as was necessary to produce articles of prime necessity. If the North were supplied with the necessary capital, it might, while the South was occupied with agriculture, engross the manufactures and the shipping interest of the country. It possessed every requisite for success in these pursuits except capital. It had no market for its agricultural produce; in dustry was stagnant for want of necessary capital to engage in profitable enterprise: the two prime requisites—labor and provisions—the North possessed in abundance. It was the aim of the Secretary of the Treasury to furnish it capital, to embark with energy in commerce, which the fostering care of government rendered so profitable an investment.

A legitimate means of partially accomplishing his object was obvious. The Federal government was bound in honor to pay, at some fair rate, the revolutionary debt. The armies had been stationed, for the most part, in the Northern states during the war, and the debt was in the hands of Northern capitalists. Its assumption by the government would give the North a capital of fifty million dollars, yielding an annual income of three millions from the Federal treasury. Hamilton challenged the gratitude and admiration of the Eastern and Middle states, by his earnest and influential advocacy of assumption; and he sought to make the capital available, by having the bonds issued in a form negotiable in the European market.—But returns from this source would be slow. Money could not be promptly realized from the bonds of an infant republic; and the three millions of annual interest was not sufficient to advance Northern interests so rapidly as was desirable. The North needed a large and available ready capital. To effect this object Hamilton brought forward a plan for a UNITED STATES BANK.

An attempt had been made in the convention to invest the Federal government with power to incorporate chartered institutions, but the power had been denied. The Bank was clearly unconstitutional. No clause in the Constitution could be strained to bestow

this power upon the government. But the North needed money, and the government only could furnish it. The Secretary of the Treasury deemed this a fit occasion for a latitudinarian construction of the Constitution. The loan of money based upon public credit and created for their express benefit would attach large property classes in the Middle and Eastern states to the government by the strongest ties of interest: it would enable the North to embark, at once, in profitable enterprises, and rival or outstrip the growth of the South,—thus averting the threatened danger of Southern predominance, and Northern secession. The measure seemed expedient in every point of view; it promised to promote the general welfare,—a main design of the establishment of the government: and even if power to charter a Bank was not granted in the Constitution, the safety of the government is superior to the instrument on which it is based! the Constitution must not be suffered to become a barrier to the well-being of the country!

Hamilton maintained that the government has the right to perform all acts which tend to promote the general welfare, without looking further for a grant of constitutional authority. Expediency was the only limit he recognized to its powers. He was inclined to contemn limitations which restricted the government within a sphere too narrow for his imperial temper, and did not scruple to call the Constitution "a thing of naught which must be changed." With the temper of a monarchist, he deemed gradual augmentations of power a justifiable art of State craft; and, conscious of the authority of precedent, he knew that a power once exercised is soon conceded as a right. He embarked upon his policy of centralization without scruple, and with consummate craft and boldness.

The Bank project encountered the most strenuous opposition. Madison, and many others were unwilling to blot out all the limitations of federal power by a sweeping system of latitudinarian construction, which perverted the Constitution from the safeguard of liberty into an instrument of usurpation. They took issue with Hamilton in opposition to the measure. But the Bank favored too many interests to be defeated. Its location at Philadelphia, securing to her merchants large prospective loans, conciliated the great State of Pennsylvania: the shipping interests of New En-

gland influenced the vote of that section. Constitutional limitations were insufficient to withstand the dictates of self-interest. The Bank charter was carried through Congress, by the votes of the Eastern and Middle states.

When the Bank charter was presented for his approval, Washington found his position one of peculiar delicacy and embarrassment. To assist him in his decision, he asked the opinions of his cabinet ministers. Their counter opinions—the Northern members, Hamilton and Knox, favoring the measure, the Southern, Jefferson and Randolph, opposing it—increased his irresolution. He hesitated long, wavering between opposing views. He even asked Madison to prepare a veto message. His vacillation proves that, upon the abstract constitutional question, he would have refused his sanction. But personal and political considerations combined to sway his mind in the opposite direction. Jefferson and Randolph were from his own state: Hamilton and Knox were his companions in arms. Himself a citizen of a Southern state, his veto would appear the result of sectional prejudice: magnanimity,—always the strongest impulse of that great soul, prompted Washington to consider favorably a measure designed to relieve the severe distress of the North. Moreover, the Federal government was as yet only an experiment, which a gust of sectional anger might overturn: the measure would attach the North warmly to the government, and to his administration: its rejection might subject him to the imputation of narrow views, sacrificing Northern interests to his sectional feelings, and might precipitate the crisis which it was Hamilton's aim to avert. The perpetuity or the disruption of the Union seemed to hang upon his decision. In such a crisis the bill seemed necessary "to promote the general welfare;" and, after long hesitation, Washington signed it, and it became a law.

Here was the first false step of the government, which, in its issues, proved the fruitful source of all our subsequent calamities. The United States Bank changed the entire course of national industry and development. It brought about a present good: but we sacrificed to it our normal destiny. It was the apple "pleasant to the eyes," for which we gave up our Eden of peace, virtue, tranquillity, and sacrificed the progress which Nature designed for us,

tranquil and void of excitement, but glorious beyond all we have attained, or even imagined.

The charter of the United States Bank—our first violation of the Constitution—brought the influence of the Federal government within the prohibited province of the internal interests of the country. It diverted the industry of the country from the natural channel in which the laws of industrial development would have impelled it, and gave it an unfortunate direction, from which it never afterward recovered. The normal course of our national industry will be best considered in a future chapter. We confine ourselves, here, to tracing the evils which flowed from the establishment of the Bank. As we proceed, it will appear that the charter of the United States Bank was the Pandora's box whence issued all our calamities.

The influence of the Bank was instantly felt by the industry of the North. The Southern states, having already a large capital invested in profitable agriculture, left the Bank accommodations to be engrossed by Northern enterprise. The Bank capital was freely loaned, and instantly infused new activity into the warehouses and dockyards of the North. Having no other field for enterprise, the North, having command at last of capital, turned its entire attention to commerce. Ships were built with Bank loans, and soon repaid the cost of construction with the enormous profits derived from the navigation laws. Again bank loans and navigation profits were invested in new vessels; and in a few years, through the impulse of bank capital and the protection of navigation laws, the growing marine of the North became more than adequate to the carrying trade of the country.

The influx of government capital quickened Northern industry in every nerve. Labor was diverted from profitless agriculture to profitable enterprise. The control of the shipping interest carried with it the control of the mercantile interests of the country. Northern ships naturally brought their cargoes to Northern ports; and, while the South was engrossed with agriculture, Northern enterprise monopolized the entire commerce and shipping of the country. Northern agriculture also felt the impulse: the numbers diverted to commercial enterprise freed it from the stagnation inci-

dent to excessive production, and gave it a ready and profitable market in the increased consumption of the seaport towns.

Hamilton's policy succeeded in averting the dangers threatening the Union from the approaching preponderance of the South; and it strengthened the government with the interested devotion of the Middle and Eastern states.

But his object was broader than this. He wished to identify the policy of the government with *his Party*, and to attach the Middle and Eastern states, with equal devotion to the Federal government and the Federalist party. He proposed to base his party upon the close union and firm support of those two sections, and govern the country by means of their votes. He might with justice hope that they would support with constancy the party whose policy originated their prosperity, and was necessary to maintain it.

The Strict Constructionists found their chief support in the Southern states. Southern interests, needing no patronage, united with reverence for the Constitution and zeal for State rights, to commit the South to the support of that party which aimed to restrict the Federal government within the constitutional limits of its authority, and debar it from interference with the internal interests of the country.

The leaders of this party beheld with concern the Middle and Eastern states leagued by interest in support of a policy subversive of the Constitution and dangerous to liberty. Self interest would cause them to maintain the policy it had impelled them to adopt: the leaders of the "Strict Constructionists" perceived that a direct issue upon the question of policy would result in the firm establishment of the Federalist party. Hamilton had planned his scheme of party domination with the skill of a consummate statesman. His antagonists prepared to counter him with skill and finesse equal to his own.

Hamilton's scheme of power was admirably conceived, and but for the force of an element which he had not calculated would have infallibly proved successful. His system of administration comprehended a double aim,—a means, and an end. It was the immediate

aim of his measures to confer vast benefits upon the Middle and Eastern states; his ultimate object, to transform the government into a Centralization based upon a moneyed aristocracy. He trusted that the immediate advantages derived from his system of administration would reconcile the people to its Anti-Republican tendency. He relied entirely upon interest, without estimating the force of sentiment. He trusted to the aid of the property classes, without taking into consideration the sentiments of the masses, who feel more than they reflect, and are swayed more by impulse than calculation.

In resting his party upon the support of the wealthy class, Hamilton was governed by prudent calculations based upon past experience. During the Colonial era, the American colonies had much of the aristocratic class distinctions which obtained in the Mother country. Men of wealth and high social position swayed the public sentiment of the Colonies. Even at the period of which we write, the property class continued to control the states by their influence. Hamilton seemed to consult the principles of sound policy, in choosing the support of the moneyed aristocracy as the foundation of his party. The Federalist party, founded upon the interested support of the Eastern and Middle states and the established influence of the aristocratic class, seemed stable beyond the possibility of overthrow.

But an event now occurred, destined to exert the most important influence upon the political and industrial development of the United States:

The French Revolution broke out simultaneously with the organization of the Federalist party, and disappointed all the calculations of Hamilton. It everywhere fanned democratic sympathies into a flame. The reverence which prevailed in America for aristocratic position was changed into antagonism. Instead of bowing, as formerly, to the influence of superior social position, the masses were ready to assert democracy against rank, and oppose the pride of equality to the pride of aristocracy. Slow alike to comprehend the policy of Hamilton and the constitutional scruples of Jefferson, they had a keen perception of the gradations of rank, and were easily wounded by the purse-proud assumption of wealth. The mass of

the American population, especially in the Middle states, were democratic in their tastes and warmly republican in their feelings, and were keenly jealous of the aristocratic sympathies and monarchical tendencies of the Federalists.

The leaders of the "Strict Constructionist" party seized this feature in the aspect of the age, and determined to array it against their opponents. The Federalists desired to lead the people into an Aristocratic Centralization, by conferring upon them unconstitutional benefits: it was their policy to enlarge upon the benefits derived from their system of administration, ignoring its aristocratic tendency. On the other hand, it was the policy of the Strict Constructionists to denounce the ultimate aim of the Federalists, ignoring the practical benefits resulting to the North from their measures. By appealing to class feelings and republican sympathies, they hoped to gain the masses in the Middle states, and array that section against the party with whose policy its interests were identified. Their rally words were Democracy and Republicanism, against Aristocracy and Monarchical tendencies. The better to enforce the grand issues they chose to present, and inflame the passions they wished to enkindle, they fixed upon a name which embodied this distinction, and styled themselves REPUBLICANS.

The attitude of the parties toward each other, and their respective sympathies, necessarily made European politics a prominent feature of antagonism. The French Revolution had entirely changed the aspect of American politics. It wrested from the Federalists a victory already won, and compelled them to dash down the chaplet of victory to harness them for doubtful conflict. They had expected to array the Eastern and Middle states against the South: it roused the masses in those sections against them. They expected puny assaults from opponents armed with abstractions: it confronted them with an angry democracy. They naturally resented the injury the French Revolution inflicted upon their cause: they saw in it the mob rule they dreaded at home: they hated it as an insurrection against established authority — the triumph of principles they deemed inimical to all government and tending to universal anarchy. These views naturally led them to oppose the French Repub-

lic, and sympathize with Great Britain in the wars raging in Europe. The Republicans, on the other hand, hailed the French Revolution as the Savior of America, and the Deliverer of Europe. Their enthusiasm was heightened by gratitude and admiration. In their eyes, it was the triumph of the People over long-established wrongs, the victory of Liberty over Oppression. They declared themselves the champions of French Republicanism against the armed despotisms of Europe, applauded its triumphs, excused its excesses, and palliated its crimes.

The Republican leaders availed themselves with energy and skill of all the advantages of their position. They cast a vail over the measures of the Federalists so popular at the North. The funding system was complete: the Bank was established for twenty years: the Republicans declared these measures beyond the politics of the time, and pointed attention exclusively to the monarchical sympathies, and ulterior aims of the Federalists. They denounced them as an aristocratic party, opposed to republicanism, every where; secretly aiming at monarchy at home, and in sympathy with despotism abroad. Their attachment to England was characterized as sycophancy to our oppressor; their hostility to France, as treason against Liberty, and black ingratitude toward our Revolutionary benefactor.

The Federalists were obliged to meet the issues tendered by their antagonists, and in the march of the French Revolution, European politics, originally incidental, became a leading feature in the antagonism of the parties.

The long, fierce contest of these parties, with its vicissitudes and changing fortunes, constitutes the first grand epic of our political history. A cursory sketch of its salient points is all our limits will allow.

Sect. 2. Humiliations arising from the Policy of the Federalists.

The outbreak of the French Revolution exerted an influence upon the material progress of America, not less potent than upon the political condition of the country. The immense mass of French population withdrawn from agriculture and thrown into the armies,

caused an immense demand for American breadstuffs, stimulating both our agricultural and shipping interests. The supremacy of Great Britain on the ocean cut France off from communication with her colonies; and the French government, abandoning the colonial system which had hitherto been strictly maintained, threw open her colonial and home ports to the vessels of neutrals. The fortune of war which soon after subjected Holland to the arms of France opened the Dutch colonies, also, to the trade of neutrals. Spain also relaxed her colonial system; and, in a few years, the course of events consigned the entire trade of her colonies, also, to neutral vessels.

A narrow mind deeming money the chief good, may hold it fortunate for America that the financial policy of Hamilton had stimulated the naval enterprise of the North into such activity that American vessels were ready to engage in this lucrative Carrying Trade. But measured even by the pecuniary standard, this neutral Carrying Trade was unfortunate for the country; its uncertain and interrupted profits turned us aside from a career of steady, uninterrupted, and enduring prosperity.—And then the measureless humiliation to which it subjected us! If wealth is purchased at a price too dear in the sacrifice of national honor and the deterioration of national character, the financial policy which, by enabling the North to extemporize a great merchant navy, embarked the Eastern and Middle States in the neutral Carrying Trade, was a great national misfortune. We obtained commercial advantages, it is true; but in acquiring them we became the football of the combatants. They both despised us, while availing themselves of our neutral position; and they mutually gave us such kicks, as wrestlers might bestow upon a beggar who was groveling around their feet for the coins that dropped in their struggle.

This accession of prosperity was dearly purchased by moral decadence, also. In the reckless fever of maritime speculation, the simplicity of manners that characterized the Colonial era was wholly lost. The thirst of sudden wealth seized the Northern mind, no longer patient of steady industry, and the prosperity attendant upon economy and patient application. New England was especially engaged in this new branch of marine speculation; the Mid-

dle states being more occupied with mercantile enterprise, and agricultural industry. It was the grand pursuit of New England, and its effects were chiefly visible upon the New England character. The character of the race was fused in the crucible of maritime speculation, and underwent a lasting and deleterious change. The stern, hardy Puritan pioneers would have failed to recognize their crafty and avaricious descendants. The New Englander became a speculator by natural bias. The wealthy embarked in the Colonial Carrying Trade where success was won by finesse and trickery; those in humble circumstances, seized with the prevailing mania, became perambulating peddlers of "Yankee notions." Then were developed the peculiar characteristics, which, wherever the race is known, have generated the proverb, "As sharp as a Yankee." From being stern, unbending, upright, they became models of address, suppleness, and finesse. Even the stern enthusiasm of the Puritan character partook of the general deterioration, and assumed a modified form of fiery fanaticism, controlled and directed by the dictates of crafty policy.

Far better for America, had Bank loans never enabled American shippers to extemporize a merchant navy, the fruitful source of gain —and demoralization. Without the Bank, we should not have had a navy sufficient to engage in the Carrying Trade, until the course of events rendered it impracticable. Pursuing our career of normal industry, we should have escaped the complications and humiliations which characterize an era of our history, upon which no American can look back without a blush.

* * * * * * * * *

* * * * * * * * *

[Here, thirty-one pages of Manuscript (comprising a sketch of the foreign relations of the country, full of humiliations, from 1793 to 1800) are omitted, as not essential to the design of the work.]

The political revolution of 1800 which ejected the Latitudinarian Constructionists from power, is a proper epoch at which to pause a moment and note the fruits of their policy. At this point of Amer-

ican history, we find the following "counts," in the indictment against the unconstitutional Centralization policy.

1. It laid the foundation of its power in public corruption, debauching the national mind into violations of compact, by bribes offered to interest.

2. It convulsed the country with party strife.

3. It gendered political trickery, causing the presentation of false issues, vailing Truth at the shrine of Expediency.

4. It fostered sectional interests, and embittered sectional strife,—which would otherwise have remained dormant, and sunk into oblivion.

5. It compromised the national dignity, making the Federalists and Republicans, respectively, the subservient partizans of England and France.

6. It diverted us from a career of steady prosperity which would have maintained our tranquillity, fostered our virtues, and conserved our honor, and plunged us headlong into the Carrying Trade,—a vortex of reckless, exciting speculation, that engulfed them all.

7. Through the agency of the Carrying Trade:

a: It subjected us to ceaseless humiliations at the hands of the European belligerents:

b: It brought upon us the contempt of mankind:

c: It debased the national character, teaching us to submit to humiliations with patience which at first had fired our blood with indignation:

d: In the absorbing pursuit of gain, it rendered us oblivious of honor, heedless of insult, and regardless of our plighted faith.

No American can look back upon that period without shame. The Carrying Trade demoralized us. We were ready to endure all things, so the Trade were not taken away. We entered upon it full of becoming national pride, taking fire at insult, from whatever quarter it came. But this pride soon forsook us, and the roar of indignation sunk into the whine of the peddler robbed of his wares. Nor is it strange that such causes produced national degeneracy. Humiliation debases the character as rapidly as vice,—and we were steeped in humiliation to the lips. We were the ally of France by revolutionary treaties, and had conceded to her the sole right to enter our

harbors with captured prizes, to the exclusion of her enemies. England heaped indignity upon us: instead of resenting it, we agreed to violate our treaty with France, exclude her vessels with prizes, and admit those of England alone!—so that we might be allowed to prosecute the Carrying Trade! France, in turn, trampled upon us: we sent an embassy to solicit a treaty! It was spurned out of the country: we sent another!—and agreed to pocket all past wrongs!—and violate our treaty with England, and allow French prizes to enter our ports! so that we might but prosecute the Carrying Trade! Thus we shuffled between the combatants, making outcry as a cuff was received from one, and a kick from the other; begging dishonorable treaties with both, and keeping faith with neither; but always with a keen eye to the main chance, industriously engaged in the Carrying Trade!

Pah! the deeds of that time smell to heaven, and even yet taint our reputation with mankind.

CHAPTER II.

THE ERA OF REPUBLICAN RULE.

The policy of Centralization was overthrown in the election of Jefferson, but the consequences of the policy remained when the party which had maintained it had fallen.

The policy of Centralization left the nation a legacy of insult and humiliation to be borne, more galling than any yet received.

The peace of Amiens gave a respite to Europe from war, and to America from insult. But the tocsin was soon heard again; and its sound was the signal for a renewal of contemptuous assaults upon our rights, and our honor.

* * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * *

[Another hiatus of nineteen manuscript pages, sketching the course of aggressions, growing out of the Carrying Trade, which issued in the War of 1812.]

The War of 1812 was necessary to vindicate our rights and assert our honor. The excessive insolence of the British government passed the measure of patience; the impudence of its negotiations surpassed, if possible, the insulting arrogance of its acts. Had the pacification of Europe found us still tamely enduring outrage and contumely, we had been branded with dishonor forever.

Still, it was a sad necessity which drove us to make common cause with Napoleon, at the very moment when he crossed the Russian frontier, to overthrow the last barrier to universal dominion. It was the last curse of Hamilton's system.

The War of 1812 was the legacy, which the Bank, expiring the year before, bequeathed to the country. In a domestic point of view, the war was the greatest evil the country had ever suffered. It destroyed the wealth which had been accumulated in the Carrying Trade; it paralyzed commerce; prostrated industry; and left the government overwhelmed with debt, and bankrupt in credit.

In 1815, the system inaugurated by Hamilton had run its course; and it left the country in a worse condition than it found it. We were deeper in debt than in 1791, when the Bank was chartered; credit was as prostrate; bankruptcy was as general; commerce and industry were at as low an ebb. The system of interference with the internal interests of the country by the Federal government had run its career. It had violated the Constitution, to force a hectic prosperity;—the short lived prosperity was dead. It had trampled down limitations of power, to foster accumulation of wealth;—the wealth had vanished. It had disregarded the institutions of the country to foster commerce;—commerce was ruined. Nothing remained of the fruits of Hamilton's system but a few hulks rotting in our harbors—Yes, the opprobrium it had brought upon us, hardly effaced by all the blood of the war, still lingered on our garments! and it had planted the seed of Centralization, and covered it in the ruin wrought by war, where it germinated as in a congenial soil, and overshadowed the country with a new and more baneful growth of Federal usurpation.

We have now traced the history of causation through which the financial system of 1791 led the country into the humiliations and

short-lived profits of the Carrying Trade, ending in the ruin of the War with England. It will be the work of a future chapter to trace the operation of natural causes, broken by the intervention of the Federal government in the internal development of the country, and mark the unbroken career of prosperity on which they would have borne us. We look not to that now. But leaving this out of view, no one will deny that even the most moderate degree of prosperity would have been preferable to the career on which Hamilton's system launched us. No one who traces the history of the country from the inauguration of the Federal government down to 1815 will maintain that our abnormal career of factious politics and excited speculation, with its concomitants of reverse and opprobrium, and its denouement in war, and industrial and financial ruin, is preferable to a normal career of steady, uninterrupted development.

Far better had the industry of the country been left to the influence of natural laws, without the interference of government. Then our people, escaping the demoralizing vicissitudes of speculation, would have remained tranquil and virtuous: no party banners would have waved over the Republic: no complications with European affairs would have induced alternate breaches of faith toward both belligerents, and brought upon us a series of humiliations dearly purchased by the gains of traffic, and expiated by the ruin of a war which swept all the fruits of toil and humiliation away.—Instead we should have been content with our own commerce: British jealousy would not have imposed restrictions upon our intercourse with foreign countries in violation of national law: our own mariners would have sufficed for our commerce, without tempting British sailors with high bounties to engage in our merchant service, thus inducing impressment in violation of our flag. A steady prosperity would have illustrated our progress; and with a spotless fame, resources conserved, and energies unwasted, we should have entered the course when quiet was restored in Europe, ready to bear away the palm of industrial prosperity from the war-worn nations of the Old World.

PART II.

EVILS OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM.

The prosperity of the United States has been unprecedented, their growth and development, without example. In little more than three-fourths of a century, three millions of people have become the most powerful nation on the earth.

We are apt to attribute this prosperity to the action of government, and to view it as proof of a wise system of administration. But it is really due to the energy of our people, and to our unparralleled natural advantages. The intermeddling of the government with the industry of the country has retarded our growth.

But for faults of administration, we should now be far in advance of our present position. We have grown with unprecedented rapidity;—but we have remained a satellite of the British industrial system, instead of ourselves becoming the center of the world's industry. We might have engrossed to ourselves the unparalleled advantages nature has lavished upon us. But, instead, we have only reaped from them a secondary advantage, lavishing our resources upon England,—resources which have rendered that country the industrial center of the world. We might have become the great center of industry and wealth, and of moral and political influence. This was the natural destiny of our country. We should have realized it under a constitutional administration of the government that left industry to the development of natural laws. Violations of the Constitution have cheated us of our destiny, and made us the satellite of England, incapable of controlling the course of events;—instead of the Central Luminary, round which all the nations would have revolved, swayed by our influence, governed by our example.

Before noticing the evils wrought by the American System, let us

mark the advantages Nature has bestowed upon us, and trace the career in which the force of irresistible causes would have directed our country.

CHAPTER I.

NORMAL CAREER OF THE UNITED STATES.

This subject will be best treated under the three grand departments of national development,—Industrial, Social, and Political. We shall therefore discuss the subject of the chapter in respect of,

1. Our Industrial Development;
2. Our Social Life;
3. Our Political Career.

SECT. 1.—THE NORMAL INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

The close attention of the reader is solicited to the course of reasoning presented in this Chapter, and especially in this Section; since the conclusions here elaborated become the basis of the course of thought presented in the subsequent part of the work. The train of thought is necessarily much condensed; much is left to the suggestion of the thoughtful mind; but the attentive reader will have no difficulty in following out the train of reasoning, and reaching the conclusions to which it infallibly leads.

In the discussion of our normal industrial career, Fancy will be discarded; our conclusions will be sought under the stern guidance of Reason. We shall not trench upon the realm of fanciful speculation, but trace the laws of cause and effect to their necessary and inevitable results. The relations of mathematical principles are not more fixed and unalterable than the relations of cause and effect. The principles of Political Economy,—the laws which govern industrial development, are as immutable as the first principles of Geometry. In reasoning upon industrial progress, deduction from cause to effect is susceptible of the same scientific accuracy as the demonstration of a geometrical problem. It is only necessary to

weigh accurately all the elements of a situation, and estimate the force of active causes, to arrive at a definite and correct conclusion. The cause being given, the effect may be positively known.

The history of our industrial development is naturally divided into two eras. The first began in the financial system of Hamilton, which launched us upon the neutral Carrying Trade. The second had origin in the American System, which undertook, a second time, to cause a forced growth of national prosperity, derived especially from the protection of home manufactures. The first era began in 1791, and extended to the peace of 1815. The commencement of the second may be dated in 1816, extending down to the present time.

It will be necessary, in tracing the normal development of our national industry, to mark,

1st, The causes in operation at the foundation of our government, which would have given direction to the national industry, had not their influence been destroyed by the intervention of the Federal government; and

2nd, The causes in operation in 1815, at the close of our War with England, ready to give direction to the national industry, when the intervention of the Federal government frustrated their influence.

In both these periods, the state of the country presented all the conditions necessary to promote a steady, uninterrupted prosperity. And in both periods, the unconstitutional interference of the Federal government in the internal affairs of the country changed the face of the situation, and rendered a career of normal prosperity impossible.

Let us mark the circumstances of the situation in both these eras, and trace the necessary operation of existing causes, in giving direction to our industrial development.

I. The Normal Industrial Career of the United States at the Inauguration of the Government.

It is the true destiny of the United States to become the manufacturer for the world. We ought, now, to be far advanced upon our career of industrial grandeur.

There are four conditions essential to the highest manufacturing success:—

1. An energetic and enterprising population, having adaptation to mechanical occupations;

2. An adequate motive power for driving machinery;

3. An abundant home supply of raw material;

4. An abundant home supply of provisions for the operatives engaged in manufacturing and auxiliary branches of industry.

These are conditions imposed by nature, essential to the highest manufacturing prosperity. Where all exist in the same country, the seal of nature has stamped that country as the destined manufacturer for the world. And though ignorance and governmental incompetence and folly may divert the country for a time from its normal career, its natural destiny will, sooner or later, be accomplished.

Of these conditions, the first may be termed fundamental. There can be no manufacturing success, without a population, energetic, enterprising, and having a mechanical adaptation. Such a population sometimes enables a country to triumph over all natural obstacles, and achieve high success in manufactures, without a home supply of either raw material, or provisions for operatives. Thus England, though importing raw material and provisions from all the world, has, by dint of the energy and mechanical adaptation of her people, attained great success in manufactures. This success, however, is owing to the fact that Great Britain has never yet been brought into active competition with a country having superior natural advantages. Other things equal, that country would be placed at great disadvantage in competing with a rival having a population equally ingenious and energetic, equal facilities for motive power, and an unlimited home supply of provisions and raw material.

The United States possesses all these advantages in an eminent degree. Our people are unsurpassed in energy, enterprise, and mechanical ingenuity; our rushing streams and immense coal-fields supply unrivaled facilities for driving machinery; we have an abundant home supply of provisions; and our capacity for the production of raw material for every kind of manufacture is unlimited. Our country possesses in an unrivaled degree the prime essentials

of manufacturing success. Nature has stamped it the great world-manufacturing site.

The causes were in operation at the inauguration of the Federal government which, if the government had not interfered, would have turned the energy of the country into the channel of manufactures.

Many obstacles had prevented the development of manufacturing industry, prior to that period. During the Colonial era, England had prohibited manufactures in the Colonies, that they might afford a better market for the manufactures of the mother country. Since the War of Independence, the want of comity between the states had prevented the development of manufactures in the Eastern and Middle states. Each state had the right, under the Articles of Confederation, to impose duties upon the commodities imported from the others. This prevented any attempt in the Northern sections of the country to manufacture for the South; and, domestic manufactures being general, there was no home market in those sections to foster manufactures upon an extensive scale.

But the adoption of the Constitution changed all this. The whole country was by it opened to home manufactures free of duty, while a revenue tariff afforded important incidental protection against foreign competition. The obstacles which had before prevented the development of manufacturing industry, were now removed.

Furthermore: the industrial condition of the country must have soon turned enterprise toward manufactures, as the only field open to it. Let us note the elements of the situation.

Abroad, the French Revolution was brewing,—soon to plunge Europe into a bloody war, and interrupt with British cruisers and blockades our communication with foreign nations. At home, the South was occupied in growing products for the foreign market, leaving commerce and manufactures to the Eastern and Middle states. The marine of the country was not yet adequate to the wants of our commerce. Until our tonnage was equal to the national freight, the impulse of the navigation laws would cause the profits of commerce to be invested in more ships. Before that maximum was reached, the repressive regulations of Great Britain would have deterred us from embarking in the neutral Carrying Trade.

Where could the profits of commerce then be invested? Not in more ships,—our tonnage being already sufficient for our wants. Not in agriculture,—that business being already overcrowded, and throwing redundant products upon a glutted market. Manufactures would be the only investment for capital. In the general stagnation of industry, they would be developed, as a matter of simple necessity.

Circumstances like these have always proved the cradle of Industry. Industrial greatness has always had hardy birth in circumstances of adversity and depression. The poor fishermen who peopled the Syrian coast, having no recourse but the sea, under the impulse of necessity worked cheaper than their wealthier neighbors; and thus engrossed the traffic of adjacent regions, and laid the foundation of the commercial greatness of Phœnicia. The fugitives who fled for refuge from the sword of Atilla to the rocky islands at the head of the Adriatic, in their exceeding poverty, developed an enterprise, and a resolute, persevering, and cheap industry, which gave birth to the wealth and power of Venice. In our own era, the poor peasants of Lancashire, far removed from the highway of British commerce, devoting themselves to labors of the spindle and the loom, laid the foundation of the manufacturing and commercial greatness of England. So in our poverty, would our enterprising population have turned of necessity to manufactures, as the only opening in the general stagnation of business.

Industry is a hardy plant, which germinates best in a sterile soil. Like the Alpine oak which takes hardy root and towers in grandeur upon rocky crags where tempests beat fiercest, Industry only grows to greatness when rooted in necessity, and nurtured in the bleak air of competition. The greenhouse is for exotics only;—the hardy plant rooted in its native soil needs but the sun and tempests of its natal air to further its growth.

We were then importing manufactures from England; the question must soon have suggested itself to our enterprising men in search of investments for capital that could no longer be embarked in shipping, whether we could not manufacture more cheaply for ourselves,—a question which must have been answered in the affirmative.

At that time the spinning of yarn by machinery was perfected, but the old handloom was still the only method of weaving. The expense of machinery, therefore, was not very great. The competition between the English and American manufacturer resolved itself into a question of cheap production.

A competition in manufacturing between two countries having equally energetic populations resolves itself into a question of

1. Cheap raw material;
2. Cheap food;
3. Cheap labor;
4. Cheap motive power.

In other words, the country will bear away the palm which can maintain the lowest scale of prices.

The conditions upon which a low scale of prices in manufacturing depends, may be divided into two classes. In the first place, it depends greatly upon the natural advantages of the respective countries; and secondly, upon their relative adventitious condition.

The natural advantages of a country for cheap manufactures consist, as already mentioned, in a home supply of raw material; and a home supply of provisions. It is needless to argue the fact that, other things equal, the country which has an abundant home supply of provisions and raw material will have both at cheaper rates than a country which imports them.

But these natural advantages are not decisive. They may be neutralized by other conditions. An inflated currency, an exorbitant tariff, heavy taxation, and the excess of demand over supply, may so inflate prices in a country which produces its own raw material and provisions, as to make both higher than in another country which imports them. These adventitious circumstances may neutralize all the natural advantages of a country for manufacturing, however great.

Therefore, besides the home production of raw material and provisions, a cheap standard of prices is dependent upon the following conditions:—

1. A specie currency;
2. A low tariff, allowing of cheap importations;
3. Light taxes:

4. Low prices are further promoted by an excess of supply over demand.

We shall not pause here to prove the fact that these conditions are essential to low prices; since the subject is treated at large in subsequent parts of this work.

In every one of these particulars the United States had the advantage of Great Britain.

1. We had a home supply of raw material;—while England was in great measure dependant upon foreign importations.

2. We had a home supply of provisions;—while in England the price was raised by transportation from abroad, and duties in the home ports.

3. We had a specie currency;—while, during the war with France, the currency of Great Britain was redundant, and depreciated fifty per cent.

4. We had a low tariff, graduated at a revenue scale;—while the English tariff raised the price of all foreign importations—breadstuffs and raw material, as well as other articles of consumption—up to the general scale of inflated war prices then prevailing.

5. We had very light taxes, indeed no taxes at all except the tariff duties;—while in England the most oppressive war taxes prevailed, and so adjusted, as to be peculiarly onerous upon manufacturing interests.

6. In the United States, prices were further reduced by the scarcity of money, and the excessive supply of provisions, raw material, and labor, above the demand;—while in England, prices were inflated by the redundant currency, and by the centralization of industry, even then begun.

In the face of these multiplied disadvantages, the British manufacturer would have found it impossible to compete with American manufactures. It needed only to turn our attention to manufacturing industry, and we should have outstripped England without difficulty. At that period, we possessed the elements of cheap production in a greater degree than any country in Christendom. We had a specie currency, and the circulating medium was very scarce. The specie value of labor, and of all commodities, was extremely low. In no country in Christendom did a dollar represent so much

value in labor and the products of agriculture. We possessed in the highest degree the three conditions of manufacturing success,—cheap raw material, cheap provisions, and cheap labor.

The raw material of the American manufacturer would be cheaper than in England: it was of native production; and the producer had the advantage of the English, in paying no rent to a landlord; no taxes to government; and in producing at prices graduated at the specie standard: he could, therefore, afford to sell at the low prices incident to an excess of supply over demand.

The same causes rendered provisions much cheaper in America than in England.

Indeed, as England was then the chief foreign market, the American price of raw material and provisions was the same as that of England, less the cost of transportation, the profits of commerce, and British duties. Upon an average, the cost of raw material and provisions in England was at least fifty per cent. greater than in America.

This fact would have proved decisive in a competition between the two countries, even if English employers starved their operatives in the attempt to reduce the price of labor to the American standard.

American enterprise would not have been long in perceiving these advantages; and the general stagnation of industry, where capital, labor, and agricultural products were all seeking a market, would soon have embarked the Middle states in manufactures. Once begun, our manufactures would easily have outstripped British competition. We should not long have lacked either capital, or skilled labor. The English manufacturer, under the impulse of competition, would reduce wages to the starvation limit; and American bounties would cause an exodus of starving British operatives. Those children of toil would gladly remove to a country where, though wages were no higher than at home, the necessaries of life were so cheap that industry was rewarded with plenty. Many British capitalists, in turn, would fly from war taxes, and war prices for raw material, provisions, and freight, to a country where they might manufacture free from the burden of taxation at a cost commensurate with specie prices for labor and raw material. Blessed

with peace, abundance, and a metallic currency, the United States, while the Old World was exhausting itself with war, would have embarked actively in a course of industry that would, ere long, have made it the manufacturer of the world.

In competition with England, we should at least have been able to supply our own demand for woolens; and we should, soon, have engrossed altogether the cotton manufacture; for, under the most favorable circumstances, the enhanced price of cotton in the English market, taxation, and the higher price of provisions, would force the British manufacturer to desist from competition. But the cotton manufacture is the most important branch of industry—almost equal in value to all other manufactures combined; and the exclusive possession of it would have made us the great commercial agent of the world.

In such a career, the progress of the country would have been ever onward. The fluctuations inseparable from a paper currency would have been unknown. Political changes could not have interrupted a prosperity founded, not on government patronage, but upon the steady laws of industry. The return of peace in Europe would have found us far advanced upon the path of greatness, and no subsequent events could have driven back the swelling tide of our prosperity.

This is not idle speculation. The laws of cause and effect may be traced to their inevitable results. And here the chain of causation is unbroken, and without a flaw.

Every other channel than manufactures would be closed to enterprise. Before we were ready to engage in the Carrying Trade, British repressive regulations would have excluded us from that field. British blockades and "orders in council" would have cut off our breadstuffs from the European market. Our foreign commerce would have been repressed by the incidents of European war. Cut off, in great measure, from foreign intercourse, the development of our internal resources would have proved a necessity.

While foreign events thus tended to force us upon a career of manufacturing industry, they conduced to render manufactures more profitable. Breadstuffs, cut off from a foreign market as contraband

of war, would be offered in abundance, and at the lowest prices: labor, out of employment, could be obtained in abundance, at wages merely sufficient for subsistence. Furthermore, a specie currency, a low tariff, and light taxes, would all conduce to sink the cost of manufacturing much below the English standard, inflated by a depreciated and redundant currency, a high tariff upon raw material and manufactures, and a most oppressive system of taxation.

Cut off from every other channel of enterprise, and with such unprecedented advantages over foreign competition in manufactures, it is not difficult to see that our astute capitalists would have perceived, and seized upon this splendid opening for investment. And once begun, manufactures would soon have infused new vigor into every branch of industry; and gradually exceeding the demand for home consumption, by the time peace was restored in Europe, they would have been in a condition to take possession of the markets of the world.

But Hamilton's financial policy precluded at a stroke the possibility of this career. The conditions essential to manufactures were the low prices and steady gains incident to a specie currency. The establishment of the United States Bank flooded the Middle states with paper issues, and inflated labor and productions to a price inconsistent with manufacturing enterprise. It developed the marine of the country in an excessive degree, and plunged us into the Carrying Trade as a means of transient prosperity. Indeed, the Carrying Trade was the only business which, in the inflation of prices, would yield a profit. That active traffic caused a brisk demand for labor and agricultural products, and contributed still further to the inflation of prices incident to a paper medium. Neither were any longer cheap. The material conditions essential to successful manufactures were no longer present. Nor was the mind of our people any longer in a condition to prompt them to engage in a steady, safe pursuit, rewarding diligence with certain, though moderate gains. That career of reckless enterprise produced in the public mind a fevered restlessness dissatisfied with safe and moderate returns, and fostered a general spirit of speculation intent upon pursuits involving great risks and large profits.

From the moment the Carrying Trade was begun—indeed from the moment the United States Bank was chartered, manufacturing industry became impossible. An exotic system of manufactures was fostered by our retaliatory legislation against European industry; but they were of hot-bed growth, and unable to endure exposure in the keen air of competition.

Hamilton's short-sighted policy, sacrificing principle to immediate advantage, cast away the crown European events were even then fitting upon our brows.

II. The Normal Industrial Career of the United States, after the Peace of 1815.

Upon the return of peace in 1815, we were again in a condition to accomplish our normal destiny of industrial grandeur.

The industry of the country, it is true, was prostrate. We did not possess one vigorous branch of enterprise; all were alike broken down and paralyzed. But though broken down, we were still abreast of the war-worn nations of Europe.

If the short-lived prosperity of Hamilton's system was past, we were also rid of its evils. The charter of the United States Bank had expired in 1811, and Congress had refused to renew its charter; in 1815, the state banks were all broken except a few in New England. We were again upon a specie basis, with only $15,000,000 of specie in the country. In this, we possessed the first requisite to the low prices essential to manufacturing success.

The return of peace also cut us off, in great measure, from foreign commerce; and the state of affairs was forcing us to engage in a course of self-sufficient industry. The European colonial system was again vigorously put in force, excluding our ships from all traffic with the colonies of European nations. Our traffic with Europe also was very limited: the continental demand for breadstuffs had ceased with the war; and the corn laws of England excluded our breadstuffs from her markets.

Indeed, we were in the same condition, as in 1791: except Southern products, rice, cotton and tobacco, the world afforded no market for any of our productions. Depression of industry was again felt in the Eastern and Middle states, and bore with extreme severity

upon the West, which had since been added to the country. Labor and food were abundant; and they were both exceedingly cheap, owing to the want of demand and the scarcity of specie, the only reliable circulating medium.

Once more the state of the country presented the necessary conditions of manufacturing success. Natural causes were again about to embark the country in a career of manufacturing industry.

But, on this occasion, the West would have become the seat of manufactures.

In tracing the causes forcing us upon a career of manufacturing industry, it is, in the first place, necessary to mark the influence the state of the country would have exerted upon the direction of emigrating population.

1*st. Emigration directed toward the South.*

It will be remembered that, in the last decade of the Eighteenth Century, the Southern states, busily engaged in prosperous planting enterprise, left the Eastern and Middle states to monopolize the mercantile and shipping interests of the country. These branches of enterprise, together with the uncertain and interrupted profits of the Carrying Trade, had busied the population of those sections, and attracted to them all the immigration to the country. The Southern states, engaged in agriculture and suffering from the paper blockade system proclaimed by the European belligerents, had not offered such attractions to the immigrating population. These causes, together with a large emigration to the West, chiefly from Virginia and Maryland, had enabled the New England and Middle states to surpass the South in the growth of population.

Upon the return of peace in 1815, the industry of the Southern states began to react from the depression caused by the European wars. The foreign market again offered an unlimited demand for their products. But the mercantile and shipping interests of the country, which the Eastern and Middle states retained, counterbalanced the prosperity of the South derived from agriculture, and held the balance even between those sections.

But the West was prostrate. Its fertile soil and salubrious climate had attracted a large immigration from the seaboard states,

and now its people were almost without a market. The Alleghanies presented an impassable barrier to the transportation of breadstuffs to the seaboard; the lower Mississippi afforded as yet no adequate market for its productions. Stagnation was universal. In the absence of specie, a depreciated currency was the only medium of exchange; and even in this currency, the price of labor and provisions was extremely low.

Virginia and Maryland are the hive whence energetic populations have swarmed, to people new states. Their healthy climate is favorable to the growth of population, which their soil, exhausted with long culture of tobacco, cannot support. From them had issued the greater part of the emigration that peopled Kentucky, Missouri, and the territories north of the Ohio. The same causes were still inducing a large annual emigration from those states. Thousands were annually forsaking worn out lands, to seek new homes, where a virgin soil yielded ample returns to labor.

In 1815, two sections—the West, and the Southwest—were rival competitors for immigration.

Whither would the Virginia and Maryland planters go?

The answer to this question was pregnant with consequences to the industrial, social, and political future of the country.

The West invited them to raise cereals and live stock, for which there was no market;—the Southwest invited them to its inexhaustible deltas, to grow cotton for an unlimited market at high prices and specie payment. The climate of the West was more attractive; but an enterprising population is influenced more by the prosperity of a country, than by climate. The West offered only stagnation, without present prospect of change;—the Southwest presented an inviting prospect of unbounded prosperity. What would be the result? The emigrating farming population of Maryland and Virginia abandoning worn out lands, to remove with their servants to a new country, would cease to flow to the West, and turn to the Southwest, to grow cotton for the English market. Southern emigration would soon become the rage. A stream of emigrants from the West would soon join the tide flowing from the seaboard to the South, carrying their servants with them from an unprofitable, to a profitable field of labor.

This emigration to the South would exert the most important influence upon the development of the country. We at present notice those consequences, only, which pertain to our industrial development, leaving future sections to trace its influence upon the social life, and the political career of the country.

The first effect of this Southern emigration would be an oversupply of the cotton market. The exclusive direction of labor to the production of cotton would soon overdo the English cotton trade, then just rising into importance.—This would lead to a division of labor. The Southern planter, no longer having a demand for all the cotton he could raise, would grow his own breadstuffs and raise his own live stock, producing, as an extra crop, merely cotton enough to supply the English demand.—This diversion of Southern industry from the exclusive production of cotton would exert a most important influence upon the social life of the country. But waiving this, for the present, we turn our attention to its influence upon the West.—It is evident that the loss of the Southern market would cause total stagnation of Western industry. Let us now trace the effect of Western stagnation in impelling that section to become the seat of the world's manufactures.

2nd. The Influence of general Stagnation in forcing the West to engage in Manufactures.

Let us return to the state of the country in 1815.

The Southern States were busied in planting for a foreign market.—The monopoly of the mercantile and shipping interests prevented a stagnation of industry in the Eastern and Middle States; the demand of the seaboard cities, and the occasional limited demand for breadstuffs abroad, afforded a market for their agricultural products,—so that, though languishing, their agriculture was not paralyzed.—But the West was suffering extremely. Almost entirely without a market for its productions, universal stagnation prevailed. There was no market for its products upon the seaboard,—even if they could be transported over the barrier of the Alleghanies. The demand in the South was too limited to relieve the stagnation.—Many Western slaveholders emigrated to

the South; many remained, unable to sell their own products, or to buy the products and importations of the other sections.

When, through emigration to the South, that section, raising its own supplies, no longer afforded a market for Western produce, manufactures would, of necessity, spring up in the West.

The Western farmer could not purchase the importations of the Eastern merchant, when he could not sell his produce in exchange. Under such conditions, continued importations from the East would soon end in bankruptcy,—it being a fixed law of trade that no country can import more than it can pay for by an exchange of its own products.

The West having no market in any other section, could not import from any other section. It would be under the necessity of supplying all its own wants.

The first step would be the establishment of domestic manufactures in every family. Homespun goods would be universally worn; and craftsmen belonging to the various mechanical trades would supply the simple wants of the people, receiving the products of the country in exchange. In a similar condition of industry the English manufactures had an humble beginning, and afterward expanded to their present proportions.

Though the West could not purchase goods from the East, owing to a want of market in the East for its productions, yet it is obvious that the manufacturer whose establishment was located in the West affording a home market for western produce, would find ready and ample sale for his goods. The advantage of machinery over hand labor would readily be perceived, and manufactories on a large scale would spring up over the country. Want of capital would impose no barrier. Nothing is so prompt as capital in seeking profitable points of investment. And, at that period, Western manufactures would have proved the most profitable investment in the world.

The West then possessed in the highest degree the conditions of manufacturing success. Money was scarce, and the standard of prices was very low. Labor and provisions were abundant, and cheaper than any where else in Christendom. Raw material for manufactures—wool and leather—might be produced in greater abundance, and at less cost, than in any other region of the earth.

Besides, it lay adjacent to the finest cotton-field in the world, and the raw material could be purchased delivered at the Western mill, at the price paid by the British manufacturer in the American port.—At that juncture, manufactures in the West would be attended with less cost than at any other point whatever. On the other hand, the price of manufactured articles would be higher there than any where else in America. The Alleghanies would afford Nature's protection to the infant manufactures of the West, more effective than any government tariff. The slow and difficult wagon transportation of goods from the seaboard, would so increase the cost of importations, as to enable the Western manufacturer to hold his goods at a price much higher than that prevailing in the Atlantic states.

With such advantages of cheap production and a home market at high prices, Western manufactures would not long languish for want of capital. The want of capital would check the growth of manufactures, until population had adjusted itself, as we have mentioned, by emigration to the Southwest. But though this cause might retard, it could not thwart the natural destiny of the West. Capitalists would readily enter into copartnerships with skilled operatives, to enable them to attach machinery to their establishments; following the example of England, where practical craftsmen had been enabled to enlarge their business, by the use of machinery purchased with borrowed, or partnership capital. Once begun, the growth of manufactures would be expedited by the influx of capitalists, mechanics, and manufacturers, from abroad, attracted by the advantages of the site, and the profitable home market for Western manufactured goods.

Western manufactures would continue to increase under the stimulus of cheap production and high prices for goods, until the Western demand was supplied.

Then the manufactures of the West would enter upon the second stage of their development. Up to this point, manufacturing for a home demand, the protection of the Alleghanies would shut out British competition. But when the Western demand was supplied, an attempt to manufacture for the other sections would at once bring them into competition with British goods. Could they engage in that competition successfully?

This question presents itself under two aspects.—(1.) The ability of Western manufactures to compete with English goods in our own markets, under the incidental protection of a revenue tariff; (2.) Their ability to compete with them in the markets of the world. Waiving the consideration of the first question as unnecessary, we propose to show that American manufactures located in the West, would have been able to compete successfully with those of Great Britain in the markets of the world, and supersede them by their greater cheapness.

3d. Vast superiority of the West over Great Britain as a Site for Manufactures.

It may be proper to remark that, at the period of which we speak, the manufactures of Great Britain had not attained the overshadowing supremacy of later years. England had not then centralized the industry and commerce of the world, nor acquired the immense capital which now gives her such a decided advantage in competition with the industry of other countries. England had just emerged from her long wars with France, burdened with debt, and with resources impaired and wasted. Her manufactures were in their infancy,—the power-loom having just been invented and put in operation. So far as resources were concerned, the competition would not have been so unequal. It would have been a competition, on equal terms, between two rivals, in which the competitor that could manufacture cheapest would bear away the prize.

In one particular the rivals would stand upon an equality. In 1820 Great Britain returned to a specie basis: both, therefore, would manufacture at prices fixed by a specie standard. But here the equality would end. In every other particular, the Western manufacturer would have most decidedly the advantage.

As already seen, the cheapness of manufacture depends upon—(1), cheap power; (2), cheap raw material; (3), cheap provisions; and, (4), cheap labor. The country which can obtain these things cheapest will outstrip all competition.

In each of these particulars the Western manufacturer would, then, have had the advantage of the English.

1. The Western Manufacturer had a cheaper 'Power' than the English.

The manufacturing greatness of England is owing to its coal beds, which give boundless power for the driving of machinery. This has given England the advantage over every other country in Europe. But in the West, motive power might be obtained from the waters of the Western States. The falls of the Ohio, the Mississippi, the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and other streams, afford unlimited water power, at points where the mills might be situated upon navigable streams, with every facility for receiving raw material, and shipping manufactured goods.

And where steam power was preferred, coal for running the machinery might be had at cheaper rates than in the manufacturing towns of England. Immense coal beds intersect the Western country; and mines may, at many points, be opened immediately upon the banks of navigable streams, where, without any expense for transportation, the coal may be loaded in boats. Then the mills, for the convenience of receiving fuel, raw material, and provisions, and of shipping manufactured goods, might be located immediately upon the bank of some Western river, where everything might be raised from boats, and lowered into them by machinery, without the expense of drayage. In such a location, the Western mill might obtain its fuel cheaper than the English. Other causes also, hereafter to be mentioned — as cheapness of provisions and lower rate of labor, together with the absence of government taxation — would conduce to sink the price of Western fuel lower than the English.

2. The Western Manufacturer had cheaper Raw Material.

In respect to a supply of raw material, the West has the advantage over every other region in the world. Mills, there, would be situated in the heart of the continent, in the center of the finest agricultural region in the world; while the Mississippi and its tributaries, veining the country in every direction with navigable streams, afford all the advantages of an inland sea. Manufactories located upon a navigable river of the West would, for all practical purposes, have the advantage of a location on the shores of the

ocean: they might receive by water carriage raw material from every quarter of the region in which they were placed, at the very lowest rate of charges for transportation. The boundless prairies and plains of the West, all veined by navigable streams, would yield an unlimited supply of wool and leather; and the cotton of the South might be delivered at the mills almost as cheap as at an ocean port.

The raw material of English manufactories was then, as now, in a great measure imported from abroad. While the Western manufacturer obtained his raw material from the adjacent region, at a cost very little above the producer's price, the British manufacturer imported his from beyond the ocean, paying, in addition to the cost price of the Western manufacturer, commissions, brokerage, and freights from the foreign port to the factory. The difference in the cost of cotton would be especially disadvantageous to the English manufacturer. For a long series of years, the Liverpool price of cotton was three cents higher than in the American port; so that cotton would cost the English manufacturer three cents a pound more than the Western manufacturer would pay for it, delivered at his mill. The English manufacturer would have to pay a similar advance over the Western price for his wool and hides.

But even this does not show all the disadvantage of the English manufacturer in respect of raw material. The British government was then in the hands of the Tories, who raised the public revenues in a manner most disadvantageous to the manufacturing interest. It was the aim of the party to protect the farming interest at the expense of the other branches of industry; and, notwithstanding the disadvantage under which the British manufacturer labored in importing his raw material from abroad, the government, to enable the British farmer to charge a higher price for his products, imposed duties upon all imported raw material that came in competition with native production. We shall be within the mark, if we estimate the cost of raw material to the English manufacturer, at thirty per cent. higher than its price at a manufactory located in the West.

3. Provisions were cheaper in the West.

At that period the British Parliament imposed high duties upon

imported provisions for the benefit of the English farmer. We may form some idea of the comparative cheapness of provisions in the West and in England, by noting the comparative burdens of the respective producers.

The Western farmer owned his own land, and, for the most part, cultivated it with his own hands;—the English farmer rented his land from the owner at an annual rent of from ten to thirty dollars per acre. The American farmer paid no government taxes;—the English farmer paid taxes upon everything he consumed,—upon the window which lighted his house and the chimney that warmed it, upon the glass which filled the one and the coal consumed in the other. He paid taxes on everything upon which ingenuity could lay a tax,—taxes on all he bought and all he sold—taxes direct and indirect—taxes levied by duties, by excises, by imposts, by stamps —taxes upon his property—taxes upon his crops—state taxes—church taxes—parish taxes for the support of the poor.

When the English farmer had paid fifteen dollars an acre rent to his landlord; the tenth of his crop to the church; twelve per cent. of his income for the support of the poor; and the taxes besides, levied by the state upon his property, his crops, his house, his business transactions, and everything he bought, and everything he sold,—he had very little left, after paying his laborers. The cost of transportation, and the profits of commerce, did not raise imported raw material and breadstuffs high enough. He needed a still higher price for his products, and induced government to secure it to him by a duty upon foreign products imported for the manufacturing and other business classes.

Owing to the cost of transportation, the profits of commerce, and the duties in the British ports, provisions were seventy per cent. higher in England than in the West.

4. Labor was cheaper in the West.

Wages in England were reduced to the starvation limit. But the laborer had to live—and had to pay his taxes. And the employer was under the necessity of allowing him wages enough to pay his taxes, and to support life. So heavy were the poor man's taxes in England, then, and so high the cost of living, that a bare

subsistence required higher wages than were then usual in the West, and sufficient to maintain the laborer in comfort.

The taxes of England were very great; and they were so adjusted as to bear with excessive severity upon the laboring population and the industrial class, while the landlord nobility who ruled the country were in great measure exempted from the public burdens.

Taxes were laid entirely upon consumption, excusing property,—a system that levies the public revenues almost exclusively upon the laboring class, compelling the mass of laboring poor to defray the expenses of government. The annual revenue of $275,000,000 was levied chiefly upon productive industry; and taxes were so adjusted that $215,000,000 were paid principally by the laboring population. State taxation met the laborer on every hand. It was laid upon his food, and drink, and clothing—upon the window of his little chamber, and the hearth by which he sat. Then, besides the taxes for the support of the government, the laborer was compelled to pay his proportion toward the support of the Established Church, and the maintenance of the pauper population.

This excessive taxation rendered it necessary to pay the English operative comparatively high wages in order to his mere subsistence. In 1830, the average rate of wages per man and woman was two dollars a week, or thirty-three cents a day. The only wonder is that, burdened as they were, the operative population could maintain life upon wages so low. But in the West wages were even lower than this, and with cheap food and no taxes the laboring population subsisted in comfort. In 1852, after the advance of prices consequent upon the opening of the California mines, the average wages of the American operative were only three dollars a week. And this in New England, where the cost of provisions was enhanced by transportation from the West and the profits of speculation, and where clothing was enhanced by the general scale of high prices prevailing. In 1830, when prices were inflated by a paper currency and a high tariff on all importations, the rate of wages for men in the West ranged from thirty-seven to fifty cents a day. The average rate of male and female wages did not exceed thirty cents a day. And they subsisted in comfort. At the lower prices incident to a specie currency and a low tariff, Western opera-

tives would have found those wages adequate to comfort; and they might have subsisted upon them much more comfortably than the operatives of New England mills now do upon their present wages. Factories situated in the heart of an agricultural region have an advantage nothing can countervail.

The English manufacturer would run his machinery with a more expensive motive power than the Western; his raw material would cost him thirty per cent. more; his provisions, seventy per cent. more; his labor, ten per cent. more. How could he possibly manufacture so cheaply as his Western competitor? The average cost of manufacturing would be at least twenty per cent. more in England than in the West.

But this is not all. We have not yet taken into consideration the personal taxation, and the individual expenses of the English manufacturer. All his expenses were increased by government taxation. His food was seventy per cent. higher than in the West; his liquors, his tobacco, and other articles of luxurious consumption were enhanced by government imposts from 100 to 300 per cent. over their cost in the West. He paid a direct government tax upon every business transaction. Then, besides his government taxes, the church rates and poor rates were assessed upon his income. The church tythes required one-tenth of his net profits; and the poor rates in 1834 averaged, throughout England, 12 per cent. of all net incomes.

Contrast with this the condition of the Western manufacturer,—absolutely free from direct taxation—clothing and provisions cheap—exempt from church and poor rates—and paying only the slight advance upon imported luxuries levied by a low tariff.

The excessive taxation levied upon the English manufacturer, together with the greater expense of living, would compel him to exact a higher rate of profits upon his business than the American would need.—Then we must consider that, besides this taxation and increased cost of living, the cost of investments was much greater in England than in the West. Under the circumstances, even if the cost of manufacturing were the same in both countries, the English manufacturer would require at least thirty per cent. more

profit upon his business, to equalize his net returns with those of his Western competitor.

Now then to sum up: The cost of manufacturing would have been twenty per cent. greater in England than in the West. Besides this, the English manufacturer would require, to meet his taxes, the greater expense of living, and the greater cost of investments, thirty per cent. more clear profits than the Western. So that, to make the same net profit upon his business, the English manufacturer would have to sell his goods fifty per cent. higher than his Western competitor.

Under such conditions, competition would have been impossible.

But this does not display to its full extent the advantage of Western manufactures over English. The shipping of the goods to the markets of the world must be taken into account, as well as the manufacturing. In this particular, the scale would be more evenly balanced, but, on the whole, the advantage would lie with the West. The English factories were nearer the ocean, but had the disadvantage of land transportation; while the Western factories, situated on the banks of the Western rivers, might lower the goods from the warehouse into a steamboat, to be taken down the Mississippi. Once reaching the Gulf, the American goods would be nearer the Central and South American markets; and as near, for all practical purposes, the markets of Asia and the Mediterranean. The English exporter would have a decided advantage in respect of distance, only in supplying the Northern coasts of Europe.

But excessive taxation, the great cost of living, and the high price of investments, would compel the English merchants and shippers to charge higher profits than the American would need. Taking the average of all the markets of the world, Western goods would reach the consumer burdened with fewer charges for transportation and mercantile profits than the English.

With cheaper motive power, cheaper raw material, cheaper provisions, cheaper labor, and cheaper transportation, Western manufactures would soon have driven those of England from the markets of the world. These advantages would have proved decisive. Against American manufactures located in the West, English fac-

tories could not have competed for a year. They must have yielded as we advanced, until we became the manufacturers of the world.

The disadvantage under which Great Britain labored in having to import raw material and provisions for her manufactories, ought alone to have precluded her from a competition with a country which produced both in abundance. The further disadvantage of $4,000,000,000 of debt, entailing a heavy annual taxation, was sufficient to cripple her competition with a country oppressed by no such burden. But the insensate method in which the enormous public revenues were levied by the Tory government, grievously oppressing manufacturing industry for the furtherance of their own class interests, ought, when superadded to the natural disadvantages of the country, to have crushed the manufactures of England in the presence of the active competition of a people, having equal energy, greater natural advantages, and exemption from public burdens. Nothing could have saved British manufacturers from overthrow at that period, but the injudicious intermeddling of the Federal government in the internal affairs of the country.

Wresting manufacturing industry from England would have opened to us a grand career of commercial enterprise. The manufacturing nation must, of necessity, be the commercial agent of mankind. It must receive the products of every country in exchange for its goods; and these, being transported to other countries, form the basis of a new and ceaseless interchange. European nations might for a time endeavor to restrict our commerce, by excluding our manufactures. But the cotton manufacture, the greatest of all, and almost equal to all others combined, would be beyond their reach; and the exclusive possession of this manufacture would alone give us the control of the commerce of the world. Moreover, our commerce, conducted upon just principles of free trade and fair and equal exchange, would be a benefit to all nations. The advantages it bestowed would be readily perceived; and the exercise of the constitutional power of the Federal government, in so regulating our commerce as to retaliate upon any country its adverse legislation, would soon have given it free course. We must soon have become the industrial center.

Such was the career which lay before us in 1815, if the government had left the industry of the country where the Constitution placed it,—to the development of natural laws. We should not have attained the height of our greatness at once: the first steps in the infancy of manufactures are taken with trepidation; but once begun, no branch of industry progresses so rapidly, or yields such vast results. The country would ere this have been far advanced upon its career,—much more populous and powerful than now.

See how England has advanced in wealth and population, since 1815. England has more than quadrupled her wealth and commerce since that era, chiefly through the manufacture of our products. Fabrics manufactured from our cotton have, during almost the entire era, comprised nearly half her exports, and they have been the basis of quite three-fourths of her commerce. Our resources have given birth to a new commercial era. The profits of the era of manufactures have been divided between England and ourselves. Our portion has enriched us, but the greatest benefit has inured to England. If we have grown great in ministering to the commercial grandeur of Britain by the sale of provisions and raw material, what would be our position if we had manufactured our products ourselves, and realized not only the wealth we have reaped as our portion of the profits, but engrossed that, also, which we have bestowed as a largess upon England?

Does any one question the fact that our unfettered industry would have sought the channel of manufactures? Where is the flaw in the unbroken chain of causation that would have impelled us of necessity, step by step, to engage in manufactures, and continue to extend them, until we became the center of the world's commerce?—Western stagnation, as its first effect, would have turned emigration toward the Southern states. This emigration would soon have oversupplied the cotton market. Then the Southern farmers must have grown all their own supplies, raising cotton only as an extra crop. This would have left the West absolutely without a market for its products. Unable to sell its own productions, equally unable to buy foreign importations, the West must, of necessity, have embarked in manufactures, as the only opening for enterprise, and the

only means of securing a home market for agricultural produce, and a home supply of necessary articles of consumption. Once originated, manufactures would have been the most profitable business in the whole country; both from the low cost of manufacture, and the high price of goods—they having exclusive possession of the Western market, through the difficulty and cost of importation across the Alleghanies. But the Western demand supplied, Western manufactures could not have stopped at that point. The growing agriculture of the West, laboring under stagnation as soon as the manufactures which constituted its market ceased to expand; the demand for foreign products for which manufactures were the only means of payment; the natural expansive force of manufacturing industry, seeking ever to widen the sphere of its operations,—would all have forced the manufactures of the West to expand beyond the wants of their own section, and compete with British manufactures, first, in supplying the markets of our own, and, then, of foreign countries. The immense advantage of the West, in every respect, over English competition is sufficient voucher for its success in supplanting England and becoming the great manufacturing site of the world.

No one can examine the natural features of the great basin drained by the Mississippi and its tributaries, without being convinced that the West is the location formed by Nature to become the seat of the world's manufactures. Where else on the earth is there a grand river chain of navigable streams, constituting, in effect, a great inland sea, connecting a whole continent, and affording in their banks a natural quay for commerce? Mark the various features which distinguish this region, peculiarly, as possessing in itself everything necessary to manufactures. There are the mill sites on the Ohio, the Mississippi, the Missouri, the Tennessee, the Cumberland,—in a salubrious climate, on the banks of navigable streams where, without expense of drayage or land transportation, provisions and raw material may be brought into the warehouse, and the manufactured article lowered into boats, to be conveyed to foreign markets. There is the boundless water power; and there the inexhaustible beds of coal, immediately upon the banks of navigable streams. There are the deltas along the Mississippi and its tributa-

ries, capable of affording an inexhaustible supply of cotton; and there the grand prairies and plains, to graze countless flocks and herds supplying raw material for manufactures of wool and leather. There is the finest agricultural region on the earth, capable of affording an unlimited supply of provisions to operatives engaged in the various departments of business auxiliary to a grand system of manufactures.—Nothing is wanting. The great region drained by the Mississippi and its tributaries affords every requisite to manufactures on the grandest scale,—provisions, raw material, motive power, facilities for transportation. Nowhere else on the earth do we find such unapproachable natural advantages for manufacturing industry.

Here is Nature's manufacturing site,—and the fiat of Nature and of Nature's God will yet be accomplished. The banks of the great rivers of the West will yet be gemmed with manufacturing villages, and become a great quay where the commerce incident to world-wide manufactures will be conducted.

America can never attain the stature of full development until it becomes the manufacturer for mankind. It never can become a great manufacturing country until the West becomes the seat of manufactures.

Whenever we abandon false principles of administration, and suffer our untrammeled industry to follow the guidance of Nature's laws, manufactures will find their home in the West, and our country, though late, will attain the grandeur to which the lavish bounties of nature evidently designed it.

We have now briefly sketched the line of causation which, first in 1790, and afterward in 1815, would have impelled the country, by force of necessity, to become a great manufacturing nation. We might here trace the operation of the causes which marred our industrial destiny. But this will be better reserved for another chapter, while we, in this connection, trace the normal destiny of the country, in its social and political aspects.

Sect. 2. Normal Social State of the United States.

The social life of a country takes its form, in great measure, from its industrial development.

The three forming principles of the social life of a people are, their religion, their government, and their industry. The influence of these three principles must be combined, to induce a high degree of social advancement. Religion produces little effect upon a population degraded by oppression and want. Nor can religion and elevated political institutions develop a high state of social progress, where the industrial condition of a people is unfavorable. Our own country is a striking example of this fact. The elevating influence of Christianity and Free government has been neutralized by an abnormal industrial system. The social life of the country has been perverted by the evils attendant upon excessive wealth, on the one hand, and excessive poverty on the other. Social excitement has prevailed to an extent unknown elsewhere. Vice, and immorality, and looseness of religious belief are alarming characteristics of American society.

We leave to a future chapter the task of tracing the effect of our abnormal industrial system in causing these forms of social evil. The present task before us is, to show the influence of our true industrial system, acting jointly with religion and free institutions, in promoting the social advancement of our people.

I. We should have escaped Social Excitement.

Social excitement is the first characteristic of American society that strikes the observer. This is an offshoot of our industrial system. It has been generated by the universal spirit of speculation, the friction of city excitements, and the abuses of easily acquired wealth. In a normal course of industry, this social excitement could not have been fostered into activity.

Under our true industrial system, each section would have supplied its own agricultural wants. The West would have found a market for its provisions and raw material in its own manufactories; the East would have afforded an active market for the agricultural products of that section; the South would have grown its own supplies, raising cotton as an extra crop. The only interchange between the sections would have consisted in manufactured products, and, in one instance, raw material. The bulky products of agriculture would have found a home market. Production and consump-

tion would have been brought into juxtaposition, and would not have required a multitude of transporters, all levying upon produce heavy profits.

Under such circumstances speculation would have no place in the business of the country. Almost the entire population would be engaged in productive industry. Each section would find a market at home for its breadstuffs and live stock, and where the producer was so near the consumer, few persons need be engaged in the transfer. The village merchant who supplied the farmer's wants would purchase his products, in turn, and sell them to the grocer in the neighboring manufacturing town. The wants of the seaports and commercial towns would be supplied with equal facility by the adjacent country.—The supply trade of the several sections would have been conducted without speculation or excitement.

The same would be true of the interchange between the different sections and the foreign commerce of the country. The true principles of commerce would obtain,—all bulky articles would find a ready market at home, and be withdrawn from commerce. Except the transfer of Southern cotton to the Western mills, the interchange between the sections would consist entirely of manufactured products and imported articles of luxurious consumption. And foreign commerce would comprise only our manufactured products in exchange for the industrial products of other countries. Commerce would consist in staple articles, not liable to fluctuation in price, and consequently not open to speculation.

The business of the country would have its regular channels, in which it would flow with methodical regularity. The cotton of the South, and the wool of the West would find their way directly to the factories, and thence to the seaboard. This would constitute the regular course of commerce. Methodical industry would be universal. Speculation could never have demoralized the public mind, and run the people mad with avarice and excitement.

As we should have escaped the excitement and demoralization incident to speculation, so we should equally have avoided the excitements incident to great cities. We should probably have had few very large cities. Consulting economy of production, factories would be located immediately upon the banks of our rivers, for con-

venience of transportation. The Mississippi and its tributaries would now be one great quay dotted with manufacturing towns. A few interior cities would rise to conduct the exchange between the sections; and with a few seaports, would suffice to carry on the commerce of the country. New Orleans would at first have taken the export trade. But Eastern enterprise would ere now have constructed ship canals from the Ohio and Upper Mississippi to the Hudson and the Chesapeake; and steamers laden at the Western factory would bear their freight to the ocean, and frequently to foreign lands.

Industrious mercantile cities do not necessarily foster excitement and corrupt the social life of a country. Social excitement and demoralization are begotten, not of business activity, but of furious speculation, and the prodigal extravagance arising from wealth easily won and readily squandered. In our normal industrial career, steady business activity would have fostered the active mentality, and the healthy prosperity essential to social advancement. The highest national prosperity would have been conjoined with moderate individual profits. Industry, contentment, and tranquillity, would have illustrated our prosperous career.

II. No Oppression of the Laboring Classes.

In our normal industrial career, we should have escaped, not only the excessive social excitement consequent upon speculation and the abuse of wealth, but also the evils incident to the oppression of the laboring classes.

Prices would have been equalized. Wages, though low, would have been upon the same scale as all articles of consumption. The factories being in the heart of the agricultural region, the operative would obtain the necessaries of life so cheap, as to live in comfort, and lay aside a fund for future necessities. Laborers in sea-ports and mercantile towns and villages, obtaining an abundant supply of cheap food from the adjacent country, and finding all manufactured articles cheap, would derive from their wages a comfortable support. The entire operative population would be happy, cheerful, and contented.

The farmer, every where, having a market at his door, would obtain prices commensurate with the standard rates for other articles.

Free from the oppression of speculators, who, to enhance their profits, reduce the prices of produce to the lowest limit, he would buy all articles of consumption at cheap rates, and obtain a fairer price for his surplus produce. Another advantage of the juxtaposition of the producer and consumer would be found in the fact that though the farmer obtained more for produce, it would cost the consumer less.

The speculator, alone, would have found no occupation. He could not have oppressed the farmer, paying him an inadequate price for his produce, while compelling the distant consumer to pay an exorbitant price. This class of middle men, who add nothing to the productive wealth of the country, but prey upon industry, building up colossal fortunes for themselves, would have had no existence. Those who have engaged in this produce speculation must have invested their capital in some other occupation, that would have increased the productive industry and the actual wealth of the country.

But our normal career of industry would have exerted a yet more powerful influence upon the South, in ameliorating the condition of the slave, and in finally putting an end to the institution of slavery.

As we have seen, Western manufactures would at first have been slow in claiming the attention of the people; that section, meantime, suffering from an absolute stagnation of industry, while the Southwest was flourishing with an unlimited demand for its cotton. This state of things, as we have seen, would induce an emigration of Virginia and Maryland planters to the South, instead of the West. This immigration would have supplied the cotton market, and prevented the rise of the slave traffic between the states; for, immigration supplying the Southern demand for labor, the South would not have become a mart for slaves.

This would have exerted a powerful influence on slavery in the border states. In Virginia and Maryland, slavery has not been profitable except in raising slaves for the Southern market. When the Southern labor demand was supplied by immigration, no negro traffic would have infused new life into Virginia slavery. Unable to support their negroes at home, and equally unable to sell, vast

numbers of planters from Virginia and Maryland must have emigrated to the Southern cotton fields. The few slaves remaining in those states could not have influenced public sentiment, and they would have followed the example of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, in establishing a system of gradual* emancipation.

The pressure of a still stronger necessity would have driven the slaveholders of Kentucky and Missouri to the South. In those states there was absolutely no market for the products of the farmer. The slaves were rather a burden than a profit. The impulse of self-interest would have swept their owners into the tide of Southern emigration, before the West became the seat of manufactures. There would have been an exodus of slavery from all the border states to the cotton-fields of the South.

This emigration, as a first effect, would have afforded a great stimulus to the national prosperity, through the rapid development of the resources of the South.—But we leave this out of view, to consider its beneficent influence upon the condition of the slave. The character of the institution would have been much ameliorated. There would be no severance of family ties. And when the Southern planter, turning his chief attention to the production of supplies, raised only cotton enough, as an extra crop, to supply the demand for the staple, the business of the plantation would proceed with the leisurely step characteristic of the border states. The servant would be cared for by his hereditary owner, surrounded with plenty, and never overtaxed with labor. The good feeling that once existed between the dependent and his superior, similar to that between the clansman and his chief, would have continued to ameliorate the institution with mutual and kindly regard.

Another effect: The value of the slave would have continued to diminish, until the institution terminated in general emancipation.

The value of servants has been exaggerated by the great demand in the South for slave labor, and by their exclusive employment in the production of cotton. They were always scarce in the market;

* This inference is corroborated by the fact that, in 1832, when Virginia framed a new Constitution, a provision for gradual emancipation failed of adoption by only a few votes. The Southern slave traffic, which afterward so strengthened slavery in the border states, was then only just begun.

and their labor was turned exclusively to a most profitable culture. The want of slave labor increased the price of cotton; and the high price of cotton combined with the small number of slaves in the market, to increase the ruling price of negroes. The want of negroes in the cotton states exaggerated their value all over the South. But with the migration of negroes from the border states, the Southern demand for slaves would cease, with a consequent decline in their market value. And the value of slaves would fall to a very low point indeed, when their labor, being greatly in excess of the wants of the cotton market, should be chiefly bestowed upon articles of home consumption.—This may be easily demonstrated. The slave whose labor produces eight bales of cotton per annum, when the article is worth fifty dollars per bale, has an annual value of four hundred dollars, less the amount required to provide for his wants;—but when, owing to the over-supply of cotton, only two bales per annum to each "hand" can be sold, and that at half the price formerly realized, the annual value of the slave falls to fifty dollars, less the cost of his clothing and doctor's bills. His continually diminishing value would eventually render the slave a burden to the owner. Chinese labor would be found more profitable. The negro would eventually have been colonized,—a happy, cheerful, civilized race, prepared to transplant to Africa our institutions and our civilization—and, without a convulsion, America would have become all free.

Let us take a rapid but comprehensive view of the social state of the country, as it would have been developed under a normal industrial system. It would have been the most healthful and virtuous any nation ever enjoyed.

The East would have been devoted to commerce. The immense foreign trade, distributed from Boston to the Chesapeake, would have afforded an active market for the products of the region east of the Alleghanies, and given life and energy to the prosperous commercial cities springing up along our coast.

The Great West, with its boundless area of fertile lands, would have been pastoral, agricultural, and manufacturing. Enterprise and capital would have been diffused over hamlet and village and town,

as the wants of industry required. Under such circumstances, manufactures would not prove the source of moral contamination they generally become, elsewhere. The operatives would be country youths, bringing with them the uncorrupted virtue of their country homes, and expecting to return, in a few years, with the savings of their industry, and establish themselves upon the cheap and fertile lands that invited settlement. The rural population would find comfortable subsistence in agriculture, and an unfailing opening for industry in the mills. Agriculture would supply the factories with labor, and the factories, in turn, would build up agriculture with a host of frugal, industrious farmers. The cities, towns, and villages, dispersed over the country, full of business activity, would graft upon the virtuous simplicity of rural manners, cultivation and social refinement. These centers of social activity would present the country population an elevating example of intelligence, energy, and refinement, and be influenced, in turn, by the hardy, simple virtues of rural life.

The South would have been dotted over with small plantations. The planters would have been modest farmers, superintending each his own culture, directing the industry of his patrimonial servants, and holding toward them the clannish relation of mutual sympathy and attachment which guardianship on the one hand, and reverence and dependence on the other, always inspire. Growing their own supplies, and free from debt, they would occupy that station of independence to which belong frugal happiness and generous liberality, equally removed from the extremes of avarice and extravagance. Amid a dense and cultivated population the wants of society would be met at home. The social circle, with its genial influences, would implant those graces of character which solitary life, on isolated plantations, surrounded by inferiors, is so little apt to inspire. The wealth and culture of the planters would render country life the social center of Southern society. Economy and content would confer a happiness wealth alone can never bestow. The home virtues would substitute the dissipation of fashion. A domestic, cultivated people would seek enjoyment, rather in social and intellectual pleasures, than in the flurry and heartless extravagance of fashionable life.

The whole country would have been blessed with a social state of unexampled excellence. The healthful home virtues would have everywhere prevailed. The home influence would not have been lost. Home would not have become merely a place of business where money might be gained, to be spent in seeking pleasure abroad,—but, a place endeared to the heart, round which affection weaves its strongest ties. We should not have been an errant people, driven by business or allured by pleasure. There would have been no fever, no excitement, no speculation,—no rush, hurry, and turmoil, building up bloated fortunes, and engendering extravagant, reckless expenditure; but, a healthy circulation, inducing industry and enterprise, and building all over the country thriving towns to become the centers of intelligence, activity, and social movement. There would have been less extravagance, fewer overgrown fortunes, and a more general diffusion of wealth. We should have exemplified enterprise without speculation, industry without avarice, hospitality without profusion, prosperity without extravagance, wealth without ostentation, contentment without indolence, economy without meanness, poverty without want. Such a condition Providence designed for the people who were intended to recommend Republicanism to the world, by their industry, their prosperity, and their virtues.

Sect. 3. The Normal Political Destiny of the United States.

I. Political Agitations Avoided.

It has already been shown that a States-rights republic, organized upon the model of ours, is calculated to maintain unbroken harmony,—the federal and state governments moving quietly in their respective spheres without the possibility of coming into collision while mutually respecting the several limits of their respective powers. In a normal course of industry nothing could have occurred to mar this harmony; the course of events would have bound the country together with the indissoluble bonds of mutual sympathies and a common interest.

The political excitements which long convulsed the country, and at length culminated in civil conflict, were engendered by three causes:—(1) The attempts of the Federal government to transcend

the limits of constitutional power and interfere with internal interests caused the formation of political parties whose heated passions, inflamed by the magnitude of the issues at stake, distracted the country with factious struggles.—(2) The Federal government, in its interference with the internal interests of the country, fostered the interests of some sections at the expense of others, and thus excited sectional animosities.—(3) When sectional bitterness was once engendered, slavery became the issue which brought about a sectional collision,—slavery, stimulated into unnatural vigor, and filled with abuses, by the abnormal course of industry fostered by the unconstitutional interference of the Federal government with the internal interests of the country.

In every step the unconstitutional course of the Federal government has been the originating cause of political agitation.

In our normal industrial career we should have had no political agitations.

Under a constitutional administration of the government, no questions of policy could have arisen of sufficient importance to give rise to excited political parties. Mere questions of foreign policy could not have excited fierce and enduring passions.

In our normal career of industry, no sectional agitations could have arisen.

The slavery question could not have caused excitement, when no slave traffic existed between the states, and when, in the cotton states, the institution presented a mild and benevolent aspect. Seeing it fading from the border states, the non-slaveholding sentiment of the North would have left the institution to the operations of natural laws.

The slavery agitation originated in sectional jealousy. But in a normal course of industry all sectional jealousies would have been allayed. Each section would then have been the complement of the others, dissimilar, yet essential to a harmonious whole,—the South and West producing the raw material, the West manufacturing it, the East, the commercial agent. This would indeed have bound the Union together by the strongest ties of interest. The prosperity of each section would have been the prosperity of all. Identity of interest would have been complete. Each section would have been dependent upon the others for its prosperity, and neither could have

been dispensed with. We should have been one body,—the South, the hands; the East, the feet; the West, the trunk, receiving all, dispensing all. Our body politic would have been an unit,—one interest, one mind, one will. Perfect harmony prevailing, affections blending, united in purpose and in effort, the bond of amity and union would have been without a flaw.

It is impossible to decide which section would have enjoyed the greater share of wealth and prosperity,—the producing South, the manufacturing West, or the commercial states of the Atlantic. It would have been a prosperity enriching all, sufficing all. As new markets were opened, Western manufactures would continually enlarge the sphere of their operations, Southern planters grow more cotton, and the Atlantic states enlarge their dock-yards, to meet the growing wants of our commerce.

Then, indeed, might America have become the standard bearer of Freedom and advancement. United, prosperous, and free, the influence of our example would be mighty, our power irresistible. Our immense superiority in wealth and commercial greatness would give us a moral ascendancy and a national influence that could not be resisted. In the present political state of the world our mandate would be law. The coming contest with despotism, now perhaps unavoidable, would have been averted. The nations would have grown up into liberty and enlightenment under the shadow of our protection; and before the mighty, though peaceful march of our career, Tyranny would have fallen without a struggle, withered as by the breath of the Almighty.

II. Our Prosperity Perpetual.

The balances of the Constitution would prevent the government from committing those faults which cause political changes, and work the downfall of republics. And from the peculiar and fortunate circumstances of our industrial condition, we might hope to escape the operation of the forces which impel nations that rise from poverty and weakness to wealth and grandeur, through an unvarying cycle of corruption and decline.

It has long been a problem how enterprise might be made consistent with virtue, and the highest civilization, with simplicity of

manners,—and the past history of mankind has failed to furnish a solution. The wealth of commerce has always gendered corruption, and ripened into decay.

But demoralization is not necessarily incident to commerce, more than tyranny to government. Centralization is, in both instances, the cause of demoralization. Heretofore, in every age, capital and enterprise have diverted commerce from its natural channels. Countries having neither raw material, nor food for operatives, have become the center of manufactures. Their importations from every land have built up vast cities, whose growth has been still further forced by their being made the entrepot for exportations. And the narrow selfishness of governments has increased the evil, by compelling shippers, even at a loss, to land the articles received in exchange for manufactures at home ports, instead of seeking an immediate market for the cargo.

England, for example, purchasing raw material and provisions from all the world, necessarily centralizes a wide traffic in her ports, to sustain her manufactures. And the produce received in exchange for her manufactured products is brought to English ports, to be sent thence to appropriate markets—again exchanged for produce to be brought to England—again exported and re-exchanged—and so on in endless succession. It is not so much manufactures, as this vast commerce which is the fruit of manufactures, that bloats the cities of a country. Thus, London, the center of commercial exchange, has a population of three million souls crowded in wretchedness within its limits, while Liverpool, the manufacturing entrepot, has a population of less than half a million. England already feels the plethora of this centralized commerce in the increase of selfishness, poverty, and crime, the relaxation of morals, the waning of political energy, and the paling of her proud spirit.

This is the natural order. No commercial nation has ever yet escaped the operation of these causes. All have been exposed to them from their very location. Situated in the highway of trade, commercial countries have hitherto necessarily become the entrepots of the commerce they conducted. Tyre, Egypt, Venice, were situated on the line of communication between the East and the West, and the commerce they successively carried on, all touched at their

docks. The same is true of Portugal, Holland, England, the successive commercial agents of modern times. Situated in the center of their traffic, they all became the central depots of their commerce, and became corrupted by excitement and the centralization of wealth. No commercial agent has yet arisen which did not of necessity centralize commerce; nor any manufacturing country, possessing within itself raw material, provisions, and labor, and indebted to commerce for nothing necessary to its business.

This destiny was reserved for us. Our country is so remote from the highway of commerce, that we might become the principal commercial agent of mankind, without centralizing traffic in our ports. And from the fortunate circumstances of our position, we might escape the luxury, and the industrial and social excitement, which lead to the corruption of manners and the downfall of states. The fungus excrescencies of a prurient civilization,—the factitious refinement that seeks to hide its revolting selfishness with a thin vail of feigned benevolence; the bloated Avarice which tramples Justice and right regardless of all save the attainment of its ends; the fevered excitement which casts loose the anchors of faith and virtue, to drive before the furious passions of the hour,—these would find no aliment in the calm atmosphere of steady industry and quiet social life that marked our career.

In the interior no very great cities would be needed, either as depots for provisions and raw material, or as entrepots of manufactures. Nor need there be any great manfacturing cities;—but a multitude of villages, gemming all the navigable streams, and radiating intelligence and refinement over the neighboring country. Upon the seaboard only would great cities grow; and there, if they became great enough to generate corruption, they would be too remote to poison the heart of social life.—But our normal traffic would not inflate them beyond the pass of virtue; and our coast is too remote from the commercial highway for the commodities received at various ports, in exchange for manufactures, to be brought home for distribution.

We should become the carriers for mankind;—but commerce would not be centralized upon our shores. We should conduct the traffic of the world;—but it would not corrupt us. We should solve,

at last, the grand problem of ages, and dissever government from tyranny, and commerce from vice. We should exemplify order consistent with liberty, and enterprise and the highest civilization coexistent with probity, temperance, and all the moral virtues. The scepter of Progress need never have fallen from our hands through undesert. Our prosperity would have known no reverse, our grandeur no decay. As the Ages rolled along, they would have beheld us still, the stainless and honored Marshal of Progress, guiding the world on its destiny, and still as ever Great, United, Virtuous, and Free.

We have now traced the operation of the causes in force in 1815, that would have launched our country upon a grand career of manufacturing industry. It remains to note the manner in which the intervention of the Federal government warped our industry, our social life and our political destiny.

CHAPTER II.

INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IN WARPING OUR INDUSTRY.

We are aware that, in its technical application, the American system only comprises a protective tariff, and internal improvements. In this work, however, the phrase, for the sake of convenience, is used in a more extended signification, as including the national bank, also. As used in this work, the phrase, "American System," is applied to, and includes all that system of unconstitutional measures adopted by the Federal government for the purpose of fostering the industrial prosperity of the country,—the National Bank, the Protective Tariff, and the system of Internal Improvement. It will be our object to trace the effect of these measures, especially the first two, upon our industry, our social life, and our political career. In this chapter, their influence in warping our industry will claim attention.

The thoughtful attention of the reader is solicited, on account of the abstruse nature of the subject requiring effort to follow the subtle chain of causation to its consequences, its importance as corroborating the views presented in the preceding chapter, and its important bearing upon the subsequent portion of the work. Indeed, the entire work is an unraveling of a connected train of causation, of which this, and the preceding chapter, constitute the first strong links, upon which the rest depend.

Sect. 1. Rise of the American System.

The elements of the situation in 1815, which would have ultimately embarked the West in manufacturing industry, were,

1. A specie currency;
2. Moderate taxes;
3. The absence of demand for Western produce.

These conditions reduced prices in the West to the standard indispensable to manufacturing success. That section had, then, the three grand essentials to cheap manufactures: cheap and abundant labor; cheap and abundant raw materials; cheap and abundant provisions.

The first effect of Western stagnation, as we have seen, would have been a general emigration to the Southern states.—As its next effect, it would have engaged the West, by force of necessity, in manufactures; which course of industry, once begun, would have continued to expand, until Western manufactures supplied the markets of the world. Stagnation would inevitably have produced this result, if it had been perfectly understood that the government would not intermeddle with internal industry; that it was beyond its sphere of power, and would be left to the force of natural laws; and that the people must look to their own energy for relief from the pressure of stagnation, and adapt their industry to the wants of the country. Then, without looking to the government for relief, the people would, at once, have gone to work in the right direction; the establishment of manufactures would have removed stagnation, and the destiny of the country would have been accomplished.

But, unfortunately, we were again to feel the effects of Hamilton's baneful policy. A bad precedent is always followed. The govern-

ment had once interfered, to afford relief in a period of general stagnation. The precedent had been established; and when the country emerged from the War with England, bankrupt, and with industry prostrate, a clamor arose for government relief. Unfortunately, the Federal government again interfered with internal affairs, and with a stronger hand than in 1791. Its intervention prevented the possibility of a normal career, and diverted the industry of the country into abnormal channels.

The Federal government was then under control of the Republicans. But the rising generation of statesmen had been reared beneath the ægis of the Federal government, and had not the jealousy of its power, nor the reverence for the rights of the states, felt by their predecessors. For years, the contest with the Federalists had turned more upon foreign relations than constitutional construction, and the battlement before which no foe appeared was left unguarded. It was palpable that the country was in a state of stagnation such as that, from which the intervention of government had rescued it, in 1791; the clamors for relief re-echoed in the Capital; the Federalists, crushed by the war, were yet watchful to seize a favorable opportunity to reinaugurate their policy: many of the Republicans feared to meet the issue, in the existing state of the country; they thought it safer for the party, to anticipate their opponents, and proffer to the country measures of relief.

The state of the currency seemed the most pressing source of distress. According to estimate, there was only $15,000,000 of specie in the country. The state banks (except a few in New England) had suspended specie payment, and their issues were discredited.

The remedy was sought in a United States Bank. Accordingly, in 1816, a bill was passed, granting a charter for twenty years to a bank, having its issues based chiefly upon government credit, with but a small proportion of specie in its vaults.—In the same session, a tariff act was passed, laying some protective duties, but fixing customs chiefly at a revenue standard.

For some years after the establishment of the Bank and Tariff, their influence was rather of a negative, than a positive character. The tariff of 1816 fixed duties at a standard sufficiently high to pro-

tect the manufactures already in existence; but not high enough to induce fresh capital to embark in them. The Bank, for the time, rendered the influence of the Tariff nugatory.

The Bank circulation infused new vitality into the currency. Its notes passed readily at par, and not only increased the currency to the extent of their circulation, but enabled the state banks to re-establish their credit. The country, though destitute of specie, was flooded with a paper medium, which inflated prices far beyond the specie standard.

But the Bank did not produce the effect that was expected from it. Its advocates had hoped that it would banish business depression, as in 1791. But the difference of the circumstances was forgotten. In 1791, an active business was waiting capital, which the Bank furnished. But in 1816, there was no longer a Carrying Trade, in which capital might be invested; our marine was already larger than our commerce required: the government offered capital to the country, when its great need was some branch of enterprise in which capital might be profitably invested. The Bank did not meet the wants of the time. The industry of the Eastern and Middle states continued to languish; and the West, to labor under stagnation.

The cause of the general stagnation was obvious. Every business was over-crowded: there were too many shippers for the limited commerce of the country; too many merchants engaged in its traffic; too many farmers for the limited demand for produce. The country was not so much in want of more capital, as of some profitable channel of enterprise, in which to invest the capital that was already overdoing the agricultural, mercantile, and shipping interests of the country. The proper remedy was to withdraw a portion of the capital and labor invested in merchandize, shipping, and agriculture, and invest it in manufactures. This would have given an additional market to agriculture, and increased the business of the mercantile and shipping interests, stimulating the entire business of the country into activity.

So far from relieving stagnation, the Bank intensified it. Its issues inflated the standard of prices throughout the country, and rendered successful manufacturing impossible. The quack nostrum

which, in 1791, happened to afford relief, in 1816, increased the sufferings of the patient. Labor and provisions still remained cheap in the West, owing to a want of demand; but capitalists knew that if they established manufactures there, and created a demand, the price of both would at once be inflated to the paper standard, when the manufactures must collapse. With the fear of paper inflation before their eyes, they wisely declined to engage in manufactures, notwithstanding our natural advantages.

A specie standard of prices was essential to success in competition with England. The inflation incident to a paper medium more than counterbalanced all our advantages. England, manufacturing upon a specie basis, notwithstanding high taxes, and dear provisions and raw material, could undersell us in our own market. England understands how essential is a specie basis to industrial prosperity. A national bank is maintained there, because specie is too necessary to her Tropical commerce to be sunk, in great quantities, in the home currency. But the greatest precautions are taken to guard against inflation. The paper currency is restricted to an amount barely sufficient for the transaction of the business of the realm, and the notes are so large (the smallest being £5, or $25,) as not to be substituted for coin, in ordinary transactions. To her sagacity in maintaining a limited currency, England mainly owes her commercial greatness. The low scale of specie prices compensates, in some measure, for the excessive government taxation, and the high cost of imported provisions and raw material. No nation that inflates prices with a paper currency can compete with her industry, whatever its natural advantages.

A notion is current among us, that an abundant and cheap currency is necessary to promote national prosperity. Never was there a greater mistake. This question will be treated at large in another connection; at present, not to turn the attention too far from the subject before us, a few thoughts must suffice.—The inflation of the currency is productive of no benefit; on the contrary, it places national industry at great disadvantage, in competition with foreign enterprise. An inflated currency may raise the rate of wages from one to two hundred dollars a year; but the laborer is not thereby benefited: his expenses are doubled; and if he saves

double the money he would at specie rate of wages, his savings, at the inflated price of property, are of no more real value for investment. The farmer is not enriched by selling his produce at a double price; — every thing he buys is enhanced in the same ratio; and he pays double for the property in which he wishes to invest his savings. The effect of inflation is to increase the nominal value of wages, profits, and property, without any intrinsic enhancement of value; but it is ruinous to general industry: the cost of production is greatly increased; and when the industry of a country, where all prices are thus inflated, comes in competition with that of a country where a specie range of prices obtains, it is at once driven from the field.

The redundancy of the paper currency was rendered more excessive in consequence of the general stagnation of industry. There was no business in which the paper issues could be employed. Manufacturing being impracticable, the industry of the country, and especially of the West, continued to languish.

The planting interest alone flourished, with an active foreign demand, at remunerative prices. Emigration began to flow rapidly to the South,—planters emigrating to the cotton field with their servants, attracted by the high price of the staple in the English market. The chief immigration to the West, at that period, consisted of adventurers, with little or no capital, attracted by its cheap lands and fertile soil.

The Southern immigration, as yet, could not, with their utmost efforts, supply the cotton demand; the planters found it most profitable to concentrate their entire force upon the production of cotton, buying stock and supplies from the West. But this limited demand could not afford an adequate market for the products of the teeming Western soil; and the age of steamboats, scarce begun, had not yet facilitated communication and cheapened freights. The price of Western produce was still extremely low. That section afforded, as yet, no attraction to the capitalist.

A large immigration of planters continued to flow toward the South; but the tide of active adventurers, also, continued to pour into the West. Western production increased more rapidly than the Southern market.

The obvious remedy,—equalizing production and consumption by emigration to the Southern cotton field, must have suggested itself to thousands. But man is averse to change; and the population of the West remained, in the expectation that government would devise measures for their relief.

Henry Clay, the Great Westerner, beheld with concern the distress pervading his section. His penetrating genius readily perceived the cause, and promptly devised a remedy.—The West needed a *Market.* The slight foreign demand for the agricultural products of the latitude was engrossed by the seaboard states. The Home Market must be increased; and, to this end, capital must be embarked in manufactures, withdrawing thousands from agriculture, to become consumers. If the cost of manufacturing was increased by the inflation of the currency, the government must enable the manufacturer to raise the price of his fabric up to the general level, or above it, by means of an exorbitant tariff. A tariff must be carried, imposing duties so excessive as to raise the price of manufactured articles to a point that would make manufacturing the best business in the country, and enlist capital in it, extensively, and at once.—But, until domestic manufactures should make considerable progress, exorbitant duties would fill the treasury to overflowing. To obviate this, a gigantic system of internal improvement was proposed; ostensibly, as necessary to facilitate communication, and the transportation of produce and goods to market; but really, as a means of effecting the necessary depletion of the treasury, and of being used, upon occasion, as a bonus, to secure to the protective policy important votes.

These measures,—an exorbitant tariff, and a system of internal improvement, comprised what was termed the American System.

Mr. Clay put forth herculean efforts to get his American System on foot; but the manifest unconstitutionality of the measures deterred many from their support. In 1820, a tariff bill passed the House of Representatives, but was defeated in the Senate. Bills making appropriations for internal improvements were defeated by the presidential veto.

Meantime, the planting emigration continued to drift to the

South—not rapidly enough, however, to over-supply the cotton market. The planters continued to give their undivided energies to the production of cotton, obtaining supplies from the West. But rapidly as the Southern market increased, the Western supply grew faster. The stream of industrious adventurers still flowed into the West and spread over its broad and fertile surface. The products of agricultural labor glutted the market, and lay stored in barns, without a purchaser. Distress deepened; Stagnation reigned; general Ruin hovered over the land. There seemed no escape but flight. Flight was the true remedy, and many emigrated with their slaves to the South. But the great mass of population, attached to home, and averse to change, sat brooding over their misfortunes, and hoping for government relief. The distress continued to deepen until 1824, when another tariff bill was introduced into Congress.

Mr. Clay, on that occasion, in an earnest and impassioned speech, depicted the sufferings of the West, and declared the Tariff the only hope of relief.

The tariff bill excited the most strenuous opposition. New England, then devoted to shipping, united with the South in opposition to it. Being recognized as a measure of relief, designed to create a home market for the benefit of agriculture, it was carried against them by the votes of the agricultural states.

Sect. 2. Ruinous Influence of the American System upon the Development of Manufactures.

In this phrase, as will be remembered, we include the Bank, the Protective Tariff, and Internal Improvements.

We do not propose to enter into an extended argument, here, to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of these measures. The argument has been too often produced, and is too generally understood, to need repetition. The right to pass these measures was claimed for Congress by a latitudinarian construction of the Constitution, as among the powers conveyed by implication. They were all violations, both of the letter, and the principle of the Constitution.

A proposition to invest the Federal Government with power to establish chartered institutions was made in the Constitutional Con-

vention;—but the Convention positively refused its assent; thus withholding from the Congress the power to charter a bank.—The right to foster industry by a tariff levying extravagant duties on importations from all foreign countries had never before been claimed by the government. Tariff duties are expressly limited in the Constitution to revenue, as their specific object; except when they are used in retaliatory legislation, as a means of regulating commerce with any country whose legislation and policy are antagonistic to our interests. But this object precludes the idea of a general tariff against all foreign goods; for the supposition that we propose to assume an attitude of antagonism toward the whole world, and adopt retaliatory measures against the commerce of all foreign nations, is too absurd to be entertained for a moment.—The advantage of internal improvements had been recognized by Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe; who had all recommended an amendment of the Constitution, granting Congress power to make them. Despairing of this, it was now proposed to assume the power by the more ready process of a latitudinarian construction.—These measures were all violations of the principle of the Constitution, also usurpations of power over the internal administration, which was carefully withheld from the Federal government. In passing them, Congress was trenching upon the reserved province of State rights, and necessarily fostering some interests at the expense of others, thus awakening furious passions, jarring interests, and sectional animosities.

But we propose rather to consider these measures in their practical aspect, than in their abstract constitutional relations—to note their influence upon the industry, the social life, and the political course of our country;—and not ours, only, but foreign countries also; for the causes which affect our national development do not stop with us, but exert a marked influence upon the foreign world.

Considered in this aspect, internal improvement may be almost left out of view. It was but the auxiliary of the Tariff, designed to deplete the treasury when too plethoric with the revenues derived from high duties, and to conciliate important sections to the tariff policy of the government, by timely disbursements of government

funds in their midst. Moreover, being aborted by executive veto, it never materially affected the development of the country.

The Bank and Tariff were the Titan bands which swaddled our infant industry into distorted development. The Bank, alone, might repress; it could not distort. It so inflated prices as to render manufacturing industry impossible; articles imported from abroad were the only cheap commodities in the country,—so cheap, that our inflated industry could not produce them. It was the office of the Tariff to inflate the price of these commodities, also, and thus bring them within the range of our abnormal industry. The Bank raised the price of the products of our own industry to an artificial standard: the Tariff was designed to raise the price of foreign products to the same artificial level.

These measures have continued to warp our industry, up to the present time. In 1824, the tariff was raised more decidedly to the protective standard by the imposition of high duties; in 1828, the duties were increased; under the Compromise Tariff of 1832, the high duties were continued until 1841; in 1842, the protective system was re-established in all its rigor, and continued until 1846; it was then overthrown, and superseded by a Tariff adjusted upon the revenue basis. Thus the country continued under the protective system, uninterruptedly, for thirty years; for twenty-two years of the period, the most rigorous protective duties were maintained.—The influence of the Bank continued even longer; for, though the institution was overthrown in 1836, yet the State banks continued to maintain the currency at the inflated standard that prevailed during its existence, even down to 1861.

We now turn to the influence of these measures upon the development of our industry—especially their influence in dwarfing our manufactures.

The essential conditions of manufacturing success in the United States, are:

1. That manufactures be established in the West, in the heart of the region producing raw material and provisions, placing consumption and supply in juxtaposition.

2. That we have a specie currency.

3. That all classes of productive industry be as little burdened as possible with taxation, especially with taxation levied by means of a tariff.

The reason of these essential conditions is obvious. Neighboring supplies of raw material, a specie currency, and low taxes, are necessary conditions of the cheap labor, cheap raw material, and cheap provisions, which are essential requisites to successful manufactures.

The Bank and Tariff reversed all these conditions.

I. The Bank and Tariff dwarf our Manufactures, by locating them in New England.

The high prices established by the Tariff engaged capital in manufactures wherever it existed. The West, their proper seat, had no capital, and could not engage in them. Capital had accumulated in New England only; and, though originally opposed to the Tariff, that section, with characteristic energy, now resolved to avail itself of its benefits. Unfortunately for herself, and for the country, New England engaged in manufactures,—the section furthest removed from the supply of raw material and provisions—the only section which had no advantage over England in respect of the supplies necessary to manufacturing industry.

Our manufacturing industry has never recovered from this fatal error. The Tariff not only made New England the seat of manufactures, but it set in operation a train of causes which ever after precluded the West from engaging in this department of industry.

The immediate effect of the diversion of capital caused by the Tariff was universal activity. Factory buildings began to rise along the New England streams, giving employment to thousands of builders, and calling into existence hundreds of iron foundries in the Eastern and Middle States, to make and repair their machinery.—The foundries, in turn, stimulated, by their demand, working of the mines of iron and coal.—The new activity required greatly increased means of transportation: it infused new life into the dockyards; and soon after afforded a new market to active industry, in the construction of railroads.—An immense demand for labor sprung up in the Middle and Eastern states,—to be employed in

building factories, foundries, vessels, and roads; in carrying on operative industry in factories and iron works; in working mines; and in the various departments of transportation and supply. This labor was chiefly aggregated in cities; and the erection of tenements still further stimulated activity in the building interest, and the various supply departments of building material. Thousands were withdrawn from agriculture, and thousands emigrated from Europe, to supply the immense demand for industry thus opened, and to engage in the various avocations incident to city life.

The era of manufactures converted the seaboard states into a vast work-shop, filled with busy multitudes engaged in all the avocations of toil. The agriculturists of those states, diminished by the numbers withdrawn to other avocations, could not supply the immense demand.—A market was thus opened for the products of the West. Though the cereals of the West could not be carried across the mountains to the seaboard; yet, converted into beef and pork, the cattle might be driven to market, and the pork carried around by way of the gulf. Western stagnation was now at an end. The Eastern demand had quadrupled its market. The prices of produce at once advanced to the inflated paper standard.

This state of things reversed the natural conditions that would have engaged the West in manufacturing, and diverted the energies of that section into a different channel. In the absence of all demand for its agricultural products, the West, as we have seen, must have engaged, perforce, in manufactures. But this active demand in the East for Western produce—this artificial demand created by the Tariff, changed the condition of things, as if by magic. It not only gave the West an Eastern market, but it perpetuated its Southern market, and engaged Western industry exclusively in producing and forwarding supplies to both the other sections.

The Eastern market for Western produce reversed the relative condition of the West and South. Formerly, the Southern planter had greatly the advantage of the Western agriculturalist. He sold his produce in the foreign market at fair prices, for specie, and bought his supplies cheap in a market glutted with Western produce. As a consequence of this state of things, immigration was flowing rapidly into the Southern states. The Tariff reversed this state of

affairs, and gave the West a decided advantage. The South still sold at specie prices, as before;—but it purchased every article of consumption at prices inflated by the new conditions inaugurated by the Tariff: The price of its agricultural supplies was inflated by the enormous Eastern demand, and by the redundant paper currency; and every product of manufacturing industry was inflated by the excessive duties of the Tariff. The condition of the Western farmer was much more advantageous. His groceries and clothing constituted his only necessary expenses; and the high price of these articles were compensated by the equally high price of his produce. He bought little; and he bought and sold by the same scale of prices. The planter bought much; and he bought at inflated prices, while he sold in the foreign market at specie rates. It was now more profitable to grow Western produce for the home market, than cotton at foreign prices.

As a natural consequence of this posture of affairs, immigration to the South fell off. The slaveholders of the Western states ceased to emigrate; the Virginia and Maryland planters, in many instances, chose to sell their slaves to the South, and invest the proceeds in Western enterprise or speculation. Few slaves went South by emigration. The labor of that section continued inadequate to supply the cotton market; and, consequently, it was still devoted almost exclusively to the production of cotton, while supplies were obtained from the West.

Thus the Tariff made the West the granary, whence both the East and the South drew their agricultural supplies. The production and transportation of supplies engrossed all its energies. Cities sprung up on all its borders, fostered into mushroom growth by this immense traffic in produce.

The West now became the chosen field of capital. While the South had but one interest, Western enterprise flowed in many channels. Farming yielded better returns than cotton; the traffic in produce was more profitable than either; and speculation in Western lands and city lots was most profitable of all. Capital found every where safe and profitable investment, and enterprise a lucrative field,—and capital and enterprise flowed Westward in a hun-

dred streams, all tributary to its prosperity, and swelling its growing greatness.

Thus, by means of the Bank and Tariff, the Federal government diverted the entire industry of the country from its natural course. It had not yet worn its channels, and readily followed the guiding finger of Power.—To recapitulate :—

First effect: The tariff crowded multitudes in the Middle and Eastern states into factories, workshops, and the various departments of auxiliary enterprise.

Second effect: The Eastern market stimulated Western industry, and gave birth to Western cities, making that section the most inviting field for capital and enterprise.

Third effect: Emigration was thus diverted from the South; leaving its labor to be gradually increased by the purchase of slaves, and wholly inadequate to the supply of the cotton market; thus preventing the industry of that section from becoming self-sustaining, and making it permanently dependent upon the West for supplies.

Fourth effect: The West thus became the permanent purveyor for both the other sections; and all its energies were engrossed in the production and transportation of supplies.

But industry cannot be warped with impunity. The swaddling bands which constrict infancy into deformity will leave their traces in the malformation of manhood. This unconstitutional interference of the Federal government with our internal industry warped and dwarfed our Industry; and marred our social life, and our political destiny.

When the policy of the Federal government had forced the West into the production and transportation of supplies for the other sections, that unnatural and factitious course of industry rendered it impossible for that section to embark in manufactures. Capital found more profitable investment, in either the produce trade, or speculation. From the moment the West became the producer for the other sections, with mushroom cities springing up to carry on the traffic, our normal course of industry became impossible. The only section that could have achieved manufacturing greatness was diverted from that department of enterprise, and manufactures were

located in a section where they always have been, and always will be, a feeble exotic.

The locality where the government tariff located manufactures labors under peculiar, and excessive disadvantages. New England is the most unfortunate location for manufactures in the whole country. It never would have engaged in them, but for the excessive bonus offered by the Tariff. It embarked its capital in them as a speculation, expecting the government to continue permanently its fostering protection, and resolved by every means to exact it. The establishment of manufactures in New England was the greatest misfortune the country has ever suffered.

The West, the heart of the great producing region, with raw material and provisions close to the manufactories, had a great advantage over England as a manufacturing site. But New England had no such advantage. Under the most favorable circumstances, New England compared with the West as a site for manufactures, labors under a disadvantage of at least 20 per cent. in the cost of production. It is impossible for the New England manufacturer to compete on equal terms with the English; for he is at a disadvantage in respect of the cost of raw material; in respect of the cost of provisions; and, consequently, of labor, also.

Of the two, England has the advantage in respect of a supply of raw material. Wool can be transported to England from Northern Europe, the Mediterranean, and South America, cheaper than from the West to New England. Southern cotton can be forwarded to Liverpool almost as cheaply as to Boston, or Lowell.—In respect of a supply of provisions, also, for the operatives engaged in factories and the auxiliary departments of industry, New England is placed at a disadvantage. The vast aggregation of numbers in the East renders necessary immense importations of provisions from the West. The market is ruled by the price at which Western produce can be offered. After being carried a thousand miles by railroad, and passing through the hands of six or eight traders, all of whom levy upon it large profits, Western produce will cost more in New England than the produce of Canada or Northern Europe in Liverpool. The Tariff placed our manufactures at a point where, with all our abundance, food is always higher than it is in Europe.

Laboring under these disadvantages, New England mills have never been able to compete with English fabrics, even in our own markets. And so it must always be. Under no circumstances can the New England mill manufacture so cheaply as the English.

New England factories always have needed protection,—they always will.

The Tariff, by locating our factories there, at a point so remote both from our cotton field and our agricultural region, has dwarfed our manufacturing industry, and rendered it inadequate to the supply of our own demand.

II. The Bank and Tariff Dwarf our Manufactures, through the Abnormal Industrial System they originate.

In locating manufactures in New England, and making the West the purveyor of agricultural supplies for both the other sections, the Bank and Tariff originated an abnormal system of industry, injurious in the highest degree to all branches of productive industry, and especially to our manufactures.

Under this abnormal system, the industry of each section was forced into a special channel, leaving the section dependent upon the others for every thing except the specialty it produced. The South grew cotton exclusively; the West became exclusively agricultural; the East was engrossed with manufactures and commerce. Neither section had a home supply for its wants, or a home market for its industry. The West sought a market in the East and South; the East, in the South and West; the South, abroad, and in both the other sections. Thus the producer and consumer were placed at the greatest distance from each other,—and a vast and rapid system of interchange grew up. This vast system of internal commerce consisted chiefly of a traffic in the raw products of agriculture,—a violation of the true principles of commerce, which require that commercial commodities (except tropical productions) shall consist exclusively of the products of manufacturing industry; all bulky products of agriculture, such as raw material and provisions being consumed in their native region.—This violation of commercial principles was productive of the most serious injury to our industry, and bore with especial severity upon manufactures.

The extent of this immense interchange between the sections may be seen in the numerous and populous cities which have sprung up, to transact it; and in the railroads necessary to carry it on. These interior cities, fostered almost exclusively* by the internal traffic of the country, are found especially upon the borders of the West, whence its productions were shipped to the South, and the East. A new country sparsely peopled, and possessing broad tracts of cheap and fertile lands would be expected to have, in proportion to its numbers, a much larger agricultural population, and proportionally fewer inhabitants in cities. But instead, the East and the West are dotted over with cities. Even among the crowded nations of the Old World—except England, the manufacturer and commercial agent for mankind—no country of equal population has half so many people crowded into commercial cities. Leaving out London, the commercial entrepot for the world, even England falls behind us in this regard.—There is no lack of capital in Europe to construct necessary works of internal improvement; yet notwithstanding the unrivaled facilities for water communication afforded by the Lakes on the North, the Atlantic and the Gulf on the South and East, and the Mississippi and its tributaries draining all the interior west of the Alleghanies, we have more miles of railway than all the rest of the world combined.

Many look upon these cities and railways with pride, as important elements of our greatness. They suppose that they increase our wealth in the ratio of their development. So they would, were the cities engaged in productive industry, and the railways engaged in

* These Western cities must have sprung up to carry on the commerce of their sections with foreign countries. And with a prosperous commerce between the West and foreign countries, based on Western manufactures, they might have become larger than at present. The author would not be understood as objecting to the existence of the cities, but to the traffic only, which has fostered them. There is not a city in the West which is not well situated to carry on a legitimate commerce with foreign countries, and essential to that object. Had they sprung up, fostered by manufactures and foreign commerce, it had been well. But as it is, comparatively a small part of their trade consists in a legitimate commerce with foreign countries: their chief business consists in a profitless, nay injurious traffic between the sections. It is this traffic in which our cities are occupied, to which objection is made.

the transportation incident to a traffic founded upon just commercial principles. But the cities are built up by a population withdrawn from productive industry, and engaged in a traffic which ought never to have had existence,—a traffic which originated in the wide separation of production and consumption, which ought to have been in juxtaposition. Under the present system of city traffic, both they and the railroads are a disadvantage to our industry, and are supported by a heavy tax upon production.

To illustrate: An extensive farmer, who might feed his stock in lots convenient to his fields with little cost, is taken with a freak to feed them only upon a height, at the extreme border of his plantation. Consequently he must erect storehouses, and build costly roads, and establish a village for the extra laborers occupied in transportation. He may point with pride to his village, his roads, his storehouses, as evidences of wealth, but Common Sense will decide that, so far from increasing his wealth, they have detracted from it; that he is the poorer by so much as his village, his roads, his storehouses have cost; and that all the labor and capital expended in keeping up his improvements and hauling produce, instead of being invested in tillage and other productive industry, is so much subtracted from his annual profits.

So, the interchange of products, in a country, does not increase its wealth. A family grows not richer by traffic between its members,—nor does a state. There are but two sources of national wealth; productive industry, and foreign (not domestic) commerce. The profits of commerce are levied upon the producer and the consumer; the one receiving so much less, the other paying so much more, to make up the profits. The charges of internal commerce are levied entirely upon the productive industry of the country. Internal traffic is, to some extent, a necessity, but it should be diminished as far as practicable, by placing production and consumption as nearly as possible in juxtaposition.

The policy which widely separates production and consumption levies a heavy tax upon both. Western agriculture, and Eastern manufactures must pay a tax upon their interchange equal to the interest of the money invested in the means of interchange, together with all the charges and profits of the commerce. Charges levied

upon Western agriculture and Eastern manufactures have built up the cities and railroads which connect them; charges are still levied upon them, to pay interest on the original investment, and, to pay for all the labor, and reward all the enterprise engaged in the traffic. They have not only built the cities and railroads;—but they keep them up; they build up city fortunes; support all the inhabitants of cities; and pay interest on all city investments.

We see the consequences of this, in the impoverishment of Western agriculture, and the oppression of Eastern manufactures,—where the operatives perish in poorhouses, while the distressed manufacturers are continually clamoring for additional protection.

In every point of view, the aggregation of population, and enterprise, and capital in cities engaged, not in productive industry and foreign commerce, but in carrying on a traffic between the sections, is injurious. It is a serious loss to our prosperity to withdraw so great resources from productive industry, to be embarked in a traffic which adds nothing to the national wealth; but it is still more injurious when these resources are employed in a traffic, which not merely adds nothing to our wealth, but inflicts actual injury upon our industry. So large a proportion of our resources rendered nugatory were a serious loss; but the injury is infinitely worse when they are sunk in parasite cities preying upon productive industry. Capital and energy and population enough to have made us manufacturers for the world, if properly directed, have been sunk in carrying on this profitless, injurious traffic between the sections.

These interior cities are all favorably situated for manufacturing. If they would turn their attention to manufactures, and employ their population and their capital in working up the raw material and consuming the provisions of the immense basin in which they are situated, and use the railways as auxiliaries to their manufacturing industry, they would add vastly to the national wealth and prosperity. While they continue to be mere agents in conducting the traffic between the sections, they will continue to be what they have hitherto been,—Vampires, sucking the life-blood of our Productive Industry, and exhausting agriculture and manufactures by their exactions upon both.

The oppression of the productive industry of the country was increased by the universal Speculation gendered by the Tariff. The rapid growth of Western cities, and the settlement of wild lands, caused great enhancement of prices yielding to speculation immense returns. Speculation in lands and city lots became a recognized and important feature in the business of the country.—This injured manufactures in three several ways:—

1. An immense deal of capital was withheld from this, and other branches of productive industry, to be embarked in speculations in real estate.

2. Manufactures, and other branches of productive industry, came to measure their profits by the standard of speculation. The speculative spirit increased the expenses of the manufacturer; and it also caused him to exact larger returns from his investment. And as, under the conditions of foreign competition, manufactures could not yield such returns, even under a high protective tariff, capital turned aside from them to be embarked in speculation in real estate, or in some of the thousand avocations incident to the carrying trade between the sections. The speculative spirit gendered by the course of industry fostered by the Tariff has, by the withdrawal of capital from manufactures to other pursuits, done more to dwarf them, perhaps, than any other agency.

3. But this speculative spirit did not injure manufactures in a negative manner only, by withdrawing capital and enterprise from them; it inflicted upon them direct and positive injury, by producing a general inflation of prices, thus increasing the cost of manufacturing. Speculation soon passed from real estate into the general business of the country. There was speculation everywhere, and in everything—not merely in lands, and railroads, and city lots, but in the food we ate, the clothes we wore. The speculating miller bought the farmer's wheat—he transported his flour, upon a speculating railroad, to the speculating produce dealer of some Western city—who shipped it again, upon a speculating railroad, to the speculating wholesale dealer in the East—by whom it was purchased and transmitted to the speculating grocer—who supplied the retail shopkeeper—who dispensed it to his customers. At every stage, produce was preyed upon by speculation. Western pork passed to

market through the hands of the speculating drover—the speculating packer—the speculating wholesale dealer—the speculating grocer—to the retail shop,—not to mention the various railways whose stockholders invested their capital in a speculation upon transportation. The Southern planter—buying his supplies transmitted to him through various speculators—raised cotton on a speculation—to be shipped upon steamboats and railroads built on speculation—to a speculating commission merchant—who shipped it upon a vessel built on speculation—to the speculating factor—who turned it over to the speculating cotton merchant—who supplied the factory,—whence it was shipped in fabric by various speculating railways—through various speculating merchants—all over the country to the consumer. So remote was consumption from production that every article of productive industry nourished from seven to twelve parasites of speculation, before it reached its destination. The manufacturer and operative of New England and the Western farmer, both paid higher for supplies, and received less for their industry and its products, than if the market had been nearer the producer. Speculators battened on the industry of the country, and built up fortunes at the expense of the manufacturer, the planter, the farmer.

This tendency to speculation was the unavoidable result of the system which separated so widely producer and consumer,—which deprived each section of a home market, and necessitated the shipment of the productions of its industry to the other sections. When the South and West shipped their wool and cotton to New England to be manufactured; and the West shipped its agricultural products to the South and East to support the operative population of those sections; and the East shipped its goods to the West and South as their market,—a gigantic system of speculation could not but grow up.

The entire system was abnormal, and was necessarily attended with baneful effects.—It caused the spirit of fevered speculation that is so striking a feature of our commercial life.—It (together with a paper currency) caused the fluctuations of business so fatal to our mercantile enterprise. Tropical productions and manufactured goods have a fixed value; but raw products fluctuate with

the seasons, and their excessive rise and fall make and mar fortunes, in a day.—But the worst influence of the system and the speculation incident to it, was its influence upon our manufacturing industry, upon which it heaped the multiplied charges of speculation, and so raised the general scale of prices as to render extensive manufactures impossible.

The system was abnormal and ruinous, in every point of view. Raw products ought never to enter into commerce, but ought to be consumed as near the place of production as possible. Commerce ought to consist exclusively of manufactured commodities and tropical products of luxurious consumption. Where commerce consists chiefly of raw agricultural products, productive industry is injured, both by high prices, and by the great numbers withdrawn from production, to carry on the system of interchange; and commerce is excited into undue activity, generating speculation, and poisoning the springs of social life.—If any fail to see the injury the system inflicts upon industry, carry out the principle to its legitimate consequences, and it at once becomes apparent. If the system which conveys raw products a thousand miles to market is promotive of the prosperity of a country, then the country will be rendered more prosperous still, by having all its raw products conveyed to a distant market. If the prosperity of the United States is increased by the commerce in raw products between the sections, let all its raw products be brought into the system of interchange,—our internal commerce will be increased; our cities and railroads will flourish; but will the general prosperity of the country be increased? Let the West send its apples to the East, to be distilled into brandy; its corn, its rye, its barley, to be manufactured into whiskey, ale, and beer; its wheat, to be ground into flour; its hogs, to be made into bacon. This is better than to manufacture those articles at home! It creates in the East a demand for Western produce to supply the operatives; and the transportation will increase trade, and benefit the cities and railways! Let no raw produce be manufactured where it is produced; but let all be transported for manufacture to New England, together with provisions for the operatives, and be reshipped thence back again for consumption.

Try this plan, and see if the prosperity of the country will be in-

creased. Will the Western farmer be benefited by sending his hogs to New England and bringing his bacon thence, instead of making it at home? The cities and railroads engaged in the traffic between the sections will be benefited; so will New England: but will the farmer prosper under the system? will the country? Can a Boston mill buy Western wheat, and ship flour back to Cincinnati, and sell it as cheap as the Cincinnati mill can afford it? If not, how can a Boston factory manufacture Western wool and hides, and sell cloth and leather as cheap as they could be manufactured in the West? How can a Lowell mill manufacture New Orleans cotton, and sell goods in the West as cheap as they could be manufactured in Louisville, Cincinnati, or St. Louis? The South and West had as well send all their wheat and hogs to New England, to be manufactured for the Southern and Western market, as their wool, and hides, and cotton. The one policy is as ruinous as the other.

This is the reason our manufacturing industry has never flourished: we have sent raw material and provisions to New England, to enable that section to become the manufacturer for the country,—consequently, our manufactures could not compete with foreign goods in our own market. Yes! and foreign flour would have driven our own from our markets, if we had sent all our wheat to New England, to be manufactured, and thence distributed over the country. And if we had sent our hogs there, to be made into bacon for home consumption, foreign bacon would have undersold ours in our own markets. And if we had sent our fruits and grains there for distillation, New England ales, and beers, and brandies, could not have competed with foreign liquors in Southern and Western markets.

Before the war exaggerated prices, we supplied foreign markets with flour and bacon; we did so by manufacturing our wheat and hogs where they were produced. Had we also manufactured our cotton, our wool, our hides, in the West, adjacent to the field of production, and in the midst of the supply of provisions, we should have supplied our own and foreign markets with shoes, and cottons, and woolens, also. But by locating our manufactures in New England, where the price of raw material and provisions was increased by the cost of transportation and the profits of speculation,

they have been dwarfed, and rendered unable to supply our own market.

Our manufacturing industry was ruined by our abnormal industrial system,—a system where manufacturers were located upon the extreme verge of the country—where raw products of agriculture were the chief commodities of commerce—where no section had a home market for its products—and where production and consumption, widely sundered, were both oppressed with the multiplied charges of speculation.

III. The Bank and Tariff dwarfed our Manufactures by their own direct influence in raising the Standard of Prices.

We have, thus far, only considered the indirect action of the Bank and Tariff, in putting causes in operation, which enhanced the cost of manufacturers, and diverted capital and enterprise into other channels. This, however, gives but a very imperfect conception of the disastrous influence of those measures upon our manufacturing industry. They exerted a direct influence upon manufactures equally ruinous, through their specific action in raising the standard of prices.

The influence of the Bank in inflating prices has already been noticed. It enhanced the price of all articles of native production much above the specie standard. The Tariff enhanced the price of all products of foreign industry up to, many of them much above, the same level.—It is easy to show that the influence of the two, combined, would have a much greater effect in inflating prices, than either alone. If inflation of the currency raised all prices when foreign importations were cheap, prices would, of course, rise still higher, when the Tariff increased all importations to an exorbitant standard. Suppose that, with a specie currency and free trade, the farmer, the foundryman, the saw mill owner, would sell a certain quantity of the products of their industry for one hundred dollars; and the mechanic, the farm laborer, and the builder would do a specified amount of work, for the same price. If, now, the currency be inflated fifty per cent, these various classes will demand an increased price for the products of their industry; but they will not raise their prices to the full standard of the currency inflation, be-

cause, free trade still existing, foreign importations are cheap,—they will be content with an average advance of prices of, perhaps, thirty-five per cent. If now the government, desirous of fostering home manufactures, levies a duty of fifty per cent. upon all foreign importations, in order to raise the price of manufactures above the general standard, these trades at once raise their prices to the same point, and one dollar and a half is charged for labor and for products of industry which could at first have been obtained for one dollar. The general scale of prices always adjusts itself at the mean* between the currency inflation and the rate of duties. If it falls below that mean, it is because some industrial class is unduly oppressed.

This is the lame feature in all protective tariffs,—they increase the general scale of prices in the ratio of the enhancement of the protected goods; and consequently, they improve the condition of the manufacturer not at all. They increase expenses in the same ratio as they increase the price of manufactured goods.

If a manufacturer is making a profit of twenty per cent. in a country having free trade and a specie currency—inflate the currency fifty per cent., and give him protection by duties of fifty per cent. on foreign importations, and his income is just the same as before; because his expenses are increased in the same proportion as his profits. But his condition is really worse than before. His business, true, yields him the same income. But his outlay is greater, and his percentage of profit less. Moreover, the purchasing power of his income is fifty per cent. less than before: family expenses and the cost of investments have gone up fifty per cent.; so

* This might be illustrated at great length: If the currency be inflated fifty per cent. and the standard of tariff duties be fixed at the same, general prices, also, will advance fifty per cent., and an equipoise be established at that point. If the currency inflation be fifty per cent., and the average standard of tariff duties be twenty-five per cent., prices will probably settle at an advance of forty per cent.: if the tariff then be advanced to seventy-five per cent., the general scale of prices will advance to, perhaps, over sixty per cent.; and if the tariff be raised to one hundred per cent., they will settle at an advance of about seventy-five per cent—The mean between the inflation of the currency and the average rate of duties is the point, at which the general scale of prices always inclines to settle.

that, if he before made $5000 annual profit on his business, he now requires a profit of $7,500 to place him in the same relative position.

This accounts for the fact that under a protective system manufacturers are always demanding increased protection—higher duties. Every increase of the tariff raises the general scale of prices; this increases the expenses of their business, enhances the cost of living, and the price of investments, and thus makes their profits, though larger in amount, of less value than before. Every time government yields to their clamors and gives still higher duties, the general scale of prices is raised proportionally, and their condition is no better, perhaps worse, than at first. Thus the tendency of tariffs is to go on increasing perpetually. Every rise prepares the way for another rise,—and so on in endless succession.

The only way to obviate this continual rise of prices and increase of duties is for capital to combine, and prevent certain classes of industry from raising their prices,—imposing upon them the entire burden of the government legislation, forcing them to accept for their labor, or its products, less than a fair equivalent. This method has been continually resorted to, in this country. The farming population and the laboring class have usually been the selected victims. By means of combination, the rate of wages and the price of farming produce have been kept down much below the average standard of prices.

But notwithstanding these expedients, the rise of prices, consequent upon an inflated currency and high duties on importations, has so crippled our manufacturing interest, as to prevent its expansion. Ever since a high tariff established them in New England, manufacturers have been continually clamoring for more protection; and their intrigues and maneuvers to attain their aim have alternately filled the country with disgust, and distracted it with civil convulsion.

It is easy to see how the general inflation of prices dwarfs manufactures, notwithstanding the increased price of goods.—(1) In the first place, the expense of erecting a factory is increased,—so that a larger capital is invested, requiring larger returns.—(2) Then, the expenses of carrying on the business are greatly increased,—re-

quiring a still larger income to realize the per centage upon the capital invested.—(3) Next, the cost of living is greatly increased,—demanding a proportional increase of profits.—(4) And finally, the price of investments is enhanced,—diminishing proportionally the value of the clear income left after paying all expenses.—These facts placed our manufactures located in New England at a disadvantage in competition with English goods, even under the protection of a high tariff. The force of another fact must also be taken into consideration,—the constant doubt respecting the continuance of protection. This distrust combined with the disadvantages of an inflation of prices, and a New England location, to dwarf our manufactures, and prevent their developing sufficiently to supply our own wants.

To establish a high tariff is a wrong method of fostering domestic industry. All industry, especially manufacturing, flourishes best in the absence of taxation. Taxation is the worst adversary of Productive Industry. But a tariff is taxation—taxation in its worst form—levied upon consumption, and falling with peculiar weight upon productive industry.

Our greatest advantage over England was our comparative freedom from debt. This fact, with its immunity from the burden of taxation, would have given our industry a decided superiority in a competition with Great Britain. But our amateur statesmen threw this advantage away, and, in order to protect industry, burdened it with a weight of taxation as great as that imposed by the national debt of England,—and taxation in its most oppressive form—levied by a tariff, and falling especially upon the industrial and producing classes, and passing directly into prices and enhancing them to a ruinous extent.

By locating our factories in New England, the Tariff deprived them of all advantage over England in respect of a supply of provisions and raw material. And by its heavy duties, it levied a heavier taxation upon our industry than the British government imposed on our rivals.

This subject might be illustrated at much greater length; but as it will again recur in another connection, it may be dismissed, for

the present. The whole argument may be summed up in a sentence:—Under the inflation of prices fostered by the Bank and Tariff, our manufactures could not compete with those of England, because the essentials to success,—cheap labor, cheap provisions, and cheap raw material, were no longer present.

To recapitulate: Our manufacturing industry has been dwarfed:—

1. By the location of the manufactories in New England, at a distance from the supply of provisions and raw material;

2. By the abnormal industrial system which consequently sprung up; increasing prices by the charges of speculation, and diverting capital, to real estate speculations, and to the various departments of enterprise incident to the interchange between the sections;

3. By the specific action of the Bank and Tariff in inflating prices.

Or, to arrange the causes more systematically, our manufacturing industry has been injured:—

1. By the greater cost of manufacturing; incident to,—
   (1) The great distance of the New England factories from the supply of provisions and raw material;
   (2) An inflation of prices; caused by,—
      a. The inflated paper currency;
      b. The taxation of the government imposed through a tariff, which greatly enhanced the cost of foreign importations.
      c. The charges of speculation.
2. By the higher profits required by manufacturers;—
   (1) To meet the increased expense of living, incident to the inflation of prices;
   (2) To equalize their clear profits, with—
      a. The increased value of investments, under the inflation of prices; and
      b. The profits of speculation in real estate, and in agricultural produce.
3. By the diversion of capital, enterprise, and population from manufactures;—
   (1) To engage in speculation in real estate;

(2) To be invested in some branch of business connected with the traffic in produce between the sections.

And all these causes may be traced directly to the agency of the Bank and Tariff, either separately, or combined.

1. The Bank counteracted the establishment of manufactures in the West, by its inflation of prices, and by concentrating capital on the seaboard; and it, jointly with the Tariff, located them in New England, by offering an extravagant bonus to manufactures, and by lavishing loans upon New England manufacturing companies.

2. They jointly co-operated in building up the abnormal industrial system, in which no section had a home market for its products but exported them to the others, by creating in the East a demand for Western products; this launched the West upon a course of factitious prosperity, diverting emigration to it, instead of the South;—this caused the South, also, through the inadequacy of its industry to supply the cotton market, to remain dependent upon the West for agricultural supplies. Thus, this abnormal industrial system embarked the West in the production and transportation of supplies, instead of manufacturing; and developed the speculation in real estate and agricultural produce, which operated so disastrously upon manufacturing industry.

3. And finally, they both co-operated in furthering the general inflation of prices, by inflating the currency, and by raising immoderately the price of all imported articles of foreign production.

These measures are responsible for the unfortunate location, the abnormal industrial system, the inflation of prices, which, in their combined influence, kept our manufactures in a feeble condition, and prevented the country from entering upon a career of industrial grandeur. If our exotic manufactures have not been able to withstand foreign competition, never, with all our protection, growing sufficiently to supply even our home demand; if, instead of becoming manufacturers for the world, we have remained the satellite of British industry, importing so largely as to keep continually in debt, and fostering the grandeur of England with resources whose profits should have been all our own,—the responsibility, the blame of all, rests with the Bank and Tariff.

CHAPTER III.

INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IN PERVERTING OUR SOCIAL LIFE.

The social evils to which our abnormal Industrial System has given birth, will be treated of at large in another connection, when we come to consider the effect of our unconstitutional course upon the world. We shall, therefore, in this chapter, give only such a brief notice of the social demoralization in our own country, wrought by our industrial system, as will enable us to comprehend the disastrous influence it exerted upon our political career.

The social evils under which the United States have suffered, may be classed under two general heads.

1. An all-pervading social excitement.
2. The oppression of the industrial population.

We shall treat of the social evils consequent upon our abnormal industrial system, under these two heads.

Sect. I.—Social Excitement Resultant from our Abnormal, forced Industrial System.

The social life of a country is, perhaps, more dependent upon industrial, than moral causes.

In eras of industrial stagnation, social movement is heavy, sometimes wholly dormant. It requires the stimulus of industry and commercial activity, to awaken the mind from torpor, and quicken social life into activity.—In every age commerce and social activity have found cotemporaneous development. The location of the Chosen People on the Syrian coast, in juxtaposition with the active commerce of Phœnicia, was not a fortuitous event. The mind of Judea, which the institutions of Sinai vainly leavened, awoke from its lethargy at the quickening touch of commerce; the social movement in Palestine dates from the age when association with Phœnician commerce infused it with vigor. The commerce with the East,

transferred to the Greeks by the destruction of Tyre by the Babylonians, gave birth to thought and social movement in Greece. Christianity could not prevent the decline of Roman civilization, when, owing rather to industrial than political causes, the traffic between Europe and the East declined, and the electric influence of commerce no longer thrilled the pulses of society. The first faint glow that ruddied the gloom of the Dark Ages, streamed from the reviving commerce of the Italian cities and those of the Hanseatic League.

In past ages, the danger to social life lay in the torpor incident to a want of commercial activity. In our age of commerce, this danger is past; social movement is threatened from the opposite quarter. Commercial activity is now so great as to fever the pulses of social life. It is the great necessity of social advancement, now, to restrict commerce within proper bounds, and prevent it from generating such excessive social excitement as to unhinge the mind of the age, and make it the prey of fitful, feverish impulses, wayward fantasies, and fierce, ungovernable passions.

The world has already suffered from the excessive social excitement caused by this age of commerce; our own country, more than any other. Every observer must be struck with the feverish state of the public mind all over Christendom, and, perhaps, perplexed to assign the cause. The cause lies in the excited commerce of the age, which has overstepped its proper limits. Manufactured articles and tropical products would give to commerce a wholesome activity; but now a boundless interchange of raw agricultural products has stimulated it into unhealthy excitement. It must be reduced within proper limits, or mankind will drift on to social and moral shipwreck.

The United States has suffered more severely from the social excitement, prevalent in our age, than any other country; for the causes in which it originated had a more intense action here. We suffered, not only from the intense commercial activity appertaining to the general international traffic of the age; but, also, from the preternatural excitement of our own abnormal traffic between the sections.

Our Industrial System dwarfed our manufactures, and preyed upon our entire productive industry. A swarm of speculators alone

throve under it. They rendered the entire industry of the country subservient to their aggrandizement, and monopolized and engrossed its wealth.

The facilities for acquisition in the various departments of traffic and speculation have been unprecedented. An unparalleled business excitement has kept the public mind in a state of fevered agitation;—an agitation far exceeding that attendant upon ordinary business, intensified by the cares and vicissitudes, the hopes and apprehensions, incident to speculation.

This mania for speculative gains has drawn into its vortex the best intellect of the country. An excessive importance is attached to wealth. In other countries, pride of birth and pride of talent modify the estimate in which mere wealth is held. The aristocracy of blood and talent hold precedence of the aristocracy of wealth. But, in America, Wealth reigns supreme. It is the criterion of social position, and despite the protests of religion, it is held the chief good. The intellect of the country has accepted the prevailing idea, and devotes all its powers to acquisition. Speculation and traffic open to intelligence and enterprise a hundred avenues to fortune, and the facility of acquisition has tempted the best intellect of the country to turn aside from the sphere of thought, to engage in active business.

Every one must remark to how low a standard the scale of intellect engaged in public life has dwindled, since the first age of the republic. Hamilton, Madison, Jefferson, Marshall, were worthily succeeded by Adams, Webster, Calhoun, Clay: some of the older statesmen of the present age evince some degree of the mind that once illustrated our history; men of most decided talent are seen here and there, struggling amid the mass of mediocrity; but the mind of the present generation is to be found in counting rooms. Every one must be struck with the intellectual character of an assembly of merchants. A convention of the merchants of any of our large cities would compare favorably with an assemblage of lawyers or divines, or with the Congress of the United States. The mind, the enterprise of the country has gone to the merchants' desk, leaving the learned professions and political life to intellects of inferior order,—too often mere adventurers, who are influenced in their

choice, more by a want of capital to engage in business, than a generous ambition for distinction.

Alas for a country whose noblest minds are absorbed in trade! Where intellect turns from the lofty walks of thought, to quench the light of its spirit in the details of traffic, some mighty cause must have wrenched society from its moorings, and launched it upon an abnormal career.

But this mania after wealth is not the worst incident to the business excitement that has pervaded the country; it has generated a general social excitement that threatens to unmoor society. The steps by which this social excitement arose may be easily traced. Money, easily obtained in speculation, was lightly spent in frivolity and display. Boundless extravagance reigned, everywhere. The calm of home life was lost. The calls of business constantly drew merchant and speculator away from home to distant parts of the country; the claims of fashion required a scale of expenditure many were unable to meet; indolence induced others to shrink from household cares. Thus many for sake of convenience, many from motives of economy, many from love of ease, abandoned home with its comforts, its retirements and repose, to become occupants of luxurious hotels and crowded boarding-houses. The mind oppressed with business cares found no quiet home atmosphere in which to recuperate its energies, and came to seek relief from overpowering anxiety in scenes of gayety and dissipation. Business excitement was followed by the excitement of society. Fashionable dissipation became with many the great occupation of city life, to which business was rendered subsidiary. The winters were spent in a whirl of fashionable excitement, the summers at places of fashionable resort.

The contagion of frivolity extended even to the laboring classes. Too busy during the week to spare time for gayety, the Sabbath was desecrated by the balls and pleasure excursions of the poor.

The duties and responsibilities of life seemed forgotten by all classes, in the universal whirl of dissipation. The Northern cities gave tone to the social life of the country,—and what an influence did they exert! They were hotbeds of the opposite vices of wealth

and poverty, centers of fashionable dissipation, and dens of festering crime! The rich, engaged in speculation, greedy of gain, corrupted by acquisition; the poor, composed largely of vicious foreigners, generally infidel, and regardless of moral obligation: the wealthy, employing the easily-acquired fruits of speculation in ostentation and frivolity; the poor, smitten with the contagion of pleasure and extravagance, wasting their small earnings in scenes of debauch and low amusement. High and low were engaged in the same round of excitement, avarice, and dissipation.

Under such circumstances the mind loses its calmness, the moral perceptions their tone. A general demoralization of thought and sentiment prevails. The jaded powers become vitiated, from over-excitement and want of repose. The excited intellect ponders impossible theories of progress; the imagination revels in wild tales of crime and passion; a weak sentimentalism usurps the place of genuine emotion; the moral sense, yielding to the universal excitement, requires stronger stimulants than the sober claims of duty, and seeks its aliment in visionary schemes of moral and social advancement, and, lost in the mazes of capricious fancy, forgets the cardinal principles of virtue—"To do justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly with God."—The social excitement extends to the house of God. Religion becomes a sentiment, instead of a principle; the speculations of philosophy and the suggestions of a deranged benevolence are placed above the obligations of the Divine Word; the laws of Jehovah are contemned in the name of religion; appeals to an abnormal benevolence displace the earnest presentation of immutable truth; Philanthropy overshadows Faith, even in the Sanctuary.

Our country has suffered from all these symptoms of morbid excitement. The North and the South have both suffered, though in a different manner, from the excessive excitement of the age.

The excited social life of the North has been the fruitful hot-bed of a multitude of "Isms." The floodgates have been opened to the speculations of an excited moral sentimentalism, and they have overborne all barriers, and overflowed the land with spurious reforms, and crazed moral and social innovations. The more insane the fancy, the more numerous its votaries. Spiritualism, Mormonism, Four-

ierism, Parkerism, Woman's Rights, Free Love, and various forms of Deism, have more votaries, there, than in all the world beside. Epicureanism has become the prevailing type of action and of thought. Present enjoyment is regarded as the highest philosophy. In search of the gratification of sense vailed beneath high-sounding phrases of social advancement, many have discarded the guidance of revelation, many the restraints of moral obligation. Among the refined and cultivated, irreligion prevails to a great extent cloaked in the semblance of philanthropy and exalted sentiment; among the ignorant and the degraded, infidelity and atheism are openly avowed, and vice stalks unmasked.

The facilities for communication, and the channels of trade have brought city and country into close contact, and diffused the moral taint that corrupts excited social life in the cities throughout the land. They are the centers of influence. The wealth, the enterprise, the talent of the land, are concentrated in them. The rural population does not come in contact with their refinement, and their virtue. These—and there is much of both in the cities—exert little influence upon the rural population. But their avarice, their extravagance and ostentation, their false sentimentality and irreligion, their vice, their infidelity, their atheism, are patent; and foster depravity of sentiment and morals, throughout the entire community.

The social life of the North has suffered from the over-excitement of speculation, which massed wealth in cities, and fostered extravagance and dissipation, gendering a degree of excitability, social, and industrial, which unbalanced the public mind, and subjected it to the sway of every gust of excitement. The South suffered from the same social excitement, but, under the peculiar condition of that section, it assumed a different form. A cultivated agricultural population has constituted the center of social life in the South. So far from being influenced by the cities, sober country manners have modified the tone of city life. Hence, the "Isms" of the North,—the froth of a seething social caldron, have obtained no footing in the South. That section suffered from the fiercer, moodier excitement germinated in social isolation. If the attrition of social activity excited the Northern mind to the verge of mania; the Southern

mind was equally diseased with the vices of solitude,—pride, and haughty self-assertion. Renconters and feuds were constant incidents of Southern social life. Southern society was a mass of units, where each preserved his isolation and individuality. It was composed of clashing, rather than commingling elements, — an assemblage of barons, each absolute lord of the servants on his estate, and exacting from all he met the punctilious courtesy due by the usages of chivalry to his station.

But extremes meet. As in the North, so in the South, the charm of home life was lost. The plantation was too often merely the place of business, where there was no home life, no social circle. However dissimilar in everything else, the city speculator and the Southern planter were alike in their extravagance and their fondness of fashionable dissipation. The denizen of the city, whose home life is destroyed in the whirl of dissipation, and the planter, whose home life is marred for want of social contact, alike flit from home, to meet in crowded places of fashionable resort, where reflection is drowned in frivolty. In the South, as in the North, the Industrial System broke up home ties, and fostered dissipation, extravagance, and excitement.

Sect. 2. Oppression of the Industrial Population through our Abnormal Industrial System.

Social advancement cannot co-exist with the oppression of the working class of society. Poverty is debasing. When life is rendered a dreary struggle for existence, the elasticity necessary to social elevation is crushed out of the soul. Self-respect and hope are the chief elements of individual development. The causes which impair the force of these traits of character strike at the foundation of all social advancement, and necessarily tend to the demoralization of the great mass of society.

Our industrial system has oppressed the working class throughout the country. Excessively high prices were universal. We do not speak of the present inflation of prices, which enhances the cost of all articles of necessity to a point far above the standard of prices in any other country. Even in the past, our industrial sys-

tem, and the measures of government, established prices at a very high standard, to the injury of the industrious working population. With our fertile soil and sparse population, the cost of living ought to have been as cheap with us as in any country in the world. But, on the contrary, living has been cheaper in the densely populated countries of Continental Europe; cheaper, even in England, the manufacturer and commercial agent of mankind, which imports provisions from all the world. In no country on earth has the cost of living been so great as in the United States.

Our industrial system enhanced the price of all articles, beyond measure. These prices were little felt by the capitalists who reaped the profits of the system: but they ground the laboring class into the dust, depriving them of many comforts, and consigning them to hopeless poverty.

I. The Oppression of Northern Labor.

1*st. The Farming Population.*

The Northern farmer, cultivating his fields with his own hands, was at least independent. The friendly soil repaid his industry with abundance, and speculation could only lay its grasp upon his surplus crops.

Where surplus crops were carried so far to market as with us, all connected with the business were necessarily pinched. With his profits diminished by speculation, the farmer who employed assistants could afford them but scanty wages. Speculation on agricultural produce ground millions of our farm laborers in hopeless poverty.

But these at least lived in abundance.

2*d. City Laborers.*

The laboring class of the cities felt the full pressure of high prices and scanty wages.

The profits which various speculators reaped upon the commodities they transported to market raised the price, necessarily, to a point which rendered it necessary to economize the labor employed in transportation. The rate of wages was fixed at a standard lower than the general scale of prices prevailing in the country. All articles of consumption were so high that many of the comforts of

life were placed beyond the reach of the laboring masses. While their wages seemed to be liberal, compared with the general scale of prices, they were, in many instances, scarcely equal to the rate of wages in Europe. In prosperous business times, a healthy laborer was pinched to meet his expenses; and the many fluctuations and financial crises, incident to the abnormal condition of business, pressed upon the laboring poor of our cities, with ruinous effect. The System which crowded them in dense masses in cities, and stinted their wages, while it inflated the cost of all articles of consumption, was an unhappy one for the poor of our cities; but the periodical crisis it involved, crushed them in remediless misery.

3d. The Factory Operatives.

Of all the victims of our Industrial System, perhaps the factory operatives of New England, were the greatest sufferers.

The New England manufacturer was oppressed by the unavoidable drawback of his remote locality; the inflation of prices caused by the Bank, increased the pressure; the tariff by which the government sought to counterbalance his disadvantages, increased his expenses yet more; and the excessive charges of speculation weighed him down with accumulated embarrassments. He could not manufacture at all without protection; and protection hardly equalized the price of his fabrics with the general inflation of prices induced by tariff, paper money, and speculation. He was driven to the most rigid economy in the management of his business. He could only offer wages sufficient to subsist females, and he exacted of them a greater amount of toil than the most hardy constitution could endure. Fourteen hours a day in the hot, close atmosphere of crowded mills, soon outwearied the delicate female frame. But their scanty wages compelled unremitting toil, and when exhausted nature could do no more, they were fortunate if the pittance saved from their wages kept them from the poor-house until death terminated their sufferings. In the West, manufactures would have been consistent with the happiness of the operatives; in New England, they could only be sustained at the price of human wretchedness. They crushed out the happiness and the life of the bond-women of Poverty, whom Necessity made the Slaves of the Loom.

The anxieties, struggles, and sufferings of these various classes of laboring population were incompatible with social improvement. Where nature is overtasked, and life is spent in privation, waging an unequal struggle with adversity, often ending in destitution and beggary, the elements essential to social improvement are crushed out of the character.

II. Oppression of Southern Labor.

The laboring classes of the South were equally removed from the comfort and content essential to social progress.

There, the poor white led a life of listless apathy, bearing with indifference the distresses of a condition he could hardly hope to improve.

But the black population of the South were especially the victims of the industrial system fostered by the Bank and Tariff.

They were happy and contented, before, in their relations with an hereditary owner. Their labor was chiefly devoted to the production of supplies for their own consumption. It was a patriarchal relation, with care and protection on the one part, repaid with reverential trust on the other. The servant was scarcely ever sold, and each generation strengthened the clannish ties of this family relation. But the abnormal course of industry on which the country was launched, severed all these ties. It gave rise to the slave trade between the states, and inflicted upon the negro population of the South untold wretchedness.

We have seen how a normal state of industry would have drained the Southern border states of their slave population, through emigration to the Southern states; and, how easy the lot of the slave in the cotton states would have been when all articles of consumption were produced at home, cotton being grown only as an extra crop. There would have been no slave-trade, then, between the states—no severe, oppressive labor—no cruelty—no privation; and the institution would have progressed through a mild career to inevitable extinction.

But the sudden change in the relative condition of the South and the West which the Tariff wrought, prevented all this. Emigration to the South in great measure ceased. The demand in the South for negro labor was no longer supplied by that means. But the demand

for cotton was continually increasing, with a consequent demand for increased labor to be devoted to its production. A brisk market was thus created in the Southern states for slaves, and, in many instances, the slaveholder on worn out lands in the border states sold his slaves, and invested the proceeds in Western enterprise or speculation. It became the custom upon the death of a farmer, instead of dividing the servants among the heirs, to expose them at public sale to the highest bidder;—scenes from which the slave trader was rarely absent. The negro trade between the states grew into collossal proportions, and fortified slavery in all the border states. At length the raising of negroes for the Southern market became a regular feature of industry in some of the border states; the farmer finding it profitable, by this means, to remain on exhausted lands, which he must otherwise have abandoned. The slave traffic, with all its abuses and horrors, was a necessary consequence of the course of industry induced by the Bank and Tariff.

By diverting emigration from the South to the Western states, it caused the border state farmer to sell, and the Southern planter to buy the negroes that emigration ought to have carried to the South.

This factitious course of industry darkened slavery with horrors not necessarily its own.

In the border states, the slave trade destroyed the clannish relation that had formerly obtained, uniting superior and dependent in ties which ameliorated the institution by kindly interest on the one side, and the attached defference, on the other, which once bound the feudal retainer to his liege. The master came to regard the servant merely in the property aspect, as a chattel to be bought and sold. The rise of the slave trade thrilled the negroes of the border states with horror. In their minds "Down the River" was a Pandemonium, of which the Negro Trader was presiding demon. A thrill of sympathy greeted every unfortunate torn from his home to be sent to the cotton plantations. The negro throughout the border states came to regard himself, not as a dependent, but as merchandise; and, with this conviction, came a brooding sense of injustice to displace the confiding trust of former years. The slave traffic to the South sundered forever the kindly relations in the border states which had prevailed between the negro and his superior.

In the South, the influence of this system upon the condition of the negro was yet more disastrous. Instead of living with his hereditary superior, surrounded with abundance, and only partially engaged in the production of cotton as a surplus crop, as would have been the case if industry and emigration had been left by the government in their normal channels, all was reversed. The want of immigration, and the inability of the planters to purchase slaves in sufficient numbers to supply the cotton demand, prevented any considerable diversion of force from the cotton crop. The planter devoted his entire attention to the culture of cotton, purchasing all his supplies. His business was a speculation, whose profits lay in the excess of income over outlay; and, naturally, the income was increased, and the outlay diminished, to the utmost limit. The planter was constantly in debt for negroes purchased in advance of his returns, and felt impelled by debt to carry out the system essential to his balance sheet. The negro was heavily tasked, and closely stinted,—a condition inconsistent with his well-being, under which life must often have been a burden.

Thus the warped industry of the country reacted upon its social life, and caused general disorganization. It built up a haughty aristocracy in both sections; it maddened the popular mind with industrial, and social excitement; it plunged whole classes in hopeless wretchedness: oppressing alike the poor whites, and the humble negroes of the South; the toiling laborers of Northern cities; and the fragile operatives of New England mills.

CHAPTER IV.

INFLUENCE OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM IN EXCITING POLITICAL ANIMOSITIES.

Two grand issues have embittered American politics: administrative policy, as involved in the Bank, Tariff, and Internal Improvements; and the Slavery question.

Both these issues had origin in the collisions between the Federalist and Republican parties; and both, in their progress, excited new passions, which culminated in civil war.

The Bank and Tariff questions were the legacy of the War with England. That contest broke down our finances, making the Bank a necessity, in the minds of many, for the restoration of financial vigor. The debt occasioned by the War also necessitated heavy duties for revenue purposes; and the hostility to England it inspired, caused the statesmen of the country to regard with satisfaction the protection thus incidentally afforded to native industry. The same hostility to England, combined with the fear of meeting their adversaries upon the issue, influenced the Republicans to yield to the popular clamor for relief, and commit the party to the Bank, Tariff, and Internal Improvements. But for the War with England, those measures would never have been brought into issue; and the country would have escaped the evils which have rendered our history, for forty years, so full of convulsion.

The struggle between the old Federalist and Republican parties proved the origin of the Slavery agitations also. The annexation of Texas, in 1844, with its immediate consequences, fanned the Slavery agitation into vigor, and became the direct cause of the recent civil war. And the annexation of Texas, and the Mexican war, and all the resultant consequences, had origin in the transfer of Texas to Spain, in 1819.

In 1819, anti-slavery excitement ran high in the North, pending the admission of Missouri as a state into the Union. The Federalists were active in fostering the agitation, as a means of regaining

political ascendency. The Republicans were anxious, above all things, to allay this excitement, which their adversaries were seeking to turn to their own advantage. Pending this question, the boundary of the Louisiana territory came up for adjustment with Spain. Spain had no claim to Texas east of the Neuces, and was astonished when Monroe offered that territory up to the Sabine, as a donation. The clue to this singular alienation of territory is found in the anxiety of the Republican leaders to soothe the anti-slavery excitement of the North, by the cession of Southern territory, and thus prevent the exciting question from militating against the re-election of Monroe, in the pending presidential election of 1820.

As already stated, this cession of Texas to Spain proved, afterward, the origin of the Slavery excitement fomented by the re-annexation of Texas and its attendant circumstances,—which ultimately led to civil war. But, though the reannexation of Texas fomented the agitation, it was the American System which gave it birth, and forced it to its fatal culmination. All the great political evils from which the country has suffered, took their origin, and found their aliment in causes originated by the American System.

To trace the operation of these causes is the object of the present chapter.

Sect. I. The American System the prolific Source of Political Evils.

In the germ of the American System, its evil tendencies were unperceived. Mr. Calhoun, in 1816, co-operated with Mr. Clay in promoting the passage of the Bank and Tariff; and, during the few following years, he committed himself so thoroughly to measures of Internal Improvement, as to become a favorite with the great, protectionist state of Pennsylvania.

But previous to 1824, when an increased tariff was proposed, the South became alarmed. The tendency of the measure was perceived, and the planting interest of the South allied itself with the shipping interest of New England, to oppose the Tariff act. Their united strength was sufficient to defeat the bill. But a defection

of Southern votes carried the measure, by very small majorities, through both houses of Congress. The votes of Andrew Jackson and his colleague from Tennessee carried it in the Senate; and the votes of six Southern representatives from districts where the agricultural interest predominated over the planting carried the measure in the House of Representatives.

New England promptly engaged in manufactures, and became, in consequence, committed to the Tariff. The South now stood alone, in opposition to the measure.

In a few years, it was found that, in the universal inflation of prices, caused by the Bank and Tariff, together with the prevailing spirit of speculation, the protection afforded by the tariff of 1824 was inadequate to yield sufficient dividends to factories laboring under the disadvantages of a New England location. In 1828, it was proposed to increase the duties, so as to afford additional protection. The measure provoked the vehement opposition of the South, and excitement ran so high as to menace the integrity of the Union. The North was so thoroughly devoted to protection, and the South was so embittered against it, that a rupture seemed imminent.

In the midst of this excitement the presidential election of 1828 occurred. Adams was thoroughly committed to protection, and if the election had turned on that issue he would have been elected President. But Jackson, also, was a protectionist. His vote for the Tariff of 1824 recommended him in the states where the Tariff was popular; and, though he had recommitted himself to the policy of protection pending the presidential election, the South preferred him, as more favorable than Adams to its interests. Northern votes were given him, as a decided advocate of protection: the South supported him, as the most moderate protectionist that could be elected in the prevailing temper of the public mind.

I. The Contest over the American System during the Administration of Jackson.

The Administration of Jackson was the grandest political epic in history. Giant systems were in conflict, assailed and defended by Titans. Our limits will not allow us to detail the tactics which

party skill brought to bear upon the issues involved; nor, to trace the vicissitudes of the conflict: we can only take into view those decisive acts on which the victory turned.

The electoral vote cast for Andrew Jackson indicated the stormy administration that was to ensue. He was elected, receiving one hundred and seventy-eight votes. Of this number, one vote was cast by a New England state; the rest were cast, half, by tariff, and half, by anti-tariff states. The electoral vote showed that the supporters of the President were equally divided upon the great questions of the day.

It showed another fact: Adams received eighty votes, all of them cast by tariff states; and eighty-nine of the votes cast for Jackson were from tariff states; so that, out of two hundred and sixty-one electoral votes, one hundred and seventy-two were favorable to the Tariff, and only eighty-nine opposed to it. The supporters of the Tariff outnumbered their opponents, nearly two to one.

1*st. Tactics of the Opposing Parties.*

The tactics of the Administration and the Opposition parties were such as might be expected from the exigencies of their respective positions.

The Opposition, or Adams party, was an unit upon the Tariff question: the party of the Administration was equally divided upon it. It was the policy of the Opposition to rend the Administration party, by making the Tariff and Internal Improvement questions the prominent issues of the day. Every vote upon those questions severed the friends of the President; one portion voting with the Opposition in favor of the policy, the other, furiously opposing it. Every bill submitted to the President compelled him, either to offend his Southern friends, by signing it, or to alienate his Northern and Western supporters by a veto.

This was a masterly policy, and it had every prospect of success. The position of Jackson at the head of a party, which agreed on no prominent question, and whose only bond of union was devotion to their chief, seemed well nigh desperate.

But, with the eye of a military leader, Jackson seized the points of the situation. He perceived, both his weakness, and strength;

and he sought by every means to avail himself of his advantages, to the utmost, and to remedy, as far as possible, the weak points of his position. His strength lay in the influence of the executive; he was himself the sole bond of union between the antagonistic elements of his motley supporters. His weakness consisted, first, in the division of his party upon the vital issues of the day; and, secondly, in the danger of being thought by his Northern friends unduly influenced by his Southern feelings in favor of that wing of his party.

The policy of Jackson embraced three points.

1st. To strengthen, as far as possible, the influence of the executive;

2d. To divert attention from the Tariff and Internal Improvement questions, by bringing forward a new issue; and,

3d. To take effectual measures, to prevent his being held committed to the extreme Southern party.

These three points furnish the key to the policy of Jackson's first term of office. The policy was a masterly one, considered merely with an eye to the present exigencies which dictated it; it countered the difficulties of his position with the decision that always brings victory: but the measures, to which he was driven by the dangerous position in which the Tariff and Internal Improvement questions placed him, were, some of them, productive of the greatest evils to the country.

1. It was his first aim, to strengthen the power of the executive. He was the sole bond of union in his party; it was necessary to increase his influence to the utmost. His party had no common views of policy; it was necessary to bind it together by the cohesive ties of interest. Jackson fortified himself, by distributing the offices of the country among his partisans, binding them to his administration, in the absence of political principles, by personal ties. Hence originated the policy of Rotation in office. It was an innovation;—but it was necessary to the existence of his administration; and, with characteristic boldness, Jackson adopted it. It provoked severe animadversion; but Jackson was indifferent to this; indeed, he rather desired it, as it turned attention from the weak points of

his administration. Jackson cut off the heads of office-holders, on the same principle that Alcibiades cut off the tail of his dog,—that while his enemies were abusing him for this, they might overlook more serious points of weakness. Besides, it afforded one issue, upon which his incongruous party could agree. However they differed upon all political measures, they were united in supporting the course of their chief, in rewarding their devotion with the emoluments of office. Nothing but this policy could have saved the administration of Jackson from overthrow. Had he pursued the policy of his predecessors, in leaving the offices of the country to their incumbents without regard to their politics, the efforts of the Opposition would have sundered his party upon the Tariff and Internal Improvement questions; his administration would have proved an ignominious failure; the government would have fallen into the hands of the party of Latitudinarian construction thoroughly reunited; the country would have been divided upon a sectional line; and, if we may judge from the excitement that preceded his first election, and that which followed his second, the danger of disunion would have been imminent.

But the system of Rotation in office then inaugurated, became the source, subsequently, of the greatest abuses. The offices of the country became the prizes of every presidential contest. Politics were degraded into a scramble for place. Corruption in public life became the rule, and extended its influence from the highest to the humblest aspirants after place. Presidential elections increased in excitement, from the increase of executive power, and from the heated passions of partisans fired, less by devotion to principle, than by considerations of interest. When politics were degraded into a trade, many of the noblest minds of the country turned from political life, and readily yielded to the tendency of industry, and engaged in business pursuits. The government was left, in the main, to third rate men, who, without intellect, culture, or ambition, to aspire to the eminence of statesmanship, were conveniently endowed with moral sensibilities too obtuse to be shocked by prevailing corruption, and the low, but grasping ambition which looks for its appropriate reward in the emoluments of office.

The innovation which Jackson introduced, can be excused only

on the plea that it saved the country from greater evils than it inflicted; that if it debased politics, and corrupted public and social life, it yet arrested tendencies which were rushing the country toward the vortex of disunion.

2. It was the aim of the President, to divert attention from the dangerous issues on which his party was equally divided, by thrusting a new issue upon the public mind.

The popularity of a chief, though backed by unlimited patronage, can never maintain a political party. A party must have principles, and a policy. In the existing posture of affairs, no policy could be assumed upon the Tariff and Internal Improvement questions. Indeed, if they remained the prominent questions of the day, not even the personal popularity of Jackson, supported by the patronage of the government, could prevent the administration party from dividing on a sectional line. Some other issue must be found, on which the friends of the administration might more generally unite. Opposition to the United States Bank would be a policy popular in itself, and safe from sectional passions. It would be generally popular with the Southern friends of the Administration; while the interests of the North were not so deeply involved as to prevent the masses from rallying in support of the administration, on the question. Jackson, with profound sagacity, resolved to waive a declaration of policy in respect of the Tariff and Internal Improvement questions; and, maintaining, as far as possible, a strict neutrality upon those issues, to make opposition to the United States Bank the policy of his administration. Upon this issue, he resolved to build up his party.

He lost no time in carrying out his policy.

The charter of the Bank had yet six years to run, when Jackson was elected. It was premature to take ground against it, with a view to practical action. Yet, in his first message to Congress, Jackson issued a fulmination against the Bank.

This was attributed by his opponents, as all his other measures were, to personal pique. It was their policy to decry his political ability, and attribute all his acts to the headstrong passions of the military chieftain. Jackson suffered them thus to deceive them-

selves, and the public. It better suited his purposes to have his acts deemed the results of headlong impulse, than of deliberate policy. The people, who would have jealously watched an astute Machiavel, were ready to applaud the honest, passionate old warrior who cared nothing for policy, but was ruled by the warm impulses of his heart, always ready to do every thing to help a friend, or crush a foe. His friends, also, regarding his hostility to the Bank merely as a personal matter, could justify themselves in supporting both the president, and the institution; while, had his opposition been regarded as the result of deliberate, calculating policy, it must have occasioned a breach between the President and a large wing of his party. It was fortunate for Jackson that his opposition to the Bank, as well as other important acts, was attributed to personal pique; but a review of the history of the times, and an analysis of the character of Jackson, than whom no man was more placable where prudence required it, show that it originated in profound policy. It was intended to divert attention from the other measures, which were the weak point of his party.

These tactics of Jackson evince remarkable political sagacity. If not himself an astute statesman, he was surrounded by the most sagacious minds of the country, and no man was more accessible to advice. In his "kitchen cabinet," he had minds of the highest order, devoted to the success of his administration, rather than to any policy, or sectional interest. They possessed his entire confidence; his receptive mind was ready to admit their suggestions, and his inflexible will, to execute their counsels.

All the measures of his administration show rare political foresight; he was never taken unawares by an unforeseen event, but everything was foreseen, everything prepared for. But at no period of his administration was greater sagacity displayed, than in the outset; when, in the absence of a well-defined policy, he sought, by the use of government patronage, to make the executive, not measures, the rally point of the party; and then turned the minds of his friends from the irritating sectional issues on which they were divided, by presenting a great national policy of opposition to the Bank.

3. But the course of events forced upon the President other politic measures, which public opinion attributed, as usual, and which he suffered to be attributed, to personal motives.

The Opposition pressed earnestly the embarrassing issues on which the administration party was divided. The Tariff agitation was kept up unceasingly, to the serious embarrassment of the administration. The difficulties were complicated by the intemperate opposition of many of the anti-tariff friends of the administration, who began to advocate nullification as the only remedy for the unconstitutional measures of the Federal government. The friends of Mr. Calhoun were the leaders of this ultra opposition. Calhoun was Vice President, and looking to the succession; and there was great danger that the intemperance of his friends, if the President were silent, might create the impression that he sympathized with their rash proceedings. It became necessary to break with Mr. Calhoun.

It would, however, be in the highest degree impolitic to make the breach upon political grounds. Such a course would alienate the entire anti-tariff wing of the party. As usual, a personal pretext must be found for an act whose motive had rise in political policy. At the proper moment, the friends of the President raked up an old ground of grievance which had slept twelve years. And Jackson, who always buried old animosities where it was politic to do so, made an opinion expressed in 1818 the ground of rupture in 1831.

The rupture with Calhoun was an act of policy, to prevent the alienation of the Tariff wing of the presidential party. It answered the purpose for which it was effected; but it was one of the most potent causes of nullification. The South was sore at the oppression of its interests by the Tariff. It submitted, however, to the objectionable policy, while yielding a cordial support to the administration. But when Calhoun was thrown off, and his friends alienated, though ostensibly on a personal issue, they had no longer the restraining motive which before taught them patience; and they yielded to the impulse of passion.

The Tariff, which forced Jackson to alienate Calhoun, and which impelled its opponents into Nullification, is responsible for all the long train of evils to which that act has given rise.

We now resume the thread of events:

2nd. The Contest over the Tariff.

The Tariff of 1828 had brought protection to the maximum point. The South was highly incensed, and bent all its energies to obtain the repeal of the protective system, and the reduction of the duties to the revenue standard. The agricultural and manufacturing states were equally resolved to maintain the system, as necessary to secure a home market for manufactures and agricultural produce. Jackson was elected as a protectionist, by the votes of half of the supporters of the tariff, and the entire vote of the anti-tariff party.

The maintenance or the downfall of the Tariff depended, in great measure, upon the state of the treasury. While the public debt incurred during the War of 1812 remained uncanceled, the country would submit patiently to the heavy duties that were thought necessary for revenue purposes. But, at the period of Jackson's accession to office, this debt was being rapidly extinguished; and there was every probability of its being liquidated in a few years. The liquidation of the public debt would leave a large annual surplus revenue, and would be the signal for a strong pressure, in favor of a general reduction of the Tariff.

This danger to the Tariff could only be obviated by such large appropriations to internal improvements as would deplete the treasury, and prevent the liquidation of the debt. With this view, the Opposition pressed the passage of numerous Internal Improvement bills, which were supported by many friends of the administration, in opposition to the interests, and earnest remonstrances of their Southern allies.

In his delicate position, Jackson acted with extreme caution. He took ground in his first message to Congress, which gratified both wings of his party. He, on the one hand, argued earnestly in favor of the constitutionality and expediency of the policy of protection; while, on the other, he maintained, that the only mode of disposing of the surplus revenue that would annually accrue was, to pass a constitutional amendment authorizing its distribution among the several states. This was a virtual committal of the administration to a reduction of the Tariff after the liquidation of the public debt; since the adoption of the proposed constitutional amendment was

hopeless. His policy during the session was equally skillful. He gratified his southern adherents by vetoing a number of bills making appropriations to improvements of a merely local character; and in a most able veto message, which had a great effect upon the course of public opinion, he urged the unconstitutionality of all appropriations to merely local improvements, and the inexpediency of diverting the revenues from the liquidation of the public debt. But, not to alienate his Northern friends too far, he sanctioned other bills of like character, where the improvements were of a less strictly local nature. He also, at this period, took decided ground against nullification, and soon after consummated the breach with Calhoun.

In his next annual message to Congress (Dec. 1830), he again argued, though less earnestly than before, in favor of the policy of protection; and again urged at length the impolicy and unconstitutionality of appropriations for internal improvements, and suggested the adoption of a constitutional amendment authorizing the distribution of surplus revenue among the States. But the Opposition continued to press bills for internal improvement, and so many of the President's friends now voted in favor of them as to give immense majorities for all, and to some of them, over two thirds of both houses of Congress. In the presence of such votes, the President waived his objections, and approved the bills; though he indicated his opposition to the policy, by refusing to return such bills as were passed during the last days of the session, and thus annulling them.

But the steady weight of Jackson's influence was producing a strong impression on the public mind. His repeated pronunciamentos were gradually exciting an opposition to the Bank, and relieving the administration from pressure upon the Tariff question. Besides, a gradual reaction was taking place on the question of Internal Improvement, which was strengthening the opposition to the Tariff in the North. Furthermore, the Tariff had produced its effect of turning capital to manufactures; and the agricultural states of the North were gradually approaching the point where they would be ready to co-operate with the South in withdrawing the bonus of high duties. In the midst of this reaction, a con-

gressional election took place, which, though a large majority of supporters of Bank and Tariff were returned from the Northern states, was on the whole favorable to the administration, and greatly strengthened the hands of the President. The current of opinion in favor of the Tariff was evidently receding. There was the best prospect of success, at no distant day, to the President's policy of bringing the Tariff back to the revenue standard.

One danger, however, still threatened. The opposition to the Tariff continued in the South; but it was temperate in all the states except South Carolina. In that state, resentment against the administration for its treatment of Calhoun was superadded to the anti-tariff excitement, and threatened to precipitate nullification of the obnoxious laws. The attitude of Jackson toward Calhoun drove South Carolina from co-operation with the administration into antagonism; and, instead of seconding the policy of the President, as did the other Southern states, it was more inclined to embarrass him. The feud with Calhoun, which was necessary to the Northern popularity of the administration, was bearing bitter fruit.

Jackson saw the gathering storm, and prepared to meet it. As his cabinet was then organized, he could not have grappled with nullification. His cabinet officers were, Van Buren of New York, Secretary of State; Eaton of Tennessee, Secretary of War; Ingham of Pennsylvania, Secretary of the Treasury; Branch of North Carolina, Secretary of the Navy; Berrien of Georgia, Attorney General. Of these, the last three were devoted friends of Calhoun, and would have sided with him, in the event of a collision. A declaration by the Attorney General that South Carolina was right, a refusal by the Secretary of the Navy to give necessary orders to the naval force, and by the Secretary of the Treasury to provide the financial sinews, would have been very embarrassing. Van Buren and Eaton might have been relied on; but the locality of the former would have excited antagonism to his state papers; and the feud of the latter with Calhoun would have given an air of persecution to all his acts. A collision at the head of such a cabinet would have precipitated a war of sections.

Jackson prepared himself to meet the crisis. A personal feud had existed between the members of his cabinet ever since its form-

ation, growing out of the refusal of the families of all the members (except Van Buren) to recognize the wife of Eaton,—a feud which the President must have known would spring up, when he organized his cabinet; and which looks like a politic provision of a pretext for its dissolution, without assigning a political cause. This feud, which had been smoldering for two years, was now made the ostensible reason for a dissolution of the cabinet. In its reconstruction, the President was careful to strengthen his administration for a collision with Nullification. Taney of Maryland, the Attorney General, and Livingston of Louisiana, the Secretary of State, were the only members from the South; but both could be relied on, thoroughly, and their support would give a powerful moral aid to the administration. The others, McLane, Cass, and Woodbury, were all Northern men, representing respectively the Eastern, Middle, and Western states, and would enable him to carry the North in solid phalanx in any collision with Nullification.

When the new Congress met, the President felt himself strong enough to change his tone on the Tariff question. In his message to Congress, (December, 1831,) he no longer advocated the distribution of surplus revenues among the states; but recommended "a modification of the Tariff which shall produce a reduction of our revenue to the wants of the government," and "relieve the people of unnecessary taxation after the extinguishment of the public debt." This recommendation, from one so guarded as Jackson always was in his state papers, is evidence that he saw the subsidence of the protection mania.

But the Tariff was still powerful in Congress. The debt would be extinguished in 1832, when the tariff would yield annually a surplus revenue of $14,000,000. A modification of the Tariff was become a necessity. But its friends brought in a new bill which increased the duties on protected articles, while it reduced them on other imports so far as to reduce the revenue some $3,000,000.

This Tariff was one of the measures on which the Opposition wished to go before the country, in the presidential election of 1832. But it was not satisfied to rest its cause upon this one issue. The combined pressure of the Bank and Tariff was deemed necessary to effect the overthrow of the administration. With this view,

a bill rechartering the United States Bank was pressed through Congress, many of the partisans of the administration voting for it. The President vetoed it, as was expected, and the issue went before the country. But unexpectedly to the Opposition, the Bank issue threw the Tariff into the shade. The popularity of the Bank veto neutralized the modified opposition to the Tariff, and won so many votes as to secure the triumphant re-election of Jackson.

Strong in his re-election, the President, in his annual message to Congress, (Dec. 1832,) strongly urged such an additional reduction of the Tariff as would bring the revenues down to the standard of expenditure. The patient policy of Jackson was about to achieve the victory, and effect a permanent adjustment of the tariff question, upon the revenue basis.

But, unfortunately, the impatience of South Carolina intervened and marred everything.

When the tariff of 1832 was passed, excitement rose to an extraordinary pitch, in South Carolina. Too much excited to see the gradual change that was working in the North—too much alienated from Jackson by his antagonism with Calhoun, to hope for any benefit from his slow and patient policy—that state deemed the law of 1832 evidence of a deliberate resolve on the part of the North to maintain the policy perpetually. The South Carolinians were tired of co-operating with Northern allies who voted on all important questions with their opponents; and of seconding an administration which was powerless to control the votes of its Northern supporters, and which denounced their own principles of constitutional exposition, and thrust out their honored statesman from its friendship. Embittered alike against the tariff wing of the party, and the President, they resolved upon extreme measures. In the fall of 1832, just after the presidential election, a state convention met, which pronounced the tariff laws unconstitutional, and declared them null and void within the limits of South Carolina, and forbade duties to be collected under them, in the ports of the state.

Such was the Nullification ordinance.

The legislatures of several states were in session at the moment, and expressed their opinion of the act of South Carolina. Delaware, Missouri, and Tennessee, disclaimed the doctrine of nullifica-

tion; it was condemned by the legislatures of North Carolina, and Alabama; Georgia reprobated it; Virginia reaffirmed the State rights resolutions of 1798, but declared that they did not sanction the proceedings of South Carolina.

The President was desirous of overturning the protective system from which the South suffered so severely, but he would not suffer federal laws to be set aside by state authority. He replied to the nullification ordinance by a proclamation, in which he took high ground in support of federal authority, declared his resolution to maintain the supremacy of federal laws and enforce the collection of duties, and urged the people of South Carolina to recede from the position they had assumed. A collision between the state and the federal government seemed imminent. Virginia assumed the attitude of mediator, declaring the tariff laws unconstitutional, but deprecating the attitude of South Carolina, and requesting that state to postpone the execution of the nullification ordinance, to give time for the repeal of the unconstitutional measures. South Carolina assented, and Congress proceeded to discuss the tariff, under the new conditions the question had assumed.

The Administration proposed to avail itself of the crisis, to obtain such a modification of the Tariff as would deprive it of its protective features, and restore it to the status of the tariff of 1816. Verplank's bill embodied such modifications. But it met a stormy opposition. The friends of the Tariff were bent upon maintaining it, and resolved to avail themselves, to the utmost, of the false position in which South Carolina had placed herself, in order to obtain such an adjustment of the question as would maintain protection intact. They especially insisted upon the impolicy of the Federal government receding from its position in the face of the attitude of South Carolina; and urged that the issue raised by the state ought to be met, and federal authority resolutely asserted.

But to many of them came sober second thought. They reflected that to leave the issue open was full of danger to the Tariff, in every point of view. Recent elections showed that in the next Congress the administration would have such a majority as would enable it to repeal the protective features of the Tariff, altogether. South Carolina had once, at the instance of Virginia, deferred the execu-

tion of her nullification ordinance, and in view of the recent elections, might decide to defer it again. If it did so, the overthrow of the Tariff at the next session of Congress was certain. Or, if South Carolina resolved to persevere and abide the issue of a conflict with federal authority, the prospect for the Tariff was no better. The collision might involve the other Southern states. If it ultimated in the disruption of the Union, the odium would rest upon the Tariff; if Jackson succeeded in suppressing resistance, the credit of the result would greatly strengthen his administration, and enable him to readjust the Tariff upon any basis he chose.

On the other hand, the time was opportune for an advantageous settlement of the issue. Jackson was bent upon coercion, and the dread of this would induce South Carolina and the other opponents of the Tariff to consent to any arrangement, however disadvantageous, which professed to be a compromise, and which would allow the state to recede, without dishonor, from its false position.

Influenced by these views, and by a patriotic desire to avert a collision between state and federal authority, Mr. Clay introduced a Compromise tariff bill, which stipulated a gradual reduction of duties for ten years, when they should be brought to the minimum standard. The reduction, however, was so gradual as to preserve protection in full force, for nine years; and there was no stipulation against the re-establishment of the protective system at the expiration of the ten years.

The measure was acceptable to the manufacturing interest, from a conviction that it made few concessions: the South Carolina delegation was forced to join in its support, as the only means of honorable escape from the false position, in which the state had placed itself by its precipitate and ill-advised action.

Nullification claimed a victory, but it had really sustained a defeat. Backed by the administration resolutely bent upon coercive measures, the Protectionists were masters of the situation. They, in fact, yielded nothing in the compromise. With full protection for nine years, they avowed their intention of re-establishing the policy in full force, as soon as the limitation of the Tariff expired. Nullification must have been hard pressed, indeed, when it accepted an act like this as a compromise.

In every point of view, Nullification was in the highest degree impolitic. It surrendered the vantage ground which the opponents of the Tariff had gained, and yielded up a victory already won; and it inflicted incalculable injury upon our system of government.

Never was there a more convincing illustration of the impolicy of an appeal to revolutionary measures, than in this instance. The Tariff had already produced the market agriculture coveted, and, this object attained, the agricultural states were almost ready to withdraw the extravagant bonus given with a view of embarking capital in manufactures. The earnest remonstrances of the South were beginning to have their effect. Jackson had thrown his immense influence in favor of a reduction of the Tariff. The Northern elections were manifesting the revulsion of sentiment caused by these various influences, and showed such a decided increase of the strength of the administration, as to menace the Tariff with overthrow. Affairs had taken a turn which made it certain, that a few years more of patient sufferance and constant agitation would overturn a system equally unjust and impolitic. But, just on the eve of success, Nullification placed the opponents of the Tariff in a false position, and ruined all. It strengthened the Tariff by exciting passions and prejudices which had never before been aroused, and enabled the Protectionists to dictate the terms, on which they would allow South Carolina to recede without loss of honor from her rash attitude. To avert a collision between the state and the Federal government, the opponents of the Tariff were compelled to make hasty terms with their opponents, and agree to endure protection for nine years, without further agitation of the question. They thus yielded all the advantages of their position,—the debt paid up, and a large excess of revenue annually accruing—the President with his immense popularity in their favor—the wavering interests of the agricultural states, combining with the sense of justice to induce a revulsion of sentiment,—they were compelled to give up all these advantages, to rescue South Carolina from her antagonism with the inflexible will of Jackson.

But its effect upon our system of government was the worst consequence of Nullification. It first brought State rights into dis-

repute with a great portion of the American people, and fostered a tendency to centralization, until then held in abeyance. The right of coercion had been disavowed by Alexander Hamilton, and, up to that period, had never been advocated by any American statesman. Daniel Webster in his debate with Hayne assumed that ground,—the first time it ever found utterance from the lips of an American statesman. But Nullification, through the influence of antagonism, popularized the doctrine, and it has been growing, ever since.

The Tariff was a violation of the Constitution. In transcending the limit of its powers, and interfering with the industry of the country, the Federal government had trenched upon the reserved province of State rights. The grievance is admitted: the only question is with regard to the redress.

In the tariff laws, the rights of the states were infringed; but South Carolina inflicted far deeper injury upon State rights, by asserting them in support of Nullification. The odium attached to Nullification attached to State rights also. Many were ready, in their repugnance to Nullification, to reject altogether the doctrine on which it was based. A great principle cannot be crushed by its opponents; it can be injured, only by the injudicious advocacy of its friends. Political, like religious truth, triumphs by patient sufferance; and is only defeated when its advocates lay aside remonstrance, to appeal to the arbitrament of Passion.

Extremes beget extremes. The unconstitutional assumption of power by the Federal government begat Nullification: and this again caused the Federal government to claim a power against South Carolina which the Constitution never gave—which Hamilton, the chief advocate of strong government, disavowed—and unheard of, until that age. It is hard for nations, as well as individuals, to learn that two wrongs do not make one right. "If the tariff laws are an usurpation," cried South Carolina, "we have the right to nullify them." "If Nullification is wrong," cried Jackson in turn, "the government has a right to put it down." The nation applauded the sentiment, and popular opinion came to regard the right of coercion as a recognized power of the Federal government.

But it may be demanded, "Is there no redress for wrong?" Yes, but it is not violence. If a man's property is illegally seized by

violence, he has redress; but it is not to burn the house of his wronger; nor would his act of arson justify his foe in taking his life. Justice would punish both acts of retaliation. The Constitution never contemplated collisions between federal and state authority. It was expected that each would, in good faith, remain within the sphere of its powers. The crime of parricide was so unheard of among the Romans that no law was made for its punishment: so the framers of the Constitution made no provision for such assumptions of power as might bring about state and federal collision. They were satisfied with so arranging the powers of each as to restrict their respective jurisdiction to separate spheres; with giving the supremacy to federal laws where they necessarily came in contact, as in the power of direct taxation; and with vesting power in the Supreme Court to annul unconstitutional and oppressive laws of Congress. That the highest judicial tribunal of the nation should be swayed by prejudice or passion to give a corrupt decision was unthought of, and its occurrence was not provided for. Should such an event occur, peaceful agitation is the true means of redress.—Truth is indestructible by oppression. Passions die; interests change with time;—but truth is immutable and eternal; and if her votaries are true to their cause, the triumph of Truth over wrong supported by fading passions and changing interests is assured. But it must be remembered that Truth has but one arbiter,—Reason; but one advocate,—Peace.

But it must not be forgotten that Nullification was provoked by the unconstitutional legislation of the Federal government. The tariff laws passed in violation of the Constitution, long patiently borne, at last outwearied patience. Injustice always rouses passion, and when does passion reflect! The Tariff developed antagonistic interests, where none previously existed; and excited sectional passions, which ought to have forever slept. It roused Southern indignation at being sacrificed to Northern interests, and thus gendered Nullification and its twin-born rival and antagonist, Coercion, which have convulsed the country with their bickerings, ever since. The South blamed Nullification as unconstitutional and ill-advised, but sympathized with it as an outbreak against intolerable and long-continued oppression. The North applauded the proclamation of

Jackson to the echo, and its doctrines, advocated for the first time by Webster, in 1831, against the almost unanimous opinion of the statesmen of the nation, became the received theory of government.

The antagonism of feeling and sentiment gendered by the Tariff was never afterward allayed. The idea gathered strength that the interests of the sections were antagonistic. The South began to balance the advantages of the Union with its burdens. Causes of irritation were continually rising, and in them all the leaven of 1832 was apparent. The South came to meet every grievance with the passionate cry, "We 'll secede;" to which the North thundered the stern rejoinder, "We 'll whip you in."

Jackson alone profited by the course events had taken. In contemplating the career of this remarkable man, we hardly know whether to attribute his success, more to the sagacity of his measures and the decision of his character, or to the Fortune which made him her favorite. The Compromise disposed of the Tariff,—the measure most threatening to his popularity, and adjourned its final adjustment to a period subsequent to his administration. The Protectionists had treated with their antagonists under the shadow of his authority, and extolled the vigor that enabled them to dictate the terms of adjustment. The "Old Roman" became, for the moment, the idol of the North, as the embodiment of the Websterian theory of government, whose patriotism rose superior to sectional feeling.

3*d*. *The Contest over the Bank.*

Jackson was strengthened by the popularity obtained through the settlement of the Tariff to meet the Bank in the death struggle, for which both were preparing. He needed it all. The veto of 1832 had scotched the Bank, not killed it. It was the beginning of the battle, not the termination of the conflict. The Bank had, as yet, brought none of its engines of offense into the field. With its immense power over the finances, the numberless possibilities of the future were all in its favor.

The Bank was the financial autocrat of the country. According to the well-considered declaration of its president, it could embarrass, save, destroy the state banks, at will. They were the crea-

tures of its favor, and must second its policy. The charter of the Bank in 1832 had, moreover, showed its power over Congress in a striking light. Its influence over the minds of many of his followers was stronger than that of Jackson himself. In obedience to its mandate, a strong division of the friends of the administration had drawn off from the party on this question, and co-operated with the Opposition to recharter the Bank, in opposition to their political allies, and the known will of their chief. And even when he had vetoed the bill, they had again voted to carry it over his veto.

Much has been said of the discipline of the Jackson Democracy; but never was party composed of more incongruous elements. Every shade of political opinion was represented in it,—Latitudinarian and Strict Constructionists, Centralizationists and Nullifiers, Bank and Anti-Bank, Tariff and Anti-Tariff, Internal Improvement and Anti-Internal Improvement partisans, were all gathered in an assemblage of incongruities. It was a period of transition—when nothing was established. The popularity of Jackson won many to his standard, whose political principles identified them with his antagonists; and, on every test question, they deserted their banners and went over in a body to the Opposition. Benton, in his "Thirty Years," complains of the Opposition for introducing the Bank, Tariff, and Internal Improvement questions into the elections of 1832;—which questions, he insists, did not belong to politics! The reader of his work wonders if these questions did not belong to politics, what questions did? Yet, as relates to the Jackson party, his assertion is, in great measure, true. The Opposition were Latitudinarian Constructionists, with a distinct policy in support of all the Latitudinarian measures of the time. But the Jackson party, as such, had no policy. They differed among themselves on all important questions, and as the only means of maintaining harmony, declared that these questions did not belong to politics! As a party, they had no measures; they were rallied only around their chief, and forgot all points of difference in a "Hurrah for Jackson."

At the head of this motley party, Jackson prepared for a war to the death with the Bank.

The moneyed institution had every advantage, and the probabilities

seemed strong in favor of its triumph. It had a circulation of $90,000,000, which Congress might increase to any extent it chose. It could force the state banks to make common cause with it in the execution of any policy it might dictate. The capitalists of the country were devoted to its interests. And, finally, a strong division of the administration party were its earnest advocates. But the settlement of the Tariff gave the Bank an advantage of more avail than all beside, to gain which was probably a powerful though unavowed motive in inducing Mr. Clay to press that measure. The "Compromise Tariff" yielded large surplus revenues. These would be suffered to accumulate, and would lie on deposit in the United States Bank, which was the treasury agent of the government. These deposits would become the basis of an immense expansion of the Bank circulation, which, in turn, would stimulate the state banks to expand their issues. This inflation of the currency would stimulate the business of the country to an unparalleled degree. In the midst of this general prosperity, and at a time judiciously chosen with a view to the presidential election of 1836, the Bank would demand a recharter, as the only condition on which it could maintain its circulation. Congress would, of course, grant a recharter, and the President would veto it. The Bank would avow that it must then proceed to wind up its affairs, and would call in its own circulation, and force state banks to call in theirs. Such a collapse would produce general ruin. The Bank, however, would lay the blame upon the Executive, which left it no alternative but to wind up its affairs. The remedy was obvious. Grant a recharter, and it could at once expand its issues, and relieve the general distress.

Under such circumstances, the Bank would certainly triumph. Jackson would never recede; but, either Congress would pass the recharter over his veto, or the issue would go into the presidential canvas of 1836, and the people would be impelled, by general ruin, to elect a Bank man to the presidency.

These probabilities were foreseen. There was only one measure that could thwart the plans of the Bank, and with military promptitude Jackson resolved to adopt it. He avowed that, if let alone, the Bank would "buy up Congress" and carry a recharter over his

veto; and he determined to cripple the institution, by removing the government deposits and placing them with state banks.

It was known that Congress would not recommend the measure. The President resolved to execute it upon his own responsibility. His friends wavered; many opposed; many held aloof; some yielded a reluctant consent. The power to remove the deposits rested with the Secretary of the Treasury. Jackson urged Congress to order a removal of the deposits. Congress refused to do it, and voted a resolution that the public deposits were safe with the institution. Jackson now wished the Secretary of the Treasury to issue the order for their removal. McLane, who was Secretary, demurred to act in direct opposition to the vote of Congress. Jackson transferred him to the State Department, and put Duane in his place. Duane, when desired to issue an order for their removal, positively refused to execute the will of the President. Jackson now announced in cabinet council his resolution to have the deposits removed on his responsibility, and fixed the day on which it should be done. As Duane persisted in his refusal, he removed him, and made Taney (since Chief Justice) Secretary, who, without scruple, carried out the views of the President.

This bold action crippled the Bank, and decided the contest. That institution curtailed its issues, with the effect of creating a panic. But the state deposit banks soon enlarged their issues, and put an end to the distress; other banks expanded; the United States Bank, fearful of being thrown into the shade, followed the example of inflation: an unprecedented prosperity ensued, which lasted long enough to kill the Bank; to elect a Democratic successor to the presidential chair; and to allow Jackson to retire with eclat to private life; when it suddenly closed down with a crash, which shook the country like an earthquake, ruining thousands and depressing industry for years.

The removal of the deposits killed the Bank, wresting from it a victory otherwise assuredly its own. It was an act of desperate resolution, which no other man than Andrew Jackson would have attempted; and no other popularity than his could have withstood the storm the measure raised. He achieved his object,—the destruction of the Bank; but the act which decided the contest was

an assumption of authority on the part of the Executive, which tended to exalt executive power, already too great. It finds palliation in the fact, that it was the only means of overthrowing an unconstitutional and dangerous monopoly. Viewed in this light, it, together with the universal ruin the policy of the President brought about, must be regarded as the farewell curse of the Bank, which could be overthrown only by executive usurpation, and by a system of tactics which involved the financial prostration of the country.

If we strike a balance at the close of Jackson's administration, we shall find that the unconstitutional policy of the Latitudinarian Constructionists had received a check;—but the struggle for its overthrow had borne bitter fruits. It necessitated the adoption of the system of Rotation in office, with all the corruption it has gendered; it gave rise to an antagonism of interests between the sections, and excited animosities which would never otherwise have arisen; it gave birth to nullification and secession, and the antagonistic theory of coercion; it exalted the executive branch of the government by encroachment; and it left a legacy of ruin to the country, out of which was to spring a new era of contest in respect of the same measures.

Yet, even thus, we escaped well. We were happy in avoiding actual disunion; we narrowly escaped it. He who reads the history of the times will perceive that, in 1828, Southern discontent was approaching a crisis, which nothing averted but the hope of an abatement of the Tariff through the influence of Jackson. Many declared that nothing saved the Union in 1828, but the election of Jackson; and we can believe it, when we remember the outbreak of Southern discontent in 1832, through impatience of a longer continuance of the evil. What would it have been in 1828, if a decided protectionist had been elected? A crisis must have occurred; and no Northern President could have held the firm rein which Jackson's popularity, and his position as a Southerner, enabled him to keep. In the attitude of parties in 1828, no man other than a decided protectionist could have been elected, except Jackson. Had Andrew Jackson not lived, the Tariff would, in all human probability, have disrupted the Union.

We must not judge Jackson hardly. The difficulties of his po-

sition were such as few men ever encountered, and no man ever before overcame. No one but Andrew Jackson could have overcome them. An Opposition united in support of an unconstitutional, but beneficial sectional policy; his own party equally divided, one-half identified by the ties of interest with the policy of the Opposition, the other half from interest furiously opposing that policy, and resolved to press their opposition to the last extreme;—with such a discordant party an ordinary man would have fallen—ruined by the collusion of one part with his opponents, and by the violence of the other. Jackson's military reputation and personal popularity were strong elements of success, without which he could not have succeeded. But they were not sufficient to secure the triumph his administration achieved. This, he owed to his remarkable and unique personal character, in which the most opposite traits were strangely commingled.

A rough limner, seizing upon a single prominent characteristic, would caricature him as an impetuous, obstinate, resolute man—an autocratic rough rider, who trampled down all opposition to his inflexible will. He *was* resolute, and his rare decision of character was a prominent element in his success. This trait prompted him to brave public opinion, in turning out opponents from office, to make room for his friends; to throttle Nullification without hesitancy; to decree the removal of deposits from the United States Bank. But he owed his success mainly to qualities the very opposite of this, which have almost escaped notice. With a party divided like his, a wrong-headed obstinacy would have wrecked the administration, at once. Had he identified himself with either faction, he had certainly been lost. His grand individuality enabled him, as it were, to overlap all the conflicting individualities writhing in conflict round him, and maintain his supremacy over them all. His wonderful self-esteem enabled him to hold the balance even between the excited factions, into which his party was divided. He belonged to neither, and was respected by both. And then, when he had marked out a policy, how patient was he of opposition; how frank and kindly with those who voted for measures to which he was opposed. Half his party voted with the Opposition for Internal Improvement bills, brought forward to embarrass him and work his overthrow: he vetoed the bills, and was as cordial and as kindly toward his partisans as before. They voted for the Bank on whose

destruction he was resolved: he vetoed the Bank, but never turned a sour face upon his friends, who co-operated with his enemies against his policy. This moderation is the most striking trait in the character of Jackson, and peculiarly fitted him for the trying circumstances of his position. To this he chiefly owed his success.

Whence this singular moderation, so strangely combined in the same character with fiery impetuosity and invincible resolution? Was it patience? good nature? gentleness? Partly these; for Jackson, whose character was a strange compound of parodoxes, was the most patient, gentle, and good-natured of men. It was partly that profound self-esteem, which, conscious of its superiority to opposition, remains unmoved by the contradictions that would infuriate an inferior nature,—the indifference of the mastiff to the snarling of a terrier that would goad a lapdog to desperation; partly the frankness and magnanimity of a great soul, asserting its own freedom, and according the same freedom to others,—the greatness of a Cæsar, indomitable in his purposes, but gentle and placable to opposition. But I am persuaded that it chiefly originated in the structure of Jackson's intellectual organism. He was a man of action, rather than of thought. His acts were identified with himself, but he did not feel the same identity with thought. Hence opposition to his acts wounded his pride, and roused the lion in his nature. But his self-love was not wounded by opposition to his policy; "That is mere difference of opinion," he would say to those who dissented from his convictions; and he treated a difference of opinion with the utmost lenity. The reader of his messages will be struck with the gentle tone in which he suggests his views of policy. Thought never moved him profoundly. His conscientious love of right made him calmly follow out his convictions; but no passions were involved; and the same conscientiousness rendered him lenient to the adverse convictions of others. Had he been more intellectual, he would have advocated his convictions with ardor, and endeavored to compel the acquiescence of his followers; and in so doing, he would have wrecked his party. As it was, the gentleness, good nature, and magnanimity, so characteristic of the man where his passions were not roused, had full scope in all questions of policy, and rendered him the least dictatorial, and most forbearing of political leaders.

Andrew Jackson is one of the most remarkable characters in history. He was a strange compound of contradictions, rarely united in the same character. Placable and imperious, gentle and stern, facile and inflexible, good-natured and passionate, patient and impetuous, yielding and self-willed,—he was peculiarly endowed with the qualities necessary to the position he was called to fill. Such a character is rarely met,—so indomitable to opponents, yet so little arrogant to friends—so sensitive to opposition to his acts, yet so indifferent to adverse opinions—so persistent in following out his own convictions, yet so magnanimous in conceding the same freedom to others. Its peculiarity consists in a grand majestic character overshadowing a clear, and penetrating, but not imperial intellect. We see the same predominance of character over intellect in Washington, united with greater calmness, and perhaps less firmness and obstinacy of purpose. Such natures must always rise first in the world of action, before they are transferred to the realm of politics. When they appear, they are the predestined leaders of men. Grand, self-poised, resolute, persistent, magnanimous, conciliatory, they are the centers, round which agitated elements gather in periods of transition—the founders of States, and establishers of systems.

We owe it to Jackson, providentially brought to the helm at the moment of crisis, and endowed with remarkable and peculiar qualifications for his difficult station, that the unconstitutional measures then dominant did not ruin the country. He saved us from evils whose magnitude we can scarcely conceive. It may be that he rescued us from disunion, and saved republicanism from downfall. Let us be grateful for his benefits, and attribute the evils he originated, not to his volition, but to the necessity forced upon him by the gigantic system he was aiming to overturn.

II. Subsequent Contest over the American System.

Powerful as Jackson was, the Bank and Tariff triumphed over his popularity, at last. The measures he was driven to adopt, as the only method of destroying the Bank, ruined the prosperity of the country. This financial ruin, justly attributed to his policy, caused a political reaction, which in 1840 gave the Whigs a complete victory, and supreme control of the government.

The defeat of the Jackson party and policy was complete and decisive. All the machinery devised by Jackson to give strength and consistency to his party was seized upon by the Whigs, and employed to strengthen their hold on power. Rotation in office, originally devised for the purpose of strengthening the administration against the pressure of unconstitutional measures, was now used to strengthen the party bent on establishing those measures as the permanent policy of the country. The Whigs, aided by bankruptcy, had driven the Democracy from their fortifications, and turned their batteries against them. The long conflict of Jackson's administration had proved fruitless. It seemed as if nothing could prevent the complete triumph of the Latitudinarian Constructionists in passing all their measures.

The Whigs were in haste to obtain the fruits of their victory. If the Bank were established for twenty years, and the protective Tariff again set on foot, the combined strength of the patronage of the government, the power of the Bank, and the devotion of the protected classes, would maintain them permanently in power, without danger of reaction. They were anxious to set their policy on foot without loss of time, and immediately upon his inauguration, General Harrison, at the instance of the party leaders, summoned a called session of Congress for the purpose.

But the death of Harrison before the Congress met dashed their triumph, and turned it into defeat.

In the shifting scenes of the struggle during Jackson's administration, the Whig party had lost its homogeneous character. It entered upon that struggle united in sentiment,—all Latitudinarian Constructionists, and all devoted to Bank, Tariff, and Internal Improvements. But in its progress, many joined them in opposition to Jackson's removal of the deposits, from a desire to resist executive encroachment, who yet were opposed to the leading measures of the Whig policy, and to their principles of constitutional construction. To make capital in the canvass of 1840, the Whigs selected one of these as their candidate for Vice President. The death of Harrison made Tyler the arbiter of the fate of his party, and of the political destiny of the country.

Had Henry Clay possessed the magnanimity of Jackson, the

party might have achieved its policy; for Tyler, in the false position in which he was placed, was sincerely desirous of co-operating with the party to which he owed his elevation. But Clay had too much arrogance of intellect to be a successful party leader. A Bank charter was passed without consulting the President, which he, with his views, could not approve. When the astonishment occasioned by the veto had subsided, the moderate members of the party arranged a compromise measure, to which Tyler promised his approval. But the arrogance of Henry Clay wrecked his party. His friends with difficulty withheld him from denouncing the President while the negotiations were pending. As soon as Tyler had committed himself by a promise, no longer to be restrained, he delivered a philippic in the Senate, in which he refused his approval to the Compromise Bank, and virtually read Tyler out of the party. The President refused to be held to a compromise in which all the conciliation was on his side; and a second veto put an end to all co-operation between him and the party which had elected him, and deprived the Whigs of the fruits of their success.

Tyler's veto killed the Bank.

In 1842, as soon as the ten years had expired during which the Compromise Tariff of 1832 was to exist, the protective Tariff was again set on foot. Thus Nullification had failed as signally to destroy the Tariff, as Jackson's assumption of power to destroy the Bank. The complete triumph of both measures was only prevented by the death of Harrison. The veto of Tyler overthrew the Bank; the demoralization of the Whig party enabled the Democrats to carry the election of 1844, upon a new issue which had sprung up, and reduce the Tariff to the revenue standard.

The events of this era of struggle teach us that we should never fight one evil by establishing another as its antagonist; that Truth should fight its own battles, without the alloy of passion;—then when principle has triumphed, the issue is laid at rest forever. Where Right strengthens itself for the conflict with Wrong by allying itself with abuses, the triumph it achieves is shortlived;—but the abuses permanently remain. The system of Rotation in office, the unwarranted assumption of executive power, the interposition of

State Nullification, failed of accomplishing the good they were designed to achieve;—but their evil influence remained, and still continues to afflict the country.

Sect. 2.—The Slavery Agitation.

The American System excited sectional animosities to the highest pitch, during the conflict over the Tariff. But it inflicted far greater evil upon the country, in giving rise to the Slavery agitation.

It has been seen, how in a normal condition of industry, Slavery would have been drained from the Border to the Cotton states, leaving the former to become free, and ameliorating the institution in the latter; and how the Bank and Tariff interfered to prevent this consummation, gave birth to the slave trade, fortified slavery within its boundaries, and filled the institution with abnormal abuses.

While slavery seemed to be waning, the area of emancipation extending steadily southward, the public mind paid little attention to the subject; it was generally agreed to leave the institution to the force of natural laws, and the advancing spirit of the age. But the new vigor imparted to the institution by the Tariff, and the abuses to which that measure gave rise, attracted attention to it. A small but zealous body of enthusiasts, erroneously believing that further emancipation was hopeless through the force of natural causes, began to look to abolition by the Federal government. Heedless of the limits of Federal power, they began a bold and reckless agitation. They flooded the South with their publications; and deluged Congress with petitions for the abolition of slavery, for the dissolution of the Union, and for other objects which would tend to foster the excitement they were bent on producing.

Their measures, however, would have been productive of no result, had not their agitation been favored by the sectional animosities gendered by the Tariff. Their publications were thrown out of the Southern mails; and Congress, at first, with very few exceptions, manifested little sympathy with their cause. But the Southern opposition to the system in which Northern interests were deeply involved, chafed many Northern congressmen, and induced them to encourage these petitions as a means of annoyance to the South. "They will not give us the Tariff," a Northern member

said, "let them be stung by these petitions." The petitions continued to pour in upon Congress. They occasioned many exciting scenes.

Southern statesmen were seized with alarm at the agitation; especially as the petitions were countenanced in Congress by a more and more numerous phalanx of sympathizers. It became evident that the agitation was leavening the Northern mind. Amid this ceaseless bickering, the sectional idea became fixed. The country came to be regarded as composed of two divisions, antagonistic in interest, and in feeling. The next step was to assume that the South could not remain in safety in the Union, without maintaining an equality in Congress. Many began to look with alarm at the increasing ascendancy of the North, in population, and in representation. Equality in the House of Representatives was lost, and the disparity of strength was annually increasing. In the Senate, the sections were as yet equal; but there was no territory left to Slavery, south of the Missouri Compromise line, while in the vast area to the north of it, new states would continue to be organized. The balance of power would soon be destroyed as effectually, in the Senate, as in the House of Representatives.

As the only means of averting this result, Southern statesmen began to meditate the acquisition of territory south of the Missouri Compromise line.

Texas originally belonged to the Louisiana territory purchased from France. It was ceded by Monroe to Spain, in 1819, to propitiate the North, then agitated by the slavery question. After the revolution which freed Mexico from the Spanish yoke, the Mexican government opened Texas to American immigration. These settlers revolted from Mexico, in 1836, and were now anxious to be reannexed to the United States. Southern politicians beheld, here, the opportunity of securing the territory necessary to maintain the balance of power with the North. Calhoun co-operated with the Democracy for years, with a view to enlist the party in favor of the Southern policy. The question of annexation was the leading issue in the presidential election of 1844.

In that election, the two adverse political parties rallied all their strength. It was the great battle of opposing views. The Bank,

the Tariff, Internal Improvements, were the grand issues to be decided. The triumph of the Democracy seemed an ultimate decision of all the questions which then distracted the American people. The Bank was placed in the category of obsolete issues; the Tariff was finally adjusted upon the revenue basis; Texas was admitted with the stipulation that, as population increased, its territory might be divided into five states. Within this area, it was thought, Slavery might find room for development, so as to maintain an equality in the Senate for a long period.

Here, had wise counsels prevailed, the vexed questions which had so deeply agitated the public mind would have rested. If the slavery agitation had stopped here, all might have been well. The Bank and Tariff removed, the country would have gradually returned to a normal course of industry; industrial and political harmony would have been restored between the sections; slavery, withdrawn from politics, would have found solution in gradual emancipation from the force of natural laws; a grand industrial career would have opened before us, in which the manufacturing West would have been the center of the system; and, though late in entering upon it, our country would have fulfilled its destiny.

But here, again, the fatality of our false industrial system intervened, to urge us yet further in a course of sectional antagonism. It had induced an excitement which had leavened the public mind, and influenced our politics no less than our social life. The national mind was fevered, and already began to display a mania for excitements. The most exciting questions were the most popular. The opportunity to pause was lost. The country was precipitated into the fatal Mexican war. New territory was acquired; the rival sections came into collision over the question of its distribution; and the question of Slavery extension became henceforth the grand issue which agitated the Union.

The greater portion of the territory acquired from Mexico lay south of the Missouri Compromise line: the South claimed that an equal share of it should be opened to the extension of slavery; the North generally took the ground that there should be no further extension of slavery into the territories. The controversy raged in both sections for several years, and at length reached such a height

as to threaten the integrity of the Union. It was settled, at length, by the compromise of 1850.

All the solid advantages of this compromise inured to the North: it virtually ceded all the territory in dispute to free labor. It admitted California as a free state; separated New Mexico from Texas; and left all the newly-acquired territories to determine for themselves the question of slavery or freedom. It was a practical common-sense disposition of the question, referring it to the determination of natural laws. Still, the Compromise measures were unfavorable to the South, for it was known that the operation of natural laws would secure the territory to freedom.

This arrangement respecting the territories acquired by the Mexican war wrested from the South the equality in the Senate secured through the annexation of Texas. This fact tended to renew and intensify the apprehensions of the South with regard to the ascendancy of the other section. And, unfortunately, the compromise became the beginning of a new agitation in the North against slavery. As the South yielded everything in respect of territory, it was proposed, as an equivalent, to embody among the Compromise measures a law for the rendition of fugitive slaves found in the Northern states. This law became the occasion of a new, and more intense anti-slavery excitement than had yet agitated the North.

The Compromise of 1850, owing to the social excitement pervading the country, became the means of widening the breach between the sections, by intensifying the anti-slavery excitement at the North, and the apprehensions at the South of Northern supremacy.

But the conservative element in both sections rallied in support of the Compromise, and, for the time, succeeded in overruling the revolutionary tendencies, both North and South. The presidential election of 1852 was an unmistakable verdict of approval of the Compromise of 1850. The social excitement had not yet risen to such a pitch as to endanger the Union. Conservatives began to hope that the slavery agitation was ended, and that the institution would henceforth be left to the operation of natural laws. But, unfortunately, a spark was struck, which again ignited the tinder.

The overwhelming approval of the principle of the Compromise

measures induced an attempt to extend it to all the territories. The act organizing the territories of Kansas and Nebraska embodied the principle of non-intervention, and sought to establish it as the definitive policy of the government.

If the public mind had been calm and healthful, the establishment of this principle would have been universally hailed as a wise adjustment of a vexed and agitating question. The North would have accepted it as a delicate but sure method of securing all the national territories to freedom; the South, as a magnanimous suggestion, permitting them to retire from a hopeless conflict, without a wounded sense of honor. But, in the social and political condition of the country, the measure was most unfortunate. It was unnecessary, since it was opening to agitation territories whose status was fixed by the Missouri Compromise; and, in the then existing state of the country, the wise, conservative calmness, necessary to weigh the measure and properly estimate its bearings, was wanting. Social excitement joined with political fervor, to inflame the public mind to a point that rendered it peculiarly accessible to the influence of passion. Moreover, Rotation in office had combined with social demoralization and sectional excitement, to elevate to prominence many political adventurers solely intent upon personal aggrandizement, and ready to appeal to sectional passions, as the theme most readily compassed by the mediocre scope of their mentality, and best adapted to chime in with the prevailing tone of excitability and subserve their selfish views of personal ambition. These ambitious adventurers seized hold upon the sensational theme, and diligently set about inflaming anew the smoldering passions of the sections: inciting the South, on the one hand, to renew the struggle for equality of political power; and, on the other, inflaming the Northern mind with the phantasm of slavery extension.

Political circumstances, also, were peculiarly favorable to the formation of a powerful anti-slavery party in the North. The Whig party was hopelessly disorganized by its late defeat; and its broken cohorts were in search of a new banner, under which to rally. Many of its leaders were still devoted to the Bank and Tariff. But they saw that these measures could only be re-established under cover of an issue that would dissever the West and the great Middle states

from their political alliance with the South, and unite them strongly with New England. The anti-slavery issue was the only one which gave a hope to these broken partisans of gratifying their personal ambition, and again establishing the measures the Democracy had overthrown. They resolved to seize upon it, and use it for the accomplishment of their purposes.

The Kansas-Nebraska act was seized on as a fit means of rousing the agitation necessary to organize a powerful sectional party. It was declared that Kansas was given up to slavery, and that it could be saved, only by the most vigorous measures. The clergy were subsidized in aid of the political movement; the Northern pulpit resounded with incendiary harangues; meetings were held for the purpose of sending out emigrants to Kansas thoroughly furnished with weapons to save the territory to freedom, if necessary, by force of arms. Every instrumentality was employed to fever the Northern mind. The excitability fostered by our industrial system was easily moved; the tinder was ready for the spark, and on the instant the North was in a blaze of excitement.

The same excitability prevailed also at the South. Under ordinary circumstances, Southern emigrants to Kansas would have settled, side by side, indiscriminately with those of the North, living in harmony with them, and quietly submitting when the issue was decided against them by the ballot. But now, Northern excitement caused a counter excitement in the South. Emigrants from the rival sections regarded each other with bitterness; their animosities issued in bloodshed; civil war raged in Kansas, and infuriated the rival sections to the pitch of frenzy.

Still, healing measures might have been found, if wisdom had ruled our public counsels. But here, again, the fatality with which our industrial system hedged us round, intervened to drive us on to shipwreck. Rotation in office had corrupted our politics, and filled public life with swarms of adventurers; many of the best minds were inspired with aversion to politics, and were enticed by the speculation incident to our industrial system into the avenues of trade; the men of enlarged views who might have steered the ship of state through the breakers had remained in private life, scorning to plunge into the political cess-pool, or attracted to business in

pursuit of the fortunes so easily won by speculation. As the rule, politics were left to mediocre minds,—excited partisans, whose stormy passions delighted in the tempests of faction—or mercenary adventurers who followed politics as a trade, battening on the fees of applicants for legislation, the brokerage of place-hunting, or the corrupt jobs given and promised to their partisans by the rival political parties. Such demagogues, from passion, or from interest, pandered to the passions of the hour.

It is needless to trace the operation of these forces in the progress of excitement to its final termination. Under such conditions, there could be only one result. The voice of reason was unheeded amid the war of furious factions; every measure of pacification failed; mutual animosities were heightened by fresh causes of antagonism; until faction reached its culmination, and the country was plunged into civil war.

It has now emerged from the conflict, bleeding; exhausted; impoverished; beridden again with Bank and Tariff; its Constitution trampled; Centralization almost an accomplished fact.

All this has sprung directly from the abnormal industrial system fostered by the Bank and Tariff. It gave rise to the alienation of the sections; it stimulated the excitability which converted alienation into fierce animosity; it caused the degeneracy of politics which made the country a prey to greedy adventurers; it organized all the forces, whose combined influence thwarted every attempt at conciliation, and led unavoidably to civil strife. The chain of causation which led from Bank and Tariff to civil war is unbroken. Those measures are responsible for all the political evils that have distracted the country, for more than forty years. In the presence of the causes induced by our industrial system, the course of events was an inevitable fatality. Under existing conditions, no other result was possible.

The Supreme Ruler of events attaches a penalty to every departure from the principles of morals, and of government. Our career might have been a Beacon to guide mankind to the haven of Liberty; it now gleams, a Balefire in the track of Time, lurid with battle strife, to warn them of the woes that attend violations of the constitutional principles of Republicanism.

BOOK II.

PROPOSITION II.

Our past VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION *have reacted most injuriously upon* FOREIGN NATIONS*: fostering a* FALSE INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM *throughout the* WORLD; *gendering dangerous* SOCIAL EVILS; *and strengthening the cause of* ABSOLUTISM, *rescuing it from ruin, and giving birth to a political reaction eminently dangerous to the cause of Liberty and Advancement.*

BOOK II.

INJURIOUS INFLUENCE OF OUR VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION UPON THE WORLD.

PART I.

INDUSTRIAL EVILS OUR VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION HAVE INFLICTED ON THE WORLD, BY FOSTERING A FALSE INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM.

The idea of attributing such importance to the policy of the United States may strike many minds as an exhibition of absurd vanity. The world, while recognizing our rapid growth and reluctantly according to us a place in the first rank of great nations, has never yet perceived the important influence we have exerted in the development of this era of industrial progress; and we have, ourselves, modestly accepted the position assigned us in foreign estimation. We have never realized our commanding influence upon the industry of the world; and an incredulous smile may be the first impulse of Americans, when informed that our country has given direction to the commercial development of the age. Yet such is indubitably the fact. Moreover, our course has diverted commerce into a channel adverse to the best interests of mankind.

CHAPTER I.

BRITISH CENTRALIZATION OF COMMERCE.

The vast influence of the United States upon the commerce of the world will be apparent, from an analysis of the elements of the world's commerce, and a brief review of its course of development. It will appear that the application of machinery to manufactures is the basis of the commerce of the age; that the productions of the United States have been the chief basis of manufactures; and consequently, that our national industry is the foundation of the industrial progress of the era.

[As frequent allusion is made in this work to the true principles of commerce, this section will be given to the consideration of the subject. The general reader may, if he chooses, pass to the next section.]

Sect. I.—The Elements and Principles of Commerce.

Commerce is the interchange by which various countries supply the deficit of their own productions in the mutual exchange of commodities. The commodities of commerce consist of the raw products of the earth, agricultural and mineral, and the products of manufacturing industry. If the earth everywhere yielded the same products, and if the industry of mankind were everywhere occupied upon the same commodities, there would be no exchange, either of the products of agriculture, or of manufacturing industry. Under such circumstances, every nation would supply its own wants. There would be little or no commercial interchange between different countries. An isolation like that of Japan might universally prevail.—The basis of all commerce, therefore, is the variety of production incident to diversity of soil and climate.

But this diversity of production, alone, will not suffice to induce commerce. If the population of a country is contented with the products of their own soil and do not aspire to the possession of anything beyond what their industry will supply, they will have no commerce, however limited that production may be. The wants of

a people are the limits of their industry. If their wants are limited to the products of their own country, their industry will be limited to supplying them. But, as soon as other wants are felt,—as soon as they begin to desire articles which they can only obtain from abroad, they extend their industry to the production of commodities of exchange. Fortunately for the interests of commerce, the desire for foreign commodities is generally greater than the ability to purchase, and every civilized nation, after supplying home wants with the products of the soil, strains its industry to the utmost in producing articles which may serve as a basis of exchange for foreign commodities.

But diversity of production and a sense of want, both combined, will not induce commercial interchange. However it may appear in theory, commerce never consists in an actual interchange of agricultural products. A poor agricultural country under an unfavorable climate may desire the products of a more favored region; but it cannot purchase them, for there is no demand for the agricultural products it has to offer in exchange. Commodities always consist, on one side, at least, of articles of manufacturing industry. Manufactures are a prime element of commerce. There can be no commerce without manufactures.

Variety of production incident to diversity of soil and climate, the desire of different nations to supply their deficit of home production by foreign importations, and manufactures as the basis of exchange,—these three conditions are the prime and indispensible elements of commerce.

Manufactures are the necessary basis of commerce, and they comprise its chief commodities. Commerce originates in manufactures—as may be shown by the natural progress of industry, and by the experience of the past.

Primitive industry has but one object,—the production of food. Manufactures are unknown. The husbandman tills the earth with a rude implement made with his own hands; the skins of animals slain for food suffice for clothing; a rude knife and hatchet carved from stone with laborious patience answer his few and simple needs.

The first step from this primitive state is the invention and man-

ufacture of useful implements and utensils. The art of pottery is discovered; the distaff is invented, and rudely manufactured: mankind obtains the use of various necessary utensils, and acquires the art of fabricating from the wool of their flocks coarse cloth suited to protect them from the inclemency of the seasons. But, still, there is no commerce. A rude agriculture is universal, together with the care of flocks and herds, and the simple art of house manufactures. Each community maintains a small traffic, in which the potter and distaff-maker furnish their wares to the surrounding district, in exchange for provisions and home-spun clothes. There is no variety of production to give rise to commerce between different districts.

But now the art of working metal is discovered in some district where a mine is wrought; and knives, and axes, and hoes are made from some easily wrought metal. The population engaged in the manufacture supply their neighbors, and receive in exchange the products of agriculture and home-made manufactures. But here the traffic stops. Other districts may desire to obtain the metal implements; but they have only provisions and rude manufactures to offer in exchange, with which the miners are already sufficiently supplied. The commerce stagnates, from a want of the variety of production necessary to form the basis of interchange.

But necessity is the mother of invention. In some district, skill is acquired to produce woolen cloth of finer texture. Few of the simple inhabitants of the district can afford to wear so costly a fabric; the surplus produced is offered to the miners in exchange for their metallic implements.—In another district the soil is adapted to the growth of flax; a linen manufacture springs up; and the linen fabrics are exchanged for metallic implements.—Another district is adapted to the grape; and the manufacture of wine is established. The three districts offer, severally, wines, fine linen, and woolen goods, in exchange for the wares of the metal manufacturers. A commerce springs up, based upon the exchange of articles of manufacturing industry.

But it is evident that this commerce is based upon an improper system. The fine woolen and linen fabrics are manufactured by the slow hand process, and are too costly for use by any but the rich; and, as the common clothing of the metal manufacturers is supplied by the coarse fabrics of their own district, they can only import

enough of these finer fabrics for the use of their wealthier class. This limited demand for their fine fabrics limits the ability of the producers to buy; so that neither district is able to pay for nearly metal implements enough to supply the general demand. Even if they could sell all the fine fabrics they could manufacture, still, the supply would be so limited by the slow process of hand manufacture, as to be inadequate to the purchase of all the metal tools needed in the several districts. The remedy is obvious. While the metal is manufactured at the mine, and exported in a manufactured form, the countries which import it must pay in manufactures, the only medium of exchange, both for the metal, and for the labor and skill expended in the manufacture of the implements. It is the latter which enhances the price. The goods which the mining district consumes are sufficient to pay for the raw metal in the unmanufactured state. If imported in that condition, smiths can manufacture it in every neighborhood into plows, axes, hoes, and knives, and they will receive the products of agriculture and coarse home-spun cloth in payment. Under this system commerce flourishes: each district grows its own agricultural supplies, produces its own wool, and manufactures on domestic looms its home-spun clothing; each purchases the needy supply of raw metal with a part of its manufactures; and they exchange the remainder with each other.

From this illustration, principles of commerce may be educed, of universal application where manufactures are wrought by hand. Some of these we now present:—

1. Countries can have commercial interchange only in the ratio of their diversity of production. Where the products of agricultural and manufacturing industry are identical, no commerce can exist.

2. Between countries of the same zone having the same agricultural products, no commerce can exist, except upon the basis of manufactures. In such case, the commodities of commerce consist entirely of manufactured articles (accounting wine such), or of the raw material of manufactures.

3. While manufactures are wrought by hand, every country must manufacture for itself all articles of general use; and where a country has not raw material, it can afford to import raw material

only, not the manufactured article. From this it follows that, while manufactures are wrought by hand, the manufactured commodities of commerce are limited to costly articles of luxurious consumption.

It follows from these principles that, between countries of the Temperate zone, little or no extensive commerce can exist, while manufactures are wrought by hand. Their products are too similar to admit of much interchange of agricultural productions. Northern Europe might desire the wines of the more Southern countries; but it would have no agricultural productions to offer, which were not equally produced in the Southern clime. Under such circumstances, manufactures must become the basis of commercial intercourse. But the slow hand process of manufacturing could not furnish manufactures in sufficient quantities to become the basis of an extensive traffic; and, moreover, goods manufactured by that process are necessarily so expensive as to place them beyond the reach of the mass of community, and restrict their use to the richer class. The slow process of manufacturing limits the supply; and also, by raising the price, limits the demand.

While manufactures are conducted by hand, the only extensive commerce consists of the exchange of the products of the Torrid and Temperate zones.

But the want of Tropical demand for the products of Temperate industry has always restricted this intercourse within narrow limits. The higher latitudes have always desired the luxurious products of warmer climates. But the Tropics neither require the agricultural products of the Temperate zone, nor the expensive manufactures wrought by hand. Their own teeming soil supplies all their wants; and their own skilled industry manufactures the light goods suited to their climate, cheaper than they could be furnished by the hand-looms of the Temperate latitudes. While manufactures were wrought by hand, the only products of the Temperate zone for which the Tropics afforded a market were the metallic products of the earth,—gold and silver—and trinkets and implements they had not skill to fabricate.

Thus, in the absence of cheap and abundant manufactures, the industry of mankind languished.

A brief review of the history of commerce will evince the justice of the conclusions that have been reached.

While manufactures were the product of industry unaided by machinery, commerce consisted, chiefly, of the interchange of the products of the Temperate zone and the Tropics. The traffic between Europe and the East Indies has always given life to industry, and enriched the nations which have successively carried it on.

We have no means of knowing the state of European industry, before the trade with India was opened; for that traffic had been carried on by the Phœnicians, ages before the date of the earliest historic records. The Indian traffic was more flourishing in the prehistoric age than ever since. Traces of its grandeur meet the eye in great cities along the Mediterranean, which grew up into splendor, culminated, declined, and were succeeded by barbarism, before the dawn of the earliest historic era. Then flourished Egyptian Thebes, with its hundred gates, and its millions of population; Baalbec, with its colossal structures, whose ruins are the wonder of succeeding ages; the Cyclopean cities of Greece, whose remains astonished the historians of a later civilization; and the marts of the ancient Pelasgi, who covered Italy with the monuments of a gigantic commerce and a flourishing civilization, long before the historic age. We cannot err in believing the first age of Indian commerce its most flourishing era. The Indies have never needed the agricultural products of Europe; but in that age, the mines of Europe furnished the world with its only useful metal. Iron was then unknown. All implements were made of bronze, the ancient brass, composed of copper hardened by tin. The copper mines of Crete and the tin of Cornwall supplied the world with bronze, which was the sole metal used for armor, agricultural implements, and household utensils. The mineral products of Europe were in demand in the Indies, then, in exchange for the Tropical luxuries of the East. The bronze of Phœnician commerce stimulated the industry of all the world, to obtain it. Every country in Europe and the Indies felt the impulse, and eagerly offered the products of their industry in exchange for this necessary metal. These commodities, again, in their interchange, swelled the commerce of that age into colossal proportions.

Phœnicia, which conducted the European branch of the traffic, was one great hive of industry. Its coast was gemmed with cities; the sails of Sidon whitened every shore of the Mediterranean, and the Western and Northern coasts of Europe. It would appear that the Eastern branch of the traffic was divided among many agents during this grand commercial era. The peace and prosperity of the Assyrian empire during more than a thousand years, and the grandeur and magnificence of Nineveh and other Assyrian cities, attest that the main current of the trade poured its flood of wealth upon the great empire of antiquity.

After the discovery of the mode of working iron, that metal was gradually introduced; and, as it superseded bronze in many articles of general use, the traffic must have declined from the grand proportions of the first era. But the interest of the Phœnicians, who were then the monopolists of commerce, would prevent, as far as possible, the substitution of iron for bronze; for many articles the latter continued in exclusive use; and the commerce with the East, of which the bronze traffic was the basis, continued to flourish, for centuries after iron was known. It was still so extensive in the age of Solomon, that the control of the Eastern branch of the traffic for thirty years, gave to the Hebrew nation an almost fabulous wealth. It continued for centuries to enrich, successively, Egypt, Babylon, Greece, and Rome. In the age of Augustus it was still flourishing, and the tin of Britain was still the basis of the traffic between the Mediterranean and Indian oceans.

The traffic seems gradually to have declined; probably from the discovery of the tin mines of Malacca, which rendered the Indies independent of the bronze of Europe. It is difficult to say how far the decline of the traffic, by paralyzing the industry of the Roman empire, promoted discontent and induced the ceaseless convulsions which hastened its decline; and how far the convulsions of the empire, by paralyzing industry, hastened the decline of the traffic. But the combined influence of these two causes subverted industry, impoverished the Roman empire, and left it incapable of resisting the puny assaults of the barbarians of Northern Europe.

Henceforth, there was little or no commerce between Europe and the Tropical regions—and European industry stagnated, and an

universal torpor reigned, for centuries. The conquests of the Arabs sealed up the usual channels of traffic. Constantinople obtained a few luxuries from the East, by a circuitous route.—In a later age, Venice endeavored to restore the traffic across the Isthmus of Suez. But Europe had, now, no commodities India wished to obtain; the trade was limited; and so far from promoting a revival of industry, it only served to drain Europe of the precious metals. Such was the state of industry in Europe, during the period emphatically styled the Dark Ages. Little commerce existed between different European countries; for there was little variety of production: little intercourse with the Indies; for Europe had nothing but the precious metals the Indies would receive in exchange.

The discovery of America and the ocean route to the East by way of Cape Good Hope introduced a new era in the commerce between the Temperate zone and the Tropics. The area of Tropical production was doubled; and the cheap route of communication and the greater abundance of the supply so diminished the cost of Tropical luxuries as to increase their consumption to a vast extent. The industry of European countries was stimulated, to produce commodities to exchange for the luxuries of the Tropics; activity displaced torpor, and a new era of life and progress dawned upon Europe.

But the traffic was limited by an insurmountable barrier. Europe no longer had, as during the Phœnician era, the exclusive possession of a metal in general demand in the Tropics. The home production of the East Indies supplied their demand for useful metals; and their hand-looms produced manufactures cheaper and of finer texture than those of Europe. The East Indies demanded a large balance of specie in return for their commodities. Fortunately the mines of America, whose products were scattered in profusion by the Spanish wars, enabled Europe to export largely of specie, and thus prevent the East India trade from languishing. The European commerce with the Tropical regions of America was conducted on a more advantageous basis: those regions were covered with European colonies, and consumed largely of European manufactures; and the specie balance sent out from Europe was brought back again by the adventurers who returned enriched with Tropical planting, or

died—leaving their wealth to European heirs. The consumption of specie in the East India commerce, also, was diminished by the manner in which the traffic was conducted. It was engrossed by Europeans who returned to Europe with the profits of the trade; and, eventually, extensive districts were subjected by Europeans, who wrung from the natives, by taxation, the specie their industry had drained from Europe.

Under such advantageous circumstances, the temperate zone was able to maintain a considerable commerce with the tropical regions of the earth. The traffic with the East enriched all the nations,—the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, the English—who successively contested, or controlled it. The dormant energies of Europe were roused, and the united impulse of mental, moral, and industrial activity bore the world onward in the career of modern civilization.

Still, the conditions under which the traffic was conducted were so unfavorable as to restrict commerce within comparatively narrow limits. The ability of European countries to consume tropical luxuries was limited by their ability to export specie in exchange; for, notwithstanding the returning current of specie to Europe through successful adventurers, a balance still remained in the tropics sufficient to keep Europe exhausted of the precious metals. The luxuries of the tropics could only be consumed to a limited extent, and the stimulus afforded by the traffic to industry, though considerable as compared with the stagnation of the Middle ages, was actually confined within very narrow limits. There was no demand for European productions in the tropics, and little interchange of productions between different countries of Europe. Each country manufactured for itself all articles of general use, and the non producers engaged in manufacturing industry consumed the agricultural products of their respective countries. The commercial commodities of Europe consisted of specie, exports of the torrid zone, and a slight interchange of wines and fine fabrics between the different European countries.

The inventions of the last hundred years have wrought a new era in manufactures, and in commerce. The inventions of the spinning jenny; the power loom; the steam engine, as applicable to ma-

chinery, and steamboats and railroads; and the cotton gin,—made manufactures possible on the most extensive scale. The application of machinery to manufactures has already multiplied tenfold the commerce of the world, and is continuing to increase it in an accelerating ratio.—And the cotton manufacture, of which the United States have furnished the staple, has been the basis of the industry and commerce of the age. The industry of our country has been the center on which the manufactures of the age have hinged: it has furnished the material for the greatest manufacture of the era; that which has furthered commerce more than all other branches of industry combined.

That we may derive some definite idea of the vast influence of our industry in developing the commerce of the age, let us briefly mark the influence of manufactures, as wrought by machinery, upon the enlargement of commerce.

We have seen that manufactures are the basis of all commercial interchange; and that the slow process of hand manufacture dwarfs commerce, both by diminishing the supply of manufactures, and by limiting the demand for them, owing to the high price necessarily demanded. The application of machinery to manufactures inaugurates a new era. It renders manufactures both cheap, and abundant; and thus removes the capital obstacles to their becoming the basis of extensive commerce. It stimulates commerce in all its branches.

The application of machinery to manufactures vastly increases the traffic with the tropics. Under present conditions, manufactures are becoming the stimulus to tropical commerce that bronze was during the Phœnician era. They are offered in abundance, and at prices cheaper than they can be manufactured in the tropics by hand. When fabrics suited to Tropical taste and climate, and various articles of ornament and use, embracing every variety of material,—wood, glass, delf, and steel—are offered at the low rates incident to power manufactures, it stimulates the tropics to multiply exports as a medium of exchange. This is already its effect; and it will be an increasing tendency, in proportion as the tropical regions advance in civilization, and realize to an increased degree necessities hitherto in a great measure unknown.

The application of machinery to manufactures vastly increases the commerce between countries of the temperate zone, also. In the first place, it offers to every country a vastly increased supply of tropical luxuries, which, being obtained in exchange for cheap manufactures, can be offered at such reduced prices as to bring them within the reach of the mass of community. It also greatly enlarged the interchange between countries of the temperate zone based on manufactures. Manufactures wrought by machinery, from their greater cheapness, superseded hand manufactures. The old system of household manufactures fell into disuse; thousands of handicraftsmen found no longer demand for their art in supplying neighboring districts; the manufactures which used to be wrought in every neighborhood were now concentrated in localities convenient to transportation and fuel. An active commerce grew up, in forwarding raw material and supplies to factories, and receiving manufactured commodities in return. The conditions of commerce were entirely changed. The principles which governed traffic during the era of hand manufactures were reversed.

Formerly, in the era of hand manufactures, factories were necessarily diffused, that the high-priced wares might be paid for in the* bountiful products of the soil; so that neither raw material and supplies for operatives, nor the manufactured products of their industry, entered into commerce. But, now, the tendency is to the concentration of manufactures in localities favorable to their business; so that raw material and supplies, which formerly were grown and consumed in the same locality, are now forwarded to the factory in exchange for goods.—Formerly, manufactured articles, which constituted the chief basis of commerce, were exclusively articles of luxurious consumption. Now, commerce is expanded, supplying not merely, the luxury of the great, but the necessities of the many.—Formerly, articles of general use were, of necessity, manufactured in the districts where they were consumed; the process affording a market for the produce and raw material of the adjacent country. Now, articles of general use have become commodities of commerce, and manufactures, raw material, and agricultural

* See the third principle of commerce, page 247.

produce, that were, once, all localized, are, now, all commodities which swell the activity of commerce.

The result of all this has been an immense increase of population devoted to manufactures, directly, or to some of its auxiliary branches, causing a vastly increased consumption of agricultural produce. Thousands are engaged in the factories; thousands, in supplying them with fuel; thousands, in mines, and founderies, working metals for machinery, for factories, for ships, for railroads, for cities; thousands, in forwarding provisions and raw material to factories, and conveying their products to the consumer; thousands, in building ships, making roads, and erecting cities necessary to the traffic; and multiplied thousands, in cities and towns, and upon ships and railroads, engaged in conducting the transfer;—and all giving employment to other thousands, tenfold multiplied, occupied in providing for their various wants.

The tendency of all this is to foster an excessive commercial activity. Formerly, the world suffered from commercial inactivity. But the era of manufacturing by machinery is fostering an excessive commercial activity, injurious to industry, and dangerous to the social condition of mankind. While manufactures were wrought by hand, commerce needed to be stimulated; but under existing conditions, it needs to be restrained within proper limits and prevented from overleaping its boundary, by the strict enforcement of correct commercial principles. Chief among these is the principle, that *each country ought to manufacture its own raw material*, and consume its own breadstuffs, thus keeping these bulky articles from becoming commercial staples. This ought to be a commercial axiom. Its strict enforcement is absolutely necessary, in our era, to restrict commerce within proper limits, and prevent it from preying upon industry, and wrecking the civilization of the age.

In the next section it will appear fully to what extent the industry of the United States has furthered the vast commerce of the age. It is sufficient to remark, here, that our industry has been the basis of a manufacture that has multiplied tenfold the commerce of the earth.

Sect. 2.—British Centralization of Commerce.

It has been seen how, but for the unfortunate interference of the Federal government with the internal industry of the country, we should have monopolized the manufacture of our own cotton, and derived to ourselves the vast commercial advantages, of which it has been the basis.

Great Britain has great natural advantages for manufacturing, in its mines of coal and iron. Its coal mines are especially valuable, as affording fuel for steam purposes, and for iron and pottery furnaces. These advantages, improved to the utmost by the Saxon energy and enterprise of the English people, have enabled Great Britain to distance European competition. No European country has such advantages. France has iron, but no fuel. Sweden has iron, but the charcoal from her forests is too expensive a fuel to enable her to compete with British iron in the general market. Germany alone of European countries has abundant mines of coal and iron; but they are too remote from water facilities for transportation, to come into active competition with the manufacturing industry of Britain.

England has nothing to fear from European competition. The United States is the only country which has such natural advantages as to render it a formidable commercial rival. During the wars of the French Revolution, while the British manufactures were struggling under the disadvantages of a paper medium, and were burdened by government with war taxes and an oppressive system of legislation, America might have obtained such vantage ground as ever after to control the cotton manufacture. Even afterward, upon the return of peace in 1815, we had every advantage over the British manufacturer. For, even then, British industry struggled under great disadvantages. The revenues of the government were levied in such a manner as to oppress it; and the agricultural interest of Britain was fostered at the expense of her manufactures, by duties levied on importations of foreign raw material and grain. But we were deprived of every advantage which nature and the ill-advised policy of the English government gave us, by the worse conceived policy of our own. Prices inflated by a paper currency, by tariff duties, and by the diversion of industry induced by the American system, rendered it impossible for us to embark exten-

sively in manufacturing industry. We, her only possible rival, left the field to England without a competitor, and suffered her to monopolize the cotton manufacture, which should have been our own. By relinquishing the cotton manufacture to England, we have sunk into the position of a satellite of British enterprise, and enabled that country to concentrate in its hands the manufacturing industry of the world.

The extent to which the cotton of the United States has been the basis of British manufacturing industry and commercial enterprise may be readily seen.

The United States and Great Britain have been the chief agents in carrying forward the grand career of commercial enterprise which characterizes our era. Great Britain has become the great manufacturer, and, hence, the grand commercial agent of the world; and the cotton of the United States has been the foundation of British manufacturing industry. That the cotton of the United States has been the basis of the manufacturing industry of Great Britain, and, consequently, of its commercial grandeur, is evident from the statistics of British commerce.

The commerce of Great Britain has grown at such an even pace with her cotton manufactures, as to show an intimate connection between the amount of her cotton exports and the extent of her commerce. Cotton manufactures, during the whole of the manufacturing era, have compromised little less than one-half of her entire exports inclusive of tropical luxuries and all other manufactures.

But this statement does not show the extent to which the commerce of Great Britain has been based upon cotton. In 1834, the entire exports of Great Britain amounted to a little over £41,000,000, of which cotton manufactures comprised £20,503,585, about one-half of the whole. The remaining exports consisted of nearly £9,000,000 worth of woolen and linen goods; a little over £4,000,000 worth of metals, chiefly iron and steel; the rest of the exports consisted chiefly of articles of luxurious consumption,—tobacco, wines, and tropical luxuries imported into the country, a portion consumed, and the remainder, amounting to over £7,000,000, re-exported.

Now, let us estimate the effect upon British commerce of withdrawing the cotton supply.

The whole value of the cotton manufactures of Great Britain, in 1834, amounted to £34,000,000, of which, as has been stated, £20,000,000 in round numbers was exported, and £14,000,000 consumed in supplying the home demand. Without the cotton manufacture, therefore, Great Britain would have been deprived of £20,000,000 of exports, and £14,000,000 of cotton clothing. The latter must have been supplied by linen and woolen fabrics; which would, at least, consume the £9,000,000 of linen, and woolen exports. Deducting the £20,500,000 of cotton exports, and the £9,000,000 of woolen and linen exports, whose place was taken by cotton fabrics, the exports of Great Britain fall from £41,000,000 to £11,000,000.

This estimate shows that three-fourths of British commerce was based on the cotton manufacture. But even this does not show the full extent to which the commerce of Great Britain rests upon cotton. The only native raw material of Britain consists of the produce of her mines, and the earths suited to the manufacture of porcelain. The country did not in 1834, nor does it now, produce wool, flax, hides, tallow, etc., sufficient for domestic consumption. With exports diminished to the value of her own raw material, England would not have had the means to purchase enough raw material from abroad, even for domestic consumption, much less to be manufactured for exportation. Not only would she fail to export silks, leather, wine, tobacco, etc.; she would not be able to import enough to supply the wants of her own people. Hence, we must deduct silk, leather, tobacco, and wines, from the sum of her exports, reducing them considerably below £11,000,000.

Deducting the exports based upon the cotton manufacture, the exports of England, in 1834, will consist only of her native products,—earthenware, and metals, iron, steel, copper, tin; and the productions of her tropical dependencies. But both these branches of exports are increased by the cotton manufacture. An extensive demand for English iron was induced by the necessities of the era of commerce, in building ships, and roads, and cities, engaged in the traffic; and a very considerable increase of tropical production was induced by the stimulus of cotton goods exported to the tropics. If the consumption of the British islands continued the same, the residue of English exports in 1834, after deducting all that

were based on her cotton industry, would be very inconsiderable, indeed.

In point of fact, however, British exports would not actually fall to the low ebb this estimate would indicate. The country would be more economical in the use of foreign supplies. The immense exports of the country induced an extravagant consumption of wines, tobacco, and tropical luxuries. Thus, of 22,000,000 pounds of coffee, imported in 1834, all except 768,000 pounds was consumed in the country; of 38,000,000 pounds of tobacco imported, 21,000,000 pounds were consumed; of 9,000,000 gallons of wine imported, 6,000,000 gallons were consumed; of 4,700,000 pounds of sugar imported, 3,700,000 pounds were consumed. This excessive consumption of articles of luxury was induced by the immense exports based on the cotton manufacture. In the absence of those exports, Britain would consume fewer tropical luxuries; a greater quantity would be re-exported in exchange for raw products for the supply of necessary home wants. But the aggregate of its commerce would be greatly diminished. We are within the mark, when we estimate that three-fourths of the commerce of Great Britain, during the last thirty years, has been based upon the cotton manufacture.

In suffering Great Britain to monopolize the cotton manufacture, we have inflicted the most serious injury upon the commercial interests of mankind. The possession of the cotton manufacture enabled Great Britain to inaugurate a commercial centralization ruinous to the best interests of commerce. She already controlled the trade with the tropics; she now monopolized all the commerce derived from manufactures, also.

In 1834, the commercial system which has since grown to such vast proportions, was in its incipiency. From the unrivaled cheapness of the material and the excellence of the fabric, cotton goods were in universal demand. In exchange for its cotton fabrics, Britain obtained raw material from all the world.—Wool for her factories was brought from Spain, Saxony, South America, and Australia; raw hides were purchased everywhere, and tan-bark was imported, to tan them into leather, to be manufactured into shoes for the foreign market; straw, for hats and bonnets, was imported

from Italy; goat's hair, for shawls, from Asia; flax and hemp, from Russia, Holland, and other European states; raw silk, from France, Turkey, and Italy. Every product of the earth was brought to England for manufacture. She grasped the raw material of the whole world, rejecting nothing, and assimilating everything in her capacious industry. Nothing came amiss: the horns of animals were purchased, to be manufactured into glue; beeswax, tallow, rosin, vegetable, animal, and fish oils, ashes, bark, dyestuffs, rags, timber, flaxseed, bristles, furs,—were all purchased wherever offered, to be used in her manufactures, or re-exported as articles of commerce.

Britain trades with all nations, and supplies every country with manufactures of every kind, and with the useful and luxurious productions of every quarter of the globe. The commerce of the age made railroads necessary to carry it on—and Britain offered her iron to build them. New cities were founded, and old towns grew up into cities—and Britain furnished the iron, and the timber necessary for their construction. These various branches of industry developed the population of the British isles, until the native agriculture did not suffice for its consumption; and butter, cheese, fruits, breadstuffs, and meats, are imported in immense quantities from all over Europe and America. Two-thirds of the exports of Great Britain consist of goods manufactured from foreign raw material; and she requires $600,000,000 of annual importations to supply the population with food and clothing. It is estimated that one-third of the population of the British Isles is dependent upon grain supplies from abroad. We have here the anomalous spectacle of a nation without raw material for her factories or provisions for her operatives becoming, by dint of energy, the great manufacturer; and without commodities of her own, the commercial agent of the world. The different nations have little direct intercourse; but exchange with each other through the intervention of England. England is the world's merchant, manufacturer, market; the general purveyor, and agent of mankind. England is a party to all the great commercial transactions of the world. She furnishes every nation with all it wishes to buy, and purchases every thing it wishes to sell. Laboring under every disadvantage,—without food

for operatives, raw material for manufactures, or timber for ships, her sagacity, energy, and capital, seconded by the follies of other nations, have overcome all obstacles, and enabled her, in defiance of nature and all the laws of industry, to achieve a gigantic monopoly of the manufactures and commerce of the world. Never before have industry and commerce been so diverted from their natural channels, to be centralized, in defiance of all natural laws, in the hands of a single nation.

The following sketch of the vast and rapidly increasing commerce of Great Britain, is drawn by an English pen and presents by no means an overdrawn picture of the colossal centralization of industry Great Britain has attained.

"It is a remarkable position England occupies in the world. A little spot amid the Northern Seas, almost invisible to the schoolboy as he seeks for it on his globe, and which, inadvertently, he may hide with his finger point as he turns round the colored sphere, the British Isles are, nevertheless, the heart of the world, the center to which the thoughts and acts of men most generally tend, and to, and from which, the streams of material life are ever flowing. If we draw on a map the great lines of commerce, we will see what a large proportion of them converge to our shores. It was once a proverb that "all roads lead to Rome;" and England, commercially, holds in the world the same predominant position which the Eternal City held in the restricted area of the Roman Empire. Our country is the chief goal of the highways of commerce. Caravans with their long strings of laden camels and horses, are ceaselessly crossing the plains and deserts of Asia,—railway trains drawn by the rapid fire car rush across Europe and America with their freight of goods,—and ships in thousands bring to us, from all parts of the world, the staple supplies of our food and industry. . . . . England . . . furnishes employment to tens of millions of people in the uttermost parts of the earth,—the Chinaman in his tea plantations and mulberry gardens—the Hindoo in his rice and cotton fields—the poor Indian miner on the Andes—the Guacho as he follows his herds on the Pampas—even the Negro of Africa, and the natives of the far and fair islands of the Pacific. . . . . .

. . . . . "China sends raw silk and tea; India sends cotton, indigo, and rice. We get our spices from the Philippine Islands; almost all our coffee from Ceylon; a portion of our cotton from Egypt; hides, chiefly from the pampas of Buenos Ayres; wool, chiefly from Australia, and the Cape; wood, from the northern countries of

America and Europe; flax and tallow from Russia; corn, chiefly from the United States and Russia; and the precious metals, from Australia, California, Mexico, and the Andes of Peru. Of our exports, we send beer to India and Australia; coal, to many places, to supply coaling stations for steam vessels, but chiefly to France. We send cotton-yarn for manufacture to India, Holland, and Germany; and cotton piece-goods to the United States and Brazil. Our hardwares and cutlery go chiefly to Australia, India, and the United States; and our woolen and worsted goods to the United States, India and China, Germany, British North America, and Australia."

. . . . . "We are the great carriers for the world. Thirty thousand ships sailing under the flag, or bearing the cargoes of England, are ever on the seas, going and coming from all parts of the globe. . . . . From the Thames, the Mersey, the Tyne, the Humber, and the Clyde, argosies and commercial armadas are ever leaving, and jostle in our estuaries with similar squadrons making to port. The shores of these estuaries, lined with miles of docks and building yards, ring with the clang of hammers; and vast ribs of wood and iron curving upward from still vaster keels show where leviathan vessels are being got ready for their adventurous career. . . . . In our home and foreign trade, taken together, we have fully 20,000 ships, with a tonnage of four and a half millions, and employing 175,000 men. Both classes of our ships, both steam and sailing, are regularly increasing in numbers. In both kinds of vessels, too, there is a steady increase in size. Comparing the present amount of our shipping with what it was in 1850, we find that we have eleven per cent. more ships, forty-four per cent. more tonnage, and fifteen per cent. more men.

. . . . . "Our little islands no longer suffice for us. Our energies have far overpassed their limits. There is room for us to live and work here,—that is all. These islands are our house and garden, but our farm is detached. Or rather, we have no farm of our own, but draw our supplies from the farms of all our neighbors. We live upon the world."

The British centralization of commerce is progressing in a rapidly-increasing ratio. In 1842 the imports and exports amounted to £131,000,000; in 1850, they had increased to £200,000,000; in 1856, to £288,000,000; in 1860, to £346,000,000; in 1863, notwithstanding the cotton famine, they amounted to £395,000,000; in 1864, to £440,000,000; and, in 1866, to £500,000,000. The commerce of Great Britain has quadrupled in the last twenty-five years, and almost doubled in the last ten years. A few years more of this

rapid increase will concentrate the commerce of almost the whole world in the hands of England.

The injury this monopoly inflicts upon the industry of mankind is but too evident.

The monopoly of manufactures maintained by England oppresses commerce with multiplied charges. She imports cotton, wool, silk, flax, and many other kinds of raw materials, to be sent back, in many instances, in a manufactured state, to the countries whence they were obtained. She sells shoes to Brazil and Norway, made of leather, tanned in England, with Norwegian tan-bark, from the hides of Brazilian cattle; sells silks to Italy, woven from Italian cocoons; furnishes cutlery to Sweden, made of Swedish iron; supplies Germany and Spain with broadcloths, woven from Saxon, and Spanish wool; sells linens to Russia, manufactured from Russian flax; and buys the cotton of the United States, imports American food for her operatives, and American oil for her machinery, and pays us back with a part of our cotton manufactured into goods.

The system of gathering raw material and provisions from all countries, to enable England to manufacture for the world, is in violation of all the laws of industry. In this age of manufactures, the only true principle of industry, as we have seen, is for each nation, as far as possible, to manufacture its own raw material. This would give each country a home market for its raw material and agricultural productions. These bulky articles would be withdrawn from commerce, and all countries would mutually exchange, on equal terms, the products of their manufacturing industry. There would, then, be no centralization of commerce, no inequality of prices, no oppression of monopoly.

In contrast with this, how injurious the system of monopoly inaugurated by England. What a heavy tax upon the industry of the world is involved in the shipment and reshipment, back and forth, of raw material and manufactures, with heavy profits levied upon the commodities at every stage. How much cheaper for Brazil to tan its own leather, and manufacture its own shoes, than to send hides to England, to have them manufactured there. How much cheaper for the United States to manufacture its own cotton, instead

of sending cotton, oil, and provisions, across the Atlantic, to enable England to do it. To import raw material and provisions, systematically, for the purpose of manufacturing for exportation, is false in principle, and ruinous in practice. It unduly dilates commerce, and is bankrupting the countries which export raw products in exchange for manufactured commodities.

The idea that such a system is beneficial to the world, merits no refutation but the *reductio ad absurdum*. If it is advantageous, carry it out to its full extent. Let everything be made a commercial commodity! As well export corn to England, to be distilled into whisky for our use, or wheat, to be manufactured into flour for our consumption, as any other raw product. As well export wheat, to obtain flour, as hides and tan-bark, to get shoes. England had as well become the miller, the baker, the distiller, for the world, as be the world's weaver and shoemaker. If this system of commerce is advantageous to the nations engaged in it, promotive of their prosperity, and encouraging to their industry, make every raw product an article of commerce, and increase the commercial activity still further. Let every country ship its tallow to England, and get candles in return; its Petroleum, and get back the refined product; its corn, in exchange for meal and spirits; its wheat, for flour and crackers and farina; its apples, for cider and brandy; its sugar and fruits, to be made into candy and preserves; and let the world ship its pigs to England, and send corn to fatten them, and take pay in bacon! It will vastly increase the commerce of the world, and will, of course, develop the wealth and promote the welfare of all the nations engaged in the exchange!

The present monopoly of England is equally injurious; it is only less odious in being confined within narrower limits. It oppresses the industry of every other country, for the benefit of England. It renders England the market of the world. Foreign commodities are worth the price of the English market less the charges of speculators and the cost of transportation. The English farmer gets nearly double the price for his wheat that the American farmer realizes; about twice the Brazilian price for his wool; and twice the Russian price for his flax. At the same time he only pays for his manufactures half their cost to the foreign purchaser. This arises

from the fact that other countries buy their manufactures from England, and sell her their raw products. The English producer obtains inflated prices; for he adds to the foreign price the profits of shippers and speculators: the foreign producer must sell at depressed prices; for he must deduct from the English market rate the profits of speculators and the cost of transportation. The foreign consumer, also, pays double the English price for goods; for he must meet the accumulated expenses of transportation.

Nations sell their raw produce, not because it is advantageous, but because it is a necessity for want of capital to manufacture. Every country manufactures its own flour, and distills its own grain, because it requires no great amount of capital to erect a mill or a distillery. It should equally manufacture its flax, its wool, its cotton. Lack of capital should not prevent. Nations will never acquire the necessary amount of capital by allowing themselves to be slowly reduced to bankruptcy by a disadvantageous system of commerce. Every country can command sufficient capital for any necessary object. Wars are never checked for want of money; improvement need not be. States extend aid to railroad companies, because roads are deemed necessary to the public welfare. On the same principle, states should prevent themselves from being reduced to bankruptcy, by loaning their credit, if necessary, to incorporated companies, organized for the purpose of manufacturing the raw material of the country.

If other countries were wise enough to manufacture their own raw material, the English farmer would cease to receive inflated prices, and the foreign producer would be able to sell at fair rates. Prices would be equalized all over the world. England would not be pampered at the expense of other countries.

Manufactures, also, would be much lower than now. Although the foreign producer receives for provisions and raw material far less than a reasonable price, they cost the English manufacturer much more; and he must indemnify himself by demanding the higher price for his goods. Thus all the world sells cheap and buys dear for the sole benefit of England. England alone profits by the system. Her speculators who gather the raw material, make money by it; her shippers make money by it; her import merchants, her

manufacturers, her export merchants, her outward bound ships,—all make money by it; above all, her farmers, and her aristocracy who rent their lands, make money by it. What matters it to her that other countries buying manufactures, too dear, and selling raw products too cheap, are being more impoverished by the traffic, every year. The Old Man of the Sea rides merrily astride the shoulders of the World, and cares not though his victim groan and writhe. There he sits, and there he will continue to sit, unless when drunken with prosperity an opportunity occur to unseat him. He must be unseated, or his victim perishes. It is the monopoly of England against the prosperity of the World. One or the other must go down.

CHAPTER II.

BRITISH CENTRALIZATION OF WEALTH.

THE possession of our cotton has not only enabled Great Britain to centralize the commerce of the world; it has placed that country in a position, in which it is centralizing the wealth of the world. The British commercial aristocracy are rapidly engrossing the wealth of the world in their hands.

England has engrossed the profits of the trade between the temperate zone and the tropics; the profits of manufacturing industry; and the profits of the carrying trade of the world,—three branches of industry which ought never to be concentrated in the same hands. Either of them is sufficient to enrich a single country overmuch; all combined are concentrating the wealth of the whole earth in the hands of Great Britain. The profits arising from this centralization of commerce have enabled Great Britain to become the creditor of almost every country on earth. As England is growing richer, the rest of the world is becoming relatively impoverished; and if the same course of traffic continues, Britain will, at no very distant day, become the actual owner in fee simple of all the property in the world, and mankind will become her tenants, paying rents and interest upon property of every kind.

This is no exaggeration, as may be easily shown.

If England were merely dealing in the commodities of other countries, her profits, as a merchant, would be immense. But the articles in which she deals as a merchant, buying and selling again, by no means comprise the bulk of her commerce. A large proportion of her exports, nearly one-third, consist of manufactures wrought from her own raw material, in which the entire price is clear profit to the nation. Her other exports, fully two-thirds of the whole, consist of articles manufactured from foreign raw material, in which the first cost of the purchased material bears but a small proportion to the price of the manufactured product. We are, here, not to account the profit of the manufacturer the sole profit of Great Britain. The British profit is the difference between the cost of the raw material, as purchased abroad, and the price of the manufactured article, as sold in the foreign market; for the profits of importing the raw material and exporting the manufactured product, are reaped by British* merchants and shippers.

The aggregate profits of all these branches of industry are immense, and they are concentrating the wealth of the whole earth in the hands of England.

Mankind, however, will be slow to admit this fact. The laws of commerce, are as yet, but little understood; the idea of a single nation reducing the world to bankruptcy, by engrossing all traffic, and all wealth in its own hands, is a novelty in human experience; and man is slow to accept facts which are, at once, contrary to past experience, contradictory of the laws of commerce as at present understood, and full of unpleasant conviction.

It will be urged that, if the profits of Great Britain are immense, the expenditure of the nation is equally great; that immense importations are made of articles of necessary consumption; that the extravagance in the use of luxuries is beyond parallel; that these

* In this estimate, it is assumed that the entire commerce of the British islands is carried on in British bottoms. This is the fact for all purposes of this estimate; for though foreign vessels do a large amount of traffic in British ports, this is more than counterbalanced by the greater amount of traffic done by British vessels between the ports of foreign countries, which is not counted in the estimate.

importations, together with the cost of her imported raw material, consume her profits, and maintain the indispensable equipoise in the balance of trade.

But it must be remembered that the situation of England is such that the highest individual extravagance comports with economy of national expenditure. From causes hereafter to be mentioned, economy of expenditure is the rule with the British aristocracy. And from the commercial condition of the country, the greater part of the extravagance of the wealthy classes is in the use of native products. Extravagance in horses, in furniture, in apparel, in carriages, constitute the greater part of the general expenditure, and this does not go out of the country. An Englishman receives the money an Englishman spends.

This economy of national expenditure is promoted by the policy of the British government, which so levies its revenue as to vastly increase the price of many articles of general use, and thus diminish their consumption. For instance, the English people would consume largely of tobacco and foreign liquors; but the government represses the consumption of these articles, by levying extravagant duties upon their importation. By this means, the consumption of foreign products is carefully kept within such bounds as to keep the balance of trade always largely in favor of England.

But it will be urged that the statistics of British commerce show that the importations vastly exceed the exports; so that, unless the balance of trade is an illusion, the commerce of England, every year, exhibits a balance against her. This, however, is easily explained. The following table exhibits the statistics of British commerce during a series of years:

	Imports.		Exports.
1854 =	£152,590,000	:	£105,833,000
1855 =	143,660,000	:	116,701,000
1856 =	172,544,000	:	139,220,000
1857 =	187,646,000	:	145,419,000
1861 =	210,000,000	:	121,000,000
1862 =	226,592,000	:	196,516,000
1863 =	248,989,000	:	146,489,768

During the last thirteen years, the imports of England have exceeded her exports by four thousand millions of dollars. But we are by no means to suppose that this indicates a balance of trade against her, and that she is a loser to that amount by her commerce. On the contrary, this excess of importations exhibits the immense profits of British commerce. In her commerce, Britain combines three characters: manufacturer, merchant, and shipper. Her traffic is chiefly carried on in British vessels, and by British merchants, who reap the profits of the transportation and transfer of the exported goods. The seeming balance of trade against her merely represents the profits of her merchants and shippers. The manner in which the profits of Britain are augmented by her commercial marine may be readily illustrated.

A British vessel sails for Canada with $100,000 worth of goods at British valuation, which are sold at Quebec for $120,000. The captain of the vessel receives in payment $20,000 in Canadian bonds, and $100,000 worth of grain, peltries, and lumber, worth in the British ports $125,000. Here the value in the British port, of the imported cargo, is one fourth greater than that of the exported goods. And yet the balance of trade is $20,000 in favor of England, as represented by the Canadian bonds.

But this does not show the extent of British profits. A large portion of them are acquired in trading between foreign ports. A British vessel, for instance, sails to Rio Janeiro with a cargo, worth, at a home valuation, $150,000. The cargo is sold for $180,000; of which $20,000 is paid in gold, the rest ($160,000) in a cargo of sugar, coffee, and other tropical productions: the vessel sails to New Orleans, where this cargo is sold for $185,000; $20,000 in Louisiana bonds, and the remainder ($165,000), in cotton, worth in the Liverpool market $215,000. Here the ship brings back goods worth 65,000 more than the exported cargo; and still the voyage has left a balance of exchange of $40,000 against foreign countries.

From this it appears that the $4,000,000,000 excess of imports over exports represent a portion, only, of the profits English merchants and shippers have derived, during the last thirteen years, from foreign nations. It does not represent their entire profits; for, as we have seen, large additional profits have been realized as repre-

sented in bonds and specie imported. Furthermore, this does not include the profits the merchants derive from their own people, to whom they sell the imported goods at an advance over the import price; they thus obtain, at last, all the money the laboring class receive from their employers, and all the money expended by all classes of English. Nor does it include the profits of the manufacturers.

The vast extent of these profits is apparent from the rapid growth of individual and public wealth.

The increased wealth of England, when the subject is divested of commercial technicalities, is the increased wealth of her people. Her manufacturers, her merchants, her shippers, her landowners, her bankers, all have incomes, derived, directly or indirectly, from the foreign traffic, largely exceeding their expenditure. The aggregate excess of all their incomes over their expenditure, represents the profits of England, which are chiefly invested in loans to foreign nations. England is continually absorbing the wealth of the world, and the clear profits of all her capitalists is the measure of the rapidity with which the process of absorption is going on.

These capitalists bestow a part of their profits in enlarging their business; the rest they invest. The increase of their business, and the increase of their investments, is the sum of the net profits of British commerce.

If Britain realized no other profits than those invested in the increase of the national business, this alone would be an immense profit. The area of her commerce is continually extending, and she is annually increasing the amount of capital embarked in various branches of industry. Every year, more factories are built, and larger supplies of raw material are purchased; every year, she builds more ships, and offers to every country greater amounts of merchandise and manufactures, and asks more merchandise and raw material in return. A nation, like an individual, which is annually increasing its business without borrowing capital is getting rich; that is, its annual income exceeds its expenditure. Some idea of the vast profits of British industry may be formed from this immense development of the national industry. Her manufacture of native material has been increased as rapidly as markets could be

opened for them; and her manufacture of all foreign raw material has been limited only by the supply she found it possible to obtain. In 1817, of raw cotton, there was imported 126 million pounds; 288 million pounds, in 1832; while in 1860, the importation had risen to 1391 million pounds. Her exports, which in 1834, only amounted to $200,000,000, had increased, in 1860, to $680,000,000; and in 1863, notwithstanding the drawback of the cotton famine, to $732,000,000. Her shipping has increased in the same ratio. In 1792, it was 1,186,000 tons, and was thought to be overgrown, and bound to decline: but in 1834, it reached 2,716,000 tons; and in 1864, it has developed to 4,500,000 tons.

But the increase of her commerce by no means shows the full extent of the increase of the wealth of Great Britain. Her accumulated wealth has sought every possible mode of investment. It has outgrown the wants of traffic, and has sought investment in every quarter of the globe.

The Continental nations of Europe have, during the last twenty years, been maintaining an armed peace, and have increased their debts at the rate of $300,000,000 annually; amounting to an aggregate increase of more than $6,000,000,000; and British capitalists have lent a large proportion of the money.—

But this is not all: British capitalists have been advancing money to all the world, in aid of internal improvements. A city wishes to build sewers, but has not the money to carry out its object: it subscribes the stock, bearing an annual interest, and English capitalists will take it at a discount, furnish the necessary funds, and pocket the city taxes ever after. A city wishes to build water works: it has only to subscribe the stock, and English capitalists will furnish the money, send out the iron pipes, and own the water rates for all time to come. A gas company is formed without the cash capital to meet all the expenses of the undertaking: England will take its bonds, send out retort and gas pipes, and the gas rates are hers. The borrowing of money from England has been reduced to a system. No railroad company expects to meet all its expenses in cash; for England will always furnish the iron, upon state and county bonds. Every joint stock company formed for whatever object,—

mining, building ships, improving cities, or building roads,—expects to obtain necessary capital from England, to carry out its objects.

Still, many will maintain that there is no danger: that the balance of trade is a necessity; that England must permit every foreign country to meet its liabilities by the exportation of produce; otherwise they would soon be compelled by bankruptcy to economize. Hence, by many, the idea that England is impoverishing the rest of the world will be scouted as visionary. It will be maintained that, if England did not suffer other nations to keep the balance even, she would soon break down her commerce. The nations would soon be exhausted of their capital, and be compelled to cease trading with her: having nothing wherewith to buy, they must cease to import British commodities. Hence, it is argued, that England must annually pay out to other countries as much as she receives from them, or her commerce would break down in a few years.

This view of the question is plausible. But, of late years, the balance of trade is beginning to be regarded by many statesmen as a myth. Nations have gone on for years buying annually from England to the amount of millions more than their exports would pay for; and yet money continues abundant, and their prosperity shows no visible marks of decline. From these facts, many statesmen treat the balance of trade as a fallacy of past ages,—a bugbear of our fathers, invented to induce economy,—but which the advance of political economy has exploded.

The Balance of Trade is a stern reality. And yet nations have gone on buying more than they sell, for years together, without a crash. The Balance of Trade is a reality. Yet England continues, year after year, to sell to her customers more than she buys of them. How does England, then, keep up the balance of trade? She must, by the fixed laws of commerce, import and retain in the country an equivalent for all she sends abroad. *She does; but a large part of her imports are* FOREIGN BONDS AND PROMISES TO PAY.

This is the way the outside world is maintaining the balance of trade with England. They buy more than their exports will pay for, and settle the balance with interest bearing bonds. This is the solution of the balance of trade enigma, which has so puzzled statesmen.

England is adopting every measure to lull the world into a fatal security. English statesmen have led the cry against the balance of trade. They say that statistics show a balance of trade against almost all countries; that it is greater against England and the United States, than any others; and yet, these are the two most prosperous countries in the world. Thus, they maintain that the logic of facts disproves the fallacy our fathers believed; and that an adverse balance of trade, so far from being a source of danger to a country, is actually a benefit,—a source of prosperity.

So argue the crafty statesmen of Britain for the ear of foreign nations; intent upon allaying apprehensions that would endanger the monopoly of wealth maintained by their country, and increasing in a ratio eminently dangerous to all foreign nations. They know well that the excess of British imports represents the profits of the British marine; and that the imports of the United States in excess of exports have kept the country perpetually drained of the precious metals, and brought it deeply into debt to England. But it is not for them to utter the truth so full of warning. They suppress or discolor every fact calculated to excite apprehension. Lately, the profits of British trade have increased so rapidly that the money cannot find safe investment, and the rate of interest has sunk as low as two per cent. There is a glut of money in England; but, lest the nations should take alarm at the excessive aggregation of wealth, the London Times tries to conceal the true cause,—wealth increasing faster than the means of investment,—and attributes the flood of money in the market to a want of confidence in the investments that offer. This is but in keeping with the general policy of British craft.

British statesmen say there is no danger in an adverse balance of trade: for the countries against which it stands still buy as freely as ever; commerce meets no check; money continues abundant; prosperity knows no diminution. They know well what makes commerce flow so smoothly, unchecked by an adverse balance of trade. The astute policy of England is systematized into a science. A foreign country—the United States, for example—is extravagant, and imports more than it exports will pay for. If we were required to pay the entire balance with gold every year, this would, in a year

or two, induce a crash, and so far compel economy, as to force us to live within our means and reduce our imports to the measure of our exports. But the watchful British Board of Trade keeps an eye upon the balance, and informs British capitalists that additional credit must be extended to America, or trade will suffer. The next American railroad that is built can get funds in England for its bonds; and in obedience to the directions of the Board of Trade, the balance is afterward kept more nearly even, by letting us have goods, railroad iron, gas and water pipes, in exchange for bonds. Thus it is England enables the rest of the world to keep the balance even and avoid a crash. In European countries, when the commercial deficit cannot be supplied by advances to public improvements, British capitalists lend gold to the needy governments, or send out specie to be invested in government bonds or mortgages of private* property. In this manner England craftily keeps the world oblivious of the tendency of commerce. She never suffers any country to be driven to economize, and thereby depress her commerce; but distributes the gold she gathers by commerce, in advances for public improvements, purchases of state and national bonds, or loans to individuals.

The *Economist*, the highest British authority in all questions of industry, estimates the annual national savings at £130,000,000, or $650,000,000. This sum seems enormous, but it only represents a profit of twenty per cent. upon the national traffic. And other facts bear out the estimate. From 1859 to 1864, England drained the foreign world of $700,000,000 of gold, which was imported into the British islands, and re-exported, in loans to Christendom, and remittances to the East. This, however, represents only in part the drain of specie from foreign countries to England; a great part of the specie balances due to British merchants never reach the British Isles, being either loaned at once in the country in which

* Vast sums have been invested in Austria upon landed security. The loan of British capital to embarrassed Austrian land owners, secured by mortgages upon real estate, has been reduced to a system. In this way, Britain returns to Austria, by loan, the money derived thence in payment of interest upon the Austrian national bonds held in London.

the deficit is due, or transferred direct to some other country for investment.

So far has this system of loans progressed already, though the era of commerce is but lately begun, that every quarter of the globe is in debt to England. If her profits are already so vast when her commerce is yet in its infancy, what will they be when its rapid and constant advance shall reach its meridian greatness? England began the era of manufactures fifty years ago, almost bankrupt, staggering beneath a load of debt she was scarcely able to bear. Hundreds of millions have since been added to the debt; yet so vast have been her accessions of wealth, that she now bears it as lightly as if it were but a straw. The general wealth is increasing so rapidly that the taxes every year yield too much revenue, and have to be annually diminished. If her prosperity should continue to advance as heretofore, England might pay off her debt of four thousand million dollars in less than a quarter of a century, without any addition to the public burdens. But the capitalists who control the government own the debt, and do not want their money. If it were paid, they could not find such safe investments abroad. Their vast and increasing incomes are sufficient to enable them to seize upon every safe and profitable investment that is offered in any quarter of the globe, and have a large surplus to be invested in foreign bonds.

The wealth of England gathers like a ball of snow. Wealth attracts wealth, as particles of iron cluster round a magnet. Not only do her merchants, her shippers, her manufacturers, make large and increasing profits greatly exceeding their expenses, which they invest abroad, but a golden tide is flowing into England from every quarter of the globe, in payment of the interest of indebtedness. Every government in Europe and America pays interest to England upon its bonds; every country in Europe and America, and one at least in Asia, pays taxes to England for advances toward water and gas works, and other public improvements. In our own country the Federal government, the state governments, our counties, our towns, are all in debt to England. And still the volume of indebtedness goes on increasing in an accelerated ratio. The profits of the annually increasing manufactures and commerce of England must be an-

nually invested, and also the annual dividends of past investments. As few opportunities of investment offer at home, they must be invested abroad. No difficulty of finding investments; the whole world is in debt, and cash will always purchase the debtor's bonds.

The process of absorption is continually going on. Under the losing system of commerce that now prevails, while other countries are unable to meet their annual outlays, England reaps all the profits, and invests her income in loans to the impoverished nations. The absorption of the world's wealth is going on in the ratio of arithmetical* progression. Every year the profits of British industry and enterprise are greater, as the sphere of that industry extends, centralizing the commerce of the world more entirely; every year, as investments are increased, the income from interest is enlarged; and every year the proceeds of all are devoted to swell the roll of the world's indebtedness, and the volume of British interest-bearing capital. Already, the annual dividends are so great that investments, as has been already mentioned, are found with difficulty. England is making money faster than the world wants to borrow it.

Already, in the infancy of her commercial centralization, Britain has attained to an autocracy of industry and wealth. The following sketch from the pen of an English writer, though highly colored, does not exaggerate the monopoly of commerce and wealth Great Britain has acquired:—

---

* Since the above was written the following allusion by a British essayist to the increasing centralization of wealth in the British Islands has met my eye: "As we listen, in our study, to this apotheosis of Trade, our tight little island seems to rise into the shape and proportions of a magnificent temple thronged with busy crowds swarming out and in—making ample use of the sanctuary, but seldom even touching their hats, as they pass, to the golden statue of the Goddess Fortuna, which stands in the midst. There they are ceaselessly storing up the wealth that flows to them from the rest of the world. Men in strange climes and in strange dresses, and speaking all manner of tongues, are seen preparing produce and luxuries of all kinds for the Temple, which flow thither in long streams across both land and sea. And still the work of storing goes on: gold, silver, and all precious things—the delights of life—the cream of the earth's good things—accumulate higher and higher in the chambers of the temple."—*Blackwood for* 1864.

"The trade of England," says this writer, "is ubiquitous. It extends North, South, East, and West. It penetrates to every spot on the earth. Fully three-fourths of the exportable produce of every country is sent direct to England; and of the remaining fourth, the greater part is carried by English enterprise, and at English risk, to the port of consumption. In like manner, almost every spot on the earth receives its foreign supplies from this country, or by the hands of English traders, and by means of English capital. In fact it may be truly said that there is not, at any time, any corner of the world in which Englishmen have not more or less pecuniary interest. Without English capital, and English enterprise, the tallow of Russia could not be brought from the interior to St. Petersburg; nor the timber of Sweden, Norway, and Poland, be brought to the ports of embarkation; nor the cotton of Egypt to Alexandria. English capital performs the internal traffic of every country, and largely supplies the means of interior production. We are the great general merchants of the world; for here, and here alone, can everything, and in any quantity, and at any moment, be sold; and in England, alone, can the foreigner obtain any and every produce of the world of any quality, and in any quantity, and at any time.

"We are the manufacturers for the world. Every nation in the world except England may be called an agricultural country; each, no doubt, has some few manufactures, more or less rough; but the manufactures of almost every one are trifling in the extreme in proportion to the raw produce which it grows. Consequently few countries export much except raw produce; and, as very few ports in the world can take an entire cargo of anything except timber, the direct trade between the various countries of the world is very small. All trade through England; for what little goes direct from one country to another is generally on English account, carried by English enterprise, and with English capital.

"We carry the mails for the whole world. Strange as it may appear, even the letters from South America to North America have always passed through the London postoffice.

"No one can go from one part of the world to another, without passing through England; so completely do we monopolize the whole passenger traffic.

"We are the bankers of the whole world. If the North sends money to the South, or the East to the West, the money must be remitted through London,—there is no other way.

"We are the great capitalists of the world. We have lent money to every government, and almost to every municipality. We are the annuitants of the world; for every country has to pay large sums to the English as interest upon loans amounting to many hun-

dreds of millions. We are the bullion dealers of the world; all gold and silver is brought direct to England in payment of debts due to us, and then redistributed by us in the shape of public or private loans.

"We are the ship-builders for the world; and own, or have mortgages upon almost every vessel afloat. The shipping in every foreign port either belong to England or are employed by England, with the exception of a few coasters.

"We are the railway makers of the world; and the actual owners of the greater proportion of foreign railways.

"We have the lion's share in every mine.

"Nothing is too large, and nothing too small for English capital, and English enterprise. We even pave, light, watch, and drain numerous foreign cities. The very water-works of Berlin were constructed by the English, and are owned in England. So endless are the ramifications of British trade and enterprise, that the slightest misfortune to any country or people seriously affects England. A severe drought in the most remote spot on earth leaves England a serious loser. A deluge in any country fills our ledgers with bad debts. An earthquake in any quarter of the globe largely reduces English profits. Every flood washes away English dividends, English exports, English imports, and sweeps away English capital, and ruins English future expectations.

"In fact, more than half the world is mortgaged to England."

This statement presents a summary of the centralization of trade and wealth effected by England. Its statements are corroborated in an article contributed to an English review by an essayist, whose calm style and intimate acquaintance with facts and commercial principles place him above the charge of exaggeration. Speaking of London, "The City of Gold," he says:—

"London, as every one knows, contains a city within a city; and within that inner city there is yet another, the very heart of the metropolis. It is a small place. In a couple of minutes you may walk across it from side to side, from end to end. Yet it is the center and citadel of our greatness,—the heart whose pulsations are felt to the farthest extremities of the empire. There is concentrated the spare capital of the nation. . . . The occupants of the precinct have dealings with all the world. The railways which accompany the ceaseless advance of the White race into the prairies of the Far West, in America—the companies which explore and develop the resources of California, and Australia—the iron roads, and irrigating canals which are maturing the prosperity of India—

the enterprise which covers with tea plantations the valleys and slopes of the Himmalayas, and which carries our countrymen into new regions, every where,—are created or sustained by the outgoings of this little spot in London. The wastes of Hudson's Bay—trading companies for the Nile—the cotton planting which is invading Africa—ocean lines of steam-ships, submarine telegraphs connecting dissevered continents, water-works for Berlin, gas for Bombay,—these, and a hundred other matters and projects, engage the thoughts, and employ the capital which is at the command of this busy hive of operators. Almost every country is included in their operations, and almost every State is indebted to them. From gigantic Russia, to petty Ecuador and Venezuela, they hold the bonds of every government, (those of Persia, China, and Japan excepted). Prosaic as their operations are in detail, taken in the mass, they constitute a grand work. Daily and hourly, it is their business to scan in detail the condition of the world. They weigh the influence of the seasons, they investigate the produce of all manner of harvests—they know the condition of every mine, the prospects of every railway, the dividends of every company . . . . . It is a city of money dealers—a sanctuary of Plutus.—Blot out that inner heart of London, and the whole world would feel the shock."

Where will this centralization of commerce and capital end? Is England to become the universal mortgagee of mankind? If the system of centralization should continue to progress in the ratio of the past, in another half century, England will become the owner of the world in fee simple, and mankind will be her tenants, paying her rents and taxes. As the writer already quoted phrases it, the British Islands will be the "garden," the rest of the world, the "farm" of the great monopolist.

The skeptic may greet this conclusion with a derisive smile. He will scout the idea of impending bankruptcy. For, he says, the world is growing richer every year, notwithstanding its increasing indebtedness.

It is true that the property wealth of almost all the countries in Christendom has vastly increased during the last thirty years. But this does not show that the traffic with England is a profitable business. It is owing to other causes, which have increased the property valuation, notwithstanding the unfavorable balance of trade with England.

A portion of this enhancement in property valuation is owing to

the depreciated value of gold consequent upon the discovery of gold in California, Australia, and our Western territories. It is easy to see how this has increased the relative wealth of the world, notwithstanding its heavy and increasing burden of debt. A man whose property, twenty years ago, was worth ten thousand dollars, while his debts were five thousand dollars, is now, when his property is enhanced to twenty thousand dollars by the depreciation of gold, twice as rich as before, though he has by his extravagance in the interval doubled his debt.

But a great part of the increase of wealth arises from the energetic improvement of property. From this cause, the value of the property in our own country has been vastly increased during the last thirty years. We have had in each succeeding year more land reclaimed from the wilderness, more stock, and larger crops.

We were in the condition of a young man starting in life with nothing but some wild lands. With great energy he begins to reduce his lands to a state of tillage. He sells his crops to a merchant; but instead of bestowing his income in the improvements he needs, he buys of the merchant every year goods whose cost exceeds the price of his crops, and borrows money of the merchant for improvements, giving mortgages upon his land as security. As his income increases, he increases his extravagance; and every year he gives more notes to the merchant to cover the excess of his expenditure over his income. Thus, he annually increases his debt; but he also increases the value of his property. At the end of thirty years, he has a fine estate, well improved, but heavily burdened with debt; but, on the whole, is richer than when he began life; the enhancement of his property has more than kept pace with his indebtedness. He now casts about him and finding that, on the whole, his circumstances are improved, thinks his system a good one, and decides to continue it. The more he improves his land and the larger his crops, the more he exceeds his income, and the more money he borrows for improvements. At last he reaches a point where his lands do not enhance in the same proportion as formerly; his crops, though large and increasing, do not maintain the same ratio of increase;—but the debt is swelling; the amount of interest is growing, and his annual expenditure exceeds his annual income

more and more every year. What is the result? Bankruptcy. By the time he grows old, and has his land highly improved, the debt will equal its value, and the merchant will foreclose his mortgage and take possession.

Here, the farmer loses by his traffic with the merchant; his buying and selling has been a losing business, throughout; for he has bought and consumed more than he sold. His increased wealth arose entirely from his industry in improving his property. So, there are young nations losing money every year by their traffic with England, and yet they are growing richer by their industry in improving their country. They every year bring more land into a state of tillage, build more houses, raise more stock, and increase the population, enriching the country more by improvement than it is impoverished by the trade with England.

New countries feel the benefits of this improvement more than any other. The value of property is more enhanced by industry than in older countries. But the countries of the old world, also, have felt the force of this age of improvement. There was comparatively little industry in Europe, forty years ago. Since then, the march of improvement has more than kept pace with the indebtedness to England. The European nations of forty years ago were like the proprietor of a worn out farm,—lazy, and burdened with debt. If the man becomes industrious, and improves his farm, he will be richer than before, even if at the same time he grows extravagant and increases his debt. The improvement of his property more than counterbalances his increased indebtedness. The European nations have become industrious; they have improved their lands, increased their productiveness, and their capacity to sustain population; and thus the value of the national property is greater, compared with the national debt, than it was fifty years ago.

But it must be remembered that this increase of wealth is not an increase of moneyed capital, but only of property valuation. England is the only country in Christendom which has a moneyed capital plus its property valuation. The moneyed capital of other countries has been reduced to zero; they have been drained of their money by England, and have borrowed it of her again. The wealth of England consists of its property valuation, plus its moneyed capital

loaned to other countries; the wealth of other countries consists of their property valuation, with their indebtedness to England subtracted. By distinguishing between the wealth that consists in the value of property, and that which consists in moneyed capital, we may perceive how English commerce may be ruining all other countries, while they may be at present richer than formerly through the enhanced value of their property.

We are now prepared to observe the necessary result of the continuance of the monopoly of manufactures and commerce established by Great Britain.

England is inducing almost every country in Christendom to buy more than it sells; and after draining the nations of their specie, returns it in loans to governments, advances to municipalities, corporations, and individuals, and purchases of government bonds. Thus far, the interest on these loans has not been felt as a burden, and the enhancement of real estate and the activity of business have blinded the nations to the fact that the active traffic they are carrying on is a losing business; that the merchants who conduct the traffic are making fortunes, but the country at large is getting deeper in debt, every year. The enhancement of property has a limit; extravagance has no limit but Ruin.

The profits of England are growing larger every year; her loans, and advances, and purchases of government bonds are becoming annually greater. It cannot be long ere the interest on this indebtedness will become so great as to be oppressive. But this will only accelerate ruin, not enforce economy. Great Britain cannot maintain her monopoly of commerce without receiving bonds from other countries to the amount of her annual profits. The balance of trade must be kept up in this, the only practicable way. Her system of commerce involves, of necessity, the credit system. She will continue to make loans and advances as long as safe mortgages can be found; and the nations will continue to trade with her as long as she extends credit so readily for all inconvenient balances—and scout the idea of bankruptcy, until it comes.

Mankind is governed by precedents; and in the history of nations there is no precedent for the commercial system of the present

age. England is a new character on the stage of nations. It is merchant and pawnbroker, combined. Like all pawnbrokers and money lenders, it is a most complaisant creditor while debtors are solvent, and an applicant is never turned away who has property to pledge. It is not for England to give prodigal nations good advice, and inform them that they are on the road to ruin. No, no; the Balance of Trade is a bugbear of the past! And so, under the influence of the credit system, commerce expands, and widens its circle; the nations go deeper into debt without a thought of the day of reckoning; and England increases her gains, and chuckles with glee as the nations come with bonds and mortgages, to get back the gold of which they have been fleeced.

But why raise the voice of warning? The world cannot be made to see the evils of this system, now. It is as thoughtless as a young heir living beyond his means, and executing a new mortgage on his estate, every year. The world is sowing its wild oats; and when did the spendthrift ever take warning? The money-lender is the prodigal's benefactor, as long as he will continue to trust. The world is living on its property, mortgaging it deeper annually, and so it will continue to do while the property lasts and the money-lender is complaisant. It is so easy to go on credit; to have everything we want without paying ready money; to live in luxury, and leave posterity to foot the bill. The nations are like Micawber—none is too poor to give its note; and why exercise self-denying economy, when credit is unbounded, and a note to be paid when we please will obtain all our desires! What matters a balance on the wrong side of the ledger, when an interest-bearing bond will square the account!

But these bonds are bearing six per cent. interest; and the interest is paid and loaned again, every year. Apart from her annual profits from manufactures and commerce, the loaned capital of England is increasing at the rate of compound interest, and *doubling itself every twelve years.*

Nothing increases so fast as money loaned at interest. The lifetime of a money-lender is, fortunately, too short for his accumulations to surpass a moderate limit. But a nation does not die. Its accumulations may go on, compounding again, and again, and again, in an infinite series, until they absorb all the wealth of the earth.

If England added nothing to her capital, henceforth, by commerce, but merely made expenses, the increase of her present interest-bearing capital, by compound interest at six per cent., would soon equal the value of all the property in the world. It would double in twelve years; quadruple in twenty-four years; be eight-fold in thirty-six years; sixteen-fold in forty-eight years; thirty-two-fold in sixty years; sixty-four-fold in seventy-two years: and in eighty-four years from the present date, at this rate of increase, the loaned capital of England will be one hundred and twenty-eight times as great as at present. Placing the indebtedness of the nations to England at the present time at $4,000,000,000, which is far short of the mark, in sixty years, merely by the accumulation of interest, the world will be indebted to her in the sum of $128,000,000,000; upon which the annual interest would be seven billions of dollars.—The world could not pay any such interest as this; the crash would come much sooner than we have estimated.

In twenty-four years, the loaned capital of England will be swollen by compound interest to $16,000,000,000, with an annual interest of $1,000,000,000. And this without any additional profits of commerce, merely by the accumulation of interest annually received and reloaned. But it must be remembered that the annual profits of her vast industry amount to six hundred millions which are also invested abroad. At a moderate computation the loaned capital of England will have increased by interest and profits to twenty billions of dollars within twenty years.

The national debts of the world now amount to about eleven billions of dollars. They are constantly in the market, and can always be purchased in any amount at the selling rate. In twelve years Great Britain will own all the national debts of the world. Every country must export to her gold in immense quantities to meet the interest. How will this end? The young heir finds the money lender exceedingly complaisant so long as he can meet the interest of borrowed money. But let him fail of the annual installment, and Money-bags shows him a sour visage—and the next thing is to put the bailiff in possession of the property. The Prodigal will be brought to his senses at last. Plenty of credit and good words till the crisis comes; and then ——

What? How will it end?

The Cuckoo—an English bird—makes no nest of its own, but lays its egg in the nest of the hedge sparrow and the robin. When the eggs hatch, the young cuckoo grows so fast as soon to fill the entire nest, and throws the young robins or hedge sparrows out, to perish, while it monopolizes the attentions of the parent birds. England is laying a cuckoo-egg in every nation's nest. They, unsuspicious, are warming the intruder into life. Soon the young cuckoo will require the entire nest, and monopolize undivided attention to satisfy its demands. What will then become of the nation's young?

"Pshaw!" cries the objector; "what can one nation do against the world? England must submit to an universal repudiation. The nations will rub out past accounts, and begin afresh, wiser than at first."

This view might be just were all the world combined against England, to enforce repudiation. But England is too cautious for that. One country at a time will be reduced to bankruptcy, by concentrating her surplus capital upon the purchase of its bonds. Then, while the rest of the world are bearing their debts easily, paying interest at home, the victim will be prostrated by the exportation of specie and produce, to pay interest, and, when the crisis comes, will be powerless to offer resistance.

And we are the purposed victim. Mr. Gladstone, while Chancellor of the Exchequer, recently made to the British public an extraordinary announcement. He analyzed all the debts of the world, and, after showing that those of most European countries are increasing so rapidly as to endanger bankruptcy at no distant day, informed his countrymen that the American debt is the safest in the world. Our debt offers other advantages to the English capitalist: it bears higher interest than any other nation is paying; and it is not subject to taxation. The object of Gladstone could only have been to suggest to British capitalists that they had better invest as large a portion of their capital as possible in American bonds. The influence of his indorsement, and the other advantages which our debt offers over all others, will induce the British money lenders to concentrate their investments upon it. Our debt will be the first

monopolized. From present appearances, it will* all be in British hands in less than five years.

How long can we stand the drain of one hundred and sixty millions of gold and exports, to pay interest? What remedy? Repudiation?

England always fights for interest when she fights for nothing else. She was prompt enough in hurling Russia back from Constantinople and the route to India. And she will always be prompt enough where interest is concerned. Because busied with her own career of ambition, England has held aloof, for some years, from European complications, the idea has gone forth that she will not fight. But she is engaged in laying the foundations of a great commercial empire which shall lay the earth under tribute. She has refused to turn aside from her ambitious purpose; but she always fights, in Europe, in Asia, in America, where the interests of her traffic† are involved.

Could we meet her, when our resources shall have been gradually exhausted before the crisis comes, while England will be fourfold more powerful than now? It will also be easy, by disposing of a portion of our bonds, to Continental capitalists, to array Europe in a league against us. European monarchies will not be backward to seize a favorable opportunity to crush the Model Republic. Millions of Continental "Hessians," if need be, could be subsidized for a war upon us. How could we, bankrupt, and broken down, with coasts blockaded, commerce ruined, resist the coalition of the world led on by the great Money Lender?

England already feels that she is becoming imperial. Indications are not wanting of a contemplated change of attitude, corresponding with her increased importance. These indications, however, will not be found in the utterances of her statesmen. They wear their honors meekly.

"Lowliness is young ambition's ladder."

---

*See the calculation on this subject, page —

†A recent English writer coolly says: "True, commerce does not always appear as a benefactor. True, we fight for markets. If a people will not accept the blessings of trade, we force them upon them at the point of the bayonet, or at the mouth of the cannon. This is indefensible—it is a reproach to civilization—but it is natural."—*Blackwood for* 1864.

The grandeur of England is always present in their thoughts. They are awake to the possibilities of the future. But they only whisper them in their bed-chambers. Their public utterances are a cuckoo song of the blessings of commerce to all nations, and the especial benefits of free trade with England. "The pear is not ripe." The suspicions of mankind must not be awakened. Hence, they never whisper of the growing centralization of wealth, and commerce, and power, in the hands of England. They pursue a policy which the whole world scoffs as timid. Till the time comes, England, like Achilles in disguise among the daughters of Lycomedes, must remain busied with the distaff and the loom, hiding the armed hand and iron muscles beneath the folds of luxurious drapery.

But English statesmen cannot always maintain the reserve they impose upon themselves; in moments of impulse,* they speak out the thought that lies deep in every Englishman's heart. All Englishmen, moreover, are not statesmen. Some speak out boldly, and blame the government for its repose, demanding that it should assume an attitude worthy the imperial wealth and power of the country. While in England, a pamphlet fell under the author's eye, which was intended for private distribution at home. The title of the publication was, "THE TRUE FOREIGN POLICY OF COMMERCIAL ENGLAND." In the table of contents the following headings appear: "England has a Money Interest in every Nation." "Every War a War upon England." "England should Invariably Chastise." "England's Power to Chastise." "English Rule a Blessing to Foreign Nations."—It is the writer's object to show that England's policy, henceforth, ought to be active, imperial intervention. Its utterances are quoted, as bespeaking the consciousness of power with which the English nation is imbued, and they may be regarded as the mutterings of the rising cloud, perhaps soon to overshadow the heavens.

After drawing a picture of the British monopoly of commerce and

* We have an example of this in a recent debate in the British parliament, which occurred since the above was written. D'Israeli closed one of his great speeches with the expression of his confidence in the grand destiny of England; which produced such a sensation in parliament, that his antagonist could not venture a reply.

wealth, and showing how every war injures English interests by interfering with industry, the writer proceeds:

"Having her property dispersed over all the earth, England should, for her own protection, constitute herself the police of the world; as she is the carrier, the banker, the merchant, the annuitant, the postoffice of the world. When the outrage of war is committed on England's commerce,—that is, whenever any war is undertaken—it should be the standing order of the people of England to their public servants, that the instant any country marches an army across its own border, the English fleet in the district shall blockade every port of the offending power, and, if necessary, bombard its maritime towns; that the British fleet throughout the world shall seize upon, and make prize of everything afloat belonging to the offender; and, further, that a British army shall, without a moment's delay, be sent to assist the nation invaded, and protect our property."

The writer next sets forth the resources of Great Britain to enforce intervention. He sums these up under the heads, "Naval Supremacy;" "The Military Character of the People"—rendering England "the only nation which has at all times maintained its armies without a conscription;" and, "The Wealth of England"—which enables her to supply the "sinews of war" in the greatest abundance. On this last head he concludes:

"No one doubts our means of supplying the waste of war. The cost that has crippled Russia for twenty years, has never for a moment been felt by us. The large outlay during the Crimean war did not curtail the smallest luxury of the poorest Englishman. That war was thoroughly popular, as all wars are in England. There is no instance of public meetings to protest against a war; for the people of England often urge a war, but never tire of one."

The writer thinks a notification "that any foreign potentate attacking any nation shall be deemed to have made war upon England," "will cause a perfect lull throughout the world." He illustrates his position as follows: "If Nicholas of Russia had been certain that war on Turkey would be war with England, he never would have committed himself to the first step, from which his pride would not suffer him to retract. If the German Autocrats had known that crossing the Elbe, [to attack Denmark,] would be war with England, not a German soldier would have crossed. And if the Northern states [of America] had known that an attack on the

South would have instantly brought the full power of England upon them, our cotton supply, and our American trade would have been unharmed to this hour."

The better to maintain the imperial supremacy of England, the writer advocates the breaking up of great powers, by giving aid to every people that raise the standard of revolt against the domination of their imperial government. Thus, Poland ought to be aided against Russia, Hungary and Venetia against Austria; because combinations of small states could not resist the supremacy of England: "A combination of such states as Denmark, Holland, and Belgium, would give us little more trouble than a Caffre war, or an attack by the Maories of New Zealand." "It is England's interest, then, that there shall be no very large territories; and, fortunately, Nature has limited within comparatively narrow bounds the extent of country which can most beneficially embrace one community. . . . . England can avail herself of these natural limits without the slightest injury to mankind, and should never fail to assist every people who are struggling for a separate existence."

This writer is laying down a policy impracticable as yet. British monopoly is only beginning to accomplish its results. His utterances show, however, that the national mind of England is fully awake to the dawning grandeur of the country. They only anticipate, by a few years, the era when, unless the centralization of industry is arrested, this universal autocracy may be practicable. In fifteen or twenty years more, when compound interest and the increasing centralization of commerce shall have quadrupled the wealth and power of England, and proportionally diminished the vigor of other countries, what now seems mere braggadocio may become stern reality.

The centralization of commerce and wealth in the hands of England menaces the world with danger. It ought to be arrested before it goes further. The present state of commerce, if suffered to progress to its limit, must result in the concentrating all wealth and power in England, enabling that country to dominate the world with an autocracy more oppressive than the sway of the sword. If the world must bow beneath oppression, let it be the despotism of

genius, not the tyranny of wealth; let it submit to the domination of the conqueror, not to the odious sway of a merchant uniting the rapacity and trickery of the peddler, the meanness and insolence of the usurer, with the remorseless exaction of a Jew.

The centralization of commerce in the hands of England must be arrested before it goes further. By giving her our cotton, we enabled her to build it up. We have made her what she is; we must undo our work. We have the opportunity, now, to do it. England is passing through an industrial crisis which gives us every advantage; if we suffer the opportunity to slip, events will pass beyond our control.

PART II.

OUR VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION HAVE INJURED THE WORLD, BY GENDERING SOCIAL EVILS DANGEROUS TO CIVILIZATION.

It is fabled that Cadmus, one of the early colonists of Greece, desirous of fostering the interests of his infant colony, was directed by an oracle to sow in the earth the teeth of a dragon he had slain. He was confounded when he beheld the teeth spring up into a fierce array of armed men, bent on destroying all that came in their way. Fortunately, their arms were turned against each other, and all perished by mutual slaughter except a single survivor; who, with fierceness abated by his wounds, became the friend of Cadmus, and aided him in the accomplishment of his design.

Our country is the Cadmus of the new world. In our anxiety to promote our prosperity, we have sowed dragons' teeth, from which have sprung a fruitful progeny of evils armed against the prosperity of man. If they all co-operated to the same end, the world were lost. But, fortunately, they mutually tend to counteract each other. It is to be hoped that they will prove mutually destructive; and that but a single evil may at last survive, in such a modified form as to assist in furthering the glorious destiny of America.

The British centralization of commerce and wealth which we have brought about, would ruin the world, if it were suffered to progress to its culmination. But that centralization has, in turn, induced social and political evils, whose united influence will tend to counteract the commercial ambition of England, and which, eventually, may have to be countered by British power. This mutual counteraction is the only hope of the world; for the powerful evils our course has developed, which are now rioting uncontrolled and gathering increasing strength, are, either of them, unless arrested, sufficient to make shipwreck of the hopes of man.

The social evils which have taken rise out of the British centralization of industry next claim attention.

CHAPTER I.

SOCIAL EXCITEMENT.

THE most striking, and most dangerous social evil of our time, is the social excitement that everywhere prevails. If one of our sober minded ancestors might return to earth, his attention would not be arrested so much by the march of improvement, the inventions of science, the labor-saving machinery, the various useful appliances formerly unknown, as by the social and mental excitement of the age. He would see new modes of action and of thought; and would lament,

"Old times are changed, old manners gone."

Whence this social excitement?

It has been fomented by the unprecedented commercial activity of the age. The centralization of traffic in the hands of England has generated too great commercial excitement. Commercial interchange between different countries is distended beyond all proportion to productive industry. There is more commerce, now, than there ought to be, were productive industry twenty times as great. A brief glance at the elements of commerce will show to what a degree its dilation has progressed.

Raw products have become staple articles of exchange. Consistently with proper commercial principles, provisions and raw material, both cheap and bulky articles, ought never to be made commodities of commerce. No country ought to have a population greater than its own agriculture would support; no country should manufacture, for exportation, more than its own supply of raw material. The converse of these propositions is also true: every country ought to have a manufacturing population sufficient to consume its provision supplies, and manufacture its own raw material. This would keep both provisions and raw material out of the list of commercial commodities.

There is only one exception to the principle that a nation ought to manufacture only its own raw material. Where a country has facilities for manufacturing, but is without a sufficient supply of raw material for some necessary articles, it may be more economical to import raw products for the supply of the wants of its own population, than to purchase the manufactured article. Thus, it is cheaper for England to import raw silk from France than to purchase silken goods; and France finds it cheaper to import British iron and coal than the manufactured cutlery. But this exception does not license the systematic importation of provisions and raw material for the production of manufactures for exportation. This system is false in theory, and ruinous in practice.

Deduct provisions and raw material from the commodities of commerce, and the vast and increasing excitement of traffic would cease. There would be healthy activity everywhere, without unwholesome excitement. The mighty stream whose swelling and rushing tide threatens the earth with devastation would be diverted into a thousand channels, diffusing fertility and beauty in its course. Every country would have its own market for provisions and raw material; and commerce would be brought to its proper standard,—the interchange of manufactured products, and such articles of luxurious consumption as the countries respectively did not produce.

But how widely has the world departed from this principle in our era. Nothing is manufactured where it is produced; nothing is consumed where it is manufactured. Manufactures and provisions and raw material swell commerce to an enormous bulk, and cross and recross each other in the mazes of a commercial *chasse* in which the whole world is engaged.

No country manufactures its own raw material. Everything seeks England as a market; everything is purchased of England as the source of supply. The United States cannot manufacture its cotton, rectify its Petroleum, nor consume its breadstuffs; all go to England for a market. Italy cannot manufacture its silk, and Leghorn hats; but sends straw and cocoons to England. Spain and Brazil send the horns and hoofs of cattle, to be manufactured into glue, and their hides, for shoes, and mattresses. Canada and Norway send timber for ships, for building cities and factories, and for

the various articles of wooden manufacture with which England supplies the world. All the world send provisions, hemp, flax, cotton, wool, dyestuffs, ashes, tallow, crude oils, leather, raw hides, and tan-bark, the hair, horns, hoofs, bones of cattle, hog bristles, goat hair, and numberless other articles for British manufacture, which ought never to have been commercial commodities.

As if this were not enough, commerce is further increased by the system of unbounded credit England has introduced. The limits which the balance of trade would fix are swept away. Every country can obtain unbounded credit, and importations are limited, not by its ability to pay, but by its willingness to run in debt.

It is the unbounded commerce England is promoting, that is causing all the excitement of the human mind in the present age. The influence of a too expansive commerce in inducing over excitement has already been traced. If each country manufactured its own raw material, and consumed its own agricultural products, commerce could never produce over-excitement. Manufacturing villages and towns scattered through a country in favorable localities, impart necessary activity to social life, but cannot become centers of excitement. And when commerce is kept within proper limits, there can be no speculation to fever the population of commercial cities.

But the radical tendency of the commercial system of the present age is to centralize manufactures, and exaggerate commerce in such a degree as to require multiplied millions to carry it on. The transportation of bulky articles of commerce gathers immense populations in cities, fostering speculation in a thousand channels.

The populations of these crowded cities have been fermenting in ceaseless activity, until the over-wrought powers of man have lost their tone. The incessant hurly burly of traffic has known no relaxation. Not even the Sabbath has been free from business cares. The mind has been kept continually strained to its utmost tension. The nervous system has been overworked, and still held by the power of the will and the strength which excitement gives, to its daily task. A state of feverish nervousness supervened, banishing calmness of thought, and bringing the high-wrought organism into *rapport* with every new form of excitement.

Everything conduced to excite the populations of these cities in

the highest degree. The business they carried on was not in the regular line of commerce where everything is stable, but partook of the spirit of speculation. Manufactured articles have a fixed value, given by the expenditure of labor upon them. But raw products are liable to ceaseless fluctuations. In purchasing provisions and raw material, fortunes were won and lost in a day, and the anxiety attendant upon speculative commercial risks deepened immeasurably the prevailing fermentation. What must be the anxieties attendant upon that course of business, in which, of one hundred merchants, ninety-seven fail, at least once, in the course of their lives?

Daily papers were born of the prevailing excitement, and being filled with sensational articles, and exciting rumors, contributed to exasperate the unrest of the public mind. Where nothing but excited thought would attract attention, a sensational literature became general. Fiction partook of the general character, and the weekly press flooded every country with sensational stories, offering to moments of relaxation a stimulant adapted to the condition of the over-wrought nervous system.

Thus, gradually, business excitement merged into social fermentation. This tendency was greatly increased by the universal extravagance fostered by the credit system of England. Every country was deluged with luxurious commodities far beyond the capacity of payment with its own productions. Fashionable extravagance became the rage. Woman, in the whirlpool of fashion, became as giddy as man in the vortex of speculation. Business and fashion, sensational news and exciting fiction, were the elements of the tempest, which kept the soul of man rocking in perpetual unrest. The infection was diffused from the cities, by business and social contact, by the press, and by itinerant lecturers, until whole communities became a seething mass of fermentation.

In the midst of this universal effervescence society is assuming new forms.

The kindly interest and cordial protection, once extended by wealth to poverty, repaid by affectionate reverence, is extended no more. Life has become a race, in which high and low, rich and

poor, the weak and the strong, jostle each other; the strong trampling the weak, the weak cursing the strong.

There is no repose, no calmness, no conservatism; but hurry, bustle, excitement, universal and all-pervading.

Man is absorbed in business, or immersed in dissipation. The masses have not time to offer, nor to accept the gentle charities of life, which soften asperities of character, and shed a halo over the rough path of existence. There are no moments of relaxation, in which the bow, too firmly bent, may regain its elasticity. There is no leisure for the cultivation and development of the nobler powers of our being; no time for self-communion, where man may acquire that highest wisdom, the knowledge of himself; no time for meditation, when the powers of the soul, released from the enforced subjection to sordid cares, soar like an eagle freed from captivity into the empyrean of lofty and noble thought, and find in heaven-born aspirations that swell the bosom proofs of immortality.

Continual disquietude and the debasement of ceaseless fretting care have, at last, done their work. The finely-tempered organs of our spiritual being cannot be abused with impunity. The nobility of human nature cannot be maintained without some communion of the soul with a higher and nobler sphere of being. The mind of the captive at last contracts to the walls of his dungeon, or, preying upon itself, perishes self-consumed; so the soul, pent in with sordid cares, wearied with disappointments, tossed with anxieties, either narrows its aspirations to the circumstances of its lot, or lashes itself to madness.

It is the fashion to compliment ourselves upon the energy and activity of our age, in contrast with the quiet of a former era. We term the activity of the age advancement, and stigmatize the quiet of our fathers as fogyism. But in that quiet noble natures ripened into holiness. Man then had leisure for communion with his God. Business was not so all-engrossing as to exclude nobler objects of contemplation. We speak of the enlarged views of our generation as compared with the contracted ideas of our ancestors. They knew nothing of the electric telegraph, nor of the wonders wrought by steam; but their views were higher, broader than our own; for ours, at their widest range, are bounded by the earth.

We mistake. Activity is not always advancement; business acuteness is not necessarily wisdom. Both may be carried to excess, and cause deterioration of character. A certain amount of social and industrial movement is necessary to the perfection of human nature; as fermentation is necessary, to convert the juice of the grape into wine. But fermentation must not be excessive, or its action is destructive. The soul of man needs repose as well as movement; as a rich mellow wine ripens in the quiet of its cask, but, constantly agitated, sets up excessive fermentation and degenerates into vinegar. The character of our fathers, full of homely virtues, might have been ripened by greater activity into a more harmonious development. But the mind of man has undergone excessive fermentation in the ceaseless unrest of this excited era of commerce. The lofty thought, the rich and varied emotions, the mellow tone of sentiment that characterized a former era, are gone. Ours is a sharp, acetous age of thin-blooded utilitarianism.

Our era has suffered from the combined influence of utilitarianism, and excessive mental and emotional excitement,—opposite evils, but both the result of the excited commerce of the time. Under the influence of these two causes, man has deteriorated, mentally, morally, socially, religiously.

Sect. I.—Mental Deterioration of the Age.

The intellectual development of man has suffered both from the utilitarian tendency of the age, and from the excessive social excitement. Many grand intellects, that would have found a lofty place in the realm of thought, have turned aside to engage in active business; many, too excitable to breast the gusts of the stormy era, have been swept away, victims, either of dissipation, or the dreams of wayward fancy. Utilitarianism, and excitement bordering on mania, are the Scylla and Charybdis of our time: Talent is stranded on the one; Genius is engulfed in the other.

Great men usually appear in clusters. The germs of greatness exist in every generation; but the world only once in ages passes through the conditions necessary to their development. In times of stagnation of thought and activity, the dormant powers slumber

on, unsuspected even by their possessor; in periods of excessive and continued fermentation, Genius runs riot. It is only in the golden mean, when a country or an age is passing from stagnation into activity, that the greatest minds find the necessary conditions of successful action, and illustrate their era with the luster of their thought. If the world could continue in that golden mean, great minds would continue to germinate; but, unfortunately, the rising excitement either relapses into dullness or overleaps its proper bounds. In the former event, intellectual stupor resumes its reign: in the latter, genius becomes erratic; mediocrity again becomes the standard, and the age sets in darkness.

The first constellation of great Grecians were nurtured in the shadow of Marathon. Themistocles, Aristides, Cymon, Pericles, Socrates, Thucydides, all derived their intellectual impulse from the excitement of the Persian war. But the effervescence of the Grecian mind ultimated in intestine wars, which kept the country in a chronic state of agitation. Alcibiades and Plato were the only Great Minds of this era. The latter was preserved from the influence of prevailing excitement by the seclusion of philosophic retirement, and left the loftiest name in the annals of ancient thought. The former, the greatest of all the statesmen of Greece, was borne away by the prevailing intoxication; his irregularities were even more conspicuous than his talents, and marred the most glorious career of ambition a statesman ever entered upon. Greece cherished his memory as the greatest of her sons, less on account of his achievements, than the transcendant abilities displayed by fitful flashes, to which nothing was impossible.—Henceforth, in the chronic excitement that prevailed, Athens was barren of greatness for ages.

The Peloponnesian war raged long, before Spartan sluggishness was sufficiently roused to become the germinating soil of genius, and develop a Lysander, an Agesilaus. Under their lead, Sparta dominated Greece; until the oppression of Thebes caused a revolution which stirred Epaminondas from his philosophic retirement, to elevate his country to the first rank among the Grecian states.

And, now, Macedon was about to rise from the lowest point of depression to imperial grandeur. Philip, who afterward ascended the throne of Macedonia, was carried in his youth a hostage to

Greece. Transplanted from the heavy barbarism of his own country, the germ of genius expanded amid the excitement of Greek activity, and he became the founder of the Macedonian empire. A constellation of great men was developed during the wars and intrigues of his reign, who assisted in the conquests of Alexander, and, after his death, contested with each other the possession of his dominions.

It is always thus. Great men only appear when states are passing through a certain stage of stimulation in the progress from stagnation of thought and activity. If this particular condition of the public mind could be maintained continually, every age might be illustrated by great men.

Rome owed its grandeur to the succession of great men whose genius extended its sway. The simplicity of manners which universally prevailed, in combination with the stimulus of its constant wars, seems to have maintained among the ruling class just the degree of excitement necessary to the germination of genius. When the learning of Greece and the treasures of the East extended the area of mental activity to the lower orders, the sphere of greatness was enlarged, and the age of Cæsar and Cicero was illustrated by a brilliant constellation of great names. But this was the last bright flare of the expiring lamp. The influx of wealth and the growth of avarice and luxury were fatal to genius, and Rome supinely sunk beneath the despotism of the Cæsars.

The fermentation of the public mind caused by the Reformation, gave to Europe the great men who stamped their seal on the succeeding age. It generated in England the great minds who adorned the reign of Elizabeth,—Shakespeare, Bacon, Raleigh, Sydney, Ben Johnson, and a host of lesser lights.

To the Revolution of 1640 we owe Milton, Dryden, Hampden, and Cromwell—and the training of Halifax, and Marlboro.

The Revolution of 1688 and the succeeding wars with France, gave us Swift and Bolingbroke, and Pope and Addison, and the training of Dr. Johnson.

After each of these eras the public mind of England subsided into inactivity. Chatham is the only great name that stands conspicuous among English statesmen, during the last century.

Our War of Independence nurtured the great men who afterward inaugurated the government.

The agitations of the French Revolution gave us our second generation of statesmen, and to Europe the constellation of genius which beamed forth with such unrivaled splendor in the early part of the century.

And, now, the excitement subsided no more. The era of commerce began, which induced the violent and universal agitation that now prevails, utterly destructive of the germs of genius.

There are a few great names in every age. Whether thought is stagnant or agitated with a too rapid fermentation, some powerful Mind surrounded by favorable circumstances germinates into greatness. The rank whence the genius springs is a sure index of the cause of the general barrenness of mind. If the age is stagnant, the few great men who rise are from the governing class, which alone is reached by excitement. Such an age may develop a great statesman,—a Chatham, from the aristocratic class; but no great thinker will spring from the ranks of the people. On the other hand, when the fermentation is excessive, the only great men are nurtured like Epaminondas in retirement, and spring from obscurity at the call of opportunity.

A social fermentation like that which characterizes the present age is peculiarly fatal to the development of mind. An excitement like that of Greece, arising from the continual din of arms, may leave the cell of philosophy in unbroken stillness to become the aerie of genius. But a fermentation which pervades social life permeates every avenue of existence. It penetrates the household; agitates the seat of learning; continually thrills the youth of active mind and nervous temperament, and surrounds him with an atmosphere of excitement until it pervades his being. A social excitement springing out of too great business activity is especially fatal to the development of talent. The respectability and position arising from wealth are set before the mind as the chief objects of desire. Many a youth turns from ambition and poverty to business and wealth. Others who choose the nobler sphere, too exciteable to bear with equanimity the hardship of their lot or to resist the temptations which beset their career, are fretted or cajoled into dis-

sipation, soured into misanthropy, or irritated into embracing some of the thousand panaceas for the social evils the world is laboring under, which in eras of fermentation are heralded forth on every hand.

In periods of fermentation like this, the general range of intellect gains in acuteness, perhaps; but mind loses in majesty; and in man's emotional nature how great the degeneracy of this materialistic age.

Where are the poets of our time? Who are the successors of the bards whose sparkling imagery, lofty sentiment, and glowing emotion rapt all hearts, and made the beginning of this century an era in the annals of song? That gallant flotilla of genius-laden barks has disappeared, all gone down in mid ocean, where the white waves still gleam in the track where Genius *has been.*

Who are their successors? The minds who might have rivaled their fame are engrossed in business or besotted with dissipation. The Author of Festus is a genius of which any age might well be proud; but in this age of excitement his over-wrought fancy has wrested the reins from judgment, and driven with reckless daring upon the confines of madness. What other poets have we to fill the places of Byron and Shelley, Campbell and Scott? Longfellow has given to the world a few gems of sentiment which might make us believe him a poet, were not his labored works Indian stories sung in crippled lines limping

"Like the forced gait of a shuffling nag."

The sweet lines of Tennyson entitle him to the highest place among the school where laborious effort seeks in polish and art compensation for the lack of that inspiration which is the seal of God stamped upon the soul of the poet.

Our age has one poet who sung a majestic dirge, which Earth will never forget while man shall die; and then—O shame! Bryant broke his harpstrings, and suspended the dishonored instrument in an office, an oblation at the shrine of Mammon! the noblest offering ever laid before an idol altar since the ark of God was placed in the temple of Dagon! We had another poet—a noble gifted nature—who seized the deep-toned harp Byron had flung away, and swept it with a stronger hand, and sung an anthem to Despair which thrills

the soul with anguish. But this age of fermentation unstrung the spirit of Poe, and drove him, frenzied to the verge of madness, to the refuge of an early grave.

Bryant and Poe! two among the loftiest spirits of their time! fellow-captives pent within the prison walls of this commercial age! the one, narrowing his mind to the walls of his cell; the other, driven to recklessness, despair, and death. But better the fate of Poe in his lowly grave, than that of Bryant in his palace. Nobler the eagle who beats out his life against the bars of his captivity, in vain longings after the aerie he can know no more, than the Prodigal, with heaven's gifts all wasted, bending his soul to slavery, and becoming the keeper and companion of swine.

Poesy has suffered in this era from the influence of utilitarianism and excitement. It has degenerated with the taste of the age, and in deference to the tone of sentiment and criticism, has assumed an utilitarian phase. Criticism will not endure the fire and abandon of untrammeled genius. It has no sympathy with lofty chivalrous sentiment, or the volcanic burst of genuine passion. Poetry has been subjected to the same rules as a young lady's toilet,—it must be as studied, as elegant, as finished, as graceful; and, withal, as stiff, as restrained, and unnatural.

But excitement has been more fatal to poetry than utilitarianism. In a calmer age, the poetic temperament found its sphere in verse; poetry was the dissipation of Genius. But in this age of excitement, the poetic temperament is completely unbalanced. The excitements which turn cooler heads completely unhinge Genius, and it is now always erratic. It soon gets beyond poetry, rioting in wayward fantasies, and dies in a kennel, or a madhouse. All the great poets are dead; hardly one lives in Europe, or America. But many who might adorn the era are maniacs or drunkards, ruined by the fermentation of our time.

Poets are always the "fast" men of their day, as the necessity of their temperament. In a quiet era it required a "fast" man to be a poet; no other could get beyond the pale of dullness. But no one is dull, now. All are excited up to the pitch of poesy, even when without the temperament of Genius—and Genius goes far beyond. Hence, in this age, our poets are men of plodding talent

and industry, with strong common sense and a sharp eye to the main chance. The true poetic temperament is beyond all capacity for persistent effort—numbered as usual among the "fast" youth, who are now dissipated worthless rakes, the brawlers and Bohemians of our cities.

The same principle applies to orators. Almost every youth who gives promise of oratorical talent dies a drunkard before he reaches middle age. The three greatest orators of our country, men of profound thought, brilliant fancy, and fervid eloquence, all sleep in unhonored graves,—all three drunkards, one a misanthrope, and one a madman. In a calmer era, they might all have lived to become cherished household names in the nation's heart. Alas, in this age of bustle and hurry and excitement, for the mettled racers! if the course were quiet they would bear away all prizes; but maddened by the confusion and hubbub of the time, they fly the track, and dash themselves in pieces.

Our stormy era is strewn with the wrecks of the noblest minds, who, beneath a calmer sky, would have achieved their destiny, and committed to mankind a fame which would never have been suffered to perish; but too thoughtless or gay or impulsive for a tempest-rocked sea, the waves of oblivion are rolling over their names buried and lost forever.

In an era like this mediocrity alone succeeds. It alone possesses the cool head and firm nerve which excitement stimulates, but cannot unbalance. It alone possesses the practical common sense which in a materialistic age is far more prized than superior qualities. Mediocrity sits in high places, while genius is wallowing in the gutter.

This is especially true of England and our own country, which are the centers of commercial activity, and industrial and social excitement. Continental Europe is not yet so completely in the vortex, and, there, genius still maintains its ascendancy. The Emperor of the French is a man of transcendant ability, whose nature is a combination of great qualities never before, perhaps, united in the same person, and in their union stamping him a prodigy of greatness. Bold as Cæsar, prudent as Washington, subtle, yet pro-

found, ambitious, yet patient—men of his stamp appear but once in ages, the agents of destiny for the accomplishment of great events. Cavour, the Italian minister, was a man of decided genius,—broad, comprehensive views, far-reaching ambition, wary, sagacious, patient, a soul of flame and a hand of iron. The Prussian minister,* Count Bismark, also bids fair with favoring fortune to become the Richelieu of his country.—But where are the great names of England or America?

In America, who are the successors, in jurisprudence, of Marshall and Story? in eloquence, of Henry and Randolph and Choate and Clay? in statesmanship, of Madison and Jefferson and Hamilton? of Calhoun and Webster?—of Douglas? the last and greatest of them all! the last great American whose heart was large enough to contain his whole country! sole leader of an era of stormy faction whose only aim was his country's good! who fought the battle of the Union with undaunted courage to the last, against foes who hemmed him round on every side, and when the battle was lost and hope had fled, laid himself down to die amid the ruins of his country!

We should hardly expect to find in our own country worthy successors in public life of the great men of a former generation; for the excitement of trade has withdrawn the talent of the country from the walks of learning, to business pursuits. A few bright names adorn public life—the brighter for the prevailing dearth of talent; but business or dissipation has engulfed the great mass of mind. But in England, there is a class that holds aloof from traffic, and is devoted to literature and the duties of government, as their sole occupation. Yet we observe in England the same dearth of talent.

This era of excited traffic has dwarfed the mind of England in every department of thought.

In Literature, Macauley and Allison, Sir William Hamilton, Bulwer Lytton and Dickens and Thackeray, are the leading authors of the time. They all received their intellectual training and bias be-

* This was written before the recent German war, before it was known whether success would crown the bold policy of the great Prussian minister.

fore the excited commercial era began; and they should be ranked as stragglers, lagging behind the age to which they belong. England has no man under fifty reared amid the influences of the era of commercial excitement, who gives any promise of high distinction in letters. There are no young Byrons and Scotts and Shelleys and Campbells and Keates and Coleridges, now. Every writer and orator and thinker that England can boast, belongs to a former generation; and those now alive were kept aloof from the excitements of commerce.

Hamilton was trained to the seclusion of his study while thought was yet calm, and brought up the rear of the corps of distinguished metaphysicians who had gone before.

Bulwer Lytton, the only other real genius among the number, was less fortunate than Hamilton. He was not protected by seclusion from the influences of the outside world. He began his career animated with a fierce hatred of social wrongs, of which he failed to discover the source, and all his works were colored with the tragic hue of his thought. Time and prosperity softened his nature to a more genial frame, but at the same time brought him within the vortex of social excitement; and Bulwer became a dreamer and a spiritualist, involved in the idle speculations of the day.

Of the others, none—unless we except Dickens—are men of real genius. They are talented, cultivated men, skilled in rhetorical arts, and endowed with the persistent energy that would have won success in any business as readily as in literature. They are all fine word painters; their pictures are beautiful as works of art; but they are not what they were intended to be,—good likenesses.

Dickens is a warm-hearted, genial caricaturist, whose greatest excellence is his sympathy with the humble and the oppressed, who have none other to pity.

Thackeray is a satirist filled with bitterness against society which had galled his pride—a Mephistophiles, gibing with mocking laughter the vices and follies of a class he at once envies and scorns.

A great historian is, of necessity, a statesman, and a man of genius. He must be able to unravel the chain of causation which constitutes his narrative, and enter into the motives and impulses of the characters he delineates. Macaulay's excellence as an

essayist and a historian consists in this latter quality. He forms his conceptions, not through the intuition of genius, but by dint of laborious application, and gives us vivid, but inaccurate pictures of the men and times he portrays. His mind is acute and patient of labor, but lacks statesmanlike breadth of view, and the imaginative power of conception that would have enabled him to enter into the feelings and motives of the characters which appear on the stage. A great historian needs to be endowed with the qualities both of a statesman, and a poet;—and he is neither. He is a Whig of the Nineteenth century, bringing the ideas of his time to the portraiture of the events of the Seventeenth. In Parliament, notwithstanding his sparkling rhetoric, he failed from the same deficiency of endowment which rendered his history inaccurate and defective.

The only qualities of a historian Allison possesses are patience of labor and rhetorical skill. A narrow-minded politician, devoted to an order of things fast disappearing before the march of mind, he vents his spleen in caricaturing events whose causes he does not comprehend, and characters whose motives he fails to conceive.

None of these are men of true genius; or, exposed to the influences that surround them, they would, like Bulwer, have been swept away. They are to be ranked with the men of talent for whom the stimulus of excitement is necessary. They were fortunate in the circumstances of their time. In ordinary times they might not have risen above mediocrity. If they had been subjected in early life to the excitement of the age, it would have prevented the formation of the mental habitude to which they owe their success; brought to bear upon them when their habits had been formed, it stimulated their faculties into unnatural activity, and enabled them to achieve a position in literature they could never otherwise have attained.

We observe, in England, the same dearth of talent, in public life. The great orators of the past have been succeeded by a race of talkers—the politicians of an utilitarian age—men of practical intellect and common sense views, whose ideas are bounded by topics of commercial industry. In England, aristocracy and common sense have formed an alliance like the mingling of snow and salt; the resultant product is a polar frost. Aristocracy has chilled Common

Sense, and common sense has stiffened aristocracy, until the modern English orator cannot unbend sufficiently for a flight of eloquence. Eloquence involves deep emotion; the Englishman of the present day is too proud to display emotion,—encased in his pride, he is as stiff as a knight in armor. Eloquence involves the admission of a desire to persuade others; an Englishman is too haughty to stoop to persuasion. He glories in his indifference to all men, and all things; in society the *blase* affectation of utter indifference is the perfection of manner, which it is the ambition of youth to acquire; and it is the perfection of modern English oratory, to utter common place truisms in a style of conversational indifference. To display emotion and to evince desire to persuade others, are alike derogatory to the dignity of an Englishman; while the attempt at persuasion is an insult to the pride of the audience. A burst of genuine feeling in the English Parliament would produce an explosion like the fall of a mass of heated metal upon an iceberg, and the unlucky orator would be sputtered and cooled down about as quick. The unhappy speaker who is betrayed by emotion into a burst of eloquence is instantly apprised of his blunder by a storm of ironical applause, which evinces in the most forcible manner the contempt and offended dignity of his hearers.

The pride of the British aristocracy even chilled at last the fiery soul of Brougham, who has been for thirty years in the House of Lords, an extinguished cinder. The English Liberals have, in the wrongs of the PEOPLE whose cause they advocate, a theme grander than that which inspired Demosthenes. But their lips are dumb; they dare not raise the voice of indignant and eloquent remonstrance. The chain of aristocratic pride is on their souls. Cobden and Bright—men who would do honor to the mercantile profession, but without a spark of genius—forcible, common sense talkers—politicians of the utilitarian school—are favorable specimens of the better class of modern English speakers. In this commercial age, England has lost the capacity to appreciate, as well as to produce, the higher flights of oratory.

Nor is Great Britain more fortunate in her present school of statesmen. The great ministers of the past—the Chathams, the Pitts, who

swayed king and parliament with the might of their imperious will, and raised England to the first rank, making it the center round which European politics revolved, have passed away. England has no great statesmen now. Not one of her politicians has given evidence of ability to grasp the elements of the situation, and weigh the causes that give direction to events.

The ministers, of England, now, are mere time-serving placemongers, ambitious of power, and with sufficient craft to devise means to secure it. Palmerston—a Tory in sentiment, a Whig in party connection, and a faithless ally of the Liberals—a trickster in home, and a shuffler in foreign politics—is the model type of the modern English minister, and was the most popular of all who have for a century governed the country.

Twenty years ago, England was the first power in Europe, the friend of every nation on the continent, and the recognized leader of the age. Now, with quadrupled resources, her weak and tortuous policy has made her the object of general derision. Napoleon with far inferior resources supplanted her in political influence, and reduced her to a cypher. She alienated Russia and the great German powers, and lost the respect of France and Italy. For years, she has stood alone in Europe, hated and contemned by all, through the wretched incapacity and impolicy of her rulers. Dotards, and usurers with capital increasing at compound interest, and with no thought but for gain,—they and their tools sway the councils of Britain. Administering the government for selfish advantage, they ignore the best interests of their country and mankind, and in the pursuit of a narrow, selfish policy are suffering all to drive on to shipwreck.

The resources and the power of England are tenfold greater now than when she controlled the destiny of the world. A great statesman, now, might give her greater influence than ever before, and render her the arbiter of Europe. It needs only a quick eye, a firm will, and a strong arm, to guide Europe safely through the breakers that beat around it, and give to England quiet, and to the world centuries of peace. England might do it; no other nation can. With a crew of patriots upon her decks and a statesman at the helm, England might be put before the storm that is sweeping down upon our Age,

and the nations of the Old World would follow safely in her wake. But, instead, while the tempest is gathering in the heavens and a hollow murmur is upon the deep whose surges are already rising, England lies wallowing, a huge, unwieldy hulk, in the trough of the sea. O for a year of Chatham with his eagle eye and lion heart, to awe the aristocracy of Britain, now, as he once awed her feudal nobility, and by the might of his commanding genius save England and the world!

Sect. II.—The Prevailing Mania of Thought and Impulse.

If the excitement of the era of commerce had merely caused a dearth of mind, it would have wrought a grievous evil ruinous to the progress of the age; for, from the age of Tarquin it has been known that the destruction of the leading minds of a country is the surest method of subverting a state.

But more than this must be charged against the prevailing social effervescence. It has not only created a dearth of great minds; it has filled the world with the bubbling froth of mental and moral excitement.

The mind of the age, tossed in perpetual unrest, has lost its tone. Conservatism of thought, of principle, is no more. The perpetual dashing of the billows has displaced the buoys, that served to mark the proper channel of thought, and adventurous minds are constantly dashing into wreck upon the shoals that bound the way. Genius is constantly exploring new and impossible theories of progress. Novelty is the rage. Old things are held to be wrong because old and established. New theories of government, of morals, of religion, are broached on every hand. Every theorist has his hobby, which is the panacea for all the ills man labors under; and no hobby is too absurd to find zealous votaries among brains turned with social and business excitement.

An unsettled brain is marked by the dominance of a single idea. The world is full of monomaniacs—political monomaniacs—social monomaniacs—religious monomaniacs; all having some ruling idea—some special direction their frenzy takes—some special object of hatred, to overthrow which they are willing to involve every thing in wreck.

The tendency of all these visionaries, however, is to greater license. Some assail one, some another of the conservative elements of social order, which impose restraint upon the unbridled passions of man. An extension of liberty is the common cry of all. Their rantings do great injury, by misleading many, and by producing a reaction in the minds of many against conservative progress. Though longing for a better order of things, the world dreads these distempered phantasms, and prefers to cling to the evils of the past, rather than throw down the dikes to the dashings of radical innovation. None know where it would end; the innovator of the present would be out-Heroded by the wilder innovator of the future, until every principle of order were lost, and society resolved into a mass of chaotic elements. Thus mankind, like a madman with enough reason left to misdoubt his fancies and dread their promptings, is ready to extinguish the torch of progress, lest it should set the world on flame.

Political Monomaniacs.

First among these visionaries, we notice those whose mania takes a political direction.

The Red Republican finds the source of all evils in the protection extended by government to vested rights, and would save the world, by leveling all distinctions, and placing mankind upon the platform of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. In dread of his doctrines, France cowered back beneath Imperialism, for protection against the evils of licentious liberty unbridled by conservatism and reason.

The political monomaniacs of America, like their brethren of France, have revolted against the protection afforded by our constitution to vested rights, and have set the country on fire to destroy the object of their hate. One-half our land lies blackened and desolate; and, unless they are timely checked, the flames of desolation may spread, until the whole country is involved in one common ruin. They have acted as madly as a frenzied lunatic who, to destroy the vermin that infest his cellar, pulls down the foundation walls of his house, and continues to glory in his sagacity and resolution until the toppling building whelms him in its ruins.

Social Monomaniacs.

Many classes of social monomaniacs exist, who rant their frenzied crudities to audiences almost as frenzied as they.

One class finds the germ of all evils in the social position of woman, which they choose to term subordinate. They hold that if the softness of woman's nature were hardened into steel by rough contact with social and political life, it would work the regeneration of our race. They would mar the one redeeming feature of society,—the gentle clinging tenderness of woman, which so fits her to soothe the excitements and soften into gentleness the asperities of the masculine nature; and would transform her into a hard, stern, strong-minded creature, wrestling and struggling with life, endeavoring to compensate the lack of strength and massiveness of organism by fiery excitability, and degenerating into a fierce, malignant, revengeful virago. An unsexed woman is a demon. A race of women formed upon the model of these monomaniacs would be the mothers of a race of savages.

Another class find all evils in the restraints of the matrimonial relation! They believe the race will never improve until it is animalized and riots in the license of bestial liberty!

Another class find in communism a remedy for all social evils. Beholding the sufferings of poverty and the riotous luxury of wealth, their souls are filled with indignation at the unequal distribution of social blessings. They behold mankind universally disquieted by care—the care of avarice, or the care of penury; and they would cut the Gordian knot of social ill by an universal distribution of goods. In other words, they would confiscate the property of the industrious, prosperous class, for the benefit of vagabonds and Bohemians; they would convert the world into a vast poor-house system, where the industrious should work for the support of the sluggards, until at last mutual disgust should empty the lazar-house Babels, and disperse over the earth a race of barbarians destitute of the principles of government and the rules of social order.

But another class of these social reformers surpass all their brethren in zeal and frenzy. They, too, believe in the perfectability of the human race, and they would destroy sin by removing

the law. These philosophers hold that selfishness and covetousness of property and person, are the leashed bloodhounds that are hunting down the happiness of man. They would destroy these two twin passions: starve self-love, by allowing man nothing to call his own —neither property, nor wife, nor children; and kill covetousness, with a surfeit—by giving man full and free possession of everything he desired! The selfishness which desires exclusive possession of anything, they say, is odious—wholly opposed to the golden rule of benevolence which loves our neighbor as ourself! If man loved his fellow as himself, he would not wish to claim any exclusive blessing either in love or wealth; and the narrow selfishness of the human heart should be mortified, that the broad principle of universal benevolence may sway his soul! "What a beautiful world," they cry with enthusiasm, "would it be, with every man possessing nothing and having everything—his soul neither narrowed with selfishness, nor fevered with vain desire of others' blessings—free alike from carking care, and gnawing envy—and with no narrow family ties to fetter the heart's expansive benevolence and prevent its embracing all mankind. Then, indeed, would the world be happy!"

Yes, happy as beasts! provided man could swap his soul for another pair of legs!

All these various forms of socialistic mania are based upon the infidel assumption that Christianity is a failure; that its principles of religion and social life might answer for a less enlightened age, but that the world has now advanced beyond them and requires a new platform—a new adjustment of social relations better adapted to the elevated stand-point of this age of enlightened progress! And the class of theorists thus far mentioned look to social and governmental reforms as the great source of amelioration, to the exclusion of the religious idea.

Religious Monomaniacs.

But there is another class of reformers crazed by the excitement of this age. They, too, believe Christianity a failure, but they severally look to other systems of religion as the source whence the world is to expect its deliverance.

Some of these systems claim to be modifications of Christianity—later revelations to favored children of Heaven.

Mormonism numbers its votaries by millions. Its appeals to a morbid imagination, and its toleration of polygamy, constitute to a certain class of excited minds irresistible attractions; and, through the tragic death of Joe Smith, it is glorified in excited fancies with the blood of a martyred prophet.

Swedenborg was a man whose sensitive organism made him the subject of clairvoyant phenomena, which, being then unknown, turned his brain and convinced him that he was the chosen prophet of a new revelation. The remarkable phenomena of which he was the subject challenged the conviction of a few wonder-mongers of his own time, but made little impression upon the public mind. But the excited imaginativeness of our era has brought myriads of minds into a fit state to embrace his fanciful dreamings. His votaries are numbered by millions; and they continue to increase as the excitement of the time ripens into more decided delirium.

But Spiritualism is less modest than its rival manias. It discards Christianity as an ultimate revelation, and professes to open revelations from another world to all its votaries.

This age has many Swedenborgs. Amid the prevailing excitement, many sensitive natures have developed an abnormal organism once very rare, which gives a clairvoyant power construed into revelations from the unseen world. The suggestions of an insane fancy are credited as spiritual revelations, and are regarded as the highest authority in establishing principles for the regulation of social, moral, and religious life. The millions of votaries of spiritualism daily seek new revelations from the spirit land. The necromancy of the olden time, probably engendered in the excitement of the first age of Phœnician commerce, has been revived among us. Man, discarding the guidance of reason, is again seeking answers from oracles, and asking of the dead enlightenment and direction. So far has it gone, that every sovereign in Europe is a spiritualist. The Queen of England is lost to the world while seeking daily communion with the spirit of her deceased husband. Napoleon III takes counsel, as he fancies, with great statesmen and sages

of past ages, who suggest the policy he should adopt. All the sovereigns of Europe, disquieted and oppressed by fear of those things which are coming on the earth, are seeking, like Saul, to the dead, for counsel and direction.

And what is Christianity doing? If the age will not follow its guidance, it might at least lock the wheels and check the mad rush toward ruin. The only conservative principle that is left to curb the madness of the time, is reverence for divine authority. Were the majesty of God proclaimed—the holiness of His law—the blindness of man—his weakness and sinfulness—the race might hear, and be humbled into submission to Jehovah; or, at least, the headstrong pride which now riots uncontrolled would be held in check, and prevented from making man the victim of his own wayward and unbridled fancies. Why this seeking to the dead? this bending in homage to the fancies of Swedenborg, and the pretensions of the Mormon impostor? It is because the Christian ministry ceased to claim the veneration of mankind for the Bible. Christianity dropped the reins, and the riderless horse is seeking a master. Man must revere something—must bow to something with blind veneration; and when the Christian ministry no longer challenge his reverence for God, he bows his neck to the yoke of necromancy and the pretensions of imposture.

It is the worst misfortune of the time that the votaries of Christianity are maddened too. The excitement that prevails has swept religious thought from its moorings. Imagination rules the hour, and leads reason captive to adorn its triumph. The votaries of Christianity are divided into two classes, equally wayward, and almost equally mad. The pious and despondent give up the world to ruin; they turn to prophecy for comfort, and await in rapt and hopeful expectation the coming of their Lord, to arrest the progress of impiety and summon man to judgment. But the largest class of professed Christians partake of the visionary theories which agitate the age. They discard reverence for divine revelation where it comes in conflict with their views. They have forgot the precepts of the religion of peace, of reverence, of love, and joined the hell-dance of madness and passion. They follow the meteor flame gen-

dered of the general fermentation, supposing it the beacon light of progress. Religion is no longer reverence for God and obedience to his will; it is devotion to the principles of progress recognized in this generation.

Shepherd and flock are gone astray together. Preachers love popularity; and congregations variously agitated with business cares, fashionable jealousies, stormy politics, and fiery fiction, will not listen patiently to an earnest appeal to the conscience, or devoutly to a presentation of the majesty of God. Veneration and conscientiousness are overwhelmed in the prevailing excitement: besides, these views are old; and to minds so long swept onward in the excited rush from one novelty to another, familiar thought has lost its charm. The ministry, moreover, has been swept along with the current of agitated feeling, and is prepared to become the organ of the prevailing intoxication of thought. Consequently, the pulpit, instead of asserting the conservative dignity of Christianity, and commanding man, everywhere, to repent and bow down in humility before God, is hounding on the excitement, and represents the Almighty as the leader of the cry.

The truths which teach humility are ignored. The ministry satisfy the consciences and please the self-love of admiring audiences, by rousing their hatred of sins not their own, and, like the authors of fiction, inspiring them with pity of sorrows far away that do not appeal to self-sacrificing benevolence. They are lecturers upon popular and exciting topics appertaining to philanthropy and progress, suited to the prevailing taste; and afford their audiences on the Sabbath an agreeable entertainment, as exciting in its way as the lectures, the theaters, the political harangues, the ball-rooms, and concerts that occupy their weekly hours. They have lowered Christianity to the level of the various Deistical movements of the day, representing its grand aim as social advancement, instead of the salvation of men. They encourage their hearers to question the inspiration of the bible, by setting human reason and the suggestions of a fanatical spirit above its teachings. The professed ministers of Jesus are beginning to question the divinity of the Savior, and, even while ministering in the functions of their office, are marshaling on the hosts of infidelity.

The excitement of the age has mastered the citadel of conservatism and turned its guns against opposition, and is almost undisputed master of the field.

Whence all this fermentation? these debasing, or fanciful theories of social reform? these inquiries after new forms of religion? these seekings after counsel from the dead? these panderings of current Christianity to the wayward impulses of the hour? It is not the march of mind; for the age is characterized by the vagaries of a wayward imagination, not the fixed conclusions of calm, enlightened reason. Sober thought is silent and unregarded, while our generation is watching the speculative flights of soaring fancy.

The World is fast going mad. Wisdom is discarded and the mad fancies of lunatic spirits, under the guise of oracles from the departed, are assuming the guidance of mankind. What can we hope when madness leads the thought, and directs the counsels of the age? This generation is moving on in a bacchanal procession where the wildest are the leaders. Crazed genius marshals the dance, and, drunken with excitement, the thoughtless multitude rush on, frantic with baseless hope and maniac glee—to ruin. It is fruitless to argue with madmen—to point to the evils that already environ them.—All is well. They have escaped from the bondage of thought which fettered past ages! they are in the wilderness now—but are bound to the land of promise!—and, heedless of argument or remonstrance, they rush blindly on.—Ah! whither will the pillar of darkness that guides their footsteps lead them?

This agitation of the human mind arose nearly forty years ago with the expansion of the new commercial era. The agitation for Reform in England, the Polish insurrection, and the Revolution in France which dethroned Charles XII, mark its inception in Europe; as strikingly, as the political tempest which overswept our country during the administration of Jackson, displays its rise in America.

It was repressed in Europe, by power; in America, by financial revulsion.

But the flood continued to rise, until, in 1848, it overflowed Europe and America with political excitement.

Power again repaired the broken dykes in Europe; and Compromise, in America.

But the torrent has gone on deepening and swelling ever since, as the growing commerce of Britain has increased. And still that exciting commerce continues its annual expansion, increasing the volume of excitement, which is threatening to deluge the earth, and sweep away all vestiges of order and civilized progress.

In our own country, the frenzy of passion and speculative thought have overleaped all bounds, and the billows of excitement are rolling a general deluge over the land. All the landmarks of our fathers have been obliterated beneath the rising flood. The old features of social and industrial life are lost. The surges of commerce dash unceasingly where placid content and quiet routine once reigned. Frothlike theories of progress and reform are bubbling up to the surface, everywhere agitated and seething with fermentation. The ark of the Constitution, freighted with the hopes of man, is drifting tempest-broken, upon the heaving billows. The dove of peace has returned, but bearing no olive branch in its mouth.—The same causes which have wrought our ruin, are everywhere in operation. Commercial excitement, and, with it, social agitation, is rapidly increasing. The world is already rocking in the throes of an universal earthquake. The fountains of the deep are breaking up. Alas for man, unless the agitation subside! The foundations of social life will be everywhere upheaved; society will rock into ruins, and chaos come again.

CHAPTER II.

OPPRESSION OF POVERTY.

The social excitement gendered by the commercial system of Great Britain is the only social evil that has, thus far, been noticed.

But that system has given rise to another great social evil; it enriches the wealthy class far beyond all former precedent, and depresses poverty into an abyss of wretchedness.

The oppression of poverty is a necessary result of a system where commerce flourishes at the expense of productive industry.

It has already been shown how the false industrial system of our own country, which placed the market at an immense distance from the producer, built up cities, and enriched merchants and speculators and capitalists, at the expense of the producing and laboring classes. While speculators flourished, the farming interest was prejudiced; and the Southern negro, the New England operative, and the laboring class of our cities, were all grievously oppressed.

The commerce of England has extended the same system over the industry of the whole earth, with similar results. In every country reached by British commerce, cities are growing with unprecedented rapidity, in which merchants and speculators, the agents of commerce, are amassing colossal fortunes by the traffic with England; while the agriculturists are weighed down by the high price of importations and the low rate of produce; and labor is oppressed by the inadequate rate of wages in proportion to the price of all articles of consumption.

Every country in Europe and America feels the pernicious influence of this centralized commerce. The British manufacturer must keep the price of the raw produce he consumes reduced to the lowest possible rate. The British merchant, to keep within the limit of price set by the manufacturer and yet realize his profit, oppresses his laborers to the verge of starvation, and cuts down the price of the foreign merchant to the narrowest margin of profit: to make his profit, the foreign merchant must pay clerks and city laborers the merest pittance sufficient for subsistence, and cut down the price of the speculator who gathers and forwards his raw commodities: the speculator, in turn, to make his profit, must oppress the employés of transportation, and cut down the price of the producer; and the producer in self-defense, must oppress his employés. Thus, the system, while enriching speculators and capitalists, who compensate for the smallness of their per centage of profits by the quantity of goods they forward, is oppressing industry, and grinding the poor into utter wretchedness, all over the earth.

But the population of Great Britain, more than any other, suffers

from the effects of this commercial centralization. The commercial aristocracy of Britain is aggrandized beyond all former precedent; but the poor are crushed into a reeking mass of suffering which a philanthropic mind is filled with anguish to behold.

The oppression of the operative is not a necessary condition of manufactures. Commerce is not a car of Juggernaut, advancing over the crushed bodies of those who bear it onward. If the industry of the world were suffered to flow in natural channels, every class of labor would purchase abundance in return for toil. If raw material were manufactured in the several countries where it is produced, the cheapness of provisions would enable the operative to live comfortably upon the wages which, in England, where provisions of every kind are imported from abroad, will scarcely yield subsistence. The false system of commercial industry which England has brought about, while bloating the wealth of the country, has, at the same time, made it a lazar-house of loathsome poverty. By the importation of raw material from all the world, a population is kept engaged in manufactures and commerce much beyond the capacity of the agriculture of the British islands to maintain. They are crowded in cities whose atmosphere is laden with the gases of the coal consumed in manufactures, which, prevented by the dampness of the climate from rising, pollutes the air almost to suffocation. While the operatives of the manufactories retain their health and ability to labor, their wages, though not adequate to their wants, will keep them from actual starvation. But when overwork, foul air, and privation, outweary nature, a single fit of sickness consumes the scanty resources pinching economy has laid aside. When the laborer recovers, he often finds his place filled by some new applicant; and if he fail soon to obtain employment, his furniture, his clothing, go to the shop of the pawn-broker, and he sinks into the ranks of the unfortunates—a very numerous class of British population—who, without regular employment, hopeless, starving, fester in a reeking mass of suffering in the great cities. The English are used to sights of suffering; from custom, they cease to regard it; but the degradation of humanity which this system has caused, the poverty, the harrowing wretchedness that every where meets the

eye, call upon Heaven and earth to overturn the system of industry which founds the prosperity of the few upon the misery of the many.

Before entering at large upon this subject, it is necessary to note some of the distinctions which obtain in English society.

British subjects are divided, politically, into two classes,—the Nobility, and the Commons. Below these is a mass of population, which used to be commonly termed the rabble, or dregs of society, having no political rights.

But the nomenclature which now obtains is deduced from social gradation. In this classification, English society is divided into three grades,—the Aristocracy, consisting of the Nobility and Gentry; the Middle class; and the Working class.

Each of these classes has its own aristocracy. There is the aristocracy of the aristocrats; the aristocracy of the Middle class; the aristocracy of the Working class.

The Aristocracy *par excellence* consists of the titled nobility of the realm, who inherit rank and lands by primogeniture. The descendants of the younger sons of nobility simply rank as gentry. They belong to the aristocracy by right of blood, and enjoy the social distinction thus conferred. They may be termed the plebeians of the Aristocracy.

The noble English Aristocracy holds its position in virtue of blood and wealth. The heir to the title inherits the lands, as essential to maintain his rank. Daughters and younger sons must be provided for by the savings of their aristocratic parents. These descendants of noble houses are numbered in the ranks of the Gentry so long as they have sufficient property to support them without resorting to any industrial pursuit. In Great Britain, branches of the Aristocracy may, consistently with their caste, become clergymen or lawyers; may enter the army or navy; or occupy a post under government, in some department of the civil administration. All other pursuits are considered degrading. As soon as necessity compels the adoption of any industrial occupation, social position is lost, and the person sinks, as the case may be, into the Middle, or the Working class. It is, therefore, the special care of aristocratic parents to provide for their younger children.

The Middle class is distinguished from the noble Aristocracy above them, as being of plebeian descent, and engaged in some business avocation; and from the Working class below, as possessing sufficient means to obviate the necessity of personal labor. The Middle class has its own aristocracy, consisting of the great merchants, manufacturers, shippers; an aristocracy of wealth, as distinguished from the aristocracy of blood. The mass of the Middle class comprises all embarking capital in industrial pursuits who do not engage in personal labor,—the merchant who overlooks his clerks; the manufacturer; the gentleman farmer who employs his capital in the cultivation of rented lands; and all persons not of noble blood, engaged in the learned professions and government service.

The Working class comprises all who are in service; and all who engage in personal labor, in any department of business. Shop, or storekeepers who attend behind their own counter, clerks, teachers, governesses, artisans, mechanics, laborers, swell the ranks of the Working class.—But the aristocratic principle is as visible, here, as in the classes above them. The Working men have their aristocracy, who regard the suffering and degraded millions below them with as much contempt and as little sympathy as is felt for themselves by the higher aristocracy of the land. The shopkeeper who works in his own store is much higher in the social scale than those who work for hire. The teacher and the clerk hold themselves above the mechanic who labors with his hands; and the latter, having regular, steady employment at fixed wages, regard themselves as immeasurably superior to the millions of laborers employed in commerce, in agriculture, and in the various menial departments of industry.

These three grades of society,—the Aristocracy, the Middle class, the Working class, are universally recognized in England. There are first, second, and third class seats in lecture rooms, theaters, and churches; first, second, and third class cars on railroads; and the undertakers announce upon their signs, "First class burials," "Second class burials," "Third class burials," with the respective charges attached to each.

The system of centralized commerce that prevails has benefited

the landed nobility, who have increased their rents four fold; and the Middle class aristocracy, who engross the manufacturing and commercial industry of the world; but it has grievously oppressed the great mass of British population belonging to all these classes. Its tendency is to increase the aggregation of wealth, and to multiply the burdens of poverty.

The British Aristocracy has always been the richest nobility in the world; but, now, its wealth is inordinately increased. It derives all the advantage of the high prices of provisions and raw material induced by the establishment of manufactures. The nobility have increased their rents, so as to restrict the profits of the farmers within as narrow limits as before, and compel the wages of the farm laborer to be stinted to a degree that deprives them of all the comforts of life. The titled nobility have further increased their wealth by intermarriages with the heiresses of the Middle class aristocracy. The British Islands were once full of small farms owned by resident farmers. But this yeoman class of country squires is rapidly becoming extinct. The nobility are buying up more lands in every generation. The aggregation of landed estates has already progressed so far that some half a dozen nobles own half the lands in England. In a few years more the nobility will possess almost all the lands in Great Britain.

While the landed nobility are thus increasing their wealth, by imposing heavier rents, and by intermarriages with the commercial aristocracy, the younger scions of the noble aristocracy, who constitute the great majority of the aristocratic class, suffer severely from the commercial system which, by concentrating manufactures and commerce in England, has exaggerated the price of all the necessaries of life. The lower orders endure excessive privations; but it is doubtful whether the poorer class of the Aristocracy are not the most wretched people in England. Reared in the enjoyment of luxury, and with all the inflated pride of their class, they are turned upon the world without the means necessary to support their rank. Their best hope is to obtain a settlement in life by marrying heiresses of the Middle class aristocracy. Failing this, the more fortunate obtain, by the influence of relatives, appointments under

government. But even these have meager salaries, scarcely sufficient for support, much less to meet the expenses incident to their position in society. They marry and raise families with that pinching economy which sacrifices comfort in the attempt to keep up appearances. But, worst of all, they have not the means of settling their children in life; their pinched resources being strained to the utmost, to afford them an education suited to their quality.

The second generation of the younger branches of the Aristocracy begin to feel severely the miseries of their position. Debarred from engaging in business by the pride of descent, they are utterly without resources to maintain their pretensions. They become, of necessity, hangers on of their noble relations. A few are so fortunate as to obtain the patronage and aid of the head of their house; but he is usually too much occupied in saving fortunes for his own younger children to extend much assistance to his brother's family. Some of them are so fortunate as to marry heiresses. The others must become starving curates, pinch their way in the law, or accept some very subordinate position under government. They are provided for in some humble way; for they are too nearly related to the head of the house to be allowed to forfeit caste, by engaging in trade.

In the next generation, however, blood loses its potency. The children of the humble curates, struggling lawyers, army lieutenants, must crush their pride of descent, to engage in any humble employment that may offer the means of subsistence. This struggle between pride and poverty racks the soul with agony. The humble plebeian, whatever his privations, endures only physical suffering. He pines with hunger and shivers with cold; but he knows nothing of the torture of a spirit vainly struggling in fierce revolt against its destiny.

Perhaps no class on earth endure such complicated miseries as the impoverished scions of Aristocracy. They were wretched before, with means miserably inadequate to their wants. But now, the cost of living is vastly increased by the enhancement of prices caused by the centralization of commerce. The system which aggrandizes the Nobility who inherit titles and estates, makes victims of the great mass of the class distinguished by noble blood.

The same contrast is seen in the effect of this system upon the two ranks of the Middle class. It aggrandizes the princely merchants, manufacturers, and capitalists, who carry on the commerce of the world. But the great Mass of the Middle class,—professional men who live by fees and salaries, merchants and tradesmen engaged in domestic traffic, the many living upon scanty incomes,—all feel the pressure of the enhanced cost of living, incident to the commercial system. So great is this pressure, that thousands of English are under the necessity of expatriating themselves and living abroad upon the Continent, where prices have not been exaggerated by a false industrial system beyond the limit of their resources.

But it is the Working class which feel with the utmost intensity the pressure of this system. The Aristocratic and Middle classes are but a small part of the population of England. A few hundred thousand will comprise all who do not obtain a subsistence by personal industry; the industrious, or Working class number millions. Great Britain is an enormous hive of industry, in which busy millions toil, hunger driven.—The classes above them only suffer from the enhanced cost of living; the Working class is oppressed by a complication of causes, originating in the commercial centralization of Britain.

The population of the British isles has been increased through this system of traffic, to a greater number than the wants of industry demand. Every department of industry and enterprise is over-crowded. There are more shopkeepers, more clerks, more mechanics, more operatives, more farm laborers, more city drudges of every kind, than can find employment. The demand for every kind of labor is glutted; so that employers can fix wages at their own standard.

And it is a necessary condition of the system of commercial centralization that wages for every kind of labor shall be fixed at the very lowest rate. The system of foreign commerce compels a narrow economy, necessitating the oppression of all the laborers engaged in it; the exactions of the nobility grind the farm laborers; all laborers engaged in the internal industry of the country also feel the pressure of the system. The foreign commerce fixes the price

of labor. The retail grocer will not give his porter higher wages than the importing merchant is offering. Moreover, the shopkeepers (as retail merchants of every kind are indiscriminately called in England), supplying the wants of hard-driven poverty, and vieing with each other in exciting competition for an overtasked trade, find their profits reduced to the lowest limit, and are compelled, in turn, to oppress all their employés. Thus, the oppression of poverty is universal. The employés of commerce, the employés of agriculture, the employés of all tradesmen,—are all oppressed.

Skilled mechanics are the only moderately-well paid class of English laborers. Being banded together under established regulations, they have been the better able to protect themselves against the oppression of capital. By repeated strikes, the better class of skilled workmen in founderies, etc., have secured established rates of wages averaging five or six dollars a week; which, with rigid economy, enables them to subsist in comparative comfort. These, with the petty shopkeepers and the higher class of clerks, constitute the aristocracy of the working class. They resort to every expedient, to maintain a position of semi-respectability.

Below them are the middle class of laborers.—First among these are the skilled craftsmen employed by manufacturers. They have maintained a long struggle with their employers; the manufacturers wishing to establish wages at a standard barely sufficient to sustain life; the operatives demanding a rate adequate to an humble style of comfort. The struggle led to repeated strikes, and ultimated in a compromise. Wages were fixed at a rate which, after supplying clothes and shelter, would afford about half enough to eat. The poor must have expedients of which the more fortunate are ignorant; for it seems impossible, at English prices for provisions, etc., to make an estimate of expenses by which the wages of operatives would suffice to subsist a family.—Ranked with these are a multitude of half-starved clerks.—The farm laborers are lower in the scale, receiving as regular wages eight shillings ($1.92) per week, with which sum they are expected to feed and clothe their families, and pay medical attendance in sickness.—With these are to be ranked the porters and regular employés of commerce, who systematically famish upon their regular wages.—Next, is the job laborer, who fasts

when he can get work, and starves when without.—Lower yet, is the shop girl, on duty fifteen hours a day, for a pittance inadequate to the supply of necessary wants—the seampstress, earning four shillings a week, slowly dying of overwork and privation—the servant girl, to whom is doled a shilling a week, and an hour's holiday twice a month.—These are the Middle classes of the Working people; for, though famishing, they have regular employment at stipulated wages.

Below them, still, are other millions—without regular work, or home, or food—hopeless, starving, dying;—literally dying—upon doorsteps where they have crowded for shelter—under hedges where they have lain down from the wind—upon heaps of ordure where they have groveled for the warmth derived from reeking exhalations. The cities of England are crowded with this unhappy class of beings. They meet the eye upon every street—too numerous to attract attention or sympathy.

The pining wretchedness of these millions has never found a voice. They die, and make no sign. Tourists who visit England are absorbed in seeing public buildings, and in noting the magnificence of the great. English writers behold the prevalence of suffering with despairing indifference, and will not harrow their readers with descriptions of wretchedness they cannot alleviate. Dickens is an honorable exception to the general reticence. In partially sketched pictures, he gives us, in some of his works, glimpses of harrowing misery; and some time ago, he, in a graphic sketch, recorded the despairing abandonment which met his eye in a midnight tour of observation through St. Giles. But the outside world knows little of the unparalleled wretchedness that exists in England. It is time it found a voice, that Philanthropy, as well as Prudence, may arm against a system which makes victims of the poor.

But how shall the wretchedness of the English poor be described? Where begin? With the homeless outcasts of the cities, perishing for want of employment? with the pining millions, hopeless, joyless, slowly famishing upon wages insufficient for subsistence? or with the aristocracy of labor,—the famine-pinched, hunger-driven Uppertendom of English Want?

Pinching want is not characteristic of the Working class alone. Decayed offshoots of the Aristocracy, and impoverished members of the Middle class, all famish alike. Hunger is an established British institution. Especial provision is made for famishing with decency. The social life of the country is established upon a basis carefully and wisely devised for the special purpose of enabling people to starve themselves in a respectable way. Boarding-houses are unknown in England. An English landlord is too poor to risk advances for food when he does not know that his inmates will be able to pay; and, on the other hand, people can generally afford so little to eat, they are ashamed to sit at a public table. Those who live on bread and water prefer to dine alone. To suit the convenience and poverty of all parties, an ingenious system has been devised, which saves the landlord from risk, and enables the inmates of his house to starve in the most decent manner imaginable.

The Lodging-house system of England is an institution which bears witness to the universal poverty. It has reduced economy to a science, and affords the highest degree of comfort and respectability, at the lowest possible expenditure. It is one of the peculiarities of English social life, and well merits a particular description.

An individual in want of a home goes in quest of "lodgings." He selects an apartment suited to his means, for which he pays a stipulated weekly sum. The apartment is taken care of by the "landlady," whose duty it is, without additional charge, to cook and serve up in the lodger's apartment such food as he may purchase in the market. Or, if the lodger does not choose to become his own purveyor, upon his furnishing the money, the "landlady" is glad to undertake the office, from the opportunity the purchase presents for her favorite occupation,—petty pilfering.

Lodging-houses are of various descriptions. Some are handsome residences three or four stories high, either built expressly as lodging houses, or once tenanted by aristocratic families, which have left them as the city extended its limits. Others are neat two-story buildings, built for the occupancy of mechanics. Others, yet, are the low, dingy dwellings of the poor—the degraded poor.

If we take a glance at the inmates of the various classes of houses which have a card in their windows inscribed in large letters, "Lodgings to let," we shall find the best class situated in a fashionable quarter of the city, and kept, perhaps, by decayed offshoots of the aristocracy, who, compelled by poverty to forego the usages of caste, have rented a house to receive lodgers of the best class. These are occupied by persons of humble means, but respectable connections, to whom respectability is a prime essential; and whose slender incomes, exhausted by the cost of lodgings and other necessary expenses, limit them to a sparing allowance of table comforts.

In another quarter are handsome rows of houses, rented by tradesmen whose business will not support their families, and enterprising clerks who are aspiring to a higher social position than their meager salaries will maintain. The best rooms of these houses are tenanted by persons of the Middle class, whose circumstances will not justify them in renting a house, and who are unwilling to lose their caste by becoming lodging-house keepers. Young tradesmen just starting in business, reduced tradesmen who are living economically upon the wreck of their fortunes, men of leisure enjoying life upon a moderate income,—these are the occupants of the better rooms; while, in the third stories, are teachers, clerks, literary hacks—men of refined instincts and social pride, who prefer to stint themselves, in order to live in a respectable quarter.

In another quarter, still, are neat two-story buildings rented by mechanics and others of the Working class, who manage to keep a spare room for lodgers. These are occupied by persons who prefer comfort to respectability; choosing prompt attention in the second story of a small house, in preference to neglect and discomfort in the third story of a large one.

But the vast majority of the English population cannot afford the expense of neat rooms in decent houses. There are quarters where the poor congregate. Some of these crowded houses are occupied by various families, which huddle into rooms where each performs its household work. Others are occupied by lodgers who sleep in crowded rooms full of double beds, all occupied, with the privilege of eating their meals beside the kitchen fire. Others, still, are large buildings once occupied by traffic, and now converted into lodging

houses, with immense rooms divided into sleeping compartments by board partitions six feet high. These are all respectable, for they contain beds; and mechanics, and laborers, and the worse paid clerks herd in them.

There is yet another class of lodging-houses,—for vagabonds, and "tramps," as laborers out of employment are termed; where, for two pence a night, Destitution sleeps promiscuously in the straw with which the floors are covered.

To let lodgings is the chief resource of respectable poverty. Decayed branches of the upper classes, too poor to subsist without some avocation, frequently find here the avenues by which to descend into the ranks of the Working class. But it is especially the resource of the more enterprising members of the Working class, who seek it, not as an exclusive occupation, but as a means of eking out a support otherwise too meager for respectability. The shop-keeper whose business is not sufficient to support his family, lets lodgings as a means of supplying the deficit. The clerk or mechanic who marries and goes into lodgings, finds his status thenceforth fixed; all his earnings are inadequate to a comfortable subsistence; respectability is beyond hope. The prudent clerk or mechanic defers his marriage, until he has stinted and saved a few pounds sterling. He then selects a "notable" girl as his "partner," and they begin life by taking a house, and letting the best rooms to lodgers.

He is now a member of the Working class aristocracy. His wages, together with the profits derived from lodgers, enable him to live in a style of homely comfort, to which the great body of his fellows cannot aspire; and, with the morbid sensitiveness to rank characteristic of the English mind, he exhibits a ridiculous vanity of superiority over the classes of laborers below him. Not a lord in the land prides himself more upon his social position, or more thoroughly contemns the degraded masses, than does the "respectable" mechanic. Respectability is his idol. He attends church with unfailing regularity, and stints himself of actual necessaries, to provide the Sunday suit, with the high-crowned hat which is the badge of respectability. I think it is Hood who distinguishes the various grades of English petty aristocracy into the six-penny, the

shilling, and the half crown aristocracy. The "respectable" mechanic belongs to the six-penny aristocracy, and turns up his nose in utter contempt of the millions below him whose currency is copper. No sympathy has he with their sufferings. His only care is to maintain himself upon the insecure eminence upon which he stands. It is his only dread that some reverse of fortune may dislodge him, and precipitate him down among the masses whom he despises.

It is pitiable to witness the hard expedients to which the most respectable class of English working people,—the petty shopkeepers, and the better class of clerks and mechanics—are compelled to resort, in order to maintain their precarious position.

The first of these is grinding pinching economy. While they retain their health and find steady employment, they manage, with the help derived from keeping lodgers, to subsist in meager respectability. But their gains are not sufficient for comfort. Every expense is rigidly curtailed within strictly-defined limits. Food, especially, which is the chief expense of living, is carefully limited to the income. The English working people, even those who are most comfortable, never have enough to eat. Many who cannot afford bread, content themselves with potatoes. But the aristocracy of the Working class do afford bread, though not enough to appease hunger. Bread with a little butter is the ordinary food, with perhaps a cup of weak tea. Meat is a luxury that can be afforded only once a week at the "Sunday Dinner;" when, if the state of the exchequer will allow the extra expense, the addition of "pudden" exalts the working man to the bliss of the Mahometan Paradise.

The poor man's Sunday Dinner! It is the reward of virtue! the blessed compensation for seven days of eager craving. Apicius never enjoyed such a meal; for it is served with Spartan sauce, —labor, and hunger. The Sunday Dinner! It makes the poor man's Sabbath a longed-for day of bliss. It is a source of perpetual enjoyment! the center of existence, to which Memory and Hope continually point! the Luminary round which all the thoughts revolve! Its pleasure lingers on the palate till Monday night, and the laborer rises on Tuesday morning, to revel in pleasing anticipa-

tion of the next delicious feast. He is happier each succeeding day as Sunday approaches, and his bliss rises to ecstasy as he wends his way from church, with eager steps, homeward, where the Sunday dinner sits smoking on the hob, ready to be transferred to the little table neatly spread against the kitchen wall.

The Sunday dinner! No careless cook ever prepared for the jaded palate of aristocrat banquet so delicious! There is poetry—music, in the taste, as the exquisite viands melt upon the tongue, and thrill the palate to ecstasy!

The preparation of the Sunday Dinner is the one sole accomplishment of the rustic beauty—the essential preparation for marriage, without which matrimony were hopeless. It is the chief attraction to the rustic swain—the one point upon which his mind must be at rest before he will commit himself. Without it, beauty is unvalued, and amiability is worthless. Excellence, here, atones for a multitude of defects, as remissness constitutes an unpardonable fault. Love and skill vie in its preparation. The good wife makes this the testimonial of attachment, the expiation of peccancy; and all bickerings are absolved, all resentments forgotten in the ecstasy of the Sunday Dinner!

To refuse to cook a Sunday dinner is the keenest blow conjugal malice can inflict. An Englishman was cited by his wife before a magistrate for venting anger in blows. He defended himself with indignant warmth. She had proved a virago for years; he endured it patiently. She had latterly taken to drink; his equanimity remained unshaken. He suspected her of infidelity; and meekly hushed his sorrows in the silence of his heart. At length, she refused to cook his Sunday Dinner;—and—forbearance could no more! The court and public, in sympathy with his unendurable grievance, acquitted him of blame.

The Sunday Dinner is the poor Englishman's highest conception of bliss. His idea of Heaven is an endless Sabbath, with a constant succession of Sunday Dinners, and plenty on the table. The noontide of glory does not strike his imagination: the sun lights him to his labor; the day is associated in his mind with famine and drudgery; he loves the night, for it brings his only forgetfulness of hun-

ger, his only relaxation from toil. To his mind Heaven is Heaven, because it is rest, and there is no hunger there.

Another resource of the better class of English laborers is the system of mutual insurance.

The state of society in England has rendered the system of insurance general. The nobleman in receipt of a large income, which will enable him, by the accumulation of years, to portion his younger children, sets apart an annual sum for life insurance, which will yield them some provision in the event of his untimely death. All in the receipt of fixed salaries endeavor to make similar provision for their families.

Life insurance is a luxury too great for the limited resources of the laboring class. Their pinched means, barely sufficient for subsistence, will not admit of the payment of a life-insurance policy. The cares of the industrious mechanic do not extend to provision for his family after his death. He is willing to trust his wife and children to Providence. His dread is to fall while yet alive into the pauper class below him. His health is his only capital. To guard against the disastrous consequences of a fit of sickness, the better class of Working men have formed mutual insurance societies, to which each pays a weekly stipend of sixpence; receiving from it in case of sickness ten shillings a week—a sum sufficient for subsistence.

The provident working man has to provide against another source of danger to his position. English pride exacts handsome obsequies for the dead. Custom establishes the expenditure required by respectability of the several classes of society. The expense of a "third class burial" is far beyond the means of a mechanic. The cost of decent interment for a member of his family would oppress him with debt for years. To meet an expense which respectability demands, the Working class have organized Burial Societies, which, in consideration of a small weekly payment, engage, in case of death, to pay a sum sufficient to defray the funeral expenses. The first duty of a prudent shopkeeper, or clerk, or mechanic, upon his marriage, is to enter his own, and the name of his wife, upon the list of a burial club. Each child at its birth is successively registered.

An agent comes round every week to collect sixpence, each, burial money for the husband and wife, and two pence for each child;—a hideous *memento mori*, but one, to which the Working class of Englishmen are habituated by custom.

Another custom indicative of the general poverty prevails. Strolling through a cemetery near London, the writer observed wagons engaged in hauling away earth, excavated from some new-made graves. His curiosity being excited, he made inquiry of the sexton, who gave some curious information respecting the burial customs of the country. A family purchases in a cemetery, not a lot, but a family grave. This is excavated from fifteen to twenty feet deep, to receive its first occupant; and at each succeeding death the grave is re-opened, and the bodies are successively deposited, one above another, until the family is extinct, or the grave is filled. The arrangement is found economical in several particulars: labor in England is cheaper than land; and a single handsome column is sufficient to mark the resting-place, and contain the names, and an economical eulogy, of every member of the family.

As to those who have third class burials, a more summary process prevails. The grave is ready dug—generally sixteen feet deep,—and the earth is removed from the cemetery; the grave remaining open, until it is full of coffins brought indiscriminately for interment. Its unsightliness is concealed by a handsome monument made of boards and sanded in imitation of marble. This is removed for each new interment until the grave is almost full; it is then filled up with earth, and left without a headstone, and the plank monument is removed, to garnish a new tomb which yawns for its miscellaneous occupants.

Other instances of economy are seen in the manner in which luxuries are obtained. The expense of a copy of a newspaper will be shared between half a dozen parties. A gentleman receives the London *Times*, and reads it at the breakfast table—the servant passes it to a shop-keeper after breakfast—who hands it over to a restaurant in time for the dinner hour—to be next passed to an afternoon club-room—whence it finally passes to a working-man's evening reading-room, to be conned by mechanics and laborers.

Still another instance of economy is exhibited by the numerous old maids, in providing subsistence for their pets. In a country like England, marriage is a luxury which many persons of small means—sufficient for one, not enough for two—must forego. Old maids are numerous, and they have the usual number of pet dogs and cats, upon which to lavish their exuberant affections. But to feed a pet with a hearty appetite is an expense which a respectable maiden lady with scanty means, barely sufficient for a respectable subsistence, can ill afford. Where every penny has to be counted and many a comfortable meal foregone, to lay aside the pittance for a rainy day, and the sum necessary for decent burial, the quantity that a lap-dog or pet cat will eat is a serious expense. Milk cannot be obtained in sufficient purity to be made an article of diet; beef, or mutton cannot be afforded. The dilemma has given rise to a distinct business in the large cities. Persons make it their business to prepare the flesh of dead horses, which they sell at a cheap rate, as "cats' and dogs' meat." A stranger beholding the sign of one of these purveyors,—"Cats' and dogs' meat for sale here"—is at first impressed with the extreme destitution of the English poor, which reduces them to live on such food; and he is much relieved when he learns that it is horse flesh for sale, as food for the pets of economical families.

The extreme poverty of the better portion of the Working class is not manifest in economy and privation, only. Petty pilfering is universal.

The dairyman mixes lard with his butter, and drugs his milk to make it hold in solution a greater quantity of chalk and water.—The baker mingles alum with his flour, to make it hold more water; and he mixes sawdust with his unbolted flour, and chalk with his white, and increases the weight of his loaf with a liberal sprinkling of sand.—The butcher is so unfortunate as to be unable to adulterate his meat; but, selling it in small quantities, he indemnifies himself by a dextrous manipulation of the scales, which enables him to cheat his customers out of an ounce in the pound.—But the shopkeeper who retails groceries by the pennyworth is the prince of petty thieves. He adulterates his sugar with sand and sawdust,

dilutes his molasses with water, and mixes lard with his butter until hardly a vestige of the lacteal taste remains. He sells his coffee in a ground state to facilitate its adulteration; for which purpose he parches and grinds acorns, and has a standing engagement with all the servant girls in the neighborhood to save coffee-grounds for his shop. Similar engagements are kept for drawn tea leaves. Besides manifold adulterations, he cheats in weight. His coffee, tea, and sugar, are kept made up in small parcels, which are always systematically light.—But of all petty thieves in England, the landladies are the most persistent and annoying. They all steal. Their lodgers' provisions and supplies of every kind pay systematic toll. They every day steal a little sugar, a little tea or coffee, a slice or two of bread, and, in winter, a few lumps of coal. The minuteness of the theft shows the destitution which prompts it. There are two comforts an Englishman never finds,—a chimney that do n't smoke, and a landlady that do n't steal.

An English lady was lauding the piety of her countrymen in conversation with the author. "Pious!" he cried in astonishment, "do n't the tradesmen all cheat, and the landladies all pilfer! are they not members of your churches?" "Oh yes," she replied, with an ingenuous blush, "but that is the custom of the country, Sir!"

But neither privation, nor every expedient to which Poverty can resort, can always shelter the English mechanic from the fate he dreads. Every branch of industry is overcrowded. Thousands of mechanics, and clerks, and laborers, are continually out of employment. A fit of sickness throws the working man out of employment, and he finds upon his recovery, that his place has been supplied. The other shops and factories are all full. In the hope of obtaining work he remains in the city, subsisting on the sums obtained from pawnbrokers upon his furniture and clothing. These at last are exhausted, and the unfortunate is driven to the alternative of starvation, suicide, or going "on tramp." Many, weary and disheartened with the sore struggle of life, choose suicide as the shortest way "to make an end on 't." Others, utterly hopeless, shut themselves and their families up in their lodgings, to perish of hunger. Where life is so beset with hardships it gradually loses its

value, and to many of the better class of laboring Englishmen death has fewer horrors than the life of the wretched thousands who exist immediately below them in the social scale.

The greater number, however, hang on to life with tenacity. They set out on tramp in search of work. England is full of these "tramps." They beg a lunch at farm-houses, and, by applying to the proper authorities, they are entitled to a loaf of bread at night and shelter in the poor-house. But these houses are frequently full to overflowing, and then the "tramp" must lie in the street exposed to the inclemency of the elements. If unsuccessful in obtaining employment, a few weeks of such experience eradicate the last remnant of self-respect. He continues mechanically to apply for work, but he soon loses the energy necessary to persistent industry, and his appearance becomes so shabby as to deter any one from offering him employment. He sinks, step by step, until he becomes a "tramp" by profession, wandering from place to place, begging of farm-houses, subsisting on public charity, sleeping under hedges or in the streets when lodging in a station-house cannot be had. He at last becomes merged in the myriads who people the cities, living as they best can, begging, working, stealing, until at last death closes the scene.

If such is the hard experience of the Aristocracy of labor, what is the condition of those below them, whose wages are inadequate to the means of subsistence?

What is the condition of the farm laborer toiling for eight shillings a week? of the city operatives, engaged in the various avocations of traffic and productive industry, whose wages average only ten shillings a week? Language cannot depict the destitution that exists among the masses of the laboring class in England. Their wages are wretchedly inadequate to their wants. If the mechanic earning thirty shillings per week is under the necessity of exercising pinching economy, how deep the destitution of those who only earn one-third that sum!

And worse still what is the condition of the widows and orphans whose husbands and fathers have fallen in the bitter struggle with life!

There are thousands of sewing girls whose wages average only four shillings a week. How they manage to subsist, is a problem we have never been able to solve. That the solution involves frightful suffering is beyond question. They are fortunate, however, for they endure their privations alone. But when the sempstress is a mother, and the wages insufficient for one must be divided to support famishing children—then ensues a scene of suffering at which humanity shudders. Some of these widows, inspired with maternal affection, resolve to keep their children around them at every sacrifice, and bravely set about the only work open to them,—sewing for shops. The family gradually sinks lower in destitution. Little articles, the purchases of happier years, gradually disappear to the pawnbrokers, whence they are never redeemed. Affection continues bravely to struggle against destiny, but in vain. Those are fortunate whom heart-weariness, and anxiety, and destitution, quickly relieve of the burden of life; though death is embittered with a pang not its own, in the consciousness that the tender ones loved so dearly are left to blight and wither amid the neglect and unkindness of this cold world. Others live on—live to see their children pining round them with cold and hunger—to behold them becoming slowly brutalized by the circumstances of their lot—to perceive the soft beautiful lines of youth changing into the pinched look of want, the gentle eye glassing into the wild stare of famine, the little forms once so lovely begrimed with dirt that poverty has no time to wash away, and clad in rags which industry vainly strives to renew. The heart grows sick at last. Its tender affections, once a source of joy, now only thrill it with anguish. The sight of those beloved ones so changed racks the soul with agony akin to that with which we look upon our dead; and at last Hope dies in the heart, and Despair sits sullenly brooding over its grave. We bury our dead out of our sight; and the despairing, widowed mother slowly reconciles herself to the thought which, day by day, grows more vivid, that she must put these children away from her. Destiny—dark Destiny, against which we all struggle so fiercely, but which conquers us at last—triumphs; and she yields her children to the parish authorities, to be bound to years of harsh slavery—to become the drudges of Poverty, the starved minions of Want.

Henceforth the quiet of her little room becomes unendurable to the bereaved spirit. The floors still echo the patterings of little feet, the walls are vocal with infantile voices. Solitude is peopled with thoughts of her lost children. Memory haunts her desolation, and she must fly to active life from the specters of the past. But whither? What resource, if the needle, the stay of the destitute, be abandoned? None for respectability; but what is respectability now, when the heart is crushed, the life desolate! Misery has no deeper gulf. For what shall she struggle—what strive to save, who has lost her all! Self-respect has gone down with hope. The world and its opinion are nothing to her, now: it stood by unpitying, and witnessed her hard struggle; it beheld with cold indifference the sacrifice of her children; and now she can scorn its idle blame, and trample its opinions with the defiant hate of a spirit stung by sorrow almost to madness. Henceforth busy life is her place; the bustle of the street may drown the voices of the Past. Hard toil is her choice—for toil is not so bitter as regret. We see these thrice-childless widows abroad on the streets, engaged in every department of labor, with faces from which the light has faded out, replaced by a hopeless aspect of sullen stoicism and defiant endurance. They are milk-women traversing the streets with a wooden beam across their shoulders, from which their milk-cans are suspended. They are peddlers of fruit or vegetables, squatted in the streets, exposed to cold and heat and storm, and seemingly indifferent to all, while they vociferously cry their wares, and in fierce competition with each other entreat the passing crowd to buy. They are—what are they not! Why trace the thousand ways in which Wretchedness struggles to support a loathed life!

Their condition is not peculiar. There is nothing to distinguish them among the thousands of suffering mortals, all as wretched as they. The myriads of city laborers receiving little better wages than the starving sempstresses have families who shiver and starve as well as theirs. Their lives are as full of misery and debasement.

Why draw a picture of isolated suffering! why single out one object from the millions equally poor, equally wretched!

How these multitudes live none can say. Their wages seem inadequate to subsistence. But poverty has its hard expedients un-

known to the happy. They do live—until want and squalor generate disease, and then they are held to die in the course of nature. Coroners sit every week upon cases of death from sheer starvation. But generally spent Nature continues its efforts to the last, until exposure becomes the auxiliary of hunger, and a slight cold, which vigorous life would not feel, exhausts the vitality, and the creature dies—by the visitation of God! A gray head is rarely seen among these hunger-pinched children of Want. They die before their time. Nature fails outwearied, before toil and hardship can blanch the hair!

These are the Middle Class of English labor. What, then, the state of the "dregs of society,"—the millions lower still in the social scale, without steady employment, who do not know from day to day where subsistence may be obtained! It is needless to attempt to note the expedients by which they support a precarious existence; and equally vain the attempt to depict their harrowing wretchedness.

Some work when they can find employment, and famish when without. Then, there are street vendors who depend for subsistence upon selling fruits and vegetables to passers by. Of this class there are thirty thousand in London, alone. It is said that three days of consecutive rain would reduce the poor creatures to starvation. Then there are gatherers of rags and old clothes, groaning forth their melancholy cry as they tread their daily round. There are the night-wandering laborers,—chiffoniers—scavengers—gatherers of ordure, old iron, bones, and various miscellaneous articles from the streets, which may be disposed of for a penny. There are degraded chimney sweeps; and sweepers of crossings, the only privileged beggars in the land.

But there are, besides, beggars many, unprivileged save by the general commission of Want, numerous as wretched, and persistent beyond belief where the police is not near. Mothers teach their children to beg, under the penalty of whipping and starvation if unsuccessful. Upon cold winter nights, little boys will lie for hours upon the sidewalk, well repaid by a penny from some charitable passer-by. Little girls whose applications are unsuccessful, as ten

o'clock approaches and passers are few, set up a piteous wail too heartfelt to be simulated: "Mother has shut them out in the cold, and they dare not go home without a penny." A laborer lies down upon the sidewalk in mute appeal, holding his spade in his hand, on which is written, "Hunger compels me." Men, women, children, stand in the streets singing sad songs, to invoke the charity of the benevolent. In bitter cold nights these entreating songs are constantly ringing on the ear; the suppliants standing ragged and barefoot, destitute of everything, food, clothing, and shelter.

Degraded poverty is present in all its avocations.

Misery presents itself in all its multiform aspects. The streets are crowded with hopeless dejected faces, which no one regards. Famine withered wretches are constantly to be seen, gazing with longing eyes upon the meat-stalls and baker shops.—But why exhibit the imbecility of language, by attempting to convey an idea of the inexpressible, inconceivable suffering that everywhere exists. Poverty, Want, Misery, Desolation, are everywhere. Haggard, hopeless, hunger-pinched faces, sullen, despairing eyes, are everywhere. All are wretched—the employed ravenous with hunger, the unemployed desperate with privation.

If the sufferers were few, Charity would fly to their relief. But they are too numerous: the mass of the British population are pining in indigence; and Benevolence turns from the spectacle in despair. Penury in every stage of want and suffering meets the eye, until it grows habituated to scenes of wretchedness, and habit renders the mind indifferent to misery it cannot relieve. The wealthy English are, many of them, by nature benevolent. Indeed, they claim to be, *par excellence*, the philanthropists of the age. The wretched, everywhere, elicit their sympathy. But the wretchedness at home is too general, and too hopeless of relief, and they try to shut their eyes to its existence. The only emotion misery seems to cause is annoyance at its obtruding upon their attention, and claiming a sympathy which, if extended, would mar their own enjoyment without benefiting its objects. In England, he who allows the sight of heart-rending misery to excite his emotions, must die. Callous indifference is the only refuge.

An aristocratic London paper gave utterance to the prevailing feeling, in an article of eloquent and pathetic remonstrance. It is wrong, it said, in Poverty to thrust its misery upon the gaze of Respectability! Upon sunny days, homeless Beggary left its dens, to bask in the cheering light of day. Sickly Want sometimes crawled from its festering alleys into the open parks, to court the fresh breeze which fans the fevered beggar as well as the prince. And the aristocratic journal complained! The Wretched, it said, owe it to decency to hide themselves from the public gaze! It cited with admiration the patriotic pride of their progenitors, who, when Alexander, Czar of Russia, visited England, from regard to the credit of their country, kept themselves so entirely aloof from the distinguished visitor that he asked in wonder, "Where are your poor?" But, now, the Wretched were everywhere obtruding themselves upon the public eye. Invalid ladies could not go into the parks but such harrowing misery met their sight as shocked their delicate nerves, and endangered their health. The Wretched had no right thus to mar the happiness of their betters, by compelling them to behold their misery! A proper consideration for the feelings of the rich should prompt them to hide distress so painful to behold! They ought to have benevolence enough to die in their dens, without disturbing the enjoyment of the happy!

The same desire to shut out the sight of wretchedness causes the gentry to wall in their grounds, and have a lodge-keeper at the outer gate, to prevent the admittance of every object that could appeal to their compassion. Lazarus could once get to the door of Dives, but now a high wall shuts him out from compassion and relief!

The British government, so far from endeavoring to alleviate the sufferings of the Working class, with an eye to the increase of the revenue, stimulates their vices, and becomes a party to their oppression. It collects a large part of the public revenue from taxes laid indirectly upon the poor. It encourages drunkenness systematically, on account of the revenue derived from the licenses of publicans; and gives orders to the police not to interfere with the disorderly crowds who infest the street corners in various stages of intoxication, lest they should be prevented from drinking, to the loss of the national excise.

The government has also licensed pawnbrokers' shops, ostensibly for the purpose of devising a system of credit for the poor, but really for the sake of the revenue derived from their licenses. The pawnbroker is a harpy, licensed to victimize the poor, and the government shares his iniquitous gains. He is authorized to exact usurious interest, and he usually advances about one-sixth of the value of the article left in pledge. The door of his shop is to many the entrance of the avenue to ruin. A visit to the pawnbroker's is the indication of extreme necessity. Usually the pressure of necessity continues to increase, and in the end the articles left are forfeited through inability to redeem them.

The multitude of these shops in every city is evidence of the universal pressure of poverty. In quarters inhabited by the poor, the three golden balls, the pawnbroker's sign, are never out of sight. These dens of avarice and oppression are always crowded with applicants who are waging an unequal struggle with Want. Many families struggling to maintain respectability regularly pledge their Sunday wardrobe on Monday morning, to be redeemed from the week's wages, on Saturday night. If sickness has been the cause of the necessity, some months of economy may finally redeem the pledge; but, usually, the pressure of want continues to increase, until the struggle to maintain decent appearances is perforce relinquished, and the family, abandoning its pledges to the pawnbroker, sinks to the humbler level better comporting with its means. As increasing families multiply expenses, many such struggles are witnessed, ending in defeat at last. Many resort to the pawnbroker to prolong the struggle for respectability; many, the struggle for existence. When the week's earnings leave a deficit, article after article disappears from its accustomed place. At length nothing is left. The struggle is over at last. The battle of life is lost. The slavery of the poor-house, beggary, starvation, or suicide, are the bitter alternatives left.

But it must not be supposed that no efforts are made to relieve the destitution of the Working class. English philanthropy is constantly engaged upon this object. The attempts at relief would

seem respectable were they not so utterly inadequate to meet the overwhelming destitution.

The poor-law system provides for all who are incapable of self-support. Upon application to the authorities, such persons are returned to their native parish and provided for in the poor-house. But the cruelty of the system that prevails in these houses renders any alternative preferable. Families are divided upon their entrance—the husband, the wife, the children, being carried to different departments. Tasks suited to, or surpassing their strength are allotted to each, and strict obedience is enforced by the arbitrary rule of the overseer. The terrors of this degrading system are so impressed upon the minds of the English poor, that they usually prefer even death. They prefer to drag on, starving upon wages that excite wonder how they can maintain life; and not unfrequently, when the struggle has ended in defeat, and they can hold up no longer, they choose suicide or starvation rather than the poor-house.

Public charity affords no partial relief to the destitute poor. It gives a limited amount of relief to the homeless poor in search of employment. A crust of bread and a night's shelter are given upon application to the relieving officer, as long as the station houses will contain the applicants. But the employed laborer can obtain no relief. He who earns sufficient for subsistence lacking one or two shillings a week must slowly perish of privation. None can obtain public charity but the utterly destitute, without work, or home, or bread.

Private charity, also, has extended its aid for the relief of destitution. Soup houses have in some places been established, where a very limited supply of cheap soup is occasionally distributed to hungry applicants. In some manufacturing cities, an establishment has been opened, where cheap meals are served up to hungry "tramps" in search of employment, at the cost of the provisions. In London, one enterprising individual, by combining a butcher-stall and bakery with his restaurant, has afforded to the laboring poor substantial meals at an unprecedented rate of cheapness; and the event was reckoned of sufficient importance to be noticed by Lord Brougham in the House of Lords, and to inspire a leader in

the London *Times*. Charity has established hospitals where the sick poor may attend, and obtain medical advice and necessary medicines at a penny a visit.—But all these efforts to mitigate the sufferings of the poor are only an acknowledgment of the destitution they fail to relieve.

The necessary result of the wretchedness of the masses of the English population is social, and moral degradation.

The social degradation of the mass of English working people is, to an American, if possible, even more painful than their privations. The mechanic, protected by his craft association, feels something of a sturdy independence. He can maintain himself against the oppression of capital. But all others of the Working class are completely at the mercy of their employers. None can obtain employment unless they come recommended from their last situation. The character of a servant is at the caprice of the employer, who by turning them away "without a character," can consign them to starvation, or the privations of vagabond life. Under such circumstances, the evils of oppression are superadded to the hardships of want. Ill humor, and caprice, and injustice, must be endured without complaint. Poverty is the tyrant that binds them beneath a yoke of servitude harder than that of the African slave. It is not merely a personal chastisement whose smart is soon forgotten, the employer can inflict. The future life, its hopes, its direst dread, are in his hands. It is the power of life and death, of misery, of despair, Capital holds over Poverty.

We are no admirer of feudal subordination. But the condition of the English laborer has sadly retrograded since the day when the feudal retainer held his little glebe of land, of which Power could not dispossess him—when he followed the banner of his lord in war, and fed in his hall in peace—when he could find shelter beneath the strong arm of his superior, and repay sympathy and kindness, by affection and loyal devotion to the person of his chief. In being released from feudal dependence, he has become the bondsman of Poverty. Want drives him to a harder labor than his ancestors ever knew, which repays him with destitution and famine. An

attempt to throw off the taskmaster's yoke achieves liberty—to starve.

In England, the evidences of class subordination are every where present. Working people are treated as beings of a different race. Young bloods sport a "tiger," whose duty it is to receive an occasional flogging with cheerfulness, and, at the risk of his limbs, to leap from the carriage in full tilt and seize the horse by the reins before it stops. Cabs are so constructed as to enable the driver to sit behind, that he may not interpose his person between his master and the wind. Working people are used in services for which beasts of burden are elsewhere employed. A lady wishing to take an airing in the park mounts her diminutive carriage, and converts a footman into a pony for the occasion. Men and women with yokes on their necks stagger along the streets beneath the burden of twenty gallons of milk. Porters are extensively substituted for drays, on the score of economy; it being cheaper to starve a man, than to feed a horse.

We are not surprised that subordination is a natural element of character among the laboring class in England. Their souls are in subjection to the ranks above them. A working man never addresses his superior except with the utmost deference and humility. "Master," is the universal term by which an employer is addressed or mentioned. If a man or woman asks or replies to a question on the street, "Master" is the universal style of address used to a superior.

Where the will of one class is absolutely subjected to another, it is slavery, whether the fetters which bind the bondsman are constructed by legal enactment, or are welded by Necessity. The bondage in which Necessity binds man is more grievous than slavery established by law; for it does not apply its coercion to the body, but rivets its fetters on the soul.

The moral condition of the English poor is even worse than their social state.

Cheating and petty pilfering, as we have seen, are universal.

Drunkenness, under the patronage of government, and amid the frightful prevalence of misery, is almost universal among the lower

orders of both sexes. Its only limit is the poverty which restrains the purchase of liquors. The unhappy creatures declare that the use of intoxicating liquors is essential to their existence. Perhaps a temporary forgetfulness of their misery is necessary to enable them to bear up beneath the weary burden of life. A part of the week's scanty wages is always spent, on Sabbath, in carousal, when crowds of intoxicated creatures block the streets about the ale-houses. The police have orders not to interfere, unless there is a breach of the peace, or riotous disorder. The pugnacity incident to intoxication, thus restrained in public, finds vent in family brawls where, in the privacy of home, husband and wife work off their excitement in mutual conflict.

Crime is rapidly on the increase. The weekly press teems to disgust with accounts of murders, suicides, and incidents of vice too shocking to pollute these pages. Order is only maintained by the strong repression of the police, who, in immense numbers, constantly patrol both town and country. Seven thousand policemen are constantly on guard in the streets of London, alone. With their uniform they resemble a military force, constantly on the watch to repress the lawlessness and crime of the millions debased by want.

The irreligion that prevails among the lower orders indicates even greater moral depravation than the vice and crime which break out despite the repression of power.

The great mass of English population are practically heathen. The sense of injustice prevents many of them from desiring to receive any instruction from a class whom they regard as their oppressors. They are taught that their sufferings are the will of God —that they must submit to them as the dispensation of divine Providence; and they reject teachings which make God the author of evil, and tax upon Providence the wrongs society inflicts upon man. Many fly to Atheism, and deny that there is a God; "for would not a just God," say they, "avenge the oppression of the great, and the intolerable sufferings of the needy?" Many reject Christianity, because it is the religion of their oppressors, and because it is claimed as the foundation of the social system that is grinding them to powder. They fly in bitterness of spirit to infidelity; they em-

brace with eager longing any new system which claims that Christianity is obsolete, and must give place to a new and better era. The reveries of Swedenborgianism, the muttering predictions of Spiritualism, the rhapsodical absurdities of Mormonism,—all find eager votaries, hopeless of the present, and ready to rush into any novelty that gives promise of a Better Time.

This is the condition of many not too debased for thought. But the great mass are so sunk in ignorance, so degraded by utter destitution, that their moral elevation seems hopeless. The farm laborers who rear their families upon less than two dollars a week, never approach a church. They cannot afford decent apparel; besides, the "Parson" is usually the justice of the peace who visits the penalties of the law upon their delinquencies, and they have little taste for "his Worship's" religious ministrations. Ignorance, apathy, and the brooding consciousness of misery half mingled with a sense of injustice, combine to keep them aloof from religious instruction. They want bread; to offer the Gospel, instead, seems to them a solemn mockery.

A committee of a benevolent organization recently examined some farm laborers in a rural district of England, and to their horror found them utter heathen. One had never heard of a God! Another, in response to a question, answered that he did not know that he had a soul! nor had he ever heard of a future state! A third had never heard the name of Jesus Christ! A fourth said he believed he had heard something of the devil, and thought he was a very good sort of person! None among the number had ever received the least religious instruction. They were brutal savages in the midst of an enlightened country—their dull faculties conscious of nothing but the pangs of want—knowing civilization only in its power—realizing nothing of wealth but its oppression.

The moral condition of the great mass of city life is even more debased, as their sufferings and temptations are greater. The farm laborer has, at least, the certainty of the pittance on which his family famishes, and he is shielded by the circumstances that environ him, from temptation to flagrant vice. But the millions of city life undergo greater suffering, and are exposed to greater temptations. Their faculties are stimulated into activity by constant con-

tact with busy life, and they have a more acute consciousness of the miseries of their condition, from its contrast with the abundance and the luxury constantly before their gaze. Millions pining with hunger pass every day by stalls loaded with luxuries they can never taste. Beggary jostles Wealth upon the crowded streets. Houseless Want crouches shivering at night upon the steps of palaces where Luxury holds its carnival.

The country peasantry are contented, and comparatively virtuous; for they are not tempted by the sight of food better than their homely fare, and their lowly sphere is protected by its very debasement from the seductions of gilded vice. The denizens of the cities are victims of fierce longings—fiercer for their hopelessness; and they rush eagerly into vice as the only vent to tumultuous passions—the only transition from the dull routine of endurance and suffering. The better class of mechanics and clerks are generally attendants at church—it is part of the respectability they affect; but the millions below them are a reeking mass of destitution, heathenism, and vice.

No attempts are made to remedy the moral destitution of the country laborers; their case is yielded as hopeless. Some pious lady may distribute a few tracts to persons who cannot read—and here effort ends.

The efforts made in cities are only a tribute to the necessity of effort. Salaried lecturers, now and then, address a few of the poor people assembled in their humble Lyceums, upon scientific and social topics—amuse them with the wonders of a camera obscura—astonish and puzzle them with illustrations of astronomical, or geographical facts—or inflict dissertations upon the evils of vices they have not the means to indulge. Tracts are indiscriminately distributed; and street preachers, emulous of the example of Whitefield, without his zeal and earnestness, drone away on Sunday evenings to throngs of strollers, upon the blessings of virtue.

These street exhibitions are well meant, and would be entitled to respect, if their inefficiency were not contemptibly ridiculous. These evangelists always run in couples,—usually a young licentiate, or an ambitious, self-important exhorter, accompanied by a pious deacon.

Having selected some spot on the street where there is less noise than usual, or where a vacant building spot affords room for the possible congregation to gather, they take off their hats, and sing a hymn;—the inattentive stream of humanity, meanwhile, drifting by in contemptuous indifference. The leader next prays;—his voice almost drowned amid the rattle of wheels, and the echoing footsteps of the drifting throng. At the close of the prayer, perhaps a dozen loiterers, who think a street preacher as entertaining a sight as can occupy a few minutes, have paused in their evening stroll. The preacher begins his discourse in a discursive way: in a few minutes his first auditors are tired, and pass on—but other curious gazers are loitering in their stead: the preacher protracts his exhortations some ten or fifteen minutes, during which time his transient auditory of loiterers has changed about once a minute, continually growing smaller, until, at length, everybody is satisfied and the last lingerer passes; when, after a few minutes of vain effort to induce somebody else to pause, the preacher incontinently brings his sermon to an end.—Sometimes a crazy genius who has taken to street preaching as the only means of obtaining an auditory for his eloquence, has sufficient tact to amuse and interest a crowd. In less than three minutes the street is blocked up, and a policeman interferes, and orders the entertaining speaker and his audience to "move on." Any one is allowed to preach in the streets, provided he cannot get anybody to listen; but a man who can command attention, and might do good, is instantly stopped, lest he block up the thoroughfare!

But pious efforts are not restricted to street preaching and tract distribution. English preachers are fond of topical discourses. They are not content to depict sin as sin; they are ambitious of the rhetorical effect of depicting specific vices. A preacher will issue special invitation to shopkeepers to come out and hear him, when he will regale them with an essay upon the sin of cheating. Another will awaken the consciences of landladies and professional thieves, by dilating upon the crime and punishment of stealing. An unfailing means of commanding a congregation is to promise them a supper. The loaves and fishes are as attractive as ever. Hungry vice will always come to be fed. A few years ago, a distinguished preacher prepared an eloquent sermon upon the sin against the

seventh commandment. The discourse was ready, but where was the congregation! It would not answer to preach such a sermon to an audience of respectable people. Nothing daunted, the preacher issued a call for all the cyprians of London, promising the poor creatures a supper at the end of the entertainment. The bait took. Hunger is stronger than shame; and it drew thousands of famine-pinched wretches from the dens of vice, to hear the preacher's eloquence—and eat his bread. Perhaps such a congregation never was gathered before, since the world began. The house was filled with halt, withered, lame, blind victims of vice. How much good the invective of the preacher accomplished is unknown; it did not impair the appetite of the audience for supper!

What remedy for this hopeless demoralization? The moral depravity originates in the social condition of the people,—their frightful suffering, their abject want. The cause must be removed before the effect will cease. That cause can only be removed by the overthrow of the industrial system in which it has origin.

It is mere trifling with misery, to look to the palliatives which charity promotes. The wretchedness that prevails in England is beyond the reach of benevolence to relieve. It is beyond the reach even of public, organized charity. It is the fruit of a vicious system of industry—a system, which, concentrating the commerce of the world in the hands of Great Britain, has increased the population beyond the capacity of comfortable subsistence—which necessitates low wages, while it exaggerates the price of all articles of necessary consumption. This system victimizes every class, except the titled nobility and the capitalists. While it prevails, there is no hope of ameliorating the condition of the English poor. Looking to the perpetuity of the existing state of things, Dickens regards colonization as the only hope of the laboring classes. And Dickens is right. They must escape from the country where commerce rules with a sway more oppressive than an oriental despotism, and grinds the many into hopeless wretchedness, for the benefit of the few. They are happy who can escape. But the many cannot. The masses are fettered by poverty in their island prison. Their only hope rests in the overthrow of the system of which they are the victims.

PART III.

OUR UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURSE HAS INJURED THE WORLD POLITICALLY; STRENGTHENING ABSOLUTISM, RESCUING IT FROM RUIN, AND GIVING BIRTH TO A POLITICAL REACTION EMINENTLY DANGEROUS TO THE CAUSE OF LIBERTY AND ADVANCEMENT.

We have seen how the exaltation of Great Britain, furthered by our policy, has injured the world, both in an industrial, and a social point of view. But these evils shrink into insignificance, in comparison with the political evils the power of the British government is about to bring upon mankind.

Europe is divided into two great antagonistic parties,—the party of Absolutism; and the party of Liberal Government, and human progress. These parties have been arrayed against each other for three-quarters of a century, in ceaseless antagonism. During the last twenty years, the party of Progress has been in the ascendant. But a great reaction has just set in, mainly through the policy of the British government. A desperate struggle is now impending in the Old World, in which the power of England will, if possible, give to Absolutism a decisive victory, and enable it to dominate Europe, and threaten liberty with extinction, throughout the world.

This is a grave charge, but facts abundantly sustain it. These facts we now set forth.

Let us, first, consider the political condition of England, which commits the British Government, in the coming crisis, to the cause of Absolutism.

CHAPTER I.

THE POLITICAL CONDITION OF ENGLAND.

The statement that the British government is in sympathy with Absolutism, will excite, in the minds of many unthinking Britons, a tempest of indignation. Englishmen are proud of asserting that England is a free country—that the government is conducted in accordance with popular sentiment, and is in sympathy with liberal movements, everywhere. They cite the popular enthusiasm in favor of Hungary, Italy, and Poland, as evidence of the liberal tendencies of Great Britain.

The sympathy of the English *people* with the liberal movements of the age is undeniable; and if the *government* faithfully reflected the *popular will*, its liberal policy would be above question. But a clear line of distinction must be drawn between the sympathies of the English *people*, and the policy of the British *government*.

England is a free country, in the sense that the royal authority is restricted within very narrow limits; and that the country is governed by the House of Commons. But the House of Commons does not now reflect the will of the English people, nor has it done so for several centuries.

The manner in which the House of Commons originated has been already* mentioned. The Nobility of the realm were accustomed to meet in the assembly since known as the House of Lords. The knights of the shires and the burghers of the towns were summoned to send representatives to a different assembly. The House of Commons, thus established, continued, for several centuries, to represent fairly the borough towns and the landholders of the shires. Prior to the Revolution of 1640, the body was not possessed of sufficient political importance to induce tampering with the freedom of election. That revolution made it the ruling power in England. The Nobility perceived that they could rule the country, only by obtain-

* See Ante, page 55–57.

ing control of the House of Commons, and they bent all their power to the accomplishment of that object. They succeeded in achieving their aim. The House of Commons ceased to reflect the will of the people, and became the mere tool of the Nobility.

This revolution (for it deserves the term), was effected in the following manner:—

In its original constitution, the members of the House of Commons consisted of representatives of the Borough towns, and knights representing the counties. The members of the body were thus divided into two classes,—the representatives of the boroughs, and representatives of the counties.—When the Nobility undertook to control the body, they, as the chief landowners in the counties, were able to control the votes of the farmers who rented their lands, and thus obtain the election of county members devoted to their interest.—The control of the boroughs was not more difficult. When the House of Commons was instituted, the most important borough towns of the period were selected to send members to the body. But, in the course of ages, many of these towns gradually sunk into insignificance. Still, however, they continued to send members to Parliament, while other towns, which afterward rose to importance, were left without representation. When it became important to control the House of Commons, wealthy nobles bought up these dilapidated borough towns—many of them sunk into villages of a few houses—and thus obtained the power to nominate their members to Parliament.

For a century after the Revolution of 1688, the English nobility ruled the country with absolute sway, through the agency of the House of Commons. Their influence as landowners in the county elections, and their possession of the "rotten boroughs," enabled them to make that body the subservient instrument of the Aristocracy. An ambitious man who aspired to a seat in Parliament, never thought of appealing to the popular voice, but obsequiously solicited of some noble lord an appointment from some of his boroughs. This political patron was his sole constituency.

It was in obedience to the will of the haughty aristocracy, that the British Parliament adopted the tyrannical measures of taxation which led to the American Revolution.—When the French Revolution broke out, the masses of the English people sympathized with

the movement. But the Aristocracy controlled the Parliament, and took the lead in the coalition of crowned heads against it, under the apprehension that the spread of its principles would lead to the overthrow of their power. The British government engaged in the war against the French Republic, in open defiance of the public opinion of the country, as expressed in overwhelming petitions to Parliament.

I. The Reform Bill of 1832.

During the war with France, an absolute monopoly of commerce, and the inflation of prices consequent upon the enormous outlays of the government and a depreciated paper currency, gave to Great Britain a factitious prosperity, which enabled the Aristocracy to carry out their policy to a successful termination. But upon the restoration of peace, the monopoly of commerce ceased, and inflated prices were reduced by the resumption of specie payments. The weight of taxation, easily borne during the war, now pressed with overpowering weight upon the energies of the nation. Dreadful suffering ensued.

In periods of industrial crisis, popular clamor is ready to attribute all evils to the public administration; and the abuses of the English parliamentary system were too glaring to be denied. The old borough towns still continued to send their members to Parliament. Some of them had dwindled down to a single house, whose resident was the sole voter. One town is mentioned, situated on the coast, which had been entirely washed away by the encroachment of the ocean; but at elections, the hereditary voters entered a boat and rowed out in the sea to the site of the old borough, where, with due formalities, the polls were opened, and a member elected to Parliament.—Public attention was forcibly drawn to these abuses by the odious administrative policy of the Aristocracy. They regarded the government as a close corporation, to be administered for the express furtherance of their class interests. Their property consisted chiefly in lands, and, regardless of the general welfare, they employed the legislature as an instrument to benefit the landed interest, by enactments designed to enhance the price of provisions. They imposed tariffs on the importation of produce, to benefit the landed aristocracy; as the American Congress has imposed tariffs on im-

ported goods, for the benefit of the New England manufacturing aristocracy. They, moreover, so adjusted the system of taxation, as to press with excessive weight upon the industrious classes, leaving the Aristocracy comparatively exempt from the public burdens. Thus, while the general stagnation bore with crushing weight upon the English non-property classes, the legislation of the country oppressed them with peculiar burdens. They were ground with taxation; and bread was so enhanced in price by prohibitory duties on wheat, known as the Corn Laws, as to be wholly beyond the means of the laboring classes, and even of many families of respectability.

The only remedy for this state of things was to wrest the government of the country from the landed Aristocracy, by reforming the abuses of parliamentary representation.

The Whig party, which had been in a hopeless minority in Parliament, for forty years, seized upon the Reform movement as a means of raising the party to power. A fearful struggle ensued between the Tories, the party of the landed Aristocracy, who sought to maintain their ascendancy by retaining all the abuses of the government, and the Whigs, who comprised all the elements of the Opposition. The Tories had the power, and were resolved to keep it; the Whigs were equally resolute in their determination to wrest it from them. The Tories, ignoring the fact that the British Constitution is nothing but a system of precedents, declaimed upon the sacredness of constitutional rights, and the danger of revolutionary tendencies; the Whigs drew appalling pictures of the public distress, and denounced the system of government, by which the Aristocracy swayed the Parliament as their vested property. These denunciations, however, were impotent to influence the government; and the Tories, secure in their strong and fixed parliamentary majority, paid little regard to the philippics of their adversaries.

The Whigs now changed their tactics. They summoned the masses to their aid. Indignation meetings were held. Popular excitement was fanned into a flame. Mammoth petitions were poured in upon Parliament. The nation resounded with the cry of "Reform." The multitude, filled with indignation at Tory oppression and maddened by want, rose in mobs under the lead of the

Whigs, and threatened to wrest from the government, by violence, the reforms demanded by the nation. Events seemed rapidly tending to a revolutionary outbreak.

The great body of the Tories held out in defiance of these movements. They were resolved to maintain their power, and repress popular outbreaks, if necessary, by force of arms. But many moderate Conservatives became alarmed. They thought it better to make moderate concessions, by Parliamentary action, than to have the entire social fabric of the country endangered by a revolution. This class of voters left the obstinate Tories, and went over to the Whig policy on the question of Reform. By the support of these allies, the Whigs found themselves in a majority of the House of Commons. They set about framing a Reform Bill.

But here their difficulties began. The Reform party was divided into three factions. A few desired such a radical reform as would render the Parliament the representative of the nation. But these were more than counterbalanced by the other extreme wing of the party, composed of such Tories as were afraid to bring the issue of Reform to the arbitrament of arms; who preferred to make some moderate concessions rather than provoke a revolution, but were resolved to concede as little as possible. The great majority of the Reform party in Parliament, however, were Whig representatives of the Middle class. These agreed with the Tories, that no concessions should be made that would give power to the masses. But they demanded such modifications of the system of representation, as would wrest the Parliament from the control of the landed Aristocracy, and consign it to the sway of the Middle class aristocracy,—the manufacturers, shippers, merchants, and capitalists, of the cities.

In endeavoring to carry out this programme, the Middle class stood between the Tories on the one hand, and the people on the other, and in antagonism to both. They wished to strike down the Tories by disfranchising the "Rotten Boroughs," and substituting in their stead the modern towns and cities, in which the trading aristocracy held the preponderance of influence. At the same time, they wished to guard against the lower orders obtaining political control of these cities, by restricting the right of suffrage to the owners of houses, and those who paid an annual rental of ten

pounds. In a word, it was the policy of the Whigs to give the cities control of the Parliament, and the Trading Aristocracy control of the cities.

They scouted the schemes of the radical Reformers, who would have given the Parliament into the control of the masses, and endeavored to form a coalition with the Moderate Tory wing of the Reform party.

The Tory allies of the Whigs—so this faction may be designated by way of distinction—were willing to co-operate with them in keeping the political control of the cities out of the hands of the Working class, by establishing a high basis of suffrage; but they would not consent to the extinction of the Tory party, by so adjusting the basis of representation as to give the cities absolute control of the Parliament.

The circumstances of the time urged upon the Whigs and their Tory coadjutors a prompt adjustment of their differences. The insurrectionary spirit was abroad; there was danger, if the agitation were prolonged, of the people rising and setting both the rival parties aside, and taking the control of the government into their own hands. Under the impulse of a common necessity, the Whigs and their Tory coadjutors entered into a compromise. It was agreed to so frame the Reform Bill as to keep the Working class out of power in the cities; and to establish, as nearly as possible, an equilibrium of power between the Landed interest, on the one hand, and the cities, on the other,—or, in other words, between the Noble Aristocracy, and the Mercantile Aristocracy,—the Tories, and the Whigs.

The Reform Bill of 1832 was the result of this compromise between the Whigs and the Moderate Tories. It was the least the Whigs would accept, and the most the Tories would grant. The Bill excluded the Working class from power, by establishing a high franchise qualification; fixing it, in the election of county members, at an annual rental of fifty pounds; and limiting it in boroughs, to owners of real estate, and householders paying an annual rent of ten pounds.—In adjusting the basis of representation, it disfranchised fifty-six of the "rotten boroughs," and reduced by half the

representation of thirty-two others. A reduction was thus made of one hundred and forty-four members, which were redistributed as follows: Forty-four new boroughs were enfranchised, among which sixty-four members were distributed,—two members each being allotted to twenty-two large towns, and one member each to twenty smaller towns. The remaining members were distributed among the counties, whose representation was thus enlarged.

The Reform Bill was an exceedingly moderate measure. It left the right of representation to many old Borough towns which did not deserve it; and it failed to give the large towns representation at all commensurate with their population. Instead of this, the representation of the disfranchised boroughs was divided between the towns and the counties. To have given them all to the enfranchised towns, would have given the Whigs a decided preponderance. Hence, more than half the members of which the "rotten boroughs" were deprived, were allotted to the Tories in the increased representation of the counties. It was the manifest design of the bill to adjust the balance between the rival parties. So obvious was this intention, that apprehension was expressed at the time that, in the new adjustment of representation, neither party would have a sufficient majority in the House of Commons to carry on the government,—an apprehension verified by subsequent events.

Imperfect as were the reforms provided for in the Bill, the Tory party resisted its passage with desperate energy. When the Bill had passed the House of Commons, the House of Lords rejected it by an immense majority. The Whigs appealed to their allies, the populace; riots all over the country indicated to the Peers what would be the result of persistence in their opposition to the measure. Nottingham and Bristol were burned. A mob of fifty thousand armed men were ready to march upon London, if the Peers did not recede from their opposition. The king, in alarm, formed a resolution to exercise his prerogative, if necessary, and create new peers enough to insure a majority for the measure in the House of Lords. Thus menaced by the People on the one hand, and the Crown on the other, the Aristocracy submitted, and the Reform Bill became a law.

II. Whig and Tory Contests.

Ever since the passage of the Reform Bill, England has been agitated by the contests of the Whigs and Tories—or, the Nobility, and Middle Class Aristocracy—for the supremacy. Before we can comprehend the pertinacity which characterizes the party conflicts of English politics, we must understand the issues involved.

The Whigs and Tories are in no sense national parties, but are factions devoted to the furtherance of their respective class interests. Considerations of national policy are made to bend to the political interests of the factions, and the pecuniary interests of the classes they represent.

The Tory party represents the interests of the titled Aristocracy. It is the "Country party," in contradistinction from their opponents, whose chief strength lies in the cities and towns. Its members in Parliament consist chiefly of representatives of the counties, and of the old Boroughs which were not expurgated by the Reform Bill of 1832.

The policy of the Tories, in 1832, must be considered under a two-fold aspect. It was both aggressive, and conservative.

The Tories were, then, an aggressive party.

The Nobility being the landowner class, its interests are identified with agriculture. It has, therefore, always been the policy of the Tory party, to extend to agriculture the protection of the government. They aimed to protect the agricultural interest, directly, by imposing duties upon importations of breadstuffs; and indirectly, by so adjusting the revenue system of the country, as to shield agriculturists, as far as possible, from taxation, imposing upon other industrial interests an undue proportion of the public burdens.

To enable the Nobility to maintain high rents, "corn laws" were passed, which imposed high and almost prohibitory duties upon imported breadstuffs. Thus, legislation maintained agricultural produce at an exorbitant price, while the people were famishing. Famine prices prevailed, for the benefit of the noble proprietors of landed estates.

Still further to benefit the landed interest, the Tories raised the

greater portion of the public revenues by duties and excises, instead of direct taxation. They imposed heavy duties upon all imported articles of general consumption; they even levied duties upon imported raw material for manufactures. In 1834, the national expenditure was, in round numbers, £53,000,000. Of this, £21,000,000 was derived from customs; £17,000,000 from excise; £10,000,000 from the business of the country, in licenses, stamps, postage, etc.; and £5,000,000 from direct taxation, levied, not on wealth, but on population, by taxes upon windows, chimneys, etc. Under this system, the taxation of Great Britain was chiefly levied upon the commerce of the country, and the Working class. The nobility, though at the time the richest class in the nation, was almost entirely exempt from taxation. The property of the country paid nothing. All taxes were levied upon industry and consumption.

This protection of the landed interest was the aggressive policy of the Tory party.

It had also a conservative policy.

The Nobility is an hereditary Aristocracy, whose existence depends upon the maintenance of certain hereditary privileges. Inheritance by primogeniture is the keystone of British Aristocracy: an equal division of estates among the children would be a fatal blow to the Nobility. But the system of primogeniture involves the necessity of making provision for younger children of noble houses out of the public purse, by obtaining for them positions, either in the Established Church, in the army or navy, or in some department of civil service. The Tory party, therefore, in the interest of the Aristocracy, was, as it still is, violently opposed to any diminution of the revenues of the Established Church, and to the adoption of any official system in the military and civil departments of service, that would prevent the scions of the Nobility from finding, in future, their accustomed quarters.

This distinction between the aggressive and conservative policy of the Tories is important, and must be borne in mind. The aggressive policy aimed to control the public administration for class benefit; the conservative policy seeks to prevent innovation, and maintain for the Nobility their prescriptive privileges under the government.

The Whig party represents the Middle class aristocracy. Its strength lies in the cities and borough towns. It is devoted to the interests of the manufacturers, merchants, shippers,—to the commercial interests of the country.

The Whig party is agreed with the Tories, in so far that it is opposed to innovations that would give power to the Working class. It holds with them that the government must be swayed by the property classes. The Middle class aristocracy has immense property-interests at stake; and it is fearful that a government controlled by the people would legislate in a manner injurious to property interests. It feels that the Nobility is a safeguard against democratic tendencies—that were it overturned, the Middle class aristocracy, standing alone, could not for a moment resist the tendency to radical innovation. The Middle class aristocracy—and its organ the Whig party—is, therefore, in favor of making common cause with the Nobility in support of all their vested privileges.

Besides this common interest against the Working class, the Middle class aristocracy is committed to the support of the Nobility by their instinctive deference for rank. Toadyism is ingrained in the English nature. The most respectable ladies will bribe or coax a policeman to suffer them to stand, for hours, in the open court of the palace, that they may have an opportunity to see royalty pass from the door to the carriage. A British merchant, the most insolent of mortals to the common world, is the cringing, obsequious humble servant of a lord. An idolatrous reverence for rank is the most striking characteristic of the Middle class. Thus, a common interest and an unbounded veneration combine to commit the Middle class aristocracy to a firm support of the Nobility. They are resolutely bent upon maintaining the Nobility in the enjoyment of all the immunities and privileges necessary to their vigorous existence as a class.

The Whigs, therefore, cordially assented to the conservative policy of the Tories, and were willing to co-operate with them in maintaining the prescriptive privileges of the Aristocracy. They are as resolute as the Tories themselves in maintaining the Established Church, and in upholding the system of administration which makes the government the wet nurse of the younger scions of the Aristoc-

racy, by providing them berths in the various civil and military departments.

The Whigs are also influenced by their reverence for the Nobility, and by motives of self-interest, to acquiesce, in part, in the aggressive policy of the Tories. The Middle class aristocracy have a common interest with the Nobility in levying the revenues of the country, as far as possible, upon the working mass of the population. The system of raising revenues by excises and customs meets the cordial approval of the Whig party. It bears heavier upon the Aristocracy of Trade than upon the Nobility, it is true; but they prefer it to a system which would raise revenue from wealth, instead of population.

But the Tories carried this system to an excess which proved injurious to the Aristocracy of trade. Their "corn laws," and their direct taxes upon windows, chimneys, etc., so oppressed the working population, as to necessitate one of two alternatives,—an advance of wages; or, a loss of strength to labor, on account of privation,—either of which must inflict serious loss upon employers. Being unwilling to submit to either of these alternatives, for the exclusive benefit of the landed Nobility, the Whigs insisted on the repeal of the corn laws and the direct taxes upon the poor.

It is unnecessary to trace the contest of the rival parties over these issues. The Reform Bill of 1832 had so nearly balanced the strength of the rival parties, as to give neither an efficient parliamentary majority. By accepting scions of the Nobility as their candidates in doubtful Boroughs, the Whigs sometimes were in control of the government; but these allies were always ready to desert them, when they attempted to carry any measure opposed to the interest of the Nobility. The contest between the parties continued till 1846, when the magnanimity of Peel, the Tory minister, accomplished what the Whigs were not able to effect—and the corn laws were abolished. The defection of Peel demoralized the Tories, and the Whigs obtained possession of the government.

The tactics by which the Whigs achieved this victory were the same as those by which they carried the Reform Bill of 1832. They appealed to the masses, who held indignation meetings, flooded Par-

liament with petitions, and rose in mobs; when, rather than risk all the privileges of the Nobility upon the chances of civil war, many moderate Tories decided to abandon the obnoxious measures.

When it came into power in 1846, the Whig party was composed of three wings.

1. First, there was the main body of true Whigs, devoted entirely to the interests of the Middle class aristocracy, and in favor of all the administrative reforms necessary to relieve the commerce of the country from its excessive burdens.

2. There was a strong body of what we may term Tory-Whigs,—persons devoted at heart to the class interests of the Nobility, but satisfied that the true interests of that class lay in assenting to such reasonable administrative reforms, as were necessary to allay public discontent, and prevent danger of outbreak. They deemed it safer to co-operate with the Aristocracy of trade in such partial reforms as they desired, and obtain, in return, their cordial co-operation in maintaining the government against organic changes dangerous to the existence of the Nobility.

It may be asked why the Whigs submitted, and have continued to the present day to submit, to this kind of alliance with moderate Tories? Why have they not elected Whigs, in their stead?

The answer reveals the secret of the weakness of the Whig party, and discloses the key to its intrigues, for years past.

In many of the English Borough towns, the influence of the Nobility and that of the Middle class aristocracy are nearly equal, with perhaps a slight preponderance of the influence of the Nobility. In such Boroughs, on a fair comparison of strength, the Whigs would be beaten. The party can carry them, only by adopting as its candidate some scion of the Nobility, firmly devoted to the interests of his class, but willing to administer the government on liberal principles, and represent the interests of the Commercial aristocracy in so far as they do not come in collision with the interests of his own class. The principles of such a candidate are satisfactory to many moderate Tories, and his family influence carries Tory votes enough to secure his election. These representatives are Whigs, while Whig measures consist with the privileges of the

Nobility; but on the first symptom of danger to the interests of their class, they abandon the Whig party, and range themselves with the Tory party, where their fealty belongs.

3. The third section of the Whig party, in 1846, consisted of "Liberals,"—a party representing the mechanics, and the better portion of the Working Class.

The rise of the "Liberal party" occurred much to the discomfiture of the Whigs. In arranging the provisions of the Reform Bill of 1832, the Whigs accounted the cities of England as their own. They expected that the Middle class aristocracy would control the elections, by compelling the clerks and mechanics who had the right of suffrage to vote for the Whig candidates. But, unfortunately for their calculations, the mechanics soon freed themselves from the dictation of their employers, by means of Trade Unions. They now resolved, instead of voting for Whigs, to elect men to Parliament devoted to the interests of the Working class. In the large manufacturing towns, where mechanics are most numerous, they obtained a decided political ascendancy. Thus, a number of cities were wrested from Whig influence, and committed to a class whose aspirations after political power were more obnoxious to the Whigs than even Tory domination.

In 1846, however, the "Liberals" were too feeble, and too modest, to hope for any distinct party influence upon the destinies of the nation. They modestly and wisely shrunk beneath the mantle of Whig protection, satisfied with the recognition of their separate existence, and hoping by their co-operation to give a more liberal direction to the policy of the Whigs.

The union of these incongruous elements in the Whig party has exerted the most important influence upon the course of English politics, and also upon political movements throughout the world.

The Whigs were completely at the mercy of the two antagonistic elements attached to their party. A defection of the Tory-Whigs, or of the Liberals, would throw them out of power. They were, therefore, under the necessity of adopting a policy that would secure the support of both their allies.

The Tory-Whigs were content with compelling the Whig party to

proceed with extreme caution in changing the system of taxation. Under such circumstances, the reform of the system of taxation proceeded slowly; but under the impulse of Liberal agitation and Whig purpose, it did progress; and after years of agitation, during which the Tories came into power again, and failed to obtain by their system sufficient revenue for the wants of the government, the Whigs succeeded in forcing their Tory allies to consent to a modification of the revenue system, and the adoption of the system of taxation that now prevails in England.

The following is an outline of the modifications adopted:—1. The abolition of the duties on imported provisions, and of the objectionable direct taxes on houses.—2. The retention of the system of raising revenue by customs, excises, stamps, and license taxes;—but many articles formerly dutyable were placed on the free list, for the benefit of the commercial and manufacturing interests,—the revenue from customs being raised from duties on a comparatively small number of articles.—3. The deficiency of revenue caused by the release of articles from duty, and by the abolition of corn laws and house taxes, was raised by a tax levied on incomes.

These modifications, though at first resisted by the Tories, were soon accepted by the party. The changes they wrought were indeed very slight, leaving the framework of the system of taxation devised by the Tories, unaltered.

The Liberals were then content with effecting these reforms, and with controlling the foreign relations of the country. In the last particular, the Liberal party has exerted a powerful influence upon the course of events. They were in sympathy with liberal movements abroad, and have been able to compel the British government to maintain a friendly attitude toward them. The Liberals have controlled the foreign policy of the British government, for the last fifteen years. It is mainly owing to them, that Great Britain assumed the friendly attitude toward the French government which has enabled Napoleon to achieve so much in behalf of liberal movements in Europe. The Anglo-French alliance, which has firmly held Absolutism in check, owed its existence to the influence of their balance of power in the British Parliament.

But the time soon came when the Liberals refused to be content

with the administrative reforms of the Whigs. They had been gradually growing in strength. In city after city, the mechanics had emancipated themselves from the dictation of their employers, and sent "Liberals" to Parliament. Every gain to the Liberals was a diminution of Whig strength: in 1857, this had progressed so far, that the Liberals held the balance of power between the other two parties. The Whigs, composed of representatives of the Middle class aristocracy and moderate Tories, were in a majority when supported by the Liberals; but the transfer of the Liberal vote to their opponents would leave them in a minority. Since, under the English parliamentary system, an administration must retire from power, whenever it is in a minority in Parliament, the Liberals now had the power to break down any administration, by joining the opposition upon a test question. They were in a position to propound their demands with confidence; and they demanded that the Whigs should continue to tread the path of Reform.

The power of the Liberals filled both the other parties with dismay. Neither could carry on the government without their aid; and they demanded, as the price of their support, concessions which neither was willing to grant. This state of things led to the system of maneuvering which has characterized English politics for the last ten years.

To comprehend the party tactics of the three parties, it is necessary to understand the aims of the Liberal party.

The policy of the Liberals embraces a two-fold aim,—a thorough parliamentary reform; and a thorough reform of the public administration.

In respect of parliamentary reform, they demand, in the first place, a new apportionment of parliamentary representatives, in which population shall be made the basis of representation. The adoption of this basis would disfranchise the remainder of the rotten boroughs, vastly increase the representation of the cities and towns, and give a small additional representation to the counties. Upon this basis, the cities and towns would control Parliament by an overwhelming majority.—The second feature in the proposed plan of reform would give the cities and towns into the control of

the Working class. To this end, the Liberals demand an extension of the franchise that will allow the better portion of the Working class to vote; and the adoption of the ballot, that they may vote free from the dictation of their employers.

This parliamentary reform would transfer the Parliament to the absolute control of the Working class.

When by means of parliamentary reform, the Liberals shall have obtained control of the government, they propose to carry out a thorough system of administrative reforms.

In the first place, they demand a radical reform of the revenue system. They desire the substitution of a general property tax for the present system of raising revenue by customs, excises, stamps, license, and income taxes, which levies all the public burdens upon the industrial classes. Their object in this is to relieve the Working class from the burden of taxation at present borne by them; and to force the wealthy classes to diminish their magnificence, or at least to pay taxes upon the property withheld from use, and devoted to purposes of display.

But the Liberals are not content with demanding a reform of the revenue system. They do not share the tenderness of the Middle class aristocracy for the Nobility. They aim at the reformation of all the time-honored abuses of the British government, through which the Nobility maintain the power of their order.

The revenues of the Church of England are derived from arbitrary levies upon the incomes of Dissenters, as well as Churchmen. It is an oppressive hierarchy, maintained because it affords a multitude of berths, emphatically termed "livings," for the younger sons of the Aristocracy; and, because the right of presenting to these "livings" is a vested property right of the Nobility, as well established as their right to their lands. The revenues of the Church of England exceed those of all the state churches of the rest of Europe. The Working class are almost all Dissenters; and the Liberals propose to take from the Established Church the patronage of the state, leaving it to rely, like the other sects, upon the voluntary contributions of its votaries.

The Liberals also propose to reform the public administration in

respect of the system of office holding. Hitherto, the army, navy, and civil departments of government have been crowded with scions of the Aristocracy, whose relations have no other means of providing for them,—"noble Barnacles," as Dickens styles them, who have fixed themselves upon the ship of state. The Crimean war showed the incapacity of these officials, in striking contrast with the efficiency of the French system. The Liberals propose to adopt the French system, where all offices, civil and military, are open to merit rather than rank, and where promotion by merit is the system, instead of promotion by family influence, or by purchase.

The execution of these reforms would be fatal to the Nobility. The overthrow of the Established Church, and of the system of government patronage, would compel every noble house to provide for its younger branches. This would be a heavy burden; and when property taxation was superadded to it, the Nobility would find their magnificence diminished, indeed. Under this system, the downfall of the Nobility would be only a question of time. The discontented younger children, deprived of all resource, would lead a clamor for the abolition of inheritance by primogeniture, and the division of estates among all the heirs; and, their petition granted—which a Liberal Parliament would not be reluctant to do—the English Nobility would soon be numbered among the things that were.

It may easily be imagined that the Tories, knowing the ultimate aims of the Liberals, looked with inquietude upon their demands for additional reforms.

Not less was the uneasiness of the Whigs. They saw that all additional reforms only approximated to the ultimate aim of the Liberals, and they were as unwilling to risk the rule of mechanics, as were the Tories. The Whigs were willing to relieve the Working class from oppression, so far as consistent with the interests of the Middle class aristocracy; but they were very far from being willing to extend to it greater political rights. They feared that Labor, if invested with political power, might oppress Capital. The Middle class employers did not choose to have the government ruled by their men. The spirit of communism was of too recent date to be forgotten. They might apprehend that, under a government ruled

by mechanics, the men might choose to purchase mills and run them on their own account; or, at least, that the government might adopt a policy fatal to their class interests.—Moreover, the Tory wing of the Whig party were resolutely bent upon yielding no further to the demands of a party whose ultimate aims were so dangerous to the Nobility.

Influenced by such apprehensions, the Whig administration, in 1857, refused to yield further to the agitation of their Liberal allies for additional reforms. Lord Palmerston, who was then premier, belonged to the Tory wing of the Whig party. He had reached the limit of his progress in reform. The administrative reforms already accomplished were sufficient to satisfy the Middle class aristocracy, and he was unwilling to go further for the gratification of the Working class.

III. Whig and Tory Intrigues.

Now began the system of intrigue which has ever since characterized English politics.

The Liberals (1857), finding that the Whig administration maintained in power by their votes would not yield to their demands, resolved to signalize their displeasure and prove their strength, by unseating it from power. Events prove that they came to an understanding with the Tory leaders; and that the terms of the alliance were, that the Tories, in return for the adhesion of the Liberals, should pass certain measures of administrative reform, and, especially, that they should pass a Reform Bill extending considerably the area of suffrage. A test question was brought up; the vote of the Liberals with the Opposition, defeated the ministry; and the Tories came into power.

The question arises, Why did the Tories enter into such an arrangement? Were their leaders so much in love with office as to make concessions dangerous to their order, to secure it? No: the Tories looked far beyond the interests of the moment; they were governed by a far-reaching policy, which sought to use the vote of the Liberals, with Reform as the bait, to pass a bill that would consolidate the power of their own party.

The Tory leaders perceived that, in the existing balance of

parties, neither of the great parties could carry on the government without the aid of the Liberals; and that this state of things enabled the latter to extort concessions, which, sooner or later, would bring the government under their control. If the Nobility and Middle class aristocracy were united against the Liberals, they might rule the country without difficulty. The dissension of these two classes gave the Liberals influence, as holding the balance of power between them. The Tory leaders sought to remedy this state of things, by so weakening the Whig party, and strengthening their own, as to destroy the former, and cause them to disband as a political organization; when, in a contest between the Tories and the Liberals, the Middle class aristocracy would promptly side with the former. The aim of the Tory leaders was to simplify English politics, by blotting out one of the great parties, and rallying all the aristocratic elements to their own organization, in opposition to the party of the Working class. To this end, they proposed to frame a Reform Bill that would cut down the strength of the Whig party, and increase the power of the Tories and Liberals;—thus, as one of their pamphleteers phrased it, "giving to a Reform measure a Tory signification."

It was not difficult to frame a Reform Bill that would have this effect. The Whigs occupy a position between the Tories and the Liberals, and antagonistic to both. In many of the larger towns, they wage a hard conflict with the Liberals, while they maintain, in the small boroughs, a doubtful contest with the Tories. If a Reform Bill were framed, that would give a few more votes to the Liberals in the cities, and a few more to the Tories in the small Boroughs, the Whig party, pared down on both sides, would be reduced to insignificance. This arrangement would strengthen the Liberals, it is true; but it would give the Tories all the doubtful Boroughs so long contested with the Whigs, and insure them a clear majority in Parliament, sufficient to carry on the government against the opposition of both the other parties. Then, the Middle class aristocracy, hopeless of power for themselves, and compelled to choose between the Nobility or the Working class, would ally themselves with the former; and the Tories would rule the country with strong majorities.

The Reform Bill of the Tories was carefully framed with an eye

to the end in view. It proposed no change in the basis of representation. It proposed to retain the "rotten boroughs;" also the open vote, that landlords might still influence the votes of their tenants and employés. The Bill simply proposed to extend the franchise,—in such a way as to include a greater number of rustics under the control of Tory landlords, and a greater number of mechanics in the towns. The votes of the former would enable the Tories to wrest from the Whigs many closely-contested small boroughs; the latter would carry a number of large towns in favor of the Liberals.

The scheme was well concocted, and if the Bill had passed, it would have extinguished the Whig party. But many of the Tories were unwilling to extend the franchise under any conditions, for fear of dangerously increasing the strength of the Liberals. The Whigs, too, were awake to their danger. They were resolved to defeat the Tory project, at all hazards: at the critical moment, they offered a motion which promised the Liberals a better Reform Bill than that of the Tories. This secured the Liberal vote, defeated the Tory project, and drove the party from power.

This defeat was a critical period for the Tories. The Whigs were in a situation to turn their own batteries against them. The Whigs might as easily frame a Reform Bill that would annihilate the Tories, as the Tories one that would ruin the Whigs; and the course of the Tories had stimulated the partisan feelings of their antagonists to such a pitch, that they were ready to use their advantage to the utmost. The Tory leaders perceived the stern resentment of the Whigs, and foresaw that the leaders would avail themselves of the passions of the hour, to unite the whole party upon a fatal Reform Bill. They resolved, therefore, to gain time, and suffer the passions of the moment to cool: instead of at once retiring, and suffering the Whigs and Liberals to form a coalition government, they chose the alternative of a dissolution of Parliament, and went before the country on the question of Reform.—The result of the election showed that the voting classes of England were opposed to Reform. The Tories gained twenty-five members: the Whigs, besides this loss, found themselves under the necessity of adopting, in many

doubtful Boroughs, candidates know to be opposed to Reform. The Tory wing of the Whig party received, in this manner, many accessions.

When the new Parliament assembled, the Whigs and Liberals, combined, had a bare working majority. A coalition was formed, in which Lord Palmerston was premier.—The Whigs were under the necessity of passing several measures for the gratification of their Liberal allies. Among these was the repeal of the obnoxious paper tax,—a most important political measure, as it reduced the price of newspapers, and brought political reading within the reach of the masses. At length, the Whig ministry brought forward a Reform Bill, which, under pretense of extending the suffrage, was so framed as to redound to the advantage of the Whig party at the expense of the Tories. The Bill proposed to disfranchise some thirty-five "rotten boroughs," which added materially to the Tory strength; and to reduce the suffrage basis in the towns from a ten pound rental, to a rental of six pounds.

The reduction of the suffrage basis would add to the Liberal strength in the manufacturing towns, where the mechanics had freed themselves from the dictation of employers; but it would give them control of very few boroughs not already under their sway, inasmuch as Whig employers could control the votes of all employés except mechanics. While the Bill would not materially weaken the Whigs in the boroughs contested with the Liberals, it would give them a mass of new votes in the boroughs contested with the Tories, sufficient, in many instances, to give them a decided preponderance. The party would thus be freed from the necessity of accepting moderate Tories as their candidates in such boroughs; and, besides, it would gain so many representatives from Tory boroughs, as to secure a firm majority in Parliament. This increase of strength would free the party from the necessity of compromising with moderate Tories on the one hand, and, on the other, of a coalition with the Liberals.

The plan was well conceived; but when the ministers brought forward the Bill in Parliament, the Tory wing of the Whig party showed unequivocal signs of revolt. They were decidedly opposed to the measure, both because it increased the power of the Working

class, and because it diminished the power of the Nobility. The Whig ministry found that the measure would not pass, and withdrew it; recapitulating to their Liberal allies all the reforms of administration effected by the Whigs for the benefit of the Working class, and bidding them "rest and be thankful."

The introduction of the Bill was sufficient to save the faith of the Whig ministry. Palmerston himself, from his Tory predilections, was not ardent in support of the Bill, and only assented to it as a propitiatory offering to the Liberals: it soon became evident that he was not favorable to the introduction of any other Bill proposing organic reform. The Liberals were resentful, but powerless; for the Tories, satisfied with the Conservatism of Palmerston, made no effort to unseat him. He continued to govern England as long as he lived, by the easy pliancy with which, as chief of a motley party, he suffered events to take their course.

The Tories might at any time have overthrown his administration, if they would have accepted of an alliance with the Liberals. But their past experience satisfied them that they could not control any Reform Bill they might introduce in co-operation with the Liberals: the Whigs could always propose such modifications as would carry the Liberal vote, and thus wrest the bill from their control. Their only hope of carrying such a Reform Bill as would redound to the advantage of the party, lay in obtaining the support of the Tory wing of the Whig party. Until then, they resolved to wait, and let reform alone.

They knew the weakness of the Whig party, with its two discordant wings,—one urgent for reform, the other resolutely opposed to it. The defection of either would overthrow the party, and the defection of one or the other was bound to occur at no distant date. If the Whigs, in deference to the wishes of their Tory allies, refused to introduce a Reform Bill, the Liberals would withdraw their support; if the Whig leaders yielded to the Liberal pressure and introduced another Reform Bill, the Tory Whigs would go over to the opposition: in either event, the Whig party would fall from power. The Tories, under the circumstances, felt themselves masters of the situation, and able to wait for the approaching crisis in the fortunes of the Whigs.

The event fulfilled their expectations. While Palmerston lived, he kept his party clear of the rock of reform; parrying with easy good nature the sarcasms of his restless Liberal allies, and keeping them in a humor of surly compliance, in the hope that his death would enable them to extort the desired concessions from the next Whig Premier.

The death of Palmerston was the signal for renewed agitation. The Liberals, whose patience was spent, demanded of the Whigs fulfillment of their compact. During the past summer,* the new Whig ministry brought forward a Reform Bill.

The Bill proposed, as usual, the disfranchisement of the "rotten boroughs," and the maintenance of open voting;—also the bestowal of the franchise upon all householders paying a rental of seven pounds, and all lodgers paying an annual rent of the same amount. The object of the bill was to consolidate Whig power, by securing for them, in the boroughs contested with the Tories, an additional number of votes. The franchise basis was fixed at a seven pounds rental, instead of six, to propitiate the Tory-Whigs; the lodger franchise was introduced for the same purpose, many of the lodgers on whom the franchise would be conferred, belonging to the Aristocratic and Middle classes.

But the Tory wing of the Whig party was not to be propitiated. Unalterably opposed to any change that would diminish the power of the Nobility, they manifested in the course of the debate their disposition to oppose the measure, if it were pressed. The Whig ministry pressed it to a vote: that section of the party seceded, and went over to the Tories: the Whigs were defeated: the Tories, strengthened by these accessions from the Whig party, have taken possession of the government.

England is now under Tory rule,—Tory rule, stronger than when the party held power seven years ago, by a doubtful alliance with the Liberals. The Tories are now supported by the Tory wing of the Whig party,—an element which has always been devoted at

* This chapter was completed early in the Fall of 1866.

heart to the Tory interest; and which will probably prove firm and true to the alliance.

What use will the Tories make of power? If we judge from their past course, they will avail themselves of the occasion, to pass a Reform Bill that will annihilate the Whigs, and place their own party firmly in the ascendant. The time is propitious. The agitation the Whigs and Liberals are making for Reform will be advantageous, inasmuch as it will convince the reluctant members of the Tory party that the question must be settled,—that the government cannot go on as it has for the last ten years,—and that it is better to settle the question, now, before the Liberals excite a dangerous agitation, and while Tories, supported by the Tory element of the Whig party, are able to control the Bill, and give it a direction favorable to their party interests.

The Tory leaders have evidently been waiting for the present opportunity, for several years. Disraeli, the planner of the former bill, who persisted in his purpose to the end, in the face of the fiercest opposition from his own party, is too astute not to seize the present opportunity, to carry his policy to a successful issue. It will no doubt be his policy to carry a Reform Bill that will give his party such a decided ascendancy over both the other parties, as will enable it to sway the country, despite their combined opposition.

It will be easy, as we have shown, to frame such a bill. Admit more mechanics to the franchise in the towns, so as to strengthen the Liberals against the Whigs, and more country rustics in the boroughs disputed between the Tories and Whigs,—and the work is done. The Tory landlords can control the votes of their tenants and laborers, and thus defeat the Whigs in the doubtful boroughs. This would give them at least all the boroughs heretofore represented by Tory Whigs,—an accession of strength sufficient to give them a clear majority in Parliament.

This adjustment is attended with only one danger: If an industrial crisis involving great distress should occur pending a parliamentary election, the general distress might drive the enfranchised tenants of the Tories to desperation, and cause them to vote for the Liberals despite the influence of their landlords, and thus give that party a majority in Parliament. In such event, the Liberals would

remodel the whole governmental fabric. This, however, is a future contingency. Meantime, the Tories would rule the government with a clear majority. The danger of such a future contingency will hardly prevent them from strengthening their position, by means of an extension of the suffrage.

But if the Tories refuse to pass a Reform Bill, still, they have control of the country for years to come. In pressing their bill even to the rupture of the party, the Whigs have thoroughly committed themselves to reform. Their course has lost them the boroughs represented by the Tory-Whigs, which are opposed to such an extension of the franchise as would weaken the Nobility. Those boroughs will elect Tories, in future, and maintain that party in possession of the government, at least for years to come. If the Tories decide not to venture on Reform, their power is safe until the agitation of the masses shall extort from them such a Reform Bill as shall give their opponents a majority in Parliament. But no dangerous agitation can be excited while the country is prosperous.

Hence, whether the Tories frame a Reform Bill for their own advantage, or not, they will keep possession of the government until some crisis occurs that shall excite the British population to an outbreak against the authority of the Nobility.

We may take it as a fixed fact, that England is, for the time, firmly under Tory rule, and base our political calculations upon that fact.

If we now turn our attention to European affairs, it will be evident that the government of Great Britain, in Tory hands, will wreck the political hopes of mankind.

A full exposition of the political status of Europe must be left to future chapters. It is sufficient for our present purpose, to remark that, on the Continent of Europe, a prolonged struggle has been going on between Absolutism and Progress. Which side will the Tory government of England take, in the approaching crisis of that struggle?

The English Tories have always sympathized with the despotic governments, against popular movements. They sympathized with Austria, in her attempt to maintain her hold upon Italy. They sym-

pathized with Bomba, the tyrant of Naples, against Garibaldi. They sympathized with Denmark, in her attempt to maintain her feudal sway over the German state of Holstein. The Tories have sympathized with all efforts to maintain the existing status. They sympathized with the Bourbons, against the French Republic of 1848; with Austria, against Hungary; with the despots, against Poland. They have regarded with bitter hostility every effort to introduce a new and better order of things. All their sympathies are for despotism, and against the people. They have heaped derision upon the aspirations of the oppressed and disparted nationalities of Europe after their lost national independence; and they have denounced, in unmeasured terms, the sympathy of Napoleon with their cause, as dangerous to Europe, and in violation of the faith of treaties.

The English nobility feel that their own privileges belong to the Feudal Ages, and are identified with the feudal cause on the Continent of Europe. The same spirit which is wrestling for Nationality, on the Continent, is endeavoring, in England, to wrest from the Nobility their oppressive feudal rights. The English nobility are well apprised that their cause is the cause of despotism, everywhere. They lean upon Russia, as firmly as do the despotic kingdoms of Europe. They feel that she is their most puissant ally. This feeling is so strong, that it prompted them to sympathize with Russia during the Crimean war! Though her triumph would menace the British empire in India, it would increase her prestige, and strengthen the cause of Absolutism in Europe! They deprecated her humiliation, as a blow to the cause of "order," struck against its most puissant champion!

The Tories are the same party, now, they were when they warred to the death against the French Revolution. They have never changed their principles. In the decisive conflict approaching between Absolutism and Progress, the Tory government of England will take sides with Russia and Absolutism, against France and Progress.

Judging from the recent foreign policy of Great Britain, it may be supposed that the British government, whatever its sympathies, will hold aloof from the conflict. But the policy of the Whigs and Liberals, who have governed England, with a brief interval, for fifteen

years, is no indication of the Tory policy. The Whigs represented the commercial interest, whose policy is peace and traffic. Their alliance with the Liberals, also, placed them in a nugatory position. The Liberals sympathized with Progress, and would not suffer the British government to take any step to its prejudice. The Liberals have ruled England for ten years. Every administration has been compelled to court their support, and yield to their influence. The Liberals held England in a neutral position, while Napoleon drove Austria out of Lombardy. The Liberals prevented the government from ordering the British cruisers to intercept the expedition of Garibaldi against the king of Naples. That the Whigs were influenced by no sympathy with the popular cause, is evident from the fact that, when Garibaldi visited England, two years ago, to tender in person his thanks for the sympathy of the nation with the cause of Italy, Mr. Gladstone, the most liberal member of the Whig ministry, requested him to leave the country, on the ground that his presence was embarrassing to the government. The predilections of the Whigs incline them to sympathize with the existing status. They are merchants, and desire peace and traffic; they are bankers, and have immense sums loaned to the existing governments; they are conservative, and deprecate revolution; they are aristocrats, and sympathize with power against population. Their predilections have been neutralized by their alliance with the Liberals. This coalition produced the equilibrium of opposing forces, and compelled the government to adopt the shuffling policy of friend of both parties, busy in endeavoring to keep the peace, but standing aloof from committal to either side. In pursuit of this policy, England has been overwhelmed with humiliation, until the nation is eager to engage in a war for any or no cause, so that it may erase the stains from the national escutcheon.

The attitude of England during the past few years has not arisen from a decay of the national spirit, but from the fact that the parties that ruled the country, by coalition, mutually neutralized each other. But the Tory policy is not neutral. Their sympathies are positive and fixed. They are allied to Absolutism, by common traditions and a common interest. Their power in England is insecure, and must fall, ere long, before the encroachments of the Liberals, unless their

position is fortified by a strong reaction abroad in favor of Absolutism. They know this, and in self-defense, will exert all their power to give success to the common cause. The warmer the sympathy of the *English people* with popular movements abroad, the more urgent the necessity of the Nobility acting efficiently to suppress movements on the Continent, whose success must be disastrous to their political interests.

Already, we see indications of the change of policy the Tories are effecting. Since they came into power, the alliance with France against Absolutism is ended. Already, the Tory organs have opened a storm of abuse upon Napoleon, and are gratulating over the successes of Prussia, which power they declare will, in future, constitute a counterbalance to French influence in Europe. The shuffling neutrality of England is ended. The Tories will adopt a consistent and vigorous foreign policy. They will quietly place England on the side of the despotic Powers, and when the contest comes, they will, if necessary, throw the whole power of Britain into the scale, and combat in favor of despotism, as ardently as in 1793.

[☞ Note.—This chapter was finished, as above, in September 1866. The course of events, in England, has demonstrated the justice of the course of thought presented. The Tories have submitted to Parliament a Reform Bill, designed to consolidate the political power of the Nobility. In its passage through Parliament, the extension of the franchise was made much broader than the Tory leaders at first intended. Still, the Bill was under the control of the Tories, throughout, and its evident tendency, as a whole, is to increase their power and that of the Liberals, while it cuts down the power of the Whigs so materially, as to endanger the existence of their party organization. If the Whigs maintain an efficient party organization, in future, they must do it by dint of bribery. The Tories are the rulers of England for years to come, and the Liberals will, in future, be their chief antagonists.

But the Tories have, in this Reform Bill, planted the germ of future danger to the Aristocracy. So great an extension of the franchise must end, sooner or later, in placing the government

in the hands of the Liberals. At some time or other, political agitation will run so high that the Nobility cannot control the peasantry. The Liberals have the voters, now, who can place them in power. It only remains to fan the flame of excitement. We may expect intense agitation, having for its object to inflame the minds of the voters to such a pitch as to make them throw off the yoke of aristocratic influence.

This agitation will be full of danger to the Tories. It must eventually succeed. The danger will fill the Tories with alarm. The triumph of the Liberals is the downfall of the Nobility. Will not the Nobility struggle fiercely for the maintainance of their power?

Absolutism and Progress are engaged in a death struggle on the Continent of Europe. The triumph of Progress will hasten the success of the English Liberals. The only hope of the English Nobility lies in the success of Absolutism, abroad.

The Reform Bill, while it secures their present power, is full of future danger, to avert which the Tories will, by every possible means, further the aims of Absolutism on the Continent of Europe.]

CHAPTER II.

POLITICAL CONDITION OF EUROPE.

WITHIN the last twenty years, a succession of tempests have darkened the political heavens of Europe. Indeed, a state of continual disquiet has prevailed, ever since the French Revolution of 1789. The seething cauldron has never slept. Agitation has sometimes sunk into troubled slumberings, only to be roused again into starts of revolutionary violence. But, since 1848, Europe has been kept in a state of sleepless agitation, by one or another of the elements of disturbance seething in perpetual unrest in its political system.

SECT. I.—GENERAL STATEMENT.

There are three disquieting elements in the European political system. But the active elements of disturbance may be reduced to two,—the ambition of monarchs; and the aspiration of nationalities

after unity and independence. The third,—aspirations after political liberty—need not now be noted, since it is, at present, too feeble to exert much influence anywhere, except in England.

Let us note more particularly these disturbing elements.

The first is the ambition and mutual jealousy of the five great Powers,—Russia, Prussia, Austria, France, and England. Their mutual jealousy has given rise to a tacit compact among them, to combine against any one of the number that threatens to gain a decisive ascendancy.

Wars to maintain the Balance of Power have hitherto been the chief occasions of European strife. Indeed, the history of Europe for the last three hundred years may be termed a series of wars waged for the maintenance of the Balance of Power. When the nations emerged from feudalism, just before the Reformation of the sixteenth century, they were, for the first time, in a condition to enter upon a career of ambition. Ever since that period, some one or another of them has been meditating an ambitious career, from which the others combined to drive it back. First, Spain, emulous of the grandeur of Charles V., aspired to an eminence inconsistent with the general safety; and Europe was watching and countering the ambition of Spain, long after the nation ceased to be formidable. Next, the House of Austria had to be beaten back, by a coalition of France and Sweden with the Protestant states of Germany. Next, France under Louis XIV. made the Continent tremble; and a coalition of England, Holland, and Austria, was necessary to humble its power. Then, England, by its maritime conquests and growing colonies, awakened jealousy; and France, Spain, and Holland combined, to aid the American Colonies in their struggle for independence. Next, France again, under Napoleon, entered upon the career of conquest; and Europe combined against the conqueror, and drove him from his throne. Finally, Russia undertook to annex Turkey, as a step in the road to India and maritime greatness; and England and France laid aside their former enmity, to repulse the Autocrat from his prey.

The Great Powers of Europe are all jealous of each other. Europe dreads France; Europe fears Russia; Europe is jealous of the

maritime supremacy of Great Britain, and her monopoly of wealth and trade. Perhaps Austria is the only one of the five Great Powers that has foregone ambition; it is content to maintain its present position, and guard against menacing ruin.

Europe, however, would have little to fear from the ambition of any of the Great Powers, were this the only source of danger. The system of maintaining the Balance of Power is reduced to a science; a coalition might easily restrain the ambition of any single state. The ambition of sovereigns is chiefly dangerous through the aid ambition derives from the peculiar political condition of the European states.

The danger most threatening to the peace of Europe has arisen from the dissatisfaction and restlessness of Nationalities.

The question of the Nationalities is little understood on this side of the Atlantic. Our journals have derived their views of European affairs from the British press: upon this question, silence has, for years, been the policy of English politicians; and the British press never goes in advance of the party leaders. Austria and Prussia, like England, have desired to taboo the subject. France alone of the Great Powers has nothing to dread, but much to gain from the agitation of the question; yet prudential reasons have caused Napoleon to desire that it should slumber, as far as possible; and he has discouraged its discussion by the French press. The question of Nationalities has been a prohibited subject in Europe. It has occupied the minds of statesmen,—but as a vision of terror; they avoid its mention, as the peasant abroad at night fears to name the Evil One, lest the sound may invoke his presence.

We will endeavor to present this important, yet somewhat obscure question, in such a light as that it may be comprehended in all its bearings.

Let the reader take a map of Europe, published fifteen or twenty years ago, and count the states there laid down. They are,

1. Portugal;
2. Spain;
3. France;
4. Holland;
5. Belgium;

6. Austria;
7. Prussia;
8. The minor German states;
9. Switzerland;
10. Denmark;
11. Russia;
12. Turkey;
13. Britain—including Scotland and Ireland;
14. Sweden.

Besides these, he will find Italy—divided among more than half a dozen states which do not deserve a rank among the European powers; and Greece—too feeble to be counted.

Mark, we do not call those states laid down on the map Nations, but Powers. Some of these Powers are not nations, but are agglomerations of different nations. Several of the nations of Europe do not appear on the map; their territories being divided out among different sovereigns. Others are set down, indeed, but they have no national or political existence.

A map of Europe delineating the nations of that quarter of the globe with their several boundaries, will present an appearance altogether different from one representing the existing Powers. It contains the following nations:—

1. Portugal;
2. Spain;
3. France;—but the French boundary is larger than at present, and runs up through Belgium to the Rhine;
4. Holland;
5. Italy;
6. Switzerland;
7. Germany;
8. Denmark;—but the Danish territory is diminished by the assignment of the southern part of the peninsula to Germany;
9. Hungary;
10. Greece,—including the present Turkish dominions in Europe;
11. Poland;
12. Russia;

13. Sweden;
14. Great Britain,—including with England, Wales, whose nationality is merged in the conquering nation—and Scotland, which has entered into a voluntary union;
15. Ireland.

How astonishing the change! Six nations appear in this map which were not in the other,—Greece, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Germany, and Ireland. Three powers have entirely disappeared,—Turkey, Austria, and Prussia. Three nations have had their dimensions vastly curtailed,—Russia, Denmark, and Great Britain. Three nations only remain unchanged,—Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland. Only two,—France and Sweden—have their boundaries enlarged.

But why these changes?

Why blot out Austria, Prussia, and Turkey, from the map of Europe? Because they are Powers, not nations. The Turks are not a nation, but a horde of warriors, who have conquered, and are now ruling, the Greeks of the old Greek empire. They are the rulers of the Greek nation. The country belongs to the Greeks. Expel the foreign rulers, and they at once become an independent nation, in possession of their own country. Neither Austria nor Prussia are nations. Neither has a foot of national territory. Every foot of Austrian territory belongs either to Italy, Hungary, Poland, or Germany. Restore those nations, and the Austrian power falls. All the territory of Prussia belongs to Germany and Poland. Austria and Prussia are kingdoms, not nations. The bond of union which holds their respective territories together is not national, but personal. They belong to the monarch. Take the monarch away, and there is no tie to unite them. Those kingdoms are agglomerations of different peoples, who are subjects of the king. Unseat the king, and the different nations at once resolve themselves again into their national unity.

The nationalities of Europe have been disparted and subjugated in every conceivable manner. In some instances, the nation is still united, but subjected to the yoke of an alien monarch; as Hungary, to the emperor of Austria, Ireland, to England, and the Greek population, to the Turks. In other instances, a nation is divided out among a number of sovereigns: thus Poland was divided between

Russia, Prussia, and Austria; Italy, into a number of states, some subject to Austria, some to the Pope, others to various rulers; Germany, among no less than thirty-five different rulers,—some kings—some dukes—some Germans—some foreign sovereigns. In other instances, a nation still maintains its national existence, but provinces have been wrested from it, and annexed to another, by feudal inheritance, or by war: thus France lost its fairest province by feudal alienation; and Sweden, the greater part of its territory, by Russian conquest.

Of all these, the disparted nationalities are the most unfortunate. Hungary and Ireland maintain their national unity, though subjected to a foreign sovereign. But Germany, Italy, and Poland are divided: the national unity is destroyed; people of the same nation and tongue, animated by the same sympathies, are sundered, and subjected to different rulers, who govern by different laws, direct their policy on different principles, and frequently, influenced by political antagonisms, assume a hostile attitude toward each other. Then, Italians are arrayed against Italians, Germans against Germans, and Poles against Poles.

This parceling out of nations was effected under the old regime, when rulers considered people and territory as their property, and settled boundaries, and transferred lands and people from one to another, as coolly as farmers will exchange stock. The human chattel of royalty had no political voice, and his royal master could transfer him at his will. But, in our age, new influences are at work. Mankind have learned something of their rights. Nations are no longer the contented chattels of a crown. Populations are demanding that the wrongs of the past shall be redressed. The Nationalities are forcing their grievances upon the attention of monarchs.

The map of Europe cannot remain as it is. It must be readjusted.

To attain a correct view of the question of Nationalities, it is necessary to note,

1. The forces which brought Europe into its present condition;

2. The clashing forces now in antagonism, the one endeavoring to overthrow, the other to maintain the status of Absolutism.

Sect. 2.—Causes which brought about the Present Condition of Europe.

The manner in which the kings of England established their dominion over Ireland needs no explanation: British domination over Ireland was obtained by conquest, and it has been the rule of the sword ever since. The Turks, also, subdued the Greek empire, and held it by the right of the strongest; the despots of Russia, Prussia, and Austria partitioned Poland; Italy was subjected to Germany, and parceled out among its various rulers, by the sword; and Russia has extended its boundaries, by conquests from Sweden, Poland, Turkey, and various barbarous tribes on its borders.

But how happened Germany to be divided among so many different sovereigns? Why is the finest province of France separated from the country? Whence the rise of Austria and Prussia?

The germ of these complications must be sought in the circumstances which attended the establishment of the Northern nations in the Roman Empire. Space will not permit any attempt to trace the gradual changes, through which the barbarism of Germany and the effete Roman civilization mingled, and slowly merged into the civilization of Modern Europe. Nor is this necessary to our present purpose. It is sufficient that we comprehend something of the elements which, passing through the chaotic era of Feudalism, resolved themselves into the forms of social order that now exist.

One thousand years ago, almost all Central and Western Europe was covered with the great empire of Charlemagne. A great part of the territory of this empire was divided into districts similar to the counties upon the maps of our own states. These districts were called counties or duchies, and were ruled by powerful nobles,—counts or dukes,—who held them as hereditary property. These nobles were sovereign over their respective districts, ruling their vassals with absolute power, while themselves subject to the monarch of the realm. The sovereign had no right to levy taxes upon the nobility, his revenues being chiefly derived from the crown

lands,—territories which, in the general division of the conquered Roman provinces, had been allotted to the kings of the conquering races. The nobles were obliged to attend the monarch, in war, at the head of their vassals, for a certain number of days in a year. This military service was almost their sole duty; when it was rendered, nothing more could be exacted of them.

This subordination of the feudal lords to the sovereign, and of the vassal population to the nobility,—termed the Feudal system,—was the germ of the institutions of Modern Europe.

A mutual jealousy always existed between the crown and the feudal nobility. During the reign of Charlemagne, his firm hand kept the nobles in subjection to the royal authority. But after his death, under the feeble rule of his successors, this jealousy led to frequent collisions,—the kings endeavoring to maintain, and increase their royal supremacy; the nobles striving to diminish their dependence upon the crown.

The political condition in which Charlemagne left his empire, tended to excite this jealousy between crown and noble into active collision. His empire was divided among his children. France and Germany became separate nations,—Germany assuming the rank of empire and having the Italian conquests of Charlemagne finally annexed to it. Out of this division sprung long wars, in which the sovereigns were compelled to court the feudal nobility. Political necessity, and the extravagance and improvidence of successive monarchs, led to the gradual alienation of the crown lands, which were variously bestowed, upon favorites and military followers. With this diminution of the royal revenues, the sovereign authority declined, the power of the nobility increasing in the same ratio. They gradually diminished their dependence upon the crown, until they became almost entirely independent, exercising in their domains the authority of sovereign princes.

It is necessary to remark particularly one of the means by which these feudal nobles increased their power.— Frequently the only child of a noble was a daughter, the heiress of his domains. Her marriage with a noble united both districts, which became the inheritance of their heir. A succession of these marriages sometimes united a great number of these districts under the sway of a

single noble, and rendered him even more powerful than the sovereign. By means of such marriages, many of the nobles were aggrandized, while the monarch was alienating the crown lands.

In France, the royal authority gradually declined until it sunk into contempt; the last weak king of the line of Charlemagne gave way to Hugh Capet, one of the great French dukes, who mounted the throne and founded a new dynasty. The kings of the house of Capet had the advantage of grafting the monarch upon the noble. They had the power of their feudal domains, to assist in maintaining the royal dignity. They alienated no crown territory; on the contrary, they enlarged their ducal domains by marrying heiresses of the great nobility. At first, however, their authority was very feeble. They waged war and made treaties with the nobles whose domains lay adjacent to their own feudal inheritance, very much on equal terms. The more distant nobles of France paid little attention to the royal authority. Gradually, however, the Capets extended their power; compelling one after another of the great vassals to bow to their authority.

At this juncture occurred the most important event of the era,—an event destined to exert a controlling influence upon the course of history. William duke of Normandy, one of the great French vassals, achieved the conquest of England, about fifty years after the accession of the Capetian dynasty to the throne of France. This accession of power rendered the dukes of Normandy more powerful than their feudal sovereigns, the kings of France. Perpetual wars were waged between them. The dukes of Normandy added vastly to their French possessions, by marriage with the heirs of other duchies. Matilda, granddaughter of the Conqueror, married Geoffry Plantagenet, ducal sovereign of two counties, Anjou and Touraine. Her son Henry, in consequence, besides the English crown, was lord of four French provinces. He married Eleanor of Aquitaine, who, through various intermarriages of her ancestors, was heiress of the provinces of Guienne, Poitou, Santogne, Auvergne, Perigord, Angoumois, and the Limousin. The union of his inherited domains with those acquired by his marriage made Henry lord over nearly half of France. Leaving out of view his English king-

dom, he was much more powerful than the French monarch; for, as feudal lord, his territories were completely under his control, while many of the vassals of the king of France lent him but a cold assistance.

Yet the consolidation of the royal authority, in France, grew out of the struggle of the French sovereigns with the Plantagenets. It rallied the other noble houses of France around the throne; and, though driven to the most unworthy intrigues against the great Henry, the French monarch, in the next generation, wrested from the weak hands of John of England almost all his French dukedoms, and annexed them to the French crown. This accession of territory added greatly to the power of the kings of France, and enabled them to attain a decided ascendancy over the nobles of the realm. From this period, the crown advanced rapidly in its ascendancy over the feudal nobles, until, in the reign of Louis XI., about fifty years before the Reformation of the sixteenth century, it achieved a final triumph. That monarch completely humbled the great nobility, and left France to his successor a united monarchy under the absolute sway of the crown.

In stating that Louis XI. humbled the power of the feudal nobility, one important exception must be made. Charles the Bold, duke of Burgundy, was too powerful for the French monarch to subdue. By marriage and inheritance, the dukes of Burgundy had acquired various provinces of the Low countries (now Holland and Belgium), and united them to their patrimonial duchy. Several of these provinces,—as Flanders, Hainault, and Guelders, occupying the territory now known as Belgium, and stretching to the Rhine,—were the feudal dependencies of France. Louis XI. anxiously sought to maintain his supremacy over these national domains. But Charles the Bold held his feudal dependence lightly; and he was too powerful to be coerced by the French monarch. The death of Charles in battle with the Swiss relieved Louis from a dangerous dilemma; and, as the deceased duke left no heirs except a daughter, Mary of Burgundy, the French king seized upon Burgundy as a male fief. Though Burgundy thus reverted to the French crown, Mary was still possessed of the rich Flemish provinces, and was the greatest heiress of the age. The House of Austria, ever eager in quest of feudal

heiresses, could not overlook this fortunate occasion; Maximilian of Austria, son of the Emperor of Germany, married her, and added the Low Countries to the feudal possessions of his family. In this manner were lost to France the fairest provinces of the kingdom.

Thus, in France, the Feudal System terminated in the consolidation of the monarchy. The royal authority was firmly established over the feudal nobility. France emerged from the feudal chaos, a great and united nation,—but weakened by the loss of her richest and most important frontier provinces.

Of the political condition of England, it is at present sufficient to remark that, owing to the manner in which the Conqueror divided out the English lands among his followers, the feudal nobility of England never became so powerful as those of France. The wars of the Roses completely broke the power of the feudal barons; in the age of the French king, Louis XI., the English monarchs, governing by means of parliaments, dominated the nobility with a power as absolute as that of the French sovereign.

In England and France, the Feudal struggle between the crown and the nobles terminated in the triumph of the former, leaving those countries consolidated nations.

In Germany, Feudalism ran a different course. The German emperors struggled in vain, to maintain their authority over the powerful nobles of the empire. The same causes which induced the decline of the Carlovingian dynasty in France, operated a similar result in Germany. There, as in France, the power of the feudal noble was brought to reinforce the feeble royal authority; but the act which reinforced Imperialism, ever after prevented the consolidation of the imperial authority, and placed the crown at the mercy of the nobility. The line of Charlemagne having failed, the nobility elected one of their own number to the imperial dignity. Henceforth, the Emperors were elected; at first, by the assembled nobility of the empire; afterward, by seven nobles, who engrossed this function and became known as ELECTORS. The character of the empire as an elective monarchy, together with the ceaseless Italian wars in which the emperors expended their resources, prevented the consolidation of the Imperial authority. The Popes, assailed in Italy

by the Emperors, retaliated by exciting commotions in Germany. Civil contentions and Italian campaigns so far weakened the Imperial resources, as to enable the feudal nobility of Germany to consolidate their authority into a recognized sovereignty over their respective domains, free from the control or interference of the emperor; who could neither impose taxes upon them, nor interfere with the internal administration of their territories. They became, in fact, sovereign princes in every sense of the word. They acknowledged a kind of feudal superiority in the emperor; they were under obligation to arm in the common defense, and follow his banner in war; but they did this as confederated princes, for the protection of the empire of which they were a part, rather than as the inferiors or subjects of the emperor.

Thus, in Germany, the Feudal System ultimated in the triumph of the feudal princes over the royal authority. The imperial dignity fell into contempt, the emperor possessing only the shadow of power. The princes of the empire were sovereigns over their respective territories; the empire became a confederation of sovereign states. In some instances, intermarriages united several of these states under one prince, who became a powerful sovereign in the empire. In other instances, by the intermarriage of the heir with foreign rulers, German states became dependencies upon foreign crowns. In the end, the German nation became divided among a number of sovereigns, some of native birth, others foreign rulers.

Out of this principle of the Feudal System, the royal houses of Austria and Prussia took their rise. Both are feudal sovereigns, ruling an agglomeration of territories united by no national tie, but simply owing obedience to the monarch as their feudal lord.

Let us trace, in the first instance, the rise of the House of Austria.

In the middle of the 13th century, the power of the German emperor had so far fallen into contempt, that an interregnum of twenty years ensued, during which Germany had no emperor. At length, the Electors chose as emperor Rodolph of Hapsburg, an obscure Swiss baron, having too little power to excite the jealousy of the powerful nobles. Rodolph was the founder of the House of Austria.

He introduced a new imperial programme. Former emperors

had employed the power of their feudal domains to maintain the imperial authority. He determined, on the contrary, to make the imperial dignity auxiliary to the advancement of the feudal interests of his family. An occasion soon offered to carry out his policy. The duke of Austria died without male heirs: the king of Bohemia claimed the duchy in right of his wife, heiress of the deceased duke; but Rodolph set up a pretended claim, seized the dukedom, and conferred it upon his son Albert,—and thus founded the House of Austria.

Albert was chosen Emperor of Germany, and the House of Austria continued, almost without interruption, to fill the imperial office for three hundred years. The dukes of Austria were wiser than their predecessors in the imperial chair. They did not seek power by aggrandizing the imperial office; but, carrying out the policy of Rodolph, they used the imperial dignity to advance their interests as feudal princes. They sought by matrimonial alliances to add other duchies to their own: they were constantly on the watch for heiresses of ducal domains. Principally by a series of fortunate marriages, they successively added to the duchy of Austria the German principalities of Bohemia, Moravia, Styria, Tyrol, Carinthia, Carniola; and, outside of Germany, the kingdom of Hungary, several of the Italian states, and (as we have already seen) the Low Countries. The further marriages, by which they annexed Spain, and narrowly missed obtaining possession of England, need not be mentioned, owing to the division of territory that subsequently occurred between the Spanish and Austrian branches of the family.

By this series of marriages, the duke of Austria became the most powerful prince of the German Empire. He was, however, only the peer of the other princes. His German dominions were all portions of the empire, just as theirs. He was usually elected emperor of Germany; but his rank as Emperor was entirely distinct from his position as a prince of the empire. Any other German prince was equally eligible to that office; and in the event of the election of another, the Austrian duke would rank only as the most powerful of the feudal nobles of Germany.

The House of Austria continued to rule its scattered possessions down to the period of the French Revolution, but without being able

to merge them into a consolidated nationality. It then lost its provinces in the Low countries, leaving its dominions restricted to Hungary, part of Poland, and its German and Italian states.

We turn our attention to the rise of the royal house of Prussia.

Brandenburg is one of the seven electoral states of Germany. The Margraves of Brandenburg never made an important figure in the history of Germany, until the close of the seventeenth century. Then, the accession of Frederic William, the Great Elector, proved an era in the annals of his house. His dominions comprised only the German marquisate of Brandenburg, and the Poland duchy of Prussia; but his able rule elevated the house of Brandenburg to an influence it had never known before, and laid the foundation of its subsequent greatness. His successor was ambitious of the royal dignity, and, to obtain it, seconded earnestly the policy of the Imperial House of Austria in a war with France. The Austrian sovereign supposing it a magnificent stroke of policy to establish a kingdom in Northern Germany as an equipoise to France, conferred the royal title upon the elector of Brandenburg, naming his kingdom after the Polish duchy of Prussia.

It soon appeared that the Prussian sovereigns were far more jealous of Austria than of France. Their German possessions were of greater extent than those of any other German prince except the Duke of Austria. Ranking second in the empire, Prussia began to aspire to the first place. Frederic the Great, grandson of the first Prussian king, wrested Silesia from Austria; and, afterward, just before the French Revolution, arranged with Russia and Austria the partition of Poland.

Up to this period, sovereigns ruled their dominions with absolute sway. They partitioned nations out among themselves, according to the dictates of ambition or caprice. They acted as absolute owners of the territories under their rule. Lands and people were heritable property. War, marriage, and treaty, severed populations from their proper relations, and consigned them to the ownership of new lords, uniting them to foreign, perhaps hostile countries. While the populations had no voice in political events, national boundaries were utterly disregarded by potentates. The authority

of the king was the central point of government; the unity of nations was left altogether out of view. At the commencement of the French Revolution, the severance of national ties had reached its culmination. Henceforth, the impulse of the populations was felt, aspiring to regain their lost nationality.

Sect. 3.—Forces in Conflict to Overthrow, and to Maintain the Old Order of Things.

The French Revolution inaugurated a new era. In denying the divine right of monarchs to reign and partition out peoples and territories at their pleasure, proclaiming the right of the people to self-government, it assailed the fundamental principle of Absolutism. It ushered in an era of conflict between Absolutism and Progress, which has, thus far, been waged with varying success, and which must continue, until one or the other shall achieve a definite triumph. The struggle, thus far, has passed through three epochs; it now seems approaching a crisis, in which Absolutism threatens to achieve a decisive predominance.

I. First Epoch: Wars of the French Revolution.

The new doctrines of the French Revolution, the gift of America to Europe, filled the monarchs of the old world with dismay. They banded together, to stifle the movement in the cradle, and prevent its leavening the minds of their subjects. The despots of Central and Eastern Europe resolved, as the surest means of suppressing republican doctrines, to partition the territory of France after the manner of Poland. Of all the enemies of the French Revolution, the Tory government of England was the most embittered and persistent; the more from the warm sympathy of the English *people* with the movement.

France was deluged with armies on every side. But the enthusiastic French soldiery overwhelmed the generals of the potentates, commanding troops indifferent to the cause for which they fought. The invading columns were repulsed: Napoleon appeared the scourge of monarchs: he appealed to the national feeling in Italy, which had slumbered for ages: he proclaimed himself the avenger of nations against despots who disregarded their rights: his arms extended the

principles of the revolution through Europe. But, at length, his ambitious career brought him into antagonism with the rights of nations. He embraced the old axiom of Absolutism, that territories and peoples belong to crowns; he began, himself, to enslave and dismember nations, becoming the greatest despot of them all. Monarchs endeavored to resist him, by wars waged in accordance with the principles of Absolutism;—but in vain: in despair, they appealed to the principles of the French Revolution, and aroused the national impulses of their subjects against the Conqueror. From that moment, the star of Napoleon waned. He was hurled from his throne by the enthusiasm of roused populations. This movement of the nations fixed the idea of national rights in their minds too deeply to be eradicated. The sovereigns had raised a spirit they could not lay. Henceforth, deep in the hearts of disparted and trampled nations smoldered longing aspirations after lost nationality, only waiting the breath of revolution to fan them into flame.

II. Second Epoch: The Rule of Absolutism from 1815 to 1848.

The monarchs were aware of the powerful emotions that had been summoned into existence; but, in the moment of victory, they relied upon force, to suppress any discontents of the people. They re-adjusted the map of Europe, by the treaties of 1815, treating nations as property to be distributed at the will of the royal owners. The Bourbons were re-established in France. Germany was divided afresh, and partitioned out as the congress of sovereigns deemed the various German princes merited punishment or reward: Prussia, especially, with the countenance of Russian diplomacy, received large accessions of territory, at the expense of various princes who had allied themselves with Napoleon. Several Italian states were given to Austria, of which Lombardy and Venetia were the most valuable; and a number of Hapsburg princes received duchies in Italy, to be held by them in dependence upon the Austrian crown. The Neapolitan states were again assigned to the Bourbon king of Naples. The partition of Poland was confirmed. Belgium was annexed to Holland, as a precautionary measure, to prevent the possibility of its being ever annexed to France; its territory

belonging of right to that nation, and its reannexation being, from the age of Louis XIV, the cherished aim of French ambition.

It was the triumph of Absolutism.

In the treaties of 1815, the despots of Europe threw down the gauntlet to the new ideas of the age. In subduing France, and restoring the Bourbons as to their rightful inheritance, they issued a declaration of irreconcilable enmity to the principle of popular rights: in repartitioning Europe at the arbitrary will of kings, they proclaimed their contempt for the rights of nationalities. It was necessary to adopt some measures, to maintain the high stand they had assumed. They found themselves face to face with an antagonistic element, whose triumph would overturn their thrones. It was for the time suppressed; but there was every probability of French ideas breaking forth, again, at the first favorable opportunity. They resolved to keep them down by force of arms; to that end, the council of sovereigns deemed it necessary to come to an explicit understanding among themselves respecting their future policy. A secret compact, termed the Holy Alliance, was formed, for the purpose of maintaining the rights of kings against populations. This treaty was signed by Prussia, Russia, and Austria; the plenipotentiaries of the British government and the restored Bourbons approved it, but deemed it best, owing to the popular sentiment at home, not to become actual parties to the instrument. In the Holy Alliance, the sovereigns agreed to mutually assist each other against their subjects, and to unite their forces for the suppression of all popular movements in Europe.

In this Holy Alliance, the European monarchs crouched beneath the mantle of Russia, for protection against French principles. Russia became the equipoise of the French nation in the European political system.

The Czar, from the necessity of his position, is the champion of Absolutism. He is sovereign of immense territories, peopled by different races,—Finns, Russians, Poles, Cossacks, and Tartars,—whose sole bond of union is subjection to the Russian crown. His throne is based upon Absolutism. His power could not stand for a year, if the principle of Nationality prevailed abroad. Were the rest of Europe to overturn the feudal monarchies, when the divided

nations regained their unity and independence, the impulse of nationality would spread to Russia, overturn the throne, and dismember the empire into its national elements. The Czar is aware of this; it is his policy to maintain the feudal monarchies of Central Europe, against the outbreaks of the restless Nationalities.

He is incited to this policy by ambition, also. Russia aspires to universal dominion. It is an hereditary ambition. Peter the Great, in his celebrated will, marked out the policy his successors should pursue, in order to attain this object. This career of ambition is open to Russia, while the Nationalities are writhing beneath feudal thrones; but the establishment of the Nationalities in independence closes it forever.

From 1815 to 1848, Europe reposed beneath the shadow of Russia. The Czar occupied the only stable throne; and the Bourbons, the Hapsburgs, the Hohenzollerns, the feudal monarchs of Central and Western Europe, leaned upon his power.

But the new ideas engrafted in the hearts of the nations continued to grow and expand. In 1830, the French people again rose in revolution, and expelled the Bourbon dynasty which had been restored in 1815. Inspired by the example of France, the Poles rose in arms to regain their lost independence; Belgium threw off the yoke of the sovereign imposed by the monarchs, and declared its independence of Holland.

But Absolutism maintained its prestige. The rising in Poland was promptly suppressed; the Belgians, awed by the Great Powers, agreed to accept a sovereign of their choice; and the French nation, to propitiate the leagued despots, placed a Bourbon upon the throne from which a Bourbon was expelled. The influence of Russia again prevailed; Absolutism asserted its predominance.

For eighteen years more, the new ideas continued to slumber, cradled in the popular heart. Meantime, the sovereigns, aware of the existence of danger ready at any moment to burst forth with revolutionary violence, clung closer to the protection of Russia.

III. Third Epoch: The Successful Aggression of French Progressive Ideas, from 1848 to 1866.

1*st. First Period: the Revolutionary Outburst.*

In 1848, the French again rose in revolution, dethroned the Bourbons, and proclaimed a Republic. Instantly the impulse flashed through Europe. Germany was in commotion; Ireland attempted to revolt from British rule; Italy rose in revolution; Hungary threw off the Austrian yoke, and declared its independence. The Czar was overwhelmed by the revolutionary outburst. So far from attempting to carry out the stipulations of the Holy Alliance, he quailed before the storm, and crouched behind his own frontiers. Drawing a military cordon around his borders, to protect his own dominions from the revolutionary contagion, he left Austria and Prussia to breast the storm as best they might.

A bold movement on the part of France, at that juncture, might have readjusted the map of Europe. The populations were everywhere ripe for revolution, and only needed a head. Had the French Republic issued a declaration in favor of the Nationalities, the whole of Central Europe would have burst into a revolutionary flame; the Austrian and Prussian thrones must have fallen; and Germany, Poland, Italy, and Hungary would have regained their lost nationality. The whole question, so full of danger to Liberty, so pregnant of possibilities for reaction in favor of Absolutism, would have been settled forever; leaving no danger in the future of a combination between despots, to conquer Europe and the world. The nations might all have fallen back, as did France, into the arms of monarchy; but it would have been liberal, constitutional monarchy, resting, not on divine right, but the will of the people,—the national monarchy of independent nations. Europe might thenceforth have had peace. The colossal armies now employed by despots to hold trampled and disparted nations in subjection, and to guard against each other's ambition, might have been disbanded. Monarchs, recognizing the people as their constituents, and governing in accordance with their will expressed by representatives freely elected, need no armies to support their thrones; and the balance of power would be sufficiently maintained by the equal strength of the various na-

tions, and by the universal recognition of the right of a nation to choose its own government. Then industry, relieved from the drain of conscription and the pressure of taxation, would soon have ushered in a prosperity hitherto unknown. The nations would have moved onward in a career of progress, only emulous of social, industrial, and political advancement,—an undeviating career, eventually culminating in universal freedom. As the nations ripened in intelligence and republican thought, thrones would have peacefully fallen, like mellow fruit from the boughs of autumn.

And events would have taken this course had America occupied the position we might have attained, even then, by using properly the advantages God and Nature had given. Had we, instead of England, been queen of the seas, or, had we been able to counterbalance the English navy and English loans, the French Republicans would have chosen the bold course, and led the nations on to freedom.

But England was already far advanced in the career of commercial grandeur our course had opened to her. Her sails covered every sea, and the wealth of the world was pouring into her coffers in a golden stream. The sympathies of the English government were in favor of the established Powers, and against revolution. The influence of Britain in that hour of crisis overawed the French Republic.

France could not head the march of freedom, nor strike a blow for the rights of man. Money is the sinews of modern war, and France was penniless: the Republic feared to enter again, as in 1793, into a contest with despotisms backed by British loans and British fleets. The French republicans adopted the course the predominance and hostility of Britain forced upon them: they proclaimed neutrality between the monarchs and the people, leaving each nation to determine its own political destiny. They, no doubt, believed that, in thus securing British neutrality also, they were best subserving the interests of the nationalities in their struggle with the crowns. But British neutrality was not secured. The government, true, held aloof; but British gold, the sinews of the nation's power, was poured out in a stream, to strengthen the despots, and enable them to equip armies against the national move-

ments. On the other hand, the patriots, left to their own unguided impulses, without the nucleus French armies would have afforded, frittered away their advantages without concerted action. The German people, after crushing their sovereigns, temporized with them, and were soothed with promises that were not intended to be kept; Russia, recovering from her panic, and strengthened with British loans, placed her armed heel upon Poland, and aided Austria to subdue the Hungarian patriots; England suppressed the Irish movement; Austria, with recovered strength, assailed and crushed Italy. After a brief convulsion, Central Europe was forced back, by means of English subsidies, into its former condition.

Thanks to England, Absolutism regained its ascendant. The feudal Powers replaced their yoke firmly upon the necks of the subjected and disparted nations.

But the revolutions of 1848 were not fruitless. France was free: the Bourbons, reinstated by foreign bayonets, in 1814, were expelled; the majesty of the nation was vindicated against Absolutist principles. France had trampled upon the treaties of 1815; and, though suppressed elsewhere, national aspirations continued to smolder in the hearts of the nations. Italy, and Germany, and Hungary, and Poland, and Ireland, still continued to long for their lost nationality. Henceforth, the struggle between the principles of Nationality and Absolutism must continue, until one or the other achieve a final triumph.

The French Republic ran its brief career, and terminated in the elevation of a Bonaparte to the imperial throne. The event proved that France is not ripe for republicanism; though it has reached a point of advancement which places it in irreconcilable antagonism with Absolutist principles. Napoleon III. became emperor in opposition to the treaties of 1815 which restored the Bourbons. His elevation was a triumph of the principles of nationality, a declaration of the right of each people to determine their own form of government, in opposition to the principles of Absolutism, which make the people the property of monarchs. Napoleon, in virtue of his imperial dignity, is pledged to the cause of nationalities. His throne is founded on a nation's choice. He recognizes the fact in all his public acts.

He heads his proclamations, "Napoleon III., by the grace of God, and the will of the French people." When the Opposition in the French Chambers has grown violent, his ministers have stated that the emperor acknowledges the French people as his constituency, and recognizes his obligation to abdicate, if the people who elevated him demand it. But they further stated, that the imperial government would not fall without a struggle; that it would recommend itself, in every possible way, to the popular favor, and meet its opponents upon their own ground in courting the good will of the nation. This declaration embodies the principles which govern the imperial administration. Napoleon is emperor, to carry out the ideas of the French nation, and to administer the government in accordance with their will.

Upon his accession, two distinct ideas committed Napoleon to the championship of the rights of Nationalities,—necessity, and ambition.

In the first place, he was compelled to adopt this policy, in order to maintain his throne against Absolutist principles abroad, and revolutionary tendencies at home.

The French empire is established upon principles adverse to the other crowns of Europe. The Absolutist principles which maintain other monarchs upon their thrones against the wishes of their people, would dethrone Napoleon, and re-establish the Bourbons. On the other hand, the principle of national consent upon which the Napoleonic dynasty is founded, would give independence to Hungary and Ireland, and nationality to Italy, Germany, and Poland.

But furthermore: the French emperor has not only to defend himself against reactionary principles abroad, but against progressive revolutionary tendencies at home. The French people idolize him as the representative and vindicator of the principles of the French revolution, against the Absolutist principles of foreign monarchs. They are indoctrinated by the national historians with the belief that it is the destiny of France to champion the principles of the Revolution. They glory in the success of the First Napoleon while he represented the Revolution, and moralize upon his fall, as occasioned by his apostacy from freedom. The least symptom of turning aside

from his policy, to coalesce with foreign potentates, would cost Napoleon III. his popularity. Instead of leading French opinion, he would suffer it to leave him behind; when he might expect the fate of Louis Phillippe. Napoleon's position necessarily renders him the opponent of Absolutism, and the champion of the oppressed Nationalities of Europe. That he appreciated his position, and was prepared to accept its duties is evident from the significant, though guarded language of his celebrated Bordeaux address, in which he indicated the policy of the empire. "We have everywhere," he exclaimed, "ruins [Nationalities] to be raised, false gods [the principles of Absolutism] to pull down, and truths to make triumphant." This was his acceptance of the duties of his position.

The ambition of Napoleon, also, has incited him to adopt this programme. Of the five great powers, France alone has nothing to fear, but much to hope from the triumph of the principle of nationality. That principle wrests Ireland from England, dismembers Russia, and destroys Austria and Prussia; but it promises to France the reannexation of the Flemish provinces, severed from the country three hundred years ago. Moreover, the championship of the movement confers upon Napoleon a position of commanding influence. It has made him the storm-king whom monarchs must court,—the Æolus imprisoning tempests whose unbridled fury would scatter in broken wrecks the feudal thrones. To this must be added the lofty fame success will give to him who shall liberate Europe from the domination of Absolutism and the dread of Russian ascendancy. Napoleon I. pronounced a great truth when he said Europe was destined to be either French or Cossack. He who should secure the ascendancy of liberal French principles, and thus save Europe from Russian domination, would leave to history the loftiest name in the records of time.

Thus France and Russia are the poles of European politics. Napoleon and the Czar represent the extremes of Absolutism and Progress. Absolutism menaces Napoleon with ruin, and promises the Czar security and universal dominion; Progress threatens Russia with downfall, and offers to Napoleon a most glorious career, and the loftiest niche in the temple of fame. Absolutism against Progress,—France against Russia,—one or the other must fall.

2nd. Second Period: Napoleon Emerges from Isolation.

The European sovereigns perceived, upon the accession of Napoleon, that circumstances devolved upon him the championship of the Nationalities. They knew that he could only rule France by entering upon a career that flattered the national pride; and they watched his movements with dread. Their fears caused them to rally more firmly around Russia, as the champion of Absolutism, and the equipoise of France.

The policy of the sovereigns was plain. France must be isolated from the rest of Europe, and Napoleon debarred from all influence.

In pursuance of this policy, the sovereigns treated the parvenu with cold and contemptuous aversion. The European press united in heaping derision and abuse upon him; by turns, charging him with the most towering schemes of ambition, and holding him up to scorn as a lucky simpleton. Foreign countries were entertained with caricatures of his personal appearance, misrepresentation of his public acts, contemptuous estimates of his capacity, and taunts upon his utter want of influence in Europe. It was hoped, either that the endurance of these taunts and patient acquiescence in isolation, would beget a general contempt, depriving him of all influence with the Nationalities, and exposing him to the contempt of France, as a weak ruler who suffered the nation to be deprived of influence abroad; or, that an impatient attempt to vindicate himself by a rash intervention in foreign politics, would give Europe an excuse for combining against him, not as the sovereign of France, but as a man dangerous to the public peace. The sovereigns seemed to have placed him in a dilemma where either alternative threatened him with ruin.

But Napoleon was equal to the occasion. He realized the strength of his position, and knew he could afford to wait. He was strong in the affections of the French; and Nationalities abroad looked upon him as their champion. The national idea was growing stronger continually; and every revolutionary tendency would increase his influence. He disregarded foreign comments upon his character and administration, and patiently bided his time.

An event occurred soon after his elevation to the presidency, which afforded him the coveted opportunity of intervention in foreign affairs. A disturbance broke out in the Roman States. The

Pope appealed for aid to foreign powers. Austria, who already held in subjection all the states of Northern Italy except Sardinia, was ready to intervene for the purpose of establishing her authority in Central Italy, also, under cover of a military protectorate of the Pope. This would shut Napoleon out from all intervention in the affairs of Italy. He anticipated Austria, and established a French force at Rome, to uphold the authority of the Pope.

The potentates did not foresee the important influence this intervention was destined to give him over the affairs of Italy. They thought it but a slight advance from his isolation, to achieve which he had been compelled to depart from French principles, and uphold a ruler against his people. Delighted to see him involving himself in the meshes of a contradictory and vacillating policy, they readily acquiesced in his intervention.

And now the contempt of the other powers afforded Napoleon the coveted opportunity so essential to his prestige, of emerging from his enforced isolation. The ambition of Russia precipitated that power into a blunder fatal to the interests of Absolutism.

The Czar had long aspired to the possession of Constantinople. Before the French Revolution of 1789 affrighted monarchs with popular revolution, the sovereigns of Europe were especially intent upon the maintenance of the Balance of Power, and kept Russia back from this goal of its ambition. Then, the wars of the French Revolution occupied its attention until the downfall of Napoleon; and afterward, the treaties of 1815 placed Turkey under the protection of the Great Powers. But so commanding was the position of Russia, so necessary was its protection to the other powers, that none were prepared to oppose its ambition. The restored Bourbons leaned upon its protection even more entirely than the feudal monarchs of Central Europe. The French Revolution of 1830 alone prevented the Czar from achieving his aim. Louis Phillippe, the king of the French, relying upon popular favor more than foreign bayonets, would have hailed an opportunity of giving stability to his dynasty by repulsing Russia from Constantinople. During his reign, the Czar could not venture on an attempt that would array England and France against him, supported probably by Austria, now reassured by twenty years of tranquillity.

The Revolutions of 1848 seemed to give the coveted opportunity. France governed by a Bonaparte was isolated in Europe: Austria, chastened by revolution, leaned upon Russia in greater dependence than ever: Prussia, in virtue of a secret understanding, which will hereafter be further mentioned, favored the ambition of the Czar: England stood alone, and the English ministry seemed little disposed to press its opposition to extremity. The Czar thought it a favorable opportunity to achieve the conquest of Turkey, and after endeavoring, in vain, to obtain the acquiescence of England, by offering a division of the spoils, he engaged in the enterprise alone.

This movement at once interrupted the cordial understanding that existed between Russia and her allies. Her movement threatened the India possessions of England. The Tories were opposed to war, because they desired to strengthen the power of the puissant champion of Absolutism. But the ministry then in power represented the Trading Aristocracy; and they were resolved to repel the Autocrat from the road to India, at all hazards. They began to cast about for an alliance. Austria could not venture to provoke an issue with the Czar; Prussia seemed ready to second his schemes: England was compelled to accept an alliance with France. The alliance was concluded, despite the protestations of the Tories, who regarded it as an egregious political blunder, far more to be deplored than the Russian acquisition of Turkey.

Napoleon's grand object was attained. He was no longer isolated. The false step of Russia enabled him to become the necessary friend of the very chiefest of his uncle's foes,—the power whose alliance was most important to the ends he had in view. The allied arms drove Russia from her prey. France reaped the laurels of the war. Just as England, having tardily mustered her resources, was prepared to act efficiently, Russia, exhausted by her herculean efforts, sued for peace. England wished to continue the war, with the double aim of winning laurels and of reducing Russia to a condition in which she would cease to be formidable. But this was not Napoleon's policy. He had ulterior aims; having obtained the friendship of England, he now sought to win the gratitude of Russia. He acted the part of a magnanimous foe, and met the overtures of Russia with cordial acquiescence. England protested in vain. He

forced the British government to assent to peace, by avowing his resolution, otherwise, to make a separate peace, and leave it to carry on the war alone.

At the close of the Crimean war, the harmony of the parties to the treaties of 1815 was irrevocably broken. Russia was hostile to England, and resentful against Austria. On the other hand, Napoleon had emerged from his isolation, and won the friendship of England by his aid, and the gratitude of Russia by his forbearance. The time was come when he might cautiously move in the delicate question of the nationalities.

3d. *Third Period: Napoleon's Restoration of Italian Nationality.*

The French emperor began with Italy, where he had already, with profound foresight, paved the way for intervention. He already had a footing in the country, as the protector of the Pope; and he had taken Victor Emanuel, the king of Sardinia, under his protection, as the only liberal sovereign in Italy, and, consequently, the only ruler suited to become the monarch of the united nation. He had also paved the way for the future elevation of his protegé, by engaging him in the Crimean war as the ally of England and France; thus giving the future Italian agitator a claim upon the gratitude of the English government.

It was the policy of Napoleon, now, to fix the eyes of Italians upon his protegé as their future king. For it is his profound policy not to excite the revolutionary spirit, without giving it an object round which to rally. He thus gives revolution a head; prevents its running into excesses; and obtains the power of controlling and guiding it at will, without coming himself in contact with revolutionary masses. With the countenance of Napoleon, the king of Sardinia assumed the championship of Italian nationality, and encouraged patriotic aspirations throughout the whole country. The Italians turned their eyes to him as the hope of Italy.

The role of agitator assumed by the king of Sardinia at once brought him into collision with Austria. That power held all Northern Italy, except Sardinia, beneath its yoke; and dependent dukedoms ruled by Austrian princes extended into Central Italy, down to the boundary of the Papal States. Austrian spies found

Sardinian agents everywhere, exciting the Italian mind with the desire of national unity. Austria took umbrage, but dared not assail Sardinia covered with the mantle of French protection. The agitation progressed, until all Northern Italy was ready to burst into a flame. The Italians turned their eyes to Napoleon for aid.

The French emperor waited until the excitement fostered by Sardinia rose to such a pitch, as to threaten an early outbreak. He then assumed the character of friend of order, and took the ground that, to avert a revolution dangerous to his own throne and to the peace of Europe, Austria must evacuate Italy.

The demand of Napoleon was supported by the moral aid of all the Great Powers, except England. Russia lent him her countenance, ostensibly because his policy was the only means of averting revolution, but really because its own policy required the humiliation of Austrian power. Prussia, seconded by Russia, has long aspired to effect the union of Germany beneath its sway. Both those powers, therefore, favored the union of Italy, as a step toward the achievement of the aim of their policy; and as the power of Austria is the grand obstacle to the intended union of Germany, they hailed the movement that promised to humble its formidable power. Russia, therefore, openly favored the policy of Napoleon: Prussia declared its neutrality so long as the war was confined to Italy; but, in its ambitious championship of Germany, vaunted its resolution to instantly resent the movement of a French army upon German soil. The British government alone manifested a warm sympathy with the Austrian cause. The Tories were then in power, by means of a coalition with the Liberals; and, in defiance of the sympathies of the English people with the patriotic Italian movement, they on all occasions manifested their sympathy with Austria and Absolutist principles.

Before moving in the Italian question, Napoleon found it necessary to take precautions to muzzle the English Tory party, and prevent it from throwing the power of England against him in his conflict with Austria. He knew he might rely upon the sympathy of the Liberals; but to make their sympathy effective, it was necessary to secure the co-operation of the Whigs. He invited Lord Palmerston, the Whig leader, to visit him; and Palmerston's subse-

quent course in Parliament showed that, during their interviews, Napoleon made him a convert to his Italian policy. He constantly supported the policy of the French emperor, and showed that his party was prepared to take issue with the Tories, if they attempted intervention in favor of Austria. The Tories knew that, upon that issue, their Liberal allies would go over to the Whigs, and unseat them from power. They were, therefore, precluded from active opposition to Napoleon. But they did what they could. They encouraged loans to Austria; and they endeavored, by the most active and earnest diplomacy, to avert a war and maintain her in possession of her Italian provinces.

All, however, proved vain. Napoleon moved steadily toward his purpose. He concluded an alliance with Sardinia, and adroitly defeating the persistent maneuvers of British Tory diplomacy, took the field in the cause of Italian nationality. In a short campaign, the French and Sardinians drove the Austrians out of Lombardy. By pursuing his advantage, Napoleon might have driven them out of Italy. But, in that event, Austria would continue the war, which would involve him in a serious dilemma: if he remained on the defensive, the war would last perpetually; if he crossed the German frontier, Prussia and all the German states were ready to combine against him. This posture of affairs compelled Napoleon to stop short in the career of victory, and make peace, leaving Venetia, and several other Italian states, in the hands of Austria. He contented himself with annexing Lombardy to the dominions of his ally, the king of Sardinia, together with the duchies from which the dukes of the House of Austria had been expelled.

In the negotiations which preceded the Italian war, we perceive the policy which characterizes the movements of Napoleon as the champion of nationalities. He never presents himself as the zealous partisan of their cause. On the contrary, he affects to be embarrassed by the necessity of his position as emperor of the French, which imposes upon him the necessity of championing them in their struggles, as the only means of preventing revolution at home. The position of the French emperor has required the most watchful prudence. He has stood alone in Europe upon this question. The

other Great Powers have been watching his movements with jealous eyes. To assume boldly the position of Agitator would bring against him a coalition which he could resist, only by summoning the Nationalities to arms;—an extreme measure, which would involve a war to the death with the existing powers; and, unless the populations were ripe for revolution, the colossal weight of Russia would suppress the premature movement, and roll upon France an irresistible torrent of invasion. Napoleon has been under the imperative necessity of patiently waiting, and secretly guiding, the course of events. It is his policy to remain behind the scenes, moving the puppets who stimulate revolutionary impulses, until his agents have excited popular fervor to a pitch which justifies him in interfering, as the friend of order, rather than the champion of revolution.

The Italian war and the peace of Villa Franca only began the work of Italian unity. Lombardy and the Austrian Duchies were annexed to Sardinia;—but Austria retained Venetia, in virtue of a treaty which the faith of Napoleon was pledged to respect; the Central states were under the dominion of the Pope, whose power was maintained by a French garrison; while the South of the peninsula was swayed by the Bourbons of Naples.—The Italians soon grew impatient of delay. But Napoleon made no movement. Garibaldi, the Italian patriot, levied a band of guerilla adventurers, to make a fillibuster expedition against the kingdom of Naples. It will not be known until time gives the archives of the present age to history, what connection Napoleon had with this enterprise. With his usual caution, he sought to avoid the suspicion of complicity, by suggesting to the British government to order its cruizers to intercept the expedition,—a suggestion obviously made for political effect; for he knew that the coalition of Whigs and Liberals who then ruled England would not entertain the proposition for a moment.—Garibaldi landed in the Neapolitan states, routed the royal forces, drove the Bourbon king out of his dominions, and annexed them to Sardinia, or, as it was now termed, the kingdom of Italy.

All Italy was now united, except Venetia and the Papal States. Italian patriots became clamorous for continued progress toward unity. But the soldiers of Napoleon garrisoned Rome, and his faith

was plighted to respect the Italian possessions of Austria. The French emperor was placed in an embarrassing position. Italian excitement ran high against Austria, and powerful armies were levied with the avowed object of driving her out of Italy. It seemed as if a collision were imminent, in which the sympathies of France would involve the emperor, contrary to the faith of treaties. The situation of German affairs promised to extricate him from his dilemma, if the crisis were postponed; and, with profound sagacity, Napoleon employed all the arts of diplomacy, to defer the assault upon Austria until the propitious moment. To appease the excitement of the Italian mind, he engaged (1864) to withdraw his troops from Rome at the expiration of two years, leaving the question between the Pope and his subjects to be determined between themselves; but, for the sake of decency, exacting from the king of Sardinia—or rather of Italy—an engagement that he would not suffer any assault to be made from without upon the Papal territories. This engagement was a virtual surrender of the temporal power of the Pope, and a consent to the union of the States of the Church with the kingdom of Italy, at the expiration of a limited time. It was regarded in this light, both by Italy and France. French pamphlets speaking by authority were issued, to prepare the mind of the Catholic world for the approaching downfall of the temporal power of the Pope. Appeased by this concession, Italy withheld the threatened blow against Austria.

The German imbroglio, fostered no doubt by the secret maneuvers of the French court, took the expected direction. Prussia became involved in war with Austria, and, at the suggestion of Napoleon, formed an alliance with Italy against their common foe. Austrian disasters compelled that power to solicit the mediation of Napoleon, and cede Venetia as the price of his good offices; and that state is now united to the kingdom of Italy. All Italy is now united, except the States of the Church. The French troops will soon evacuate Rome according to agreement, and then, if no unfortunate turn of affairs occurs to thwart the far-seeing policy of Napoleon, Italian nationality will be restored. The policy of the French emperor, combining a rare union of prudence, skill, and energy, may be said to have brought the Italian imbroglio to a favorable conclusion.

Unless a great reaction in favor of despotism shall occur, the first act in the drama of European reconstruction will soon be complete.

We have thus, to avoid prolixity of statement, traced the progress of the Italian question down to the present time. It remains to trace the important events to which progressive French ideas have given rise in Germany.

4th. The Napoleonic Programme for effecting the National Unity of Germany.

It will be remembered that, as Italy was divided between the king of Naples, the Pope, the king of Sardinia, the emperor of Austria, and various Austrian dukes, so Germany was divided between the emperor of Austria, the king of Prussia, the king of Denmark, and more than thirty other feudal princes. When Napoleon first assumed the championship of the principle of nationality, the German mind was as thoroughly imbued with aspirations after national unity as the Italian; the same process of agitation which wrought such grand results in Italy would have produced effects not less important in Germany. Napoleon selected Italy as the first field for agitation, not because it was riper for revolution, but because fewer difficulties were to be encountered in carrying the question to a successful issue. The princes who divided Italy among them had no common policy; they might be assailed in detail; but agitation in Germany would have been met by the action of the *Bund*, and must have precipitated a general war. Again, agitation might progress in Italy without involving European complications. Prussia, as already mentioned, aspired to unite Germany beneath her scepter; regarding all steps toward the union of Italy with approval, as facilitating her own ambition, she rejoiced in the blows which weakened the power of Austria, the great obstacle to her intended career. Russia, also, sympathized with the aims of Prussian ambition, and was not disposed to make any opposition to measures which so directly facilitated it. Napoleon, therefore, selected Italy as the field for agitation, leaving Germany to ripen gradually for a movement in favor of Nationality.

Whether the recent agitation in Germany originated in the secret

maneuvers of French diplomacy, cannot be certainly known in this age. But that agitation reached a crisis very opportunely, and rescued Napoleon from an embarrassing position in respect of the Italian imbroglio; whether its beginning was fostered by French intrigue or not, it is certain that French diplomacy fostered it, and gave it direction.

We must understand the policy of the French emperor with regard to Germany, in order to comprehend the tangled skein of events which ultimated in the Prusso-Austrian war of 1866. His policy is the key to the course of the German imbroglio. The events of the last three years prove that Napoleon had a consistent, well-devised plan, by which he proposed to effect the re-establishment of all the European nationalities, by means of the movement in Germany. A statement of the facts will prove the existence of a far-reaching policy in the mind of the French emperor.

It will be remembered, that Germany is an agglomeration of feudal states, governed by feudal princes, some of sovereign rank, but all united in a loose confederation, and represented in a general federal diet. Several centuries ago, the German duchy of Holstein became, by inheritance, the feudal possession of the king of Denmark. The Danish sovereigns, having inherited the duchy, regarded it as their own, by as good a title as the rest of their dominions. Never supposing that their possession, running through centuries, would be questioned, they did not restrict the German population of Holstein to their own territory, but suffered them to settle in the adjoining Danish duchy of Schleswig. So that, in process of time, half the duchy of Schleswig became peopled with Germans. The people of Holstein and the German population of Schleswig have been, for years, restive beneath Danish rule. They were separated from German interests and association, and governed as a portion of a foreign kingdom. Their dissatisfaction at length (1863) reached such a height as to threaten a revolt from the Danish yoke. The king of Denmark, like other feudal sovereigns in similar circumstances, strengthened his garrisons and bade defiance to the popular aspirations.

The question now assumed a new phase. The people of Germany

sympathized warmly with the cause of the Holsteiners. Mutterings were heard indicative of a rising storm of national indignation. The question now boded danger to the other feudal sovereigns, for indignation against one might soon embrace them all. The German Diet made haste to anticipate the popular fermentation, and, to that end, resolved to take the question into its own hands and call out the troops of the Confederation, to wrest Holstein and Schleswig from the king of Denmark.

The open interference of Prussia in the question, now began. It has long been the policy of Prussia to assume the championship of German nationality; doubtless, with the design of fixing the national mind on the Prussian monarch, as the prince under whose scepter the long hoped for nationality may be attained. Prussia now came zealously forward, to become the executive of the national will. Austria, jealous of this officious zeal, placed herself abreast of her rival. The two Great German Powers took upon themselves the execution of the decree of the Diet, and promptly prepared to attack Denmark with overwhelming forces.

At this juncture, British diplomacy interposed, to avert the storm that was about to burst upon Denmark. The Prince of Wales had married a Danish princess, and British sympathies were enlisted by the family alliance. Austria was willing to consent to a compromise. But Prussia, no doubt meditating the appropriation of the Duchies, even then, was inexorable, and dragged Austria reluctantly after. The British government then solicited the intervention of the other two Great Powers, France and Russia, and avowed its willingness to fight, if either of them would second its arms. But both refused to interfere. Russia, no doubt, knew the ultimate aims of Prussia, and approved them, in furtherance of its own ambitious policy. Napoleon saw that the Great German Powers were championing the principle of Nationality against a feudal sovereign, and that affairs were taking the direction he wished. True to the principle of Nationality, he responded to the British overtures by proposing an European Congress that should settle all the vexed questions embroiling Europe: upon the rejection of his suggestion, he held aloof, while the belligerents brought the question to the arbitrament of force.

A short campaign drove the Danes out of the Duchies, and compelled the king of Denmark to sue for peace on any terms the German Powers chose to impose. In the treaty that followed, Denmark ceded the disputed Duchies.

Thus far, the sympathy of Napoleon with the cause of Nationalities is sufficient to account for his course, without supposing that he had a definite plan by which to avail himself of the course of events. His general policy in the cause of Nationality would induce him to favor an attempt to wrest the Duchies from a feudal sovereign, and unite them to the German nation. But the question now assumed a new phase, in which the course of the French emperor was either dictated by mad folly, or by a profound scheme for promoting the union of Germany and the restoration of all the Nationalities of Europe.

When the Duchies were surrendered by Denmark, it was expected that they would be given to the next heir of the Ducal domains. Both the principles of the feudal system, and the policy of Europe for the maintenance of the Balance of Power, required the adoption of this course. Claimants were not wanting. But the Prussian government maintained its hold upon the Duchies; and, after delaying upon various pretexts the final settlement of the question, it, at length, avowed its resolution to annex them to its own domains.

The aim of Prussia in attempting to secure this acquisition was patent to all familiar with the past policy of that State. The restlessness of the German nation in its disparted condition, and the popular aspirations after national unity, have long made it evident that, sooner or later, the unity of Germany must be consummated. Prussia has long aspired to become the imperial state of Germany, around which the whole nation may be united. With this end in view, it, from policy, always assumes the championship of the national interests. This policy induced it to menace Napoleon during the Italian war, in the event of his crossing the German frontier: the same policy caused it to stand forward in asserting the national cause against Denmark. It hopes that, being associated in the German mind with the cause of national unity, popular aspirations may

rally around it, as the exponent of the national idea, and the proper head of the German empire.

But the superior power of Austria in Germany has been an insuperable obstacle, hitherto, to the consummation of Prussian ambition. Austria possessed the greater extent of German territory; and all the minor princes of Germany, standing equally in dread of the aggressive ambition of Prussia, made common cause with Austria, in the German *Bund*. Prussia occupied the position of a restless agitator dangerous to the existing status, whom the other princes united to restrain. Before it could make any advance toward the goal of its ambition, an increase of power and influence was imperatively necessary. But it could not hope to rival Austria in extent of dominions; its only hope of attaining an ascendancy in Germany lay in becoming the commercial agent and industrial center of the nation. Commerce has, in our age, become the great source of wealth and power. The situation of the Austrian dominions in the center of the European continent, with only a few obscure ports upon the head of the Adriatic sea, precluded that power from becoming a commercial state. The Prussian dominions, whose only ports lay on the Baltic, were not more favorably situated for commerce. Prussia has deeply felt her disadvantageous situation; years ago, she manifested her desire of becoming a commercial state, by purchasing of Russia (in the Duchy of Oldenburg) a site for a port on the North Sea. This site, however, was too far removed from the rest of the Prussian territories to further materially the aims of that power. The purchase only served to show the anxiety of Prussia to become a commercial state, and the sympathy of Russia with the ambitious project.

The situation of Holstein is most favorable for commercial purposes. It has a number of fine harbors situated on the German Ocean; and the river Elbe, which drains a great part of Germany, forms the boundary between Holstein and Hanover down to the sea. The possession of Holstein would give Prussia the ocean ports she coveted, and the command of the mouth of the Elbe; and would enable it to become a commercial power, and drain the entire trade of Germany to its ports. Traffic always carries with it political power; the consummation of the scheme would give Prussia a

decided political ascendancy in Germany, and prove an important step toward the goal of its ambition.

All Europe was apprised of the aim of Prussian ambition; and the important bearing its acquisition of the Duchies would have in furthering its ulterior aims, was patent to all. Austria and the minor German princes were seized with alarm, and protested vigorously against the attempted acquisition. They resolved to prevent it by force of arms, and appealed to the Great Powers of Europe to aid them in preventing Prussia from acquiring a dangerous increase of power. England, always devoted to the maintenance of the Balance of Power, lent a favorable ear to their representations. If either France or Russia had taken a stand in opposition to Prussian ambition, the coalition would have been too formidable to confront; and Prussia must, perforce, have withdrawn from the Duchies, and yielded them to the lawful claimant, the duke of Augustenburg. But both France and Russia favored the designs of Prussia. The motives which influenced Russia will appear when we shall hereafter analyze its policy. But why did Napoleon favor Prussia? Why did he, when a word would have forced it to give up the Duchies, lend his countenance to its ambition?

The Prussian government, opposed by Austria and all the minor German states, was overmatched. It could not proceed with its design alone. The Prussian minister, Bismarck, applied for an alliance—to whom? To Napoleon. Then an understanding existed between the courts. The Prussian government knew that it might rely upon the sympathy of Napoleon, before it ventured to avow its resolution to appropriate the Duchies. And now in the face of an opposition too formidable to be confronted alone, it applied to him for assistance. Napoleon declined to interfere, but referred Bismarck to Italy, and suggested that an Italian alliance would answer the purpose. The Italian alliance was formed with the full approval of Napoleon, at his suggestion indeed, and Prussia and Italy confronted Austria allied with all the minor German States.

We cannot suppose that Napoleon was induced to countenance Prussia, merely for the purpose of obtaining her alliance to aid Italy in wresting Venetia from Austria. The end was too trivial to be obtained by such means. The Prussian acquisition of the Duchies

would completely overturn the balance of power in Germany, giving Prussia a decided ascendancy, and putting in operation causes which would effect the union of Germany beneath her sway, at no distant period. Napoleon is an able statesman, and he would never have suffered the Balance of Power to be thus irretrievably subverted, merely to effect a temporary object in providing Italy with an ally. He must have had a profounder aim, a far-sighted policy, to be furthered in the aggrandizement of Prussia,—nothing less than the final adjustment of the question of the Nationalities.

Napoleon must have foreseen that the establishment of Italian unity would excite national enthusiasm in Germany and Central Europe, and that the issue would force itself upon him at no distant day. It is not his habit to suffer issues to come upon him unprepared. By his occupation of Rome, and his patronage of Sardinia, he prepared himself to take control of Italian events, years before he attempted any active intervention. So, it was his policy to anticipate German agitation, and obtain a position to direct and control the movement, before the outburst came. Napoleon never suffers national aspirations to break out in popular revolution; but he aims to direct the popular impulse, by selecting some state as the nucleus round which national impulses may center. We have seen how he selected Sardinia as the center round which to unite Italy. So, in effecting the unity of Germany, it was his programme to select some German sovereign, under whose supremacy all the States of the Confederation might be united.

Several considerations pointed to Prussia as the state best fitted to become the Sardinia of Germany.—(1.) It had power enough, seconded by France, to carry out the movement and effect the union of Germany. The union of Germany under Prussia would be much less difficult to effect, than the union of Italy under the Sardinian crown. (2.) It had but a small extra German territory, in Poland, which it might readily give up to the national principle, in order to secure the aid of France in achieving the union of Germany beneath its sway. (3.) It seemed ready to enter upon the career; having, since 1848, assumed the championship of German nationality, as Sardinia had of Italian.—The only drawback was its past career, which committed the government to absolutist principles. Its share

in the partition of Poland, especially, linked it with Russia. Napoleon was apprised of the policy of Russia for the last fifty years, in seeking the aggrandizement of Prussia in the interest of its own ambition. He was also apprised of the cordial understanding which has existed between the two crowns during the whole of that period. He knew that the union of Germany under the Prussian crown would be fatal to liberal institutions in Europe, if the Prussian sovereign continued to cling to Absolutism, and used his accession of power for the furtherance of Russian policy, and Russian ambition. He is too profound a statesman to suffer a movement to progress, that would strengthen Absolutism and enable it to dominate Europe.

Napoleon perceived the risk involved in trusting Prussia with increased power, but he must, notwithstanding, have decided that Prussia should become the Sardinia of Germany. I doubt not, when the secret history of our time is known, it will be found that an understanding existed between the two governments before the Danish war. The French emperor, with the sublime self-confidence of greatness, relied upon his own ability to keep Prussia true to his policy while it was being carried to a successful termination; and, indeed, to so direct events, as to give that government no opportunity to play him false, until the question of the Nationalities was finally settled on so firm a basis as to make Prussian treachery hopeless. Confident in his ability to direct events and control Prussia, he countenanced its designs and seconded its ambition, by lending the moral support of France and furthering an alliance with Italy.

Let us note the probabilities which at that time must have dwelt in the far-seeing mind of Napoleon.

It seemed probable that, with the assistance of Italy, Prussia would make good its claim upon Holstein and Schleswig; and that, after a short war, peace would be made upon the basis of the cession of those duchies to Prussia, and Venetia to Italy.

Then the German enthusiasm for nationality, stimulated by French agents, would continue slowly to rise, compelling Prussia to take the option of going down before the movement, or of co-operating with Napoleon to direct it to her own advantage. Under the circum-

stances, Prussia would have no alternative but to co-operate with France and head the national agitation. Soon, Germany, Hungary, and Poland would grow ripe for a revolutionary outburst.

If Napoleon could trust Prussia implicitly, he might then intervene by arms, as in the case of Italy, and effect the unity of Germany, by aiding Prussia to overrun the territories of Austria and the other feudal princes. But the genius of Napoleon is rather politic than military. He would rather effect his object by negotiation than arms. Besides, he could not trust Prussia. Germany once united beneath its sway, the Prussian government might return to its absolutist proclivities, and, bidding defiance to France, enter into an alliance with Russia to arrest the further progress of liberal principles. Prudence would counsel Napoleon to keep the thread of events in his own hands, until his object was consummated.

Therefore, when Germany, Hungary, and Poland were ripe for revolution, he would exact of the Prussian government a renewed pledge to give up its Polish provinces, and second him in restoring all these Nationalities, on condition of having Germany united beneath its sway. This preliminary arranged, (and Prussia, with revolution menacing its throne as the alternative, would be compelled to submit,) he would repeat his call to the European Powers to meet in a European Congress, to avert an universal revolutionary outbreak, by adjusting the question of the Nationalities. His call would be seconded by Italy, on principle; and by Prussia, from anxiety to avert revolution and secure the sovereignty of Germany: a pledge not to introduce the Irish question would secure the adhesion of Great Britain, always anxious to maintain tranquillity: the Austrian government, completely at the mercy of revolution ready to break out in all its dominions, might be easily won over, by the promise of indemnity in Turkey for the dominions it would be required to cede. Russia alone would be reluctant; but Russia would be forced to acquiesce in the united voice of Europe.

The Congress assembled, Napoleon would propose, in order to settle forever the question of Nationalities and give peace and security to Europe, that Germany should be united under the Prussian scepter; that Poland should be restored to national unity and independence; that the Swedish provinces conquered by Russia should

be restored; that the Austrian dynasty should make Hungary its imperial seat, and receive indemnity for its German and Polish territories in the Turkish principalities,—an arrangement every way advantageous to the Hungarians, which would be highly acceptable to them; that the Greek population of Turkey should be restored to nationality, with the limits of the old Greek empire, having the Danube on its northern border; that the Belgic provinces wrested from France three hundred years ago should be restored; and that the unity of Italy, if still imperfect, should be completed.

This programme would give general satisfaction. France, Prussia, Austria, Italy, England, and Sweden would embrace it with one accord. Russia might demur; but confronted, on the one hand, by revolution, and on the other, by the united voice of Europe, Russia, seeing the hopelessness of resistance, would yield with a good grace the spoils she found it impossible to keep.

The arrangement once consummated, Europe would rest upon the equipoise of ten great nations,—Great Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Sweden, Russia, and Greece. There would no longer be any danger of Russian ambition, nor of a combination dangerous to the independence of the nations. Gradually, the progress of the principle of Nationality would cause England to consent to the independence of Ireland: it would also dismember the Russian empire into its national elements; when the Russian territory left, after restoring the Polish and Swedish boundaries, would be divided into Great Russia, Kasan, Ukraine, the Cossack territory, and Circassia. Then, at length, freed from the dread of dynastic ambition, the nations of Europe might give themselves to the arts of peace.

Such a consummation Napoleon must have designed for the question of Nationalities, when he gave his sanction to the Prussian acquisition of the Duchies, and lent that power his support in a war to maintain its claim. His programme supposed that, in the war with Austria, Prussia would merely maintain its possession of the Duchies; and, that his policy would have the moral support of the British government which had sustained him hitherto. This last was especially important to the success of his policy. Supported by the moral influence of England, or left unembarrassed by its

neutrality, he felt himself master of the situation; the success of his policy seemed infallible; Prussian treachery impossible; and the reconstruction of the map of Europe, and the re-establishment of the Nationalities at an early day, absolutely certain.

But both the contingencies upon which he relied for success failed him. Prussia achieved more decisive success than he had anticipated; the British government, under Tory rule, ranged itself against him.

The war began. The allies of Austria displayed the proverbial slowness of a league in taking the field; and, as a great part of the Austrian forces were detached to resist the assault of Italy, Prussia gained the advantage of the initiative. The Prussian government made a levy *en masse* of the military population, and, assuming a vigorous offensive, overran the territories of the North German states in alliance with Austria, and then invaded the Austrian states with one of the largest armies that has taken the field in modern times. The opposing forces met at Sadowa, in Bohemia, and after a terrible conflict, the superiority of the Prussians in numbers, arms, discipline, and dash, achieved a decisive victory. The Austrians were utterly routed, leaving 75,000 men on the field of battle.

The rout of Sadowa reduced Austria to extremity. Lying at the mercy of its antagonist, as its only hope, it appealed to the intervention of the Great Powers. To Napoleon it proffered Venetia, the bone of contention with Italy, as the price of his good offices.

The rapid and decisive success of the Prussian arms outran the expectations of Napoleon. The event showed that Prussia was sufficiently powerful to achieve the union of Germany by conquest, without the aid of France. The Prussian armies were pressing forward to another victory, which would have completed the destruction of the Austrian power and laid Germany at the feet of the conqueror.

At this moment, Napoleon intervened. He was justly distrustful, from the past course of Prussia, that the government, if permitted to achieve the union of Germany by conquest, might violate all its pledges, set him at defiance, and employ its power for the consolidation of Absolutism in Europe. He accepted Venetia, thus

preventing further attack by Italy, and enabling Austria to confront Prussia with all her forces; and gaining an impregnable base of operations, if he should find it necessary to take up arms, to force Prussia to treat. Napoleon intervened, not to prevent the union of Germany under the Prussian crown, but to prevent Prussia from achieving that union under circumstances that would render it independent of French influence, and enable it to contravene all his plans, and even endanger liberal institutions in Europe. He was still ready to co-operate with Prussia, as before, but he was resolved to keep the key of the situation in his own hands, that he might insure the fidelity of Prussia to his policy.

His distrust was well founded. Subsequent events prove that, if he had suffered Prussia, then, to achieve the union of Germany by conquest, it would have abused its power to the advancement of Absolutism. But it was then in the power of Napoleon. Russia, it is true, was ready to lend its support; but even with the aid of Russia, it was not able to cope with France and Austria. Upon the appearance of France in the field, Italy would change sides; a rapid movement of the French armies upon the Rhine would expel the Prussian troops from the German states they had overrun, and compel them to evacuate the Austrian territories; and that power would stand stripped of all its conquests, in opposition to all Germany allied with France.

Prussia perceived that Napoleon was master of the situation, and, with whatever reluctance, it promptly paused in the career of conquest at his bidding. The terms of peace Napoleon imposed show that his policy still looked to the union of all Germany under the Prussian crown. Prussia had taken up arms, only to make good its possession of Holstein and Schleswig. Napoleon might easily have enforced a demand, that peace should be made on the basis of the restoration of the territories overrun by the Prussian arms to their feudal princes, Prussia retaining only the duchies which were the occasion of the war. But Prussia, throughout the imbroglio, had proclaimed itself the advocate of French principles. It had asserted the principle of nationality against feudalism, in wresting the duchies from Denmark; in its alliance with Italy, it championed Italian nationality; during the war with Austria, it summoned Hungary by

proclamation to strike for its national independence. In all this, it proclaimed itself the exponent of French liberal principles. Still further to propitiate Napoleon, it now proposed to settle the questions involved in the treaty of peace, upon the basis of French principles. It proposed that the destiny of the conquered territories, either to return to their feudal princes, or to be annexed to Prussia, should be left to the vote of the people; thus asserting the progressive idea that the choice of the people is higher than feudal rights. It proposed, furthermore, that a North German Confederation should be established, to be governed by a national parliament elected by universal suffrage.

These propositions seemed to commit Prussia fully to the Napoleonic ideas, and the French emperor acquiesced in the vast increase of power the arrangement would secure. Peace was made upon the following basis: (1.) The States of Holstein and German Schleswig, the original ground of contention, were ceded to Prussia. (2.) The States overrun by the Prussian arms,—Hanover, Hesse Cassel, Saxony, etc.,—were to be annexed to the Prussian dominions, or return to their feudal lords, according as their populations should elect. (3.) The old Germanic Bund was dissolved, and a North-German Confederation established under the presidency of the king of Prussia, which included all those states of Northern Germany not actually annexed to his dominions.

This treaty nearly doubled the German territories of Prussia, and gave that power complete control of all Northern Germany; while the South-German states, including Bavaria, Baden, Wirtemberg, and the Austrian possessions, were left out to form a South-German union or not, as they chose. The arrangement places Prussia in a position to achieve the union of all Germany beneath its scepter. It is already head of half the country; and the other portion is placed in a position to feel more acutely than ever the severance of the nation, and to aspire ardently to an union with the Prussian North-German Confederation.

With this treaty we may close our chapter upon the state of Europe. It also closes the third epoch in the struggle between progress and Absolutism. It constitutes an era in the question of the

Nationalities, from which the historian will date a new phase of this important and exciting issue. Down to that event, French progressive ideas were aggressive. Napoleon controlled events for years, and he dictated the terms of that arrangement. Prussia seemed, at that time, to have committed herself thoroughly to his policy; and Napoleon seemed to have the fairest prospect of guiding events according to his desire, and securing, at no distant day, the establishment of the Nationalities.

But just at this crisis, occurred the political revolution in England mentioned in the preceding chapter, which gave the Tories control of the government. This change of English politics completely revolutionized the face of affairs on the Continent. It wrested the helm from the hand of Napoleon, and closed the era of French aggression against Absolutism; it rescued Absolutism from approaching downfall, and placed it at once in a haughty ascendant, which will enable it to dominate Europe, and threaten Liberty, throughout the world.

But we must reserve the new era so full of dangers, inaugurated by the Tory ascendancy in England, for another chapter.

CHAPTER III.

FOURTH EPOCH IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN ABSOLUTISM AND PROGRESS: IMPENDING TRIUMPH OF ABSOLUTISM.

Since the French Revolution of 1789, as has been seen in the preceding chapter, the question of the Nationalities has passed through three successive stages.

The First Epoch comprises the French Revolutionary wars, from 1789 to 1815: embracing, first, the period when France waged a defensive struggle with the armies of the Absolute nations; secondly, the period when, under Napoleon, revolutionary thought was aggressive, until the ambition of that monarch diverted the Revolution from its true channel, and perverted it to subserve the aims of

dynastic ambition; and, thirdly, the period when the despots appealed to the patriotism of their subjects, and crushed the conqueror with the onset of outraged nations.

The Second Epoch was inaugurated by the treaties of 1815, and extended to 1848: during this period Absolutism was predominant; but the nations were restive beneath the yoke, and were held in check by the rule of the sword.

The Third Epoch took its rise in the French revolution of 1848, and stretches to 1866: during which, the two forces, Progress and Absolutism, have been standing armed, front to front; Absolutism on the defensive; Progress gradually winning its way to what seemed a decisive supremacy. Throughout this epoch, France—supported by the alliance with England where the Liberal party held the balance of power—has been the standard-bearer of Progress.

But the revolution in English politics, during the past year, which established the Tories firmly in power, has inaugurated a Fourth Epoch. That revolution rescued Absolutism in the very crisis of the struggle from approaching ruin, and placed it in an ascendancy that will enable it to crush Progress in Europe—perhaps to trample the world beneath its feet. The epoch in the question of Nationalities now just begun, will be marked by a decisive conflict between Absolutism and Progress, in which the power of England under Tory rule will give the former a decisive victory, in the highest degree disastrous to the cause of Freedom in the earth.

To present a view of the political forces that will govern this epoch, and trace the necessary course of European events in this eventful crisis, will be the design of this chapter.

Sect. 1.—Forces at Work in Europe.

It is now admitted on all hands, that the existing status in Europe cannot continue. The question of Nationalities has reached a crisis in which some change is inevitable. The issue is, now, whether this change shall take such a direction as to re-establish all the Nationalities, and give a definitive victory to Progress; or whether events shall be controlled by reactionary forces, in such a manner as to firmly re-establish the ascendancy of Absolutism. Europe is in a critical condition. It is in that unsettled posture which marks the

decline of an old era, when worn out forces are about to be exchanged for the vigorous energetic agencies that mark a new age. Two rival principles,—Liberal Government, and Consolidated Absolutism,—are struggling for supremacy, battling for the sway of the dawning era. The present unsettled state of Europe may give place to either. Whichever principle is the victor in the approaching crisis will dominate Europe with irresistible sway. Both give promise of peace from the agitation of this unsettled age: the one, beneath the shadow of Despotism; the other, in the prevalence of constitutional liberty.

I. The Impending Outbreak of the Nationalities.

If events are left to take their course, within a few years, a general revolutionary outbreak in Germany, Hungary, and Poland, is inevitable.

Several distinct lines of causation combine their influence to hasten an outbreak of German national enthusiasm.—(1.) In the natural progress of thought, the German mind must, ere long, be thrilled with eager aspirations after national unity. The leaven has already been working, for years. The profound agitation of the German popular mind was manifest in the national movement respecting Holstein and Schleswig, which led to the Danish war.—(2.) The issue of that war, and the recent acts of Prussia, have contributed to deepen the excitement. That power, for the furtherance of its ambition, has appealed to the patriotic impulses of the German nation; and has dethroned various feudal princes whose rights stood in the way of the realization of national unity,—thus pointing the way to nationality over the ruins of feudal thrones.—(3.) The success of Italy, also, will exercise a powerful influence upon the German mind. Hitherto, ridicule has been the most powerful weapon of the advocates of feudal rights. They have derided the idea of nationality, as the fancy of weak and visionary minds—the fanciful ideal of patriotic dreamers, not to be realized in practical life. Its advocates, themselves, have hitherto regarded it as the object of dreamy longing rather than the aim of assured hope. But the experience of Italy has refuted every scoff. The condition of that country seemed more hopeless than that of any nation on the Con-

tinent: when, in spite of every obstacle, the Italians shall have achieved their national unity, their example will nerve the other disparted nations to a persevering struggle in behalf of their lost nationality. It will prove that no obstacles are too great to be overcome by a nation resolved to be free. Italy standing at the goal, waving the banner of national independence and beckoning the nations on in the path to freedom, will thrill the hearts of the oppressed with an ardor tenfold greater than that awakened by the commotion of her struggle.—(4.) The arrangements of the treaty which terminated the recent war will fire the German heart with national enthusiasm. The Northern states of Germany are united under the lead of Prussia, while the Southern are excluded from this union, and subjected to the sway of Austria and their respective feudal princes. The severance of Germany is thus more palpable than ever before; which fact, alone, will excite a greater fervor of aspiration after national unity. This impulse will be quickened by material interests. Prussia, by her late acquisitions, having obtained an extended line of coast, with numerous fine harbors, will be able to consummate her aim of becoming a great commercial power. Her administration will be so directed as to foster commercial industry, of which Northern Germany will have the benefit. The necessary effect of this will be dissatisfaction in the Southern German states that are excluded from the benefits of the new regime. They will long for a participation in the commercial advantages of their Northern brethren, and for an union with them as the only method of obtaining their end. North Germany will sympathize with the South, and the whole nation will glow with the impulse of national emotion.

If events are left to take their course, Germany will, in a few years, be ripe for revolution in favor of nationality.

A revolutionary outburst in Germany would quickly spread to Hungary and Poland. The thrill of national emotion diffuses itself with electric rapidity through the oppressed nations of Europe,—the impulse of one nation vibrating through all. The French Revolution of 1848 threw all the European nations into a convulsion of national excitement. Three years ago, the growing enthusiasm of Italy found a response in the movements of the Irish Fenians—in

the resolute, though unsuccessful insurrection in Poland—and in the excitement of the German masses on the Holstein question. But the Italian movement has been regulated by the guidance of Victor Emanuel; and the detached situation of Italy has prevented its excitement from thoroughly fevering the rest of Europe: Germany has thought and reflected upon the subject of nationality, but the national passions have not been deeply stirred: Hungary and Poland have made fierce, spasmodic efforts to regain their independence, but theirs have been isolated struggles, easily suppressed. But, unlike Italy, Germany is the heart of Europe; its fevered pulsations will be felt to the extremities of the Continent. It borders upon Hungary and Poland, along their entire western frontier. A revolutionary outbreak in Germany will throw all Central Europe into a flame.

II. The Policy of Absolutism.

But Absolutism has a policy by which to counter these national aspirations, which will not only render them harmless, but make them contribute to the firm establishment of despotic government.

Absolutism feels it imperatively necessary to avert the impending revolution in Germany, which will imperil all the absolute crowns in Europe: the insurrection of the populations of Germany, Hungary, and Poland, supported by France and Italy, would be too powerful to be suppressed even by the power of Russia. The crowned heads of Europe have reduced the management of popular impulse to a system. It is their policy to anticipate its demands, and prevent an outbreak, by achieving, themselves, what the people would otherwise attempt by revolution. Such was the policy of Napoleon in Italy, and of Austria and Prussia in wresting the German duchies from Denmark. So, it is the policy of Absolutism, now, to unite Germany under some sovereign devoted to absolutist principles, before the German masses rise for the establishment of national unity.

The agitations of Europe by no means indicate the necessary decline of Absolutism. They only show that the form of Absolutism which has hitherto prevailed, where absolute governments are continually clashing with each other, and with the national aspirations of populations, cannot continue. Absolutism may take a new lease

of existence under a new arrangement. The day of feudal despotism is over. If Absolutism is to continue, it must change its base, and found its power upon National Despotism.

This change of base is now the policy of Absolutism. Russia will no longer attempt to maintain feudal thrones in Central Europe. It is her aim to erect a great national throne in Germany, firmly committed to Absolutism, and resting upon the proud and devoted attachment of a great and imperial nation. The union of Germany beneath the Prussian scepter before the impending outbreak of the Nationalities occurs, is essential to the safety of Absolutism. The German mind, inflamed and revolutionary, would set all Central Europe on fire. But satisfy the national aspirations of Germany by uniting it under the Prussian scepter; then make it an imperial nation ruling neighboring subject dependencies,—and Germany will be firmly arrayed on the side of Absolutism, and will aid in crushing out the national aspirations of the populations held in subjection to the German empire.

Make Germany under the Prussian sovereign what France was under the first Napoleon,—the imperial center of subject provinces,—and Absolutism will have no more devoted adherent. Germany must be brought by this means to the support of Absolutism;—or Absolutism must fall, and all the Nationalities achieve their independence. The only hope of Absolutism lies in establishing a new Germanic empire over the countries of Western Europe.

Russia, as the champion of Absolutism, is committed to this aim.

But the policy of Russia, in this regard, is not swayed solely by the conservative principles of Absolutism. The union of Germany under Prussia, and the establishment of a German empire over Western Europe, are measures necessary, not only to suppress revolutionary tendencies and give stability to despotism; they are, also, especially essential to the success of the ambitious designs of Russia.

Dynastic ambition has long swayed the counsels of that empire. Its policy in all European questions, for the last century and a half, has been dictated by the ambition of universal dominion. Peter the

Great, who died 1725, left a celebrated will, which marked out the policy Russia has consistently followed, ever since.

He directed that Russia should first effect the conquest of Turkey; that it should then propose, either to France or Austria (Prussia was then too feeble a power to attract attention), a division of Europe between them; that, this consummated, it should afterward overturn the feeble, discordant Empire of the West;—when, Europe being subdued, the empire of the earth would be easily attained.

The Russian government at once entered upon the career so strikingly indicated in this remarkable document. Ten years afterward, it entered into an Austrian alliance—an alliance which was firmly maintained for three-quarters of a century, during which period Russia steadily endeavored by every means to further the consolidation of Austrian power in Germany. In 1736, the two powers entered into an alliance for the conquest of Turkey, which awakened the jealousy of the rest of Europe; but, after a war of two years duration, they were foiled by the persevering valor of the Turks.—In 1740, when, upon the accession of Maria Theresa, the grand coalition was formed for the dismemberment of the Austrian dominions, Russia was the firm friend of Austria, and was only prevented from rendering active and efficient aid, by a Swedish war purposely excited by the coalition.—During this war, Frederic the Great, who had just ascended the Prussian throne, wrested from Austria the German states, Silesia and Glatz. This loss of power did not comport with the policy of Russia. That policy required that the power of Austria should be supreme in Germany; and in 1756, the Czarina Elizabeth, daughter of Peter the Great, formed an alliance with Austria for the purpose of conquering and dismembering Prussia. The French government was weak enough to be cajoled into this coalition, which, if it had succeeded in its objects, would have rendered the imperial house of Austria absolute in Germany, and enabled it to wield the whole power of the German nation in furtherance of the common objects of its own, and Russian ambition. Frederic the Great won his title by his heroic resistance of this overwhelming coalition. But he must have succumbed, had not the Czarina died just as his resources were exhausted. Peter III., who succeeded to the Russian crown, was won by admiration

of Frederic to abandon the policy of his predecessor, and form an alliance with Prussia. This seasonable aid enabled Frederic to retrieve his ruined fortunes, by a last desperate effort forcing his remaining adversaries to consent to a peace. It is probable the Czar Peter was convinced by Prussian heroism, in contrast with Austrian incapacity, that Prussia was the German power whose alliance would best forward the ambitious designs of Russia. If such was his policy, he did not live to execute it; for his desertion of Austria and abandonment of the traditional policy of the empire just in the moment of success, gave rise to a conspiracy which cost him his throne and life. Russia was true to ambition and the Austrian alliance, and sacrificed an emperor to its policy.—Again, in the reign of Joseph II. of Austria, Russia manifested its desire to increase Austrian power: its sympathy with his efforts to consolidate his dominions was openly expressed; it also sanctioned his proposed exchange of the Netherlands for Bavaria,—an arrangement which, if effected, would have vastly increased the power of the House of Austria in Germany; and it concluded an alliance with him for the conquest and division of Turkey. These various intrigues, all looking to the aggrandizement of Austria, were thwarted by the intrigues and diplomacy of the Prussian government, which knew that the aggrandizement of Austria involved the fall of Prussia. The king of Prussia fomented discontents which prevented the consolidation of the Austrian dominions; thwarted the projected exchange of the Netherlands for Bavaria, by a German league; and, at the moment of decisive success in the Turkish war, excited an insurrection in the Netherlands, which compelled Austria to withdraw its armies from Turkey.—Again, it is this aim of Russia which gives the key to Russian and Prussian policy, during the early period of the French revolution. While Prussia rejoiced in the humiliation of its Austrian rival, Russia battled long and fiercely to maintain Austria against the assaults of the French. But, at length, the repeated defeats of the Austrian armies revealed the intrinsic weakness of the state, and its utter unfitness ever to aid in the ambitious designs of Russia.—The Russian government now gave up the Austrian alliance forever.

Upon abandoning the idea of an Austrian alliance, Russia em-

braced the alternative presented in the will of Peter the Great, and adopted the policy of a French alliance. It lent itself to the ambitious aims of Napoleon I., until it became evident that the conqueror would not admit Russia to an equal partition of the spoils. As soon as the Czar found that Napoleon would not consent to the Russian conquest of Turkey, he became his determined foe, and at length effected his downfall.

But Russia was still true to the ambitious traditions of the empire, and to the far-seeing policy marked out by Peter the Great. Its ulterior aims could only be attained by an alliance with Germany, or France. All idea of an alliance with either Austria, or France, was now abandoned. The distracted empire of Austria was too feeble to effect the Union of Germany beneath its scepter; and public opinion was too advanced in France, to permit that country to be a safe ally of despotic ambition. But Prussia, in the partition of Poland, which it was the first to suggest, had indicated its willingness to commit itself to the policy of Absolutism; and the obstinate valor of the Prussian troops promised to render Prussia a most useful ally. Henceforth, Russia looked upon Prussia as its destined coadjutor, and lent all its influence to the aggrandizement of the monarchy.

The treaties of 1815 show the adoption of this policy by the Russian government. In those negotiations, it laid the train by which Prussia was to be elevated to the head of the German empire. By Russian influence, great accessions of territory were granted to Prussia, which elevated it to the front rank among European nations; and Germany, instead of being placed under the emperor of Austria, as before the French revolution, was erected into a confederation of states without an imperial head. The arrangements of the treaties of 1815 freed Prussia from all subordination to Austria, and gave it such an accession of power as placed it upon an equal footing with its rival.—Russia has ever since maintained the same policy: events have showed that the most cordial understanding exists between the two governments, which mutually further each other's ambition, in utter disregard of the Balance of Power, and the interests of the other states. Before the Crimean war, when France and England were negotiating to secure the neutrality of the German Powers, Austria, which was fully aware of the changed German policy of the

Czar, and beheld in it the omen of approaching ruin, cordially acquiesced in the movement of the Western Powers; but Prussia, on the contrary, threw all its influence in favor of the Autocrat, and even displayed a willingness to take up arms in his behalf, until it saw that Germany would not follow its lead in such a movement.—The policy of exalting Prussia as a maritime state induced the Czar to sell the Prussian sovereign a port on the North Sea, in the duchy of Oldenburg.—The same policy of exalting Prussia at the expense of Austria, induced Russia to urge forward Napoleon's attack upon Austria, in Italy.—Hence, also, the acquiescence of Russia in the Prussian appropriation of Holstein; and also, in its more recent acquisition of the territories of the minor German princes, overrun during the last war.—These are all steps to the goal of German unity under the Prussian crown, so necessary to the consummation of the ambitious aims of the Czar.

Germany once united under the Prussian scepter, and the Prusso-German sovereign in cordial co-operation with Russia,—the coalition might dominate Europe without let or control. The Austrian monarch would then be reduced to the Hungarian crown, and compelled to second the wishes of his powerful neighbors, under penalty of dethronement. No power in Europe could prevent the allied despots from seizing upon Turkey. A movement upon the flank from Russia, might be supported by an army marching to the rear from Germany, and the allies would meet upon the Hellespont. The movement would be far beyond the reach of the other European powers, who could not even make an effort to prevent it.

What powers in Europe could resist the coalition of Russia and Germany, then, wielding, in addition, the power of Turkey and Hungary?

III. The Present Posture of Affairs.

Three years ago, the Prussian government occupied a position of singular advantage. Its aggrandizement was a part of the programme of each of the conflicting forces which divided Europe. Russia wished to secure the union of Germany beneath the sway of Prussia: in order to fortify Absolutism; and to open the way for a career of conquest, by means of a Prussian alliance. France

wished to further the same end, that it might secure the Prussian government to a liberal policy, and obtain its co-operation for the cause of Progress. Prussia had only to decide which alliance it would choose.

The Prussian monarchy is a feudal power, and all its traditions link it with Absolutism. Its possessions were all obtained, and are still held, by the right of the sword. Its sympathies are all Absolutist. It has maintained a suspicious understanding with Russia for fifty years, and has always been ready to second the ambition of that power.—Ambition, moreover, prompted it to prefer the Russian to the French policy. Napoleon's policy offered it only the throne of Germany, as one among the independent nations of Europe: the Russian programme offered it the empire of Western Europe; and if the issue between the allied despots afterward came to the arbitrament of the sword, the chances were at least equal that the military spirit of the German nation would bear away the victory from the phlegmatic Muscovites, and achieve for Prussia universal dominion. Influenced by all these considerations, Prussia would have decidedly preferred to achieve the union of Germany by means of a Russian alliance, if Russia had been sufficiently powerful to enable it to achieve the aim of its ambition.

But while Napoleon was supported by the friendship, or even the neutrality of England, he was master of the situation: Prussia could not take the first step in the career of aggrandizement without his consent. Without being assured of his concurrence, it could not have ventured to annex Holstein and Schleswig. England, Austria, and all the minor German states were opposed to it: had France taken a stand on the same side, Prussia must have abandoned the undertaking, even though supported by the power of Russia. The Prussian government had no alternative but to secure the countenance of Napoleon, on any terms he chose to impose. Throughout the German war, therefore, it assumed the character of a decided champion of progressive principles. And even at the close of the war, it maintained the same attitude; and probably with a real intention of carrying out its engagements, and keeping faith with Napoleon; for, supported by a liberal government in England, the French emperor was in a position to enforce the maintenance of his

policy, notwithstanding the accession of power obtained by Prussia in the war. France, Italy, Austria, and the minor German states, backed by England, still held the Balance of power, and could strip Prussia of its recent acquisitions, and hold Russian ambition in effectual check.

While under a Whig and Liberal administration, Great Britain gave a steady support to the liberal cause in Europe. Supported by England and Italy, Napoleon was the arbiter of the Continent. He might either maintain Austria against Prussia, while the national enthusiasm was rising that would overturn both their thrones; or, if Prussia were docile, he might direct the movement, until it ultimated in the establishment of all the Nationalities.

But the political revolution in England which brought the Tories into power, at once changed the face of European politics. England holds the balance of power in Europe. The Tories at once withdrew the government from its attitude of co-operation with France, and threw all its influence in favor of Absolutism. The Tory organs commenced pouring volumes of abuse upon Napoleon, and gratulations upon Prussia, rejoicing in the prospect of its becoming the equipoise of France. The Prussian government saw that, with the support of England, a Russian alliance would enable it to achieve its aims, in defiance of Napoleon. No sooner did it see the Tories firmly established in power and exciting it to achieve the union of Germany despite of France, than it discarded the policy of acquiescence in French principles, and placed itself boldly upon the platform of Absolutism. It positively refused to carry out its engagement to submit the question of the annexation of the territories it had overrun to the votes of the population. It now declared that it had conquered those territories, and would hold them as conquests, treating with contempt the idea of consulting the people on the question. It thus threw the gage of defiance at the feet of Napoleon, and reasserted the principles of Absolutism on which the monarchy is founded.

The animus of the press of the several countries plainly shows the present drift of European politics. The press of Prussia and France are indulging in mutual and fierce recriminations, which in-

dicate an approaching rupture between the governments. The Tory press of England is inciting Prussia to a rupture with France, and urging it on to attempt the consolidation of Germany. The press of Russia is glorying over the present position of Prussia, and declaring that an alliance of the two countries may bid defiance to the rest of Europe. Napoleon himself maintains his usual calm reticence. He has displayed no mark of resentment at the tergiversation of Prussia. But he has announced the policy of France in a calm sentence, expressing his conviction that the recent treaty has established the political state of Europe for years to come. He will not suffer the Absolutist Prussian government to consummate the union of Germany beneath its sway; but will, at all hazards, maintain the existing status in Germany.

The Tory ascendancy in England threatens to be fatal to liberty in Europe.

While England seconded the policy of Napoleon, the French emperor had Prussia, like a led hound, held unwillingly in his leash, and compelled, however unwillingly, to do his behests. Events, too, were approaching a crisis, where the far-seeing, patient policy of Napoleon would attain a definitive ascendancy, and enable him to reconstruct the Nationalities in such a manner as to render despotism powerless ever after. And he would have attained his object without a struggle, by the universal consent of Europe, Russia alone excepted. But the Revolution of the British government has changed everything—reversed everything. Just in the crisis of the struggle between Progress and Absolutism, when the former was about to achieve a decisive and final victory, this fatal change of sides reverses the relative strength of the opposing parties, and will give to Absolutism a victory ruinous to the world.

Before this change, the parties stood—France, England, and Italy, for Progress—Russia for Absolutism. In such a balance of power, the liberal governments were able to control Europe, and compel Prussia to submit to their policy. But, now, the British abandonment of the cause of Progress leaves France and Italy alone; and encourages Prussia to follow out the traditional policy of the monarchy, and seek to achieve its aims supported by a Russian alliance. Parties now stand—England, Russia, and Prussia, for Abso-

lutism—France and Italy, for Progress—with Austria the bone of contention.

The dangers arising out of the question of nationality are but just begun. A great reaction against liberal government has set in. It will progress until it threatens the very existence of liberty in the world. Hitherto the question of Nationalities has been menacing to monarchs: it has now grown big with danger to liberty. Hitherto Napoleon, as the champion of Nationalities, has dominated Europe; and the despots have trembled at his frown: henceforth, the despots may sway Europe; and Napoleon will be overmatched, or must suffer events to be governed by their dictation. The despots have, for fifteen years, waged a defensive struggle, divided among themselves, and drifting without a defined policy upon the current of events: henceforth, Absolutism will assume a firm aggressive attitude, with every advantage in its favor. The French emperor has hitherto been the arbiter of Europe. Holding the Nationalities in his leash, and awing the despots from any attempt toward reaction, he steered the vessel of European politics with a firm hand, safe between the Scylla of revolution and the Charybdis of universal war. Austria was too entirely at the mercy of revolution to provoke him: Prussia was too feeble to act alone; Russia was too assiduously engaged in promoting internal reforms, and recruiting her resources exhausted by the Crimean war, to attempt any active intervention in European affairs. But, now, Russia has recovered from exhaustion; Prussia has become a power of the first magnitude: an alliance of the two powers, countenanced by England, can dominate Europe. Napoleon stands alone, or supported only by the embryo government of Italy. He can no longer sway events. Absolutism rules the hour.

Sect. 2.—The Impending Struggle,—Triumph of Absolutism.

I. The Impending Struggle.

The certainty of an approaching struggle between Absolutism and Progress is beyond question. We cannot venture a suggestion, however, as to the time of its occurrence. Either party may precipitate it by an early movement; or both may, by common consent, defer to the latest moment a crisis fraught with utter ruin to one or

the other. But the nature of the circumstances forbids a very long procrastination. The revolutionary spirit in Germany *must* bring it on; and it cannot be many years, as we have seen, before Germany will be agitated with national enthusiasm.

It is evident that there is, even now, an explicit understanding between Russia and Prussia. The Muscovite government shows that it is ready to lend all its power to further the ambitious aims of Prussia. The past career of Prussia shows that power to be resolved upon achieving the union of Germany beneath its sway; and it cannot effect its object alone, but needs an alliance, either with France or Russia. Napoleon has manifested his readiness to further its aim, on certain conditions; and Prussia would not forego the French alliance, unless Russia had entered into a positive engagement to aid it in achieving the union of Germany. Its rupture with Napoleon and its defiant attitude toward France, augur too surely an understanding with the Czar.

The first object of this alliance is undoubtedly the union of Germany under the Prussian crown. But the ambitious policy of Russia renders it evident that the alliance embraces the further object of securing for Russia an equivalent, in Turkey, for the Prussian acquisitions in Germany.

But the possession of Constantinople by Russia involves the necessity of further Prussian acquisitions in Western Europe. The Southern part of Germany is not a sufficient offset to Turkey. Indeed, the first Napoleon declared that the Russian acquisition of Turkey was more than an equipoise to the union of all Western Europe under the French Empire. If Prussia acquired no extra-German territory, Russia, with Turkey annexed, would completely overshadow Germany, and speedily reduce it to a subordinate position. Prussia must have equivalents for the Russian acquisition of Constantinople.—Where but in Western Europe are those equivalents to be obtained?—And, with Germany united, and Turkey annexed to Russia, what European powers could prevent the combined despots from partitioning Europe as ambition and policy dictated?

The Tory British government is a party to this understanding between Russia and Prussia. A significant editorial has recently

appeared in the London *Times*, the organ *par excellence* of the Tory aristocracy, which broadly intimates the future policy of the British Tory government. The *Times* depreciates the importance of the acquisition of Constantinople by a foreign power, declaring it a matter of little concern to England, and insinuating that a British protectorate over Egypt would afford ample indemnity.

The British Tory administration will contribute all its power to insure complete success to the reactionary movement. The British *government* is reckless of consequences. The Tory nobility are willing to save their privileges on any terms; and, if the advancing movement of the age, which is threatening their feudal rights, cannot be arrested save by Russian predominance, they are ready to hail the triumph of Absolutism. They would rather enjoy their privileges under the shadow of Russia, than lose them by the advance of republican thought. The failing cause of the English nobility cannot long withstand the march of popular sentiment, unless reinforced by a great political reaction on the Continent; and the Tory government of Great Britain will enter zealously into the schemes of the allied despots.

It is not probable, however, that the British government will solicit an explanation from the despots of their ulterior aims. It will be content with the surface of things, and will refuse to look beyond. The Tories will concentrate their minds and the minds of the British nation upon the union of Germany under the Prussian crown, and will refuse to look further. They will see that this movement settles definitely the question of Nationalities; puts an end to revolutionary tendencies; extinguishes French ideas of progress; and promises the crowned heads and the feudal nobility of Europe a long enjoyment of their rights, free from the specter of impending revolution;—and this will suffice them.

The question also has its popular aspect, in which it will win the applause of the unthinking multitude. The Prussian dynasty is closely allied to the royal house of England, and the union of Germany under that crown may be represented as a triumph of British policy,—establishing a powerful ally on the continent, as a strong barrier against French and Russian ambition. But the crowning popularity of the movement will lie in its surface aspect of cham-

pioning German nationality against the opposition of French jealousy.

By vailing all ulterior aims, the enterprise of the despots will be highly popular in England, and the Tories will be able, should it become necessary, to cast all the power of Britain into the scale against France and Progress. Were all the aims of the despots unvailed, the sturdy independence of the English yeomanry would drive the Tories from their fraternization with despotism, or unseat them from power before the grand scheme were accomplished. The British public must be hoodwinked, until the despots shall have passed the crisis of their movement. It will be time enough to throw off the mask, when, Germany united and committed to Absolutism, a counter-revolution in English politics can no longer turn the wavering balance in favor of Progress. Until then, the catchword of the Absolutist despots will be, THE NATIONAL UNION OF GERMANY.

The National Union of Germany: the coming war, may, from motives of expediency, be based upon some other issue; but whatever the ostensible ground of war, this will be the real issue that will soon convulse Europe with a war of giants. Russia, Prussia, and, if necessary, England, will take the field in favor of it; France and Italy must oppose it to the death.

For Napoleon knows that the only hope of countering the ambitious aims of the despots, and preventing their complete ascendancy, lies in preventing the union of Germany under the Prussian scepter. That once achieved, the vast accession of Prussian power would enable them to override all opposition. Their career of ambition could not afterward be checked. While willing to forward the aggrandizement of *liberal* Prussia, Napoleon will oppose to the uttermost any further accessions of power to Prussia allied with Absolutism. He must take a determined stand against the proposed consolidation of Germany, and stand or fall upon the issue.

It is impossible to say when the struggle may come on; conflicting motives counsel both parties to delay, and to immediate action. Potential reasons influence Napoleon to assume a prompt initiative:

his best hope of success lies in assailing Prussia before her power over her recent conquests is consolidated, and re-establishing the former status by a bold aggressive campaign; and his advancing years warn him of the expediency of bringing the existing complications to an issue, while his life and power are in their prime, instead of leaving them to his own old age, or to the minority of his son.—On the other hand, the present preponderance of power on the other side admonishes him of the prudence of waiting: perhaps a change in English politics bringing the Liberals into power, may secure to France a British alliance again, and give it the preponderance of power; or, the approach of revolution in Germany may render the struggle less hopeless.

The motives which influence the Absolutist governments are equally conflicting. By delay, Prussia will have time to consolidate its power; and infirmities or death may remove Napoleon from their path.—But on the other hand, the danger of counter-revolution in England against the Tories, and of revolution in Germany against Absolutism and in favor of France and Progress, admonish them of the expediency of striking promptly, while their present excessive preponderance of strength gives them every advantage.

There are three possibilities: Napoleon may take a prompt initiative, and make a fierce assault upon Prussia; or the despots may take the initiative; or both parties may stand armed, face to face, each afraid to strike, until revolution in Germany shall force the issue upon them.

Whichever direction events take, the triumph of Absolutism seems certain, with its necessary consequence, the utter overthrow of Progress. At the danger of being tedious, we will examine the three contingencies, somewhat in detail.

1*st. First Contingency,—French Initiative.*

If Napoleon decides that his best hope of success lies in striking Prussia before its power is consolidated, two alternatives are before him.—(1.) He may form an alliance with Austria and Italy, and take the field against Prussia supported by Russia and England, for the avowed purpose of re-establishing the former balance of power. But this course would place him at great disadvantage, both in re-

spect of policy, and military force. He would assume the attitude of a disturber of an arrangement in which all Europe has acquiesced; and the predominance of force against him would leave hardly a hope of success.—(2.) He would more probably desire to force a single combat between France and Prussia. If so, he would make cause of war upon some new issue, which does not involve the nationality question; then, if a rapid initiative should enable him strike Prussia down, he as conqueror, backed by Austria and Italy, might strip her of her recent acquisitions, and re-establish the former balance of power in Germany. This policy would give Napoleon his best hope of success, and it is probable he would adopt it, if he could induce Russia and England to stand aloof while he assailed Prussia.

But there is very little probability that those powers will suffer him to engage in a single-handed war with Prussia. Great Britain is the self-constituted preserver of European peace. The British government has attempted to mediate in every contest that has arisen between the other powers of Europe, for the last twenty years. Any attempt of Napoleon to force a war upon Prussia alone, will be countered by the mediation of England, as the professed friend of both parties, but really as the secret partisan of Prussia. A conference would be proposed by England, which, being accepted by Prussia and acceded to by Russia, Napoleon could not reject; then, such proposals would be made by England and backed by Russia, as Prussia would accept; and if Napoleon were inclined to reject them and go to war, he would find himself confronted by all three of the Absolutist powers arrayed against him as a disturber of the peace of Europe.

An initiative on the part of the French emperor is hardly possible, unless he goes openly to war with Prussia backed by Russia and England; when he must seek the alliance of Austria and Italy, and make an open struggle upon the direct issues involved. If he decides upon this, he might gain some advantages, at first; but a Russian invasion of Hungary would recall Austria to the defense of her own dominions; another Russian army in Northern Germany would enable Prussia, supported by British subsidies, to protract the struggle, until British blockades of French ports would break

down the finances of France, and leave it a prey to a grand onset of the despots.—Napoleon's only hope in such a struggle would lie in a vigorous offensive, obtaining great advantages, and conquering a peace upon his own terms at a blow. But the dashing strategy of Napoleon First, by which an inferior force compensates its weakness by rapidity of attack, is no longer practicable. It would be countered by the skillful engineering tactics of recent wars, which would enable the despots to protract the struggle, until, between military expenditure and British blockades, French resources would be exhausted. Then, the allies would assume the offensive; British descents would keep Italy on the defensive; a Russian army in Hungary would occupy Austria; a rapid march would overrun the South German states and annex them to Prussia;—and then the whole weight of Eastern Europe would be rolled upon France. The issue of such a struggle could not be doubtful.

2nd. Second Contingency.—An Absolutist Initiative.

Many considerations combine to induce the Absolutist powers to carry out their programme with promptitude, waiting only long enough for Prussian power to become consolidated.

Revolution in Germany is imminent at no distant day; and in the uprising of populations, there is danger that feudal Prussia, the oppressor of Poland, the sympathizer with Absolutism, the ally of Russia, will not be the chosen champion of German patriots. A struggle with the Nationalities supported by France and Italy, would be full of danger to Absolutism. The active support of England would be necessary, in that event, to give Absolutism the victory; and they might fear that a movement on the part of the British government in open support of Absolutism against the Nationalities, might cause a revolution in England that would place the Liberals in power, and range the country firmly on the side of Progress. It is the interest of the despots to run no unnecessary risk. The late political revolution in England has given them, for the time, an unexpected advantage, and they will not wish to forfeit the favor of Fortune by unnecessary delay. They will wish to bring the pending issues to a crisis while they are sure of the support of Great

Britain. Their vast preponderance of strength, also, will embolden them to assume a prompt initiative.

Should the despotic powers decide to assume the initiative, the choice of three lines of policy is open to them.—(1.) They may seek to effect the union of Germany under the Prussian crown, by means of negotiation with Austria and the other Southern German states; or, failing this, (2.) They may assail Austria, and aim to carry out their object by force of arms; or, (3.) They may begin the conflict upon a side issue, by Russia's making an attack upon Turkey.

It seems probable that, before attempting to achieve the union of Germany by force of arms, negotiation may be first resorted to. The position of England holding the balance of power between Absolutism and Progress may enable the British government to dictate the plan by which the union of Germany shall be achieved. If so, the policy of Great Britain will incline that government to propose some plan that will obtain the assent of Austria to the programme. The British government, as the friend of Austria, may propose that the House of Hapsburg retain possession of Hungary and the Polish territories, but cede its German provinces to Prussia, and accept of indemnity out of the Turkish territories.

This proposition, if carried out in good faith, would be eminently advantageous to Austria. Such an arrangement would settle forever the distracting question of the Nationalities. It would appease the restless aspirations of Germany; and would make Hungary imperial, and the seat of the new empire, when it would become as warmly attached to the Austrian dynasty as it has been restless in a provincial condition. Poland alone would remain restive; but surrounded and pressed by Imperial Russia on the East, Imperial Germany on the West, and Imperial Hungary on the South, the Poles would have no recourse but submission. The arrangement would give the Austrian sovereign an empire absolutely secure against internal revolution. The loyal Hungarians would easily keep the Polish and Turkish provinces in subjection.

Again, the arrangement would be eminently advantageous in another point of view. The Austrian territories are now without seaports, and are shut out from commerce. But the possession of

the states of Servia, Bosnia, Croatia, and Dalmatia, south of the Danube, and the principalities of Wallachia, and Moldavia, on the north bank of the river, would give Austria a broad seaboard upon the Adriatic, and the navigation of the Danube down to its mouth. With such advantages of commercial position, the new possessions, though not more extensive than its present German dependencies, would be of much greater value. It would open up a commercial career which would soon double the resources of the empire.

If the Austrian government could rely upon the good faith of Russia and Prussia, it would accede to such an offer; and, if so, Napoleon could make no effectual opposition. The united power of England, Russia, Germany, and Hungary would be arrayed in its favor, against which France could not venture to contend.

But it is probable that Austria would fear to trust the faith of its powerful and ambitious neighbors, and would demand that all the great European powers should guarantee the arrangement. Napoleon might possibly consent, if the Belgic provinces of France were re-annexed to his dominions, so as to appease public sentiment in France, and equalize the balance of power, disturbed by the increased power of Prussia and the house of Hapsburg. But England would not consent to this; nor would Russia and Prussia agree to any increase of French territory.

This would probably frustrate any such arrangement. Austria would not enter into it in opposition to the wishes of Napoleon; for it knows that it would have to lean on France and Italy for support against the ambition of Russia and Prussia. It would prefer its present position, however critical, to an arrangement which would place it completely at the mercy of its ambitious neighbors.

If Austria should decline (as it probably would) the proposition to exchange its German territories for a Turkish indemnity, it will be the policy of the reactionary powers to achieve the union of Germany by force of arms, before the revolutionary spirit issues in outbreak.

They may begin the conflict by a direct assault upon the South German states; or they may provoke it in a more politic manner, by a Russian attack upon Turkey.

Whatever phase the issue may present, Napoleon will be under the necessity of forming an alliance with Italy and Austria, to maintain the existing status; he will thus be placed in the false attitude of a supporter of despotism, while the despots will have the popular *role* of assertors of the national principle.—Under such circumstances, the great preponderance of force on the other side would easily strike down the French alliance. Judging merely from the map, England, Russsia, and Prussia, would be matched not unequally by France, Italy, and Austria. But this is only in seeming. It must be remembered that Italian troops will not face Russian and German bayonets. Moreover, the majority of the Austro-German population would be on the other side: Prussia would advance the popular issue—The National Union of Germany—which would spread disaffection throughout all the Austrian territories.—If left to choose their own time for movement, the agents of Prussia will busily promote disaffection in the Austrian territories; then, when the impulse in behalf of nationality shall have ripened to the proper point, a sudden advance of the Prussian armies upon Southern Germany, and of Russia upon Hungary, would strike Austria down before France and Italy could come to her assistance. Prussia alone has beaten Austria and all the princes of Germany, combined,—and beaten them without the aid of disaffection in the opposing ranks. Now that all Northern Germany is united to Prussia, how easy would be her triumph, when her advancing armies would find friends at every step! And when the power of England and Russia is thrown into the same scale, how inadequate is the power of Napoleon to uphold the tottering Austrian empire against their combined assault, supported by internal disaffection!

Then, Austria stricken down, the contest would resolve itself into a conflict between France and the rest of Europe.

The strong probability is, that Russia and Prussia with the aid and countenance of Great Britain, will, within a few years, overwhelm the strenuous opposition of France, and achieve the union of Germany under the Prussian crown, either with the consent of Austria, or by conquest.

3d. Third Contingency,—Both Parties Delay until the Outbreak of the Nationalities.

This contingency is in the highest degree improbable. It is the interest of Prussia to delay her movement until the national feeling in Southern Germany rises to such a pitch as will second her aims. But as soon as German sentiment attains that standard, it is then her policy to strike, before enthusiasm rises to a point in harmony with French principles of progress, and consequently antagonistic to a throne so thoroughly committed to Absolutism.

But nations are not always guided by the dictates of sound policy. A mighty purpose sometimes stands awed in the presence of great attempts. Cæsar hesitated at the Rubicon. Mere irresolution (though that does not seem a failing of Bismark) may keep the despots hesitating on the brink of a great war that must involve all Europe, until the Nationalities rise in revolution supported by France and Italy. This is the best hope for liberal institutions; but even in this event, the assistance of the Tory government of England will enable the despots to crush the movement. For in every such revolution, there are royalists who rally round the throne from sentiment, and peasants who are influenced by the priesthood and by hatred of their landlords to support the crown against the patriots,—and these elements, supported by Russian bayonets and British fleets and subsidies, would triumph over the patriotic movement, and enable the triumphant despots to hurl the united force of Europe against France.

The Tory ascendancy in England is fatal to Progress. We can conceive no contingency in which the power of Great Britain will not enable the despots to achieve a decisive victory over Progress, and unite Germany under the Prussian crown.

II. Abuse of Absolutist Ascendancy.

How will the despots use their success?

When Prussia is head of imperial Germany, what will be the consequence of this triumph, to France and Italy, and the other liberal governments in Europe?

Of two things, one will happen. Napoleon will endeavor to counter their policy, and be stricken down; or, overawed by the strength of the coalition, and despairing of successfully opposing it, he will proclaim non-intervention, and suffer the despots to carry out their programme unopposed. The first is the more probable.

1st. If Napoleon is beaten in endeavoring to thwart the aims of the despots, he will have nothing to hope from their forbearance. The French empire with its progressive principles, is a standing menace to Absolutism, which the latter, in the hour of victory, will not fail to destroy. His unsuccessful resistance of their ambition would be stigmatized as a renewed example of the ambition of the Bonaparte dynasty; and the fiat of overthrow would be uttered against it—for the sake of the peace of Europe! Another invasion of 1814 would occur, and France would be crushed beneath the heel of despotism.

2d. But take the most favorable prospect for the cause of Progress that the defection of Great Britain leaves: suppose Napoleon, hopeless of resisting the combination of the despots, proclaims non-intervention, leaving them to carry out their programme unopposed. Still, the overthrow of Liberal government in Europe will be equally certain.

In this hypothesis, the union of Germany will soon be achieved: either with the consent of Austria; or by force of arms.

1. The first alternative is most favorable to Liberty.

Suppose then, this arrangement consummated—and the Prussian crown possessed of Germany—while Turkey is divided between Russia and Austria, as an equivalent for the Prussian accession of territory. What a revolution do these changes work in the aspect of Europe!

The first effect of the arrangement would be to quiet the restless aspirations of Nationalities. Germany united, with part of Poland dependent upon the empire, the German nation becomes at once enthusiastically attached to the new dynasty which has elevated the nation to imperial grandeur; for, however zealous a nation may be in asserting its own independence, it never hesitates to aggrandize

itself by trampling down the independence of its neighbors: Hungary also becomes the seat of Austrian power; and the Hungarian nation is ardent in support of a dynasty which elevated the country to imperial power: the Greeks will not trouble their despots for ages to come: Poland alone may be restless; but Poland is crushed between Russia, Germany, and Hungary, until the feeble aspirations of nationality are extinguished. The arrangement frees Absolutism from all its dangers.

It also quadruples its power in Europe. Heretofore, Turkey has exerted no active influence upon the political destinies of Europe; and Germany and Hungary have been neutralized by the antagonistic attitude of the governments and the people: France and Russia have been the only powers on the Continent capable of exerting a positive influence upon political events. In the nugatory condition of the other Continental powers, and the neutral attitude of England, the balance of power on the Continent has been maintained by the antagonism and equipoise of France and Russia.—But under this arrangement, the equipoise between the liberal and absolute powers exists no longer. It wrests Turkey, and Germany, and Hungary, from their nugatory position, and converts them into the strong, earnest partisans of Absolutism. France stands alone, or supported by the embryo government of Italy, against all Eastern and Central Europe, arrayed in opposition to the principles of governmental progress.—How vast the preponderance. The German empire alone, with its Polish dependencies, is more powerful than France. The Hungarian empire, firmly based upon the attachment of the loyal Hungarians and the inertia of the Greek population, is as powerful as France. Russia with its colossal power increased by its accessions of Turkish territory, overmatches France almost as two to one.

Two antagonisms in the presence of each other, the one so powerful, the other so weak, must soon come into collision. France might avoid offense; but the innocence of the lamb never averts the assault of the wolf. The liberal constitution of the French empire is alone sufficient offense to despotism possessed of an overwhelming superiority of strength. The parties to the Holy Alliance of 1815 would avail themselves of their ascendancy to renew their alliance against Progress, and lay forever the specter of revolution,

which has, for twenty years, sat at their feasts. The Austrian dynasty would be so completely in the power of the despots whose dominions envelop its own, that it must yield absolutely to their dictation. Despotism always abuses its ascendancy. Banded Europe would be hurled against France.

2. The same result would follow the consummation of the union of Germany, by force, upon the ruins of Austrian power.

In the event of the union of Germany under Prussia, no conceivable circumstances could prevent the despots from entering upon a career of conquest which would subject Europe to their sway. As we have seen, the ambition of Russia has long aspired to a conquering career, and Prussia is evidently prepared to abet her aims. Prudence also will urge them to enter upon the career to which ambition invites. The spread of republican thought will then be the only danger the despots will have to apprehend. The example of America is constantly menacing Absolutism with danger. England is rapidly ripening for Republicanism. Republicanism is constantly aggressive, and if the despotic powers wait its advance, it will, ere long, undermine their thrones.

France, especially, is a mine that would soon explode. The French nation is content with an emperor, only on condition of his maintaining the ascendancy of France abroad, and advancing the principles of liberal government. As soon as it perceives that Absolutism has proved too strong for Napoleon, it will become restless beneath his sway. If it cannot cope with Absolutism by dynastic power, it will assail it with revolution, and, proclaiming a republic, summon the oppressed populations of Europe to follow in the path of Freedom. Then, such an outburst in Germany as occurred in 1848, supported vigorously by French bayonets, might shatter the thrones of the despots to ruins.

The independence of France is incompatible with the safety of Absolutism. If Absolutism is to be safe, France must be subjugated. The mere overthrow of the Napoleonic dynasty, and the re-establishment of the Bourbons, will not suffice. That expedient was tried in 1815; and it resulted in the French Revolution of 1848, which shook the power of Absolutism to its base, and which, in its

results, has, for nearly twenty years, kept it trembling for existence. The danger of revolution can be averted only by carrying out the programme of 1793: until France is disarmed, and permanently garrisoned by foreign soldiers, Absolutism can never be secure.

The despots, in the hour of triumph, will not hesitate to take the precautionary measures necessary to secure their power. They will endeavor, by every means, to prevent the recurrence of the dangers they will have so narrowly escaped. Let Germany once be united under the Prussian crown, and the despots will not hesitate to enter upon the career of conquest to which prudence and ambition will invite them. The Russian policy will be carried out. France would no doubt make a heroic resistance. But a resistance as heroic as that of 1793 would not avail against vastly superior numbers. The old strategy of frontier maneuvers has passed away. Napoleon I. taught despots how to conquer. The French empire would fall before the rapid march of overwhelming numbers; and liberal government would disappear on the Continent of Europe before the aggressive career of dominant Absolutism.

And then what would be the fate of England?—

When the English people discover too late the betrayal of the cause of Progress by the Tory Aristocracy, their indignation will probably hurl the party from power. But what will this avail, when the Continent is at the feet of Absolutism! A country so rich, and so defenseless, could not escape the grasp of the despots. The same prudential motives which urged the conquest of France, would urge, with even greater force, the subjugation of England. Republican thought is making rapid strides in Great Britain. The moral influence of the country is dangerous to Absolutism. Eventual antagonism is certain. And with time for preparation and alliance with America, its immense resources would enable England to equip fleets that would hold the continent in blockade, and eventually break Absolutism down by exhaustion. The despots would seek to prevent this possibility by conquering the country while it lay exposed defenseless to their arms. The war fleets of the Continental nations, when combined, are twice as powerful as that of England; a descent might easily be effected; and, an army once landed, resistance would

be vain. Indeed, it seems not improbable that the Tory Aristocracy would welcome the invaders. Driven from power by a popular reaction against the ruin they had brought upon Europe, and with all their privileges at stake, rather than submit to the rule of the mechanics, the British Tory Aristocracy would not hesitate to summon the despots to their aid. An Aristocracy will always betray its country, to preserve its privileges!

And, then, America!—What will be our fate?—

Despotism will not stop short in the career of victory. It will make no compromise with Liberty. It has learned that the world is not wide enough for Absolutism and Freedom, both. In our age, Absolutism and liberal government cannot coexist. The irreconcilable enmity between them can only terminate in the destruction of one or the other. Unfettered Freedom is continually widening its sway, and sapping the foundations of despotic government. If Absolutism is to live, Freedom must be destroyed: if Freedom lives, Absolutism must perish.

In the present state of the world, despotism can only exist by attaining universal dominion. Ambition is the only safety. The dominating nation may be warmly attached to the throne by the pride of conquest, and the spoils of the earth; and, converted into a nation of soldiers, it might rule a disarmed world, for ages.

We may scoff the idea of universal dominion, but it is by no means an impracticability. Rome swayed the Mediterranean nations for a thousand years, and, during the entire period, no nation ever revolted that had once been subdued. It were far easier, now, to sway the world. Then, the means of communicating intelligence and moving troops, were equally slow. A year was spent in receiving intelligence of a war or a revolt, and dispatching an army to the frontier. Now, the telegraph flashes tidings round the earth faster than the sun can move; and steamers and railways can, in a month, transport an army to the antipodes. With proper means of transportation, telegraphic orders might concentrate, in a week, an overwhelming force upon any revolting nation. A revolting nation! How can a disarmed nation revolt? A Roman province might revolt; for when the weapons were swords and spears, they might be

secretly made by any country smith. But can muskets and cannon be secretly manufactured? Can powder manufactories be secretly established? or magazines of the thousand articles of supply indispensable to equip a modern army? In the present state of military advancement, the world, once disarmed, could never revolt. An overwhelming force might be sent from the imperial country to the antipodes, long before an insurrectionary nation could equip an army. Let us not attempt to drive away apprehensions with a sneer, until despotism is prepared to fix the yoke upon our necks,—a yoke which, once imposed, never can be shaken off.

Ambition and prudence will alike incite Russia and Germany to enter upon a career of universal conquest. No power in Europe can withstand them. We shall be compelled to engage in a death-struggle with Despotism at the head of the marshaled forces of Europe. When that struggle comes, God grant that half our country may not be driven by oppression to welcome the invader, whose feet, once firmly planted on our soil, might never be dislodged! Upon us the destinies of the earth will depend, and I trust we shall not fail! It will be, it must be, a desperate conflict. But I believe in the destiny of Republicanism! I believe in the mission of America! I believe in the God of Providence!

In giving to England the colossal power she wields, and which will be thrown at the critical moment into the wrong side of the scale, we have brought the world to the verge of political shipwreck. Ah! when the crisis comes in Europe, were America but in a condition to turn the wavering balance in favor of the cause of Progress! We might have been, had we been true to our Constitution, and trodden the path of greatness Nature marked out for us. We may be, still, if we in this crisis of our destiny return to a constitutional administration of the government. If, at a future day, the cause of Liberty and Religion is exposed to deadliest peril, the historian who chronicles that dreadful conflict, will attribute it all to our violations of the constitution of our country.

NOTE.—My view of European affairs was completed in the Fall of 1866, and they are presented without change. The course of subsequent events has demonstrated the correctness of the view of the situation then taken.

In the imbroglio that sprung up on the Luxembourg question, Napoleon showed his anxiety to precipitate a conflict with Prussia on a side issue between the two governments, which did not involve the question of nationality. But the prompt interposition of the British government saved Prussia from a conflict, for which it was not prepared. Since then, seemingly convinced that he will not be suffered to engage Prussia single-handed, Napoleon has visited the emperor of Austria, and has, no doubt, come to an explicit understanding with regard to the future policy of the two states.

The Italian question, however, was not so near a final solution as I then supposed. The turn taken by German affairs has embarrassed Napoleon, and compelled him to adopt a cautious policy with regard to the Pope, which has prevented, as yet, the annexation of the Papal States to the kingdom of Italy. It is now the policy of Napoleon to unite all the Catholic States, if possible, against the ambition of Russia and Prussia. To make head against their ambitious aims, he will need the alliance of all the Catholic Powers,—Spain and Portugal, as well as Austria and Italy. This change of the situation renders it necessary to conciliate the Pope. And Napoleon, who, two years ago, virtually abandoned the temporal sovereignty of the Pope to the kingdom of Italy, now finds it advisable, in order to conciliate Austria and Spain, his natural allies against Prussia and Russia, to become the champion of Papal authority.

No doubt Napoleon is acting in cordial co-operation with the Italian government. Victor Emanuel would like to annex the Papal territories. But to attain this object, he will hardly co-operate with Prussian ambition. He will rather, if he is wise, relinquish his private ambition for the time, to promote the the general safety, and cheerfully co-operate with the policy of Napoleon in maintaining the authority of the Pope, as a concession to the Catholic Powers. But this understanding is necessarily a State secret between the two courts. The king of Italy cannot venture to take part against the movement of the patriotic fillibusters, for fear of losing popularity with the Italians. He therefore professes to favor the movement against Rome, while he, no doubt, secretly invites the movement of French troops to drive Garibaldi from the Papal territories.

From present indications, Napoleon must continue to protect the temporal power of the Pope, as a propitiation to the Catholic powers, who are his natural allies against Russian and Prussian ambition.

Events that have occurred since the chapters on European affairs were completed confirm the views there presented of the imminence of the approaching conflict. The antagonism of France and Prussia; the sympathy of England and Russia with Prussian ambition; the understanding between France and Austria,—all point to a grand conflict, inevitable, however it may be deferred.

BOOK III.

PROPOSITION III.

THE PRESENT IS A CRISIS *in which the Government of the* UNITED STATES *may, by* A WISE AND CONSERVATIVE POLICY, *enable Our* COUNTRY *to enter upon a course of* UNEXAMPLED PROSPERITY; *and exert an influence upon* FOREIGN AFFAIRS *that will arrest the* INDUSTRIAL AND POLITICAL EVILS *now menacing the World with ruin: But where an ill-advised policy will involve the* COUNTRY *in* FINANCIAL RUIN; *and suffer the* WORLD *to drift, without restraint, into a* CHAOS OF CONVULSION, *threatening with overthrow the cause of* HUMAN ADVANCEMENT.

BOOK III.

THE WORLD'S CRISIS.

THIS is the World's Crisis.

Whether we look at home or abroad, whether we contemplate the condition of the world in its industrial, its social, or its political aspect, we are equally impressed with the conviction that this is a momentous crisis in the destiny of the earth.

Dangers arise on every hand, menacing with ruin the cause of human advancement. The world's industry has been warped into abnormal development; social life is reeling with excitement, and threatens to smother civilization with the fungus growth of prurient development; in the political world, Despotism is recovering from the severe blows inflicted upon it within the last century, and is threatening Liberty with a stern reaction. Industrial, social, and political evils seem hastening to a crisis, as though emulous which shall first strike down the hopes of man.

If we analyze the causes of the dangers which overshadow the world, the centralization of industry and commerce in the hands of England, will be found the prime cause of them all.

The industrial evils under which the world is laboring have their origin in British centralization of commerce. It oppresses the industry of all other countries, compelling them to sell raw material and provisions to a foreign market, accepting prices diminished by the profits of various speculators and the cost of heavy transportation. It also places them under the necessity of buying manufactures from a foreign country, at prices enhanced by speculation and mercantile profits, both on the raw material, and the manufactured article. Thus selling cheap and buying dear, they are impoverished by a losing traffic. Every country in Christendom is becoming

annually more deeply involved in debt to England. That country is becoming the annuitant of the world; and unless the tendency to centralization is arrested, it will soon have the nations bankrupt dependencies of its imperial grandeur.

The same centralization of industry and commerce is causing the general excitement so deleterious to the social and moral advancement of our age. It has stimulated commercial exchange into undue activity, making raw material and provisions—bulky articles, which should be consumed and manufactured in the countries which produce them—the prime commodities of traffic. This has led to excitement in traffic, withdrawing millions from productive industry to engage in some of the departments of trade, and massing population in cities under such circumstances as to corrupt the fountains of social life. The result has been wide-spread excitement, attended with social demoralization throughout the civilized nations of the earth.

The same centralization of commerce and wealth in the hands of England has given that country the balance of power, which has enabled it to give to Absolutism a vigor which, in this age it has never before possessed. It is the Tory government of England which gives Russia and Prussia the power to control the affairs of Europe at their will, and which, unless a timely check is given to the evil, will enable them to trample down liberty in Europe, and endanger free institutions throughout the world. This last and most imminent danger derives its threatening aspect entirely from the alliance of British wealth and power with the Absolutist governments. The power of trade and commerce is thus thrown into the balance, in favor of despotism.

This state of things will continue as long as the Tories retain control of the British government. All their sympathies and interests ally them with Absolutism against the principles of progress. It is now evident that the Tories will remain in power so long as England continues to enjoy the prosperity she now possesses. The Liberal leaders are endeavoring to obtain a Reform Bill* which

*This was written before the passage of the recent Reform Bill by the English Parliament.

shall so extend the suffrage as to give their party the control of the government. But the Tories are resolved to so frame the measure as, to destroy the Whig party, by strengthening their own and the Liberal parties; knowing that in a contest between the landed aristocracy and the mechanics, the Middle class aristocracy will range themselves on the side of the former. From the known devotion of a great number of nominal Whigs to Tory principles, it seems probable that the Tory ministry will be able to carry a bill through Parliament, substantially such as they desire. If they succeed, they will turn to their own advantage the entire Reform movement, strengthen their own party, crush the Whigs, and place the Liberals in a decided minority in Parliament. The Reform bill now before Parliament will doubtless so adjust the suffrage, as to establish the Tories firmly in power.

But the Tory position has one weak point. In extending the suffrage they will increase the power of the people, and they can control the votes of the enfranchised masses only so long as no period of general discontent intervenes. Whenever an industrial crisis shall inflict general suffering upon the English masses, the people will cast off the influence of the Aristocracy, and with their votes bring the Liberals into power. Until then, the Tories will control the government with strong parliamentary majorities.

The only hope of getting the Liberals into power, and arraying the British government on the side of Progress in the coming European struggle, lies in bringing about a period of industrial distress which will wrest the enfranchised masses from Tory influence. It must not be supposed that, in urging this consummation, the writer is actuated by hate of England, or a desire to cause yet deeper suffering among the oppressed masses of that country. On the contrary, he is influenced by a sincere desire to promote the true interests of Britain. Her centralization of industry is a false system. It is oppressing the British people no less than foreign nations. It does not benefit the country; it only increases the colossal fortunes of an already overgrown aristocracy. Besides, a false industrial system must sooner or later, be overthrown. The sooner the crisis comes, the less suffering it will involve. Far better that it should come at a period when it will stimulate the English people to unseat

the aristocracy from power, and place their government in alliance with liberty in the approaching crisis, than that it should be deferred until the manacles of despotism are riveted upon themselves, and upon mankind.

A blow to the commercial centralization of England would cause general discontent among the suffering masses. The thousands of operatives thrown out of employment would demand labor and relief from taxation. They would point to half the lands of the country devoted to pleasure grounds, pasturage, and the growth of timber. They would notice the unequal distribution of taxation, of which more than half is imposed upon the suffering people, while the property of the rich is exempt from public burdens. They would demand that taxation should be removed from articles chiefly consumed by the poor,—that excises and customs upon articles consumed by the laboring classes should be abolished. They would demand that the public revenues should be raised by a property tax, which would free industry from public burdens, and compel the aristocracy to devote their parks and forests to tillage, and thus afford food and employment to the millions languishing in want.

The Tories would never yield to these demands, without a struggle. They would bring all the engines of wealth and power to bear, in order to control elections. But the famine-stricken people would not recede. A fair election would elevate the Liberals to power: an attempt to control the polls by fraud or violence would lead to revolution.

If this revolution in English politics precedes the great coming struggle in Europe between Feudalism and Progress, all will be well: the British Government, under Liberal rule, will place itself in the van of Progress, and assure oppressed populations of its sympathy and support. Meantime, our own country, through the measures necessary to break down British monopoly, would make rapid strides in manufacturing industry and commercial greatness. Our moral influence would afford a powerful support to liberal movements abroad, and a combination of the United States, France, and England, would overawe the despotic powers. An European Congress might then be held, whose decisions would re-establish the Nationalities, reduce Russia within proper limits, and settle without an

appeal to the sword the dangerous issues which have so long agitated Europe. We should become the great leader in the march of advancement. Stimulated by our example, and encouraged by our sympathy and moral aid, the nations would tread the path from monarchy to republicanism, and, at no distant day, thrones would give place to universal freedom.

If the world is to be saved from the dangers which menace it, the centralization of Great Britain must be overthrown. We are more deeply interested in the achievement of this object than any other country. To us will inure the advantages resultant from it; upon us, especially, will be inflicted the evils it is engendering. America more than any other country is the victim of the social excitement gendered by the British centralization of commerce; it will be the first country doomed to bankruptcy; and, if the programme of Absolutism furthered by England is consummated, the United States will be the victim immolated upon the broken altar of freedom. It behooves us to bend our undivided energies to the overthrow of this baneful centralization. It should be made the chief aim of our policy. To this grand purpose every thing else should be made secondary.

The centralization of commerce in the hands of England was occasioned by our departure from the principles of the Constitution, which gave that country the opportunity to engross the cotton manufacture, and thus lay the foundation of that centralization it has since attained. We thus dwarfed our own manufactures, perverted our industry, and gave England advantages which she has used to the utmost.

We must now undo our work. We have built England up. We must now, in self-defense, and in the interests of human progress, pull her down. The only hope of averting a great catastrophe lies in breaking down the British centralization of industry and commerce, and becoming, ourselves, a great manufacturing and commercial nation. We must return from our departures, and enter, though at the eleventh hour, the path of industry for which nature designed us.

The cotton manufacture is the only one in which we can, at pres-

ent, successfully compete with England; and it is the only branch of industry of sufficient importance to overthrow the commercial monopoly of England, if wrested from her. We have much fewer advantages in attempting to compete with her in woolen manufactures. She can obtain an unlimited supply of wool from Australia, South America, and the Mediterranean, at prices cheaper than we can, at present, grow it. Moreover, the woolen manufacture is not of sufficient importance, even if wrested from England, to cause the downfall of her centralization of industry.

The cotton manufacture is the vital point. In 1859, the exports of Great Britain were nearly £120,000,000, ($600,000,000,) of which nearly £50,000,000 ($250,000,000) were cotton manufactures. In 1861, the cotton famine had begun to influence the manufacture, but even then, cotton fabrics comprised £47,000,000 ($235,000,000) out of £125,000,000, ($625,000,000),—the entire exports of the country. When we reflect that, besides the cotton goods exported, a great quantity is consumed in Great Britain, instead of woolen and flaxen goods, leaving those to be exported in larger quantities; and when we further reflect that the cotton exports are used in exchange, to stimulate the production of many articles of British commerce which would not otherwise be produced; and, furthermore, that the transportation of cotton goods and raw products received in exchange, creates a demand for British coal, and railway iron, and machinery,—we shall see that more than half of the commerce of England is based on the manufacture of cotton goods. In depriving her of the cotton manufacture, we should, at a blow, divert one-half of the commerce of Great Britain to ourselves.

Accomplish this, and we shall rescue ourselves and the world from the calamities now impending. It will at once arrest the abnormal system of commerce that has prevailed, stop the drain of wealth from all the world to be centralized in England, and avert from us the bankruptcy otherwise inevitable; it will check the social excitement generated by centralized commerce, now threatening the downfall of civilization; it will avert the political ruin now overshadowing the world.

We can do this. No other nation can. We alone have been en-

dowed by nature with advantages, which, wisely used, will enable us to outrival Britain, and dispossess her of her baneful supremacy. We can do it. We must do it. In this, the most important crisis that has ever occurred in the history of the world, all the great interests of humanity hail us on to the rescue.

We may achieve this aim. But it will be no easy task. It will challenge all our energies, and require the adoption of the wisest policy. We might, in 1860, have wrested from Britain the scepter of commerce, with little difficulty. But the events of the last five years have almost wrecked our industry, and have enabled England to fortify her position to such an extent as to almost defy competition.

It now becomes a question of the utmost importance to consider the policy necessary to be adopted, in order to achieve the overthrow of British monopoly. This will be the aim of the remaining portion of this work. It is necessary, however, before entering upon this discussion, to notice the elements of the present situation, together with the causes which have brought affairs to the present pass. This will be the subject first before us.

PART I.

THE SITUATION, AND ITS CAUSES.

It will appear, in the ensuing chapters, that the dangers of the present situation arise entirely from the unconstitutional interference of the Federal government with the internal interests of the country.

We propose, in the first place, to give a brief *resume* of the train of causation already traced, showing that all the past evils of the republic arose out of the unconstitutional course of the Federal government, and that the recent Civil War, itself, is but the necessary result of causes thus set in operation; and, secondly, to trace the evil effects of the War, especially upon our industry as in competition with Great Britain.

We shall thus obtain a clear view of the elements of the situation, and be the better prepared to consider the measures necessary to be adopted, to enable us to enter into successful competition with Great Britain.

CHAPTER I.

A RESUME.

The evil consequences of the unconstitutional intervention of the government in the internal industry of the country, as already traced, may be stated in their regular order, as follows:—

First Line of Causation.

1. The influence of the Bank and Tariff fostered manufactures in New England, which was the only section of the country that had capital to engage in them.

2. The Bank and Tariff raised the scale of prices throughout the country, and increased the cost of production in the same ratio. This operated greatly to the disadvantage of the South, which produced cotton at prices enhanced by an inflated currency and by high duties, while it sold in a foreign market at prices graduated by a specie standard.

3. The Eastern market relieved the West from stagnation, and gave an impetus to its industry that made it the most prosperous section of the country.

4. Emigration was thus diverted from the South to the West; and the development which Southern industry would have derived from a large emigration was prevented.

Second Line of Causation.

The comparatively slow development of Southern industry was productive of the most unfortunate results:—

1. It prevented the South from growing its own supplies besides supplying the English cotton market, and compelled it to concentrate its entire industry upon cotton, importing its supplies in great measure from the West.

2. This extensive demand in the East and South compelled the West to concentrate its industry upon agriculture, and thus diverted it from manufactures.

3. The absence of sufficient emigration to the South gave rise to the slave trade between the states: fortifying slavery in the border states; and, in the cotton states, increasing the hardships of the negro, and generating a slave aristocracy.

Third Line of Causation.

The Industrial System that now sprung up, in which the East was chiefly devoted to manufactures and merchandise, the South to planting, and the West to supplies, led to a third train of industrial results:—

1. The inability of our New England factories to compete with those of Great Britain, especially when the cost of manufacturing was enhanced by a scale of prices inflated by a redundant currency and a

protective tariff, prevented us from becoming a great manufacturing country.

2. This system of industry, in which no section produced its own supplies, gave rise to an excessive internal commerce where provisions and raw material, as well as manufactured articles, were hurried to and fro from one end of the country to the other.

3. This excited system of interchange gave rise to speculation, and massed vast populations in cities; and it thus generated a social excitement impairing the judgment and depraving the moral perception of large masses of our people, and fitting them to run to any extreme in morals, politics, or religion.

Fourth Line of Causation.

1. The oppression of the South by the Bank and Tariff was readily perceived by Southern statesmen, (though they attributed the combined influence of both exclusively to the latter,) and caused a most determined and excited opposition to the Tariff system. This was met as resolutely by the friends of the system, who were chiefly in the North and West. The political antagonism was intensified by the social excitement which now began to pervade the country.

2. The Tariff generated antagonistic interests where nature intended all to be harmony, and the agitation of this issue first gave rise to the sectional bickering which afterward rose to such a height, and ultimated in civil war.

3. The Tariff agitation, by exciting fierce passions on both sides, first caused a collision between Federal and State authority, which, under the Constitution, was never contemplated, and ought never to have occurred. In Nullification, it planted the seeds of Secession and Coercion,—the germs of civil war and national ruin.

4. The exigencies of the Tariff agitation compelled Andrew Jackson to introduce into the administration the innovation, Rotation in office; which ended in making politics a trade, and the government a prize of contest to ambitious and grasping place-hunters, who sacrificed the best interests of the country to the lust of office.

5. The contest over the Tariff question generated passions among the advocates of protection which caused them to originate and foster the slavery agitation as a means of retaliation upon the South.

And, afterward, when the West and the Middle states united with the South to break down the protective system, the advocates of the Tariff seized upon the abuses of Slavery, caused mainly by the Tariff system, to unite the entire North against the South, and enable them again to set on foot the protective system.

6. And, now, the social excitement fostered by our industrial system, and the political corruption engendered by rotation in office, exerted a combined influence to embitter the sectional agitation, rendering both sections deaf to the voice of reason and the counsels of moderation, and plunged the country, despite the restraining efforts of conservatism, headlong into civil war.

Fifth Line of Causation.

1. The location of our factories in New England, causing us to fail of becoming a manufacturing country, left British enterprise to engross the manufacture of our cotton, and to construct upon the basis of that manufacture, a gigantic commercial centralization, rendering the whole world tributary to its industry.

2. This commercial monopoly, based upon a violation of just commercial principles, is preying upon the industry of all nations, compelling them to exchange raw produce for manufactures, to sell cheap and purchase dear, and is making England the annuitant of all countries to an extent which threatens the world with bankruptcy.

3. This commercial centralization, making staple commercial commodities of provisions and raw material,—articles which ought never to enter into the system of commercial interchange—has given rise to a general social excitement throughout Christendom, developing erratic impulse, and tending to demoralization.

4. The commercial centralization of England has given that country a wealth and influence which invest it with controlling power in the present political condition of the world;—power which it has hitherto used in critical periods in favor of Absolutism, and which is now strengthening despotism for a decisive conflict with freedom in Europe.

Sixth Line of Causation.

The Civil War from which we have just emerged was the direct

result of the Tariff policy of the country and the industrial and political forces it had set in operation; and it became, in turn, a more potent cause of evil to the country and the world, than any we have hitherto noticed.—It remains to trace in the detail its importance demands, the baneful results flowing from our Civil War.

The influence of the War requires attention, both under its negative, and positive aspect. Its evils are to be sought, both in the good it prevented, and in the positive evils it inflicted. We will view it in both these aspects: tracing

1st. The negative influence of the War, in arresting our career of normal prosperity; and

2d. The positive evils to which the War has given rise.

The extent of the subject demands that one or more chapters be assigned to each of these topics.

CHAPTER II.

THE EVIL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR.—1. ITS NEGATIVE INFLUENCE IN ARRESTING OUR CAREER OF NORMAL PROSPERITY.

We have now traced the line of industrial, social, and political evils which flowed from the Bank and Tariff as their primal source. But, as in the human system, so in the body politic, diseases run their course; when reaction sets in, tending to repair the ravages of disease and restore healthy action. As the influence of the Bank of 1791 had run its course in 1812, leaving the country with a tendency to enter once more upon a course of normal industry; so, in 1860, the influence of the Bank and Tariff policy had spent its force upon the industry of the country, and the causes were already at work which would have arrested abnormal development, corrected the evils from which we suffered, and restored us to a healthy condition. But, as the War of 1812 arrested the return to a healthful state, and set in

operation a train of causes which plunged the country into new evils; so the Civil War of 1861 arrested the tendency to healthy reaction, and precipitated evils an hundredfold worse than any we had endured.

The War of 1861 was an unpardonable blunder on the part of all concerned. Every step that led to it was a blunder, from the organization of the Abolition party, to the passage of the first Ordinance of Secession. It will remain to posterity the most memorable example on record of the worse than folly of attempting the violent removal of evils, instead of leaving them to the operation of natural laws. The Abolition and Free soil parties were successively organized to check the spread, and effect the overthrow of slavery, when the operation of natural laws would have effected its peaceful extinction within half a century. The organization of those parties was a blunder. They originated in the shortsighted policy of men who were unable to read the signs of the times,—who could not see that Nature had affixed boundaries, beyond which slavery could not pass; nor trace the industrial causes which doomed the institution to an early and peaceful extinction;—men, who were too impatient to wait the sure operation of nature's laws, and too faithless to trust the advancement of the world to the guiding hand of the Almighty;—Uzziahs who, excited to frenzy by the prevailing excitement, upon seeing the ark of progress tottering, as they supposed, stretched forth sacrilegious hands to its support.

It will be remembered that our abnormal course of industry, with all its consequent evils originated in the diversion of emigration from the South. This prevented the South from over supplying the English cotton market: and compelled it to concentrate its labor upon cotton; to rely upon the West in a great measure for supplies; and to purchase slaves from the border states. The want of emigration to the South perverted the entire industry of the country. While the labor of the South continued inadequate, industry could not resume its normal channels. So long as the South could not supply the English cotton demand, that section would continue to purchase slaves from the border states, and to concentrate its industry upon cotton, depending upon the West for supplies. And so

long as this state of things continued, Slavery would maintain its vigor, and continue to be oppressive: and the West would be too busily engaged in growing agricultural supplies, to turn its attention to manufactures. Before the evils under which the country labored could cease, the South must acquire sufficient labor to over supply the cotton market. As soon as this end were attained, our warped industry would begin to leave its erratic channels, and return to its natural course.

Now, the South was, for years, approximating to this condition. For forty years the maxim of the Southern planter was, "Buy more negroes, to raise more cotton; and raise more cotton, to buy more negroes." As each succeeding crop grew larger, the purchase of negroes became more extensive. The labor of the South increased in arithmetical progression. Rapidly as the cotton market extended under the impulse of British enterprise, the labor of the South increased more rapidly still. Year by year, a full supply of the cotton market was approximated more nearly. In 1860, the end was achieved. The two full crops of 1859 and 1860 overstocked the market. Vast quantities of cotton were stored in English warehouses; and English factories manufactured so far in excess of the demand, that eighteen months of short supply, consequent upon our civil war, hardly sufficed to reduce the stock of goods on hand to the normal quantity. It was evident that production had at length outstripped consumption. Southern labor had at length so far increased, as to over supply the demand for cotton.

Let us mark the necessary effect this state of things would have produced upon the industry of the country, if the war had not intervened to arrest our natural progress. We will trace its influence,

1st. Upon the institution of Slavery.

2nd. Upon the industrial condition of the West.

Sec. 1.—The Influence of the Over-supply of the Cotton Market upon the Institution of Slavery.

The over-supply of the cotton market, as its first effect, would cause the planter to turn a part of his labor to the production of supplies for home consumption, and for adjacent town and city

markets. The purchase of negroes from the border states might continue a few years longer, until the labor of the South were sufficient to grow all necessary supplies, besides growing cotton enough to supply the demand. Then, other investments would be more profitable than negroes, and planters would cease to buy slaves from the border states.

The slave trade between the states would cease.

I. The Effect of the Cessation of the Slave Traffic upon Slavery in the Border States.

1*st. Effect upon Slavery in Maryland and Virginia.*

Slavery has not, for years, been profitable in Maryland and Virginia, except in the raising of negroes for the Southern market. The farmers in those states have long been unable to meet their expenses by the cultivation of the soil. Two or three young negroes were annually sold to meet the expenses of the plantation. What could those farmers do, when the Southern demand for negroes ceased?

In Virginia and Maryland, tobacco is the only crop that will afford profitable employment for a large force of negroes upon a plantation. If the farmer increased his tobacco crop in the effort to make up the deficit arising from the want of market for surplus slaves, his land would soon be exhausted: if he continued to limit his crops to the capacity of his land, his negroes would be an incumbrance instead of a profit, and an annual deficit of thousands of dollars, formerly made up by the sale of slaves, would threaten him with beggary.

What resource would the Virginia farmer have, whose farm was thus overstocked with negroes?

It might be his first impulse to rid himself of the oppressive number of his slaves, by sending a portion of them with his children to settle in the South or West. But the want of money to meet the expenses of removal, and to purchase land at the destination, would render this impracticable. His negroes being unsaleable, the only method of raising money would be the sale of his land. But the sale of part of his land, to obtain means to send away part of his

negroes, would not better his condition.—The Virginia farmer who was oppressed by the number of his negroes exceeding the capacity of his land, would find it his only resource to sell his land and migrate with his slaves to the South or West. The migration of slave owners would soon leave too few negroes in Virginia, and Maryland, and Delaware, to influence public sentiment, and those states would follow the example of states farther north, by establishing a system of gradual emancipation.—Virginia came very near declaring gradual emancipation in 1832. The demand of the Southern market afterward strengthened the institution. The withdrawal of that market would soon have ripened public sentiment in favor of emancipation.

2*nd. The Influence of this State of Things upon Slavery in Kentucky and Missouri.*

What would be the effect of this migration of slaveholders into Kentucky and Missouri?

Hemp is the only crop in those states, upon which large gangs of negroes can be profitably worked in a limited space. But the concentration of immense numbers upon the hemp crop, would soon glut the market and reduce the staple to a merely nominal value. What would the slaveholders then do? If they turned their attention to tobacco, the very limited market for the article would be glutted, with a consequent decline of price; and the same result would follow as in Virginia,—the exhaustion of the soil. Grain crops require too extensive a surface in proportion to labor, for gangs of negroes to be profitably employed upon them. In the absence of a Southern market to which the Western negroes might be sent, the negro population of the West would soon increase, by immigration and natural growth, to such a degree as to become burdensome to their owners. No Western crop would enable the Western farmer to meet the necessary expenses of his plantation.—The slave owner of the Western states would be under the necessity of selling his lands, and migrating with his slaves to the cotton states, leaving the border states to go into gradual emancipation.

II. The Effect of this State of Things upon Slavery in the Cotton States.

Two causes would soon render this negro population concentrated in the cotton states an injury to the country, and a burden to the owner, of which he would gladly rid himself:—

1st. The over-population of negroes in the cotton states would, in less than half a century, have rendered emancipation and colonization an unavoidable necessity.

2nd. The cotton market would be gorged, and the labor of a plantation of slaves would not justify the expense of maintaining them.

Let us, in the first place, take the most favorable view of the question, for slavery, and suppose that a steady demand continued for the products of slave labor. Still, it is capable of easy demonstration that slavery in the cotton states was doomed to an early extinction by the mere over-peopling of the soil.

1*st. Slavery doomed to Early Extinction by the Narrow Limits of the Territory adapted to Slave Labor.*

The first thing to be considered in this connection is, the rapid exhaustion of the soil by slave labor. Cotton is an exhausting crop, and with a large gang of negroes upon a limited quantity of land, the first consideration with the planter must be, not the improvement of the soil, but employment and subsistence for his slaves. The result would be the absolute exhaustion and abandonment of millions of acres of uplands, in a few years. The exhaustive system of culture was, before the war, already awakening apprehensions for the future, in the minds of reflective Southern men. Tract after tract had been exhausted, and abandoned by emigration to a virgin soil.

This exhaustion of land is an important feature in the estimate of the profit of negro labor. If, in thirty years, the net profits of the labor of a plantation of negroes is $40,000, there is a net loss of $10,000, if, meantime, they have worn out and compelled the owner to abandon lands whose value as a virgin soil would be $50,000. With the immense influx of negroes to the cotton states, this item would swell into overshadowing dimensions. The increase of population would enhance the value of land, while it would necessitate its rapid exhaustion.

How long would it require for this increase of slave population to overstock all the good lands in the Cotton States, and necessitate emancipation through the exhaustion of the soil?

The following are the statistical facts necessary to make an estimate:

First: The negro population of this country has, since the beginning of the century advanced at a regular ratio of increase,—it has doubled once in thirty years. It doubled in the interval of thirty years from 1810 to 1840; again the negro population of 1820 had doubled in 1850; and the population of 1830 was doubled in 1860.

Second: Upon an average, the effective force of a plantation of negroes was equal to two-thirds of their whole number,—one hundred and fifty negroes, men, women, and children, were estimated as equal in the cultivation of cotton to one hundred "hands."

Third: Ten acres of cotton to the "hand" was the usual crop. To make our estimate as favorable to the existence of slavery as possible, let us suppose that only eight acres of cotton to the "hand" are grown.

Fourth: For the support of the plantation it was necessary to raise, besides the crop of cotton, five acres of Indian corn to the hand; and upon a self-sustaining plantation, an equal quantity either of some other grain, or of peas, would be necessary. We will suppose, however, that eight acres of grain to the hand are sufficient for all plantation uses.

Fifth: To prevent the exhaustion of the soil, and to supply necessary pasturage for stock, it would be necessary to have a quantity of fallow, or grass land, equal to one-third of the whole tillable land.

Sixth: Hence a judicious system of tillage would allow to every hand eight acres of cotton, eight of grain and other supplies, and eight of fallow or grass. Consequently, apart from the land reserved for timber and fuel, every self-sustaining plantation would require twenty-four acres of land to each hand, or sixteen acres to every head of negro population.

Now let us see how many negroes the cotton states would support in full employment, without exhausting the soil. Let us make the most favorable estimate. Suppose the entire non-slaveholding white population to be concentrated in cities and towns, or living on poor

lands unsuited to slave plantations, leaving to slave plantations all the fertile lands in the cotton states. This certainly is a most favorable estimate for slavery. It will not be counterbalanced if, to simplify our calculation, we suppose that the entire slave population is concentrated on plantations, leaving to whites the avocations of towns and cities, and every class of business except planting. Furthermore, as we take it for granted in this estimate, that there is an unlimited demand for cotton, it is not necessary to draw any distinction between the production of cotton and other Southern staples: for the purpose of our estimate we may suppose the entire slave population of the cotton States assembled on plantations engaged in the production of cotton.

How much good land is there in the cotton States?—Leaving out Texas and Florida, there are in round numbers in the cotton States, including Arkansas, one hundred and seventy-five million acres of land. From this, however, we must deduct the swamp lands of Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, Georgia, and South Carolina, and the vast upland barrens in all the states, covered with pine and oak, and wholly unfit for the growth of cotton. Of the surface of Louisiana, it is estimated that over three-sevenths or nearly one-half is swamp. Every traveler in the cotton states remembers the immense extent of the pine and oak barrens which comprise the uplands. It is a liberal estimate, to suppose that one-third of the surface of those states, or 60,000,000 acres, is a fertile soil suited to the growth of cotton.—The greater part of Florida is either swamp, or pine barrens; and of Texas, far the greater portion is composed of dry plains, only suited to pasturage. Of the 195,000,000 acres of surface in those two states, less than one-fourth is adapted to cotton plantations.—It will be a most liberal estimate to suppose that, of the 370,000,000 acres of land in the cotton states, one-fourth, or 90,000,000 acres are* fertile soil adapted to cotton plantations.

---

* A writer in the *Southern Quarterly Review*,—speaking of the extent of surface adapted to the cotton culture, says: "A very low latitude, even in the United States, is not favorable to a large yield of the upland cotton. Low down in Texas or Louisiana, the plant runs too much to weed, with long joints and few bolls. The truth is, the real cotton region is, comparatively speaking, a narrow belt in the

Now let us suppose every acre of this land to be devoted to slave plantations; and let it all be devoted to tillage, not reserving an acre for timber or fuel. How many negroes could find profitable employment, without exhausting the soil? As we have seen, twenty-four acres would be required for every hand,—being sixteen acres to every head of negro population. At this rate, 5,625,000 negroes would occupy all the good cotton lands in the Southern states. This number would be equal to 3,750,000 hands, and would cultivate, at eight acres to the hand, 30 million acres in cotton, 30 million acres in cereals, and 30 million acres in grass and fallow.

In 1860, there were about 2,500,000 negroes in the cotton states. Suppose that, prior to emancipation in the border states, only one-third of the negro population were sent South. Then, at their regular rate of increase, doubling once in thirty years, the 2,500,000 negroes in the cotton states in 1860, together with the subsequent immigration from the border states, would amount to 6,000,000, in 1890. They would then have occupied every acre of cotton lands in the cotton states.

Their subsequent increase would be a burden, either taxing the soil with excessive culture and rapidly exhausting it, or diminishing the cotton crop to give place to supplies.

In 1900 A. D., the negroes of the cotton states would have increased to nearly 8,000,000, of whom two-thirds, or 5,333,000, would be hands. These must continue to grow eight acres, each, of grain for supplies. The planters would now be under the necessity of choosing whether they would exhaust their land with excessive culture—abandon the growth of cotton—or emancipate their negroes as

---

United States. Take the latitude of 33 degrees and run it west, and it will be found to be the center of the belt. Seventy-five miles north and south of that degree will comprise the cotton region of this country, and the plant will degenerate as fast going south of that line as it will north of it, as far as the quantity per acre is concerned. The weed will not degenerate, but the bolls will grow fewer, as you go south; and as you go north of that latitude, they will not mature so fully. Even within that belt there is great inequality." The writer states that the climate of Texas "will forever prevent that region from being permanently a cotton country." He concludes: "We infer from all this, that the climate suited for cotton, even in the United States, is far more limited than was formerly supposed."—From his remarks it appears that the estimate given in the text is much too large.

expensive and unprofitable, and employ coolie labor, instead. If they gave up the necessary quantity of land to grass and fallow, there would not remain five million acres for cotton: if they continued to cultivate the usual quantity of cotton, their lands would be so exhausted in a few years, as to be unable to support their negroes. In either case, ruin would confront them.

The longer they deferred action, the worse their condition would become. In 1910, there would be 10,000,000 negroes, requiring, at our estimate, 50,000,000 acres to be devoted to supplies; leaving only 40,000,000 acres for cotton, if the entire surface were devoted to ceaseless cultivation. In 1920, there would be 12,000,000 slaves, requiring 64,000,000 acres to be devoted to the production of supplies. The subsistence of the negroes alone, would then give full employment to the soil.

This tendency would be readily perceived, and as soon as slavery became less profitable than coolie labor, a system of gradual emancipation and colonization would be adopted. This state of things would occur in 1900; when, as we have seen, slavery would be unprofitable unless with the exhaustion of the soil, while coolie labor would yield a large profit. Three and three-quarter millions of coolies would cultivate the 90 million acres of land,—30 million acres in cotton, 30 million in supplies, and 30 million in fallow. The land cultivated in cotton would yield, at the usual average, 15,000,000* bales, worth, at ten cents a pound, $600,000,000. Their wages, at $50 each a year, would amount to $187,000,000, leaving a profit of $413,000,000.

Let us reduce this estimate to the scale of a single plantation. A planter with 1,200 acres of land would, in 1890, have on it, by our estimate, seventy-five negroes, equal to fifty hands. They would cultivate every acre of his land,—four hundred in cotton, four hundred in cereals, and four hundred in fallow.—In the year 1900, these negroes would have increased to one hundred, requiring the culture of 530 acres of cereals for the support of the plantation, and diminishing, proportionally, the amount of cotton produced. This tendency would go on until 1920, when the negroes would have increased

* It will be recollected that this estimate is based upon the supposition that the cotton market is unlimited; so that, by hypothesis, the labor of the South is limited only by the quantity of land on which to employ it.

to one hundred and fifty, and the support of the plantation would require 800 acres to be cultivated in cereals, and tax the soil to its full capacity of production for the support of the plantation. The planter, in the year 1900, would already perceive the tendency. The negroes would at that time be a burden, while, by the employment of coolie labor, the planter would realize a large annual profit. Fifty coolies would cultivate his land, at a cost for wages of $2,500, and produce a cotton crop worth $8,000, leaving a net profit of $5,500 annually.

The result would be that, by the close of this century, the cotton states would be driven to the adoption of a system of gradual emancipation, in connection with African colonization.

Southern statesmen foresaw this result. They perceived that the time was coming when the increase of the slave population in the cotton states would overstock the soil, and render the institution a burden. Hence their efforts to prevent this consummation, by obtaining territory into which slavery might spread.—But this could not have averted the impending doom of the institution. Slavery could not exist on an extensive scale in the territory occupied by Mexico. The six months of dry season which there prevails, unfits the country for the growth of slave products, except where the land can be artificially irrigated; and the valleys susceptible of irrigation are small, and the supply of water is wholly inadequate to the irrigation, even of these. Slavery could not be saved by expansion. Divine Providence had assigned its limits, and fixed the bounds of its duration, in the immutable laws of industry.

It thus appears that, under the most favorable supposition, slavery could not have endured half a century. It may be objected that, in our estimate, too large a surface has been devoted to the production of cereals, inasmuch as the surface devoted to cereals would not increase in the ratio of the negro population. Admit this, and still our estimate is much too favorable to the institution.—We have supposed that the white population of the cotton states, who at the regular rate of increase would have numbered eight millions in 1890, would yield all the fertile lands to the occupancy of negro plantations; and, furthermore, that these lands would be equally distrib-

uted among slave owners in proportion to the number of their slaves. But practically, neither of these suppositions is correct. Many of the fertile lands would be held by non-slaveholding whites; many slaveholders would have engrossed lands much in excess of the number of their negroes;—leaving many slave owners to settle on inferior lands, which slave culture would soon exhaust. Their clamors under the burden of slavery would lead the cry of emancipation, while yet extensive landowners in fertile districts found slavery profitable. These causes would materially shorten the duration of the institution.

2*nd*. *Slavery Doomed to Early Extinction by the Over-supply of the Cotton Market.*

In the preceding estimate, we have supposed that the cotton demand would be boundless, and that the institution would be exceedingly profitable until the increase of the negro population compelled the diminution of the cotton crop, to give place to cereals. In carrying out the calculation based on this supposition, the cotton crop of 1790 was estimated at fifteen million bales. This supposition yields altogether too much to the duration of slavery. The limited demand for cotton would cut short the profits of the institution during the entire period.—Our cotton production began at zero, in the presence of a demand which the supply could not meet. Our production doubling about once in fifteen years, grew faster than the demand; and at this ratio of increase, we, at length, in 1860, produced a quantity surpassing the demand.—It would be a liberal estimate to suppose that the demand for cotton would double once in thirty years. At this rate ten million bales would supply the cotton market in 1890.

The glut of the cotton market would exert a most important influence in shortening the duration of slavery. Even if we had an unlimited surface upon which slavery might spread, the want of demand for slave products suited to the soil, would soon render the institution a burden.

In 1890, there would be in the cotton states six million slaves, of whom at least four millions and a half would be gathered upon cotton plantations. We should then have four million five hundred

thousand negroes engaged in raising supplies, and growing ten million bales of cotton as an extra crop. Two million laborers are sufficient to grow that amount of cotton; so that the South would be sustaining two million and a half of negroes in practical idleness. By the year 1900, the negroes on cotton plantations would have increased to six millions, of whom three and one-third millions would be an useless burden. In 1910, the idlers on cotton plantations would number over four millions; in 1920, five millions, out of a population of nine millions.

The question would arise, Why keep millions of idle negroes occupying the best lands of the country, when less than half their number would suffice to do their work? The non-slaveholding whites would see themselves excluded from millions of acres of the best lands by negroes, of whose labor there was no need, who were an incubus upon the country, and a burden to their owners. They would demand that a different system of labor should be introduced. The slave owners would see that the interest of the capital invested in lands and farming implements for the support of these idle negroes, together with the amounts expended in clothing them, etc., would pay for the labor necessary to supply the cotton market. If they were disposed to hold out, their obstinacy must give way when they saw these idle surplus negroes requiring so much land to be devoted to their subsistence as to trench upon the surface devoted to the production of cotton. As they saw their cotton crops, year by year, diminished, to give place to supplies necessary to maintain their negroes, they would be forced to recognize the necessity of ridding themselves of the incubus of slavery.

Slavery in the cotton states was menaced by two horns of a dilemma, one, or both of which assured its destruction. The want of sufficient land to support the negroes would be fatal to it: the want of sufficient demand for cotton would be fatal to it. The combination of the two doomed it to early and inevitable extinction.—Indeed, slavery can only exist under peculiar circumstances. It requires two things to render it profitable,—an abundance of cheap and unoccupied lands where a wasteful system of culture is of little consequence, and an unbounded market for products on which slave labor may be profitably employed. It becomes unprofitable when

the slave population increases beyond the ratio of the demand for slave grown products; or, when the country in which it exists becomes populated to such an extent as to leave no room for the further spread of slave population. It can only exist in a new country growing slave products, for which the markets of the world afford an unlimited demand.

Slavery had been highly profitable once in the border states. In 1860, it was no longer so, except in connection with the southern slave market. It was still highly profitable in the cotton states, and would continue to be so, for years to come. So long as the market for cotton and for agricultural produce afforded the negroes active employment, the profits of the institution would continue. But when the increase of the slave population exceeded the limits of the demand for their productions, and the capacity of the country for their support, the institution would become a burden, and would pass away with the circumstances which gave it vitality.

Far better for our country had slavery been left to the operation of natural laws. By the close of the present century, the institution would have been brought under the influence of emancipation legislation, which would have quietly freed the country from its presence. Our civil war came on at the very moment when industrial forces were being developed tending to emancipation. Had the crisis been deferred a few years longer, the evident wane of slavery in the border states would have quieted all excitement, and the institution would have been left by general accord to the operation of industrial laws.

Let us consider,

Sect. 2.—The Effect of the Supply of the Cotton Market upon our Manufacturing Industry.

The concentration of southern labor upon the cotton crop, causing that section to rely largely upon the West for agricultural supplies, was one of the chief causes which turned the industry of the latter section away from manufacture, to the production and transportation of cereals. The supply of the cotton market would, as a first effect, divert a great part of the labor of the South to the

growth of supplies; and this would continue until the entire wants of the section were met. The Southern market for Western produce would cease. The stagnation of Western industry would find no relief except in manufactures.—Cities have grown up on the southern borders of the West, engaged in the Southern supply trade. Both their population and their capital would now be idle. Their laboring population would be under the necessity of dispersing into the country to increase the already too great production of agricultural supplies. The capitalists and property holders of the cities, and the country farming population, would be equally interested in averting this depopulation, alike ruinous to them all. The only alternative would be, to employ this population in manufactures; and the immense capital of the West would all be promptly invested in manufacturing industry.

None can question the ability of *Western* manufacturers, at that period, to compete with British cotton and woolen fabrics, in our own markets, where the incidental protection of a revenue tariff was afforded them.—But it may be questioned whether they would have been able to compete with English manufactures in the markets of the world. A comparison of advantages will show that the West still possessed the superiority which, at an earlier day, should have secured to that section manufacturing supremacy.

England, it is true, then possessed greater advantages than thirty years before. During that period, her manufacturing industry had attained extraordinary dimensions; her industry had become thoroughly systematized; and unexampled prosperity had given her the power of an immense accumulated capital. But the West had also developed in an unexampled degree all the elements of industrial greatness. If it had not the accumulated capital of England, it had enough to establish manufactures to the full extent of the wants of industry. If it had not the organized operative industry, it had the population already assembled at desirable points, and ready to engage in manufactures at the first signal. Everything was ready but the manufactories,—raw material, operatives, warehouses, steamboats, railways, and labor in abundance. No enterprise is capable of such rapid development as manufactures. In a

few years, the West might have had in operation as many looms and spindles as Great Britain.

Once in operation, British manufactures would have been driven from competition. In every element of successful industry, the West had immeasurably the advantage.

1. The English factories were supplied with American cotton, forwarded to Liverpool as the depot of supply for English mills. The cotton from the Mississippi valley could be forwarded to St. Louis, Louisville, and Cincinnati, about as cheaply as to New Orleans. The Western manufacturer, therefore, would save in the cost of raw material, the freight from New Orleans to New York — factorage there—freight from New York to Liverpool—brokerage there—and freight from Liverpool to Manchester.

2. The English operative was fed on Western produce, at prices enhanced beyond the Western cost, by transportation to New York —mercantile profits there—freight to Liverpool—mercantile profits there—and freight to Manchester.

3. The price of imported commodities was not enhanced by Tariff duties with us so much as in England. Our Tariff was then reduced to the revenue standard, averaging only a duty of 19 per cent.; and the cost of imported commodities and luxuries used by the laboring class was much cheaper, here, than there.

4. The difference of taxation gave the Western manufacturer a great advantage over the English.

We were free from debt; while England owed £894,644,060 ($4,473,220,300), entailing an annual burden of £30,110,000 ($150,-550,000), for interest. Besides this, Great Britain was under the necessity of maintaining a heavy military and naval armament, costing annually £27,385,000 ($136,925,000). The whole expenses of the British government involved an annual taxation of $350,000,000.

But moreover, the mode in which British taxation was adjusted, caused it to press upon industry with excessive severity. The Aristocracy would not suffer a tax to be laid upon their property,—the system that presses most lightly upon industry. The system of taxation was so adjusted as to press with undue weight upon the industrial, and especially upon the laboring class.

Compare the weight of taxation in the two countries:—

The American paid no tax upon breadstuffs, and scarcely any upon tea, sugar, and coffee; the English people paid on these articles $47,000,000.

The American paid no tax upon his distilled and malt liquors, of which great quantities are consumed by the laboring class of all countries;—the English people paid upon these articles in Tariff duties, excises, and tavern licenses, $170,143,140.

The American people paid no tax upon tobacco;—the English people paid $32,779,720.

The business men of America transacted their business without paying taxes on business transactions;—the business transactions in England were charged with stamps to the amount of $47,500,000.

The business men of America invested their profits without any deduction from taxation;—the business of England paid an income tax of $40,000,000.

The only point in which England had the advantage of us lay in the currency. Our currency was then much less inflated than it had been at any recent period. We had just emerged from the crash of the free banks in 1857, whose issues, like those of the National Banks, now, were based on public bonds, and the people were disgusted with expanded paper issues. There were, then, in the United States, 1,118 banks founded on a specie basis, having $83,000,000 of specie in their vaults, and a circulation of $178,000,000: besides these, there were 444 stock banks, based on state bonds, and having a circulation of $29,000,000: it is estimated that our specie circulation, at that time, amounted to $10,000,000. The entire circulation of the country was $217,000,000, of which $188,000,000 consisted of specie and the notes of banks on a specie basis.—The circulation of Great Britain at that time was $225,000,000,—fifty millions of coin, and one hundred and seventy-five millions of paper currency. Our circulation was much more inflated than that of Great Britain, when the commercial transactions of the two countries are compared; and it was attended with its natural result,—an inflation of prices beyond the English standard. But this drawback was not sufficient to counterbalance our advantages in every other particular.

In view of the high prices of provisions imported from abroad, and the burden of taxation imposed upon the laboring classes in duties and excises upon the articles they consumed, the British manufacturer was compelled to pay his operatives high wages, to enable them to subsist. Wages in Lowell were lower than in Manchester. The wages paid in New England were too little, in view of the high price of all articles of subsistence, enhanced by transportation from the West; but in the midst of the Western agricultural region, those wages would have subsisted the operative in comfort. The establishment of manufactures in the West would lower the cost of our manufactured goods; and, by breaking down the false industrial system that had sprung up, it would lower prices so far, that wages might be reduced fifty per cent below the English standard, and yet yield the operative a better subsistence than that class has ever hitherto realized, in any country.—But the American manufacturer could afford to pay the same wages as the English, and still manufacture at a cheaper cost: the greater cheapness in the cost of raw material would alone make a handsome profit; and this with the cheaper cost of living, and the absence of government taxation, would enable him to sell his goods at a lower scale of profit, and still realize the same clear gains as his British competitor. These two facts would be decisive. The American could afford to sell his goods in the world's market thirty per* cent. cheaper than English fabrics, and still realize the same net profit as his competitor.

It is needless to trace in detail the advantages flowing from the establishment of manufactures in the West, and our wresting from Great Britain the centralization of manufacturing industry. As the subject will be treated more in detail† hereafter, it will suffice merely to indicate results, leaving the mind of the reader to supply the chain of causation.

1. It would have struck down at a blow all the evils under which our country has labored so long.

(1.) All political evils would have soon disappeared.—Sectional

* See a more detailed estimate of the relative expenses of the English and American manufacturer, on page 612. which fully bears out this declaration.

† See page 616.

animosity would have ceased through identity of interest,—the West and South being copartners in the cotton supply, and the East their commercial agent.—The slavery agitation would have ceased, from the identity of Northern and Southern interests, and from the amelioration of the institution and its evident decadence.—New England, engaged in its legitimate business, the carrying trade of the country, would cease to clamor and conspire for the triumph of the protective policy. The country would have peace.

(2.) Our industrial evils would soon have disappeared.—Industry would have flowed in its normal channels.—With our abnormal industry, would have passed away the industrial evils, and the social excitement, to which it had given rise.

2. The attainment of our proper industrial position would have quietly averted the dangers now so menacing to the world.

(1.) The downfall of the British commercial centralization would carry with it the industrial oppression and the social excitement it has occasioned.

(2.) The event would dispossess Britain of the colossal power which has always been used to strengthen Absolutism, and which is now strengthening Despotism for the overthrow of Progress.

If the industrial reaction which had begun in 1860, had been suffered to work out its results unimpeded, the world would now be safe. Had slavery been left to the solution of natural causes, our career of prosperity would have been uninterrupted. The crisis that is now menacing the world so dangerously would have been averted without effort. But the War has wrenched us from our career of normal industry, and suffered events to drift on to a crisis, where only the most prompt, resolute, and well-directed efforts can save all from impending ruin.

The Anti-slavery agitation has been, from the first, a positive evil. It precipitated a struggle, which checked, in its incipiency, the tendency to emancipation; which has cost the lives of one-fourth of the negro population; which has paralyzed our national industry, and burdened the country with debt;—and all, to effect precipitately, and at the wrong time, the emancipation which would have been brought about, at the proper time, by the laws of industry. It may

prove, in the future, the source of yet greater evil. The want of the organized systematic industry of the South may prove the cause of wide-pervading industrial ruin, from which no quarter of the country will escape. If the influence of America is paralyzed in the hour of the World's crisis, and the hopes of mankind drift helplessly on to shipwreck, it will be because the American people committed the fatal error of precipitating a movement which should have been left to the guidance of Providence, and thus ruined their country at the very moment when its prosperity was greatest, and when it might and would have achieved every thing for itself, and for mankind.

CHAPTER III.

EVIL RESULTS OF THE WAR—Continued. POSITIVE EVILS.

A GREAT industrial contest with England is now our only hope. In this contest we should have nothing to fear, if our condition were the same as before the War. Our victory would be sure. If we had now the same monopoly of cotton production as then; if England were entirely dependent upon us, now, for her supplies of raw material; if we were, now, in the same industrial condition, free from debt, with a revenue tariff, a specie basis, and an organized Southern industry,—we might easily wrest from England the cotton manufacture, and overthrow her commercial supremacy. But the War has not only made the contest necessary; it has rendered our position well nigh desperate.

The War has afforded England the opportunity to strengthen her position. It has robbed us of the sinews of our strength.

SECT. I.—THE WAR HAS ENABLED ENGLAND TO FORTIFY HER CENTRALIZATION OF INDUSTRY.

Great Britain has always regarded with uneasiness her dependence upon us for raw material; knowing that whenever we adopted a wise industrial policy, our competition would wrest from her the

most profitable and important branch of her manufactures. The far-sighted commercial statesmen of Britain have long anxiously desired to free their country from dependence upon us for the raw material of her cotton manufactures.

For years, the energy, and capital, and finesse of that country, were directed to the furtherance of this object. British policy has had two aims,—to develop rival fields of cotton production; and to diminish our efficiency as cotton growers. With one hand, British capitalists lavished money to develop the cotton culture in new fields; with the other, they showered gold to foster the anti-slavery movement in the United States, having in view the subversion of the labor system of the South.

The first aim of their policy proved fruitless. A supply of seed, machinery, and capital was offered to every country that would engage in the cotton culture. But while the Southern states were growing cotton with slave labor, no country could compete with us in the cotton market. Nowhere else was there a labor system so thoroughly reliable, and so cheap. The Southern planter could afford to grow cotton at a price which barely paid expenses,—the natural increase of his slaves affording sufficient profit. In the interval between 1825 and 1860, while the supply of American cotton had increased 976,000,000 pounds, the supply from Brazil had fallen off 16,000,000 pounds, that from the West Indies 9,000,000 pounds. Egypt and India only had increased their supply,—the former 22,000,000 pounds, the latter 18,000,000 pounds. American slave labor distanced all competition, and bade defiance to every effort to foster rival fields of production.

The effort to foster the anti-slavery excitement in this country was more successful. Philanthropy was the vail used to cover the deep interest manifested by British statesmen in the war waged in the North against slavery. But it seems suspicious that British capital should be lavished to strike down an institution which gave her only dangerous commercial rival a decided advantage. The historian may, perhaps, declare that the efforts both of British capitalists, and of the leaders of British public sentiment, were influenced more by jealousy and commercial rivalry, than by philanthropic hatred of slavery.

Be this as it may, when the issue between the North and South, fomented as far as possible by British influence, approached a crisis, British capitalists promptly prepared to avail themselves of any opportunity to foster their cherished object which the fermentation of American passions might offer. In 1857, when the "Kansas War" was embittering sectional passions and strengthening the Republican party, British capitalists organized "The Cotton Supply Association," having for its aim the systematic development of the growth of cotton in new fields. Then, no sooner was war declared in 1861, than Britain seized the coveted opportunity to stimulate cotton production all over the world. British capital was poured out with a lavish hand upon every quarter of the globe. A supply of seed, of farming utensils, of necessary machinery, was offered wherever needed; dams and sluices were constructed for irrigation; and railroads were built, to open up cotton fields to market. Under the stimulus of high prices and specie payment, cotton was grown in large quantities wherever the soil and climate were adapted to its culture, and the necessary labor could be obtained.

The result shows the grandest triumph of enterprise and capital ever witnessed. The growth of cotton has everywhere been largely increased; and countries which never before produced cotton have engaged extensively in its culture. Brazil, Egypt, Turkey, and India now supply England with an amount of cotton almost equal to the supply received from the United States before the War.

The following table exhibits the British importations of cotton since 1857:

1857	=	969,618,896 lbs.
1858	=	1,034,452,176 lbs.
1859	=	1,225,989,072 lbs.
1860	=	1,390,938,752 lbs.
1861	=	1,256,684,735 lbs.
1862	=	523,973,296 lbs.
1863	=	669,583,264 lbs.
1864	=	893,304,720 lbs.
1865	=	977,968,288 lbs.
1866	=	1,377,129,936 lbs.

It appears from this table that England has so far succeeded in stimulating production in these new fields, that, notwithstanding the comparatively small amount received from the United States, her cotton supply is now as great as in 1860. British manufacturers now seem in a fair way to achieve their cherished object of becoming independent of our supply of cotton. If the present state of things continues a few years longer, they will dispense with our cotton as readily as they now dipense with our wool.

This state of affairs is full of menace to our prosperity. Cotton has always been our chief article of export, upon which both the foreign commerce, and the internal traffic of the country is based. British enterprise threatens to exclude us from the cotton production, altogether. The "British Cotton Supply Association" will, of course, continue to cherish the culture of cotton in these new fields of production; and if there is any competition in the market, it will give their products the preference over ours. And it is unquestionable that, once fairly embarked in the cotton culture, with labor systematized, these new fields can grow the staple cheaper than we can, in the present industrial condition of the country. If our industry continues in its present abnormal condition, and we remain the satellite of British industry, growing raw material and provisions for her market, in a few years more we shall find ourselves driven from the cotton production, altogether.

We now have to protect our home wool-growers from foreign competition by a tariff on foreign wool. If the present state of things continues, in a few years hence, Brazil, Turkey, Egypt, and India, after supplying England with cotton, will compete with our own cotton planters in our home market; and we shall be under the necessity of protecting our home-grown cotton from their competition by high duties, as we now protect our wool.

That this is not a meaningless jeer, will appear in a glance at the natural advantages of those fields for the production of cotton. We notice them as briefly as the importance of the subject will warrant.

We will notice:

1. *Brazil as a Cotton-producing Country.*

Brazil has advantages which will render it, if once embarked in the culture of cotton, a formidable rival of the United States.

It has a boundless extent of fertile soil, and a climate finely adapted to the growth of cotton. Indeed, cotton is an indigenous plant, growing without culture, and in its wild state continuing five or six years without decay. An American traveler who investigated the subject with care, states that two-thirds of the surface of the country is adapted to the production of cotton.

Brazil has also an abundant supply of cheap and reliable labor, in four million African slaves. The emperor has recently expressed himself in favor of a system of gradual emancipation, to take effect at the expiration of twenty years. But the Congress has taken no action on the subject; and, in any event, this generation will not find any modification of the labor system now prevailing in that country.

Besides the advantages of soil, climate, and labor, adapted to the culture of cotton, Brazil has every requisite to cheap production. Its vast extent of seaboard, and its numerous navigable streams intersecting the interior, give the best facilities for cheap transportation; its exuberant soil yields to agriculture ample returns, and countless herds of cattle roam its boundless plains; facility of production, and the distance from market, will always render agricultural supplies cheaper than with us. In all the natural advantages for cheap and abundant production, Brazil surpasses our own country. Lack of enterprise, and ignorance of its vast resources, alone prevent it from taking the front rank among cotton producing countries. Had England lavished upon Brazil the enterprise and capital with which India has been inundated, it would have rushed with a giant's step upon the career of industrial grandeur. As it is,—its slumbering energies not yet fully awakened to the fiery ardor of which the Portuguese character is capable,—the profitable nature of its other productions, and the modest recognition of our industrial supremacy, withheld it from attempting to rival our production while interrupted by the War. It was expected that, peace once restored, we would again monopolize the cotton market in defiance of competition. But let

it be seen that the locks of our strength are shorn, and Brazil will enter the field of competition in earnest, and assist in driving us from the English market.

2. *The Countries around the Mediterranean.*

The soil and climate of these countries are well adapted to the growth of cotton. Under the stimulus of British enterprise, many of the Turkish dependencies have engaged extensively in the culture.

Egypt has engaged in the culture with remarkable energy. The influence of the government has co-operated with British enterprise in stimulating production to the utmost. For years to come, Egypt may be expected to send an annually increasing crop to the British market. The country has the capacity for immense production. The delta of the Nile still retains the proverbial fertility which enabled it, in the days of the Pharaohs, to sustain a population of fifteen million souls, besides exporting large quantities of breadstuffs to the neighboring countries; and which, under the Roman empire, gained it the title of "Granary of Italy."—And, to its full capacity for growing cotton, Egypt presents the conditions of cheap production. Its staple is finer, and commands a higher price than any sent to the English market, except our small product of the sea-island variety; the Fellah Arabs cultivate their own lands, avoiding expenditure for labor; the productiveness of the soil, and the absence of market for breadstuffs, reduces life-sustaining products and the profits of labor to a much lower standard than with us. Egypt now exports a great quantity of cotton; but the production has not yet nearly reached the limit of the capacity of the country.

3. *India.*

But India is the great cotton-field, whence England hoped—and hopes to draw its chief supplies of staple.

Imagine a country larger than the entire territory of the United States east of the meridian line of the western border of Missouri, all lying within the cotton zone, and peopled by an industrious population four times larger than that of the United States,—and we have some idea of the immense capacity of India as a cotton producing country. Cotton has always been grown in India, and the

cotton manufacture has, from its earliest history, been one of the staple branches of industry. Its annual cotton crop was estimated in 1851 at 400,000,000 lbs, being half the amount of the cotton imports of England, at that period. But until recently, owing to the stereotyped habits of the people and the want of transportation to the coast, only a small portion of the product was exported. The greater part was used in household manufactures upon the primitive hand-loom.

But its past production is no criterion of the capacity of this vast region as a cotton growing country. Its fertile uplands, and the inexhaustible deltas of its great rivers, are equally adapted to the growth of the staple. India has hitherto been depressed by the evils of misgovernment: many of the works constructed in former ages for irrigation were suffered to fall into ruin, and no new works were built: the rudest system of culture has prevailed: the want of roads has cut off the interior from market. Under such circumstances, industry might be expected to languish.

Still, under these accumulated disadvantages, the cotton exports of India have steadily advanced during the last forty years. About half the cotton exported was sent to England, the other half finding a market in China. In 1825, it exported to England 20 million pounds; 41 million pounds in 1835; 77 million pounds in 1840; 118 million pounds in 1850; 204 million pounds in 1860; and 370 million pounds in 1861.

Then, British enterprise began the lavish use of capital, to foster cotton production in the country. Millions were spent in the construction of railroads to open up the interior cotton-fields; millions more were advanced for repairing old, and constructing new works of irrigation; and other millions were expended in providing proper implements and machinery for cultivating and preparing cotton for market.—A few statistics will show how earnestly British enterprise is engaged in developing the vast resources of India. In 1864, there were completed 2,688 miles of railway; in 1865, there were completed 3,186 miles, and the completion of nearly 5,000 miles was guaranteed. Immense works for irrigation have been constructed along the Ganges, and other streams. The main channel of the Ganges canal is 900 miles long, with over 1,800 miles of dis-

tributing channels, besides many hundred miles of minor channels. It irrigates a million and a half acres. Along other streams canals have been constructed varying from 100, to 500 miles, in length. In the presidency of Madras, nearly all the great rivers have been intersected by wiers, or dams, which prevent the water of summer rains from flowing to the sea, retaining them for irrigation. The government of India, withal, has been much ameliorated, and the country now enjoys a just and beneficent system of administration. Great Britain is neglecting no means of fostering the production of India.

The fruits of the wise policy so recently adopted are manifest in an industrial development wholly without precedent.

In 1862, the fostering care of England had not had time to produce effect, and the cotton export was 388,000,000 pounds, only 18,000,000 pounds more than in the preceding year. But in 1863, the export was increased to 430 million pounds, and in 1864, to 506 million pounds,—a quantity greater than the United States exported in 1850. If we compare the development of cotton exportation in India since 1860, with the increase of production of our own country, we are deeply impressed with the vast resources of that region. Its export, in 1860, was about equal to ours in 1825. Four years later, its exportation was equal to ours in 1847. Indian exportation advanced as rapidly in four years, as ours did in twenty.

If we look at the industrial development of India in another point of view, we are equally impressed with its extraordinary progress. In 1833, the entire sea-borne commerce of India, including imports and exports, only amounted to $95,000,000. In 1864, its sea-borne commerce amounted to $784,000,000, equal to one-third of that of Great Britain, and exceeding our own import and export trade for 1865, and our commerce in any former year.

India has suddenly become the commercial rival of the United States.

The development of these new fields warns us that, if Great Britain is suffered to continue her policy of fostering their production, in a few years more, they will drive us from the cotton market.

We are in the habit of soothing our apprehensions by various

suggestions, all utterly futile. It is better to look the situation in the face, and adopt a decisive policy that will avert the dangers that threaten us.

It was long urged that the India staple was of such inferior quality that it could never come in competition with ours. But this inferiority was chiefly owing to the indifference of the cultivators to the improvement of its quality. The same inferiority was once characteristic of India indigo, which was so worthless as to be unfit for the European market. The attention of English superintendents, however, so far improved its quality as to make it one of the staple exports. The same system of careless, slovenly management, without proper machinery for ginning and packing, allowed the India cotton to remain an inferior staple, hardly fit for the English market, and only suited to coarser fabrics when mixed with the American staple. While it was used in this manner, merely as an auxiliary to American cotton, to eke out the inadequate supply, its improvement was not very essential. The producers, finding a ready demand for their staple as it was, gave no care to the production of a better article. But when the American supply fell off, and the stock from these new fields became the prime staple of manufactures, the improvement of the quality became a matter of the first necessity. The "British Cotton Supply Association" forwarded to India large quantities of the seed of the fine Egyptian cotton, and furnished the Hindoo cultivators with the most improved machinery for ginning and packing. The result has been a remarkable improvement in the quality of the India staple. The Egyptian seed produces, on India soil, a cotton of larger and stronger fiber than the American, which answers well in manufactures for those purposes to which the latter has hitherto been applied.

It is again urged that these new fields cannot become formidable competitors, from the fact that their inhabitants are not sufficiently advanced in civilization to require manufactures in exchange; and that, consequently, a traffic which requires from Christendom an annual exportation of specie to pay for cotton must soon cease. This objection has some weight. England is draining Christendom of specie to pay for her cotton supply. But the process has gone

on for five years without producing any financial crisis. The remittance is systematized, and England is careful not to increase the remittances of specie beyond the amount of the annual product of the American and Australian mines. The traffic, therefore, merely serves as a conductor to prevent the accumulation of specie in Christendom. Moreover, time only is wanting to restore the balance of trade. Nothing introduces the wants of civilization so rapidly as commerce. The introduction of new and cheap articles of manufacture into a country, soon creates an extensive demand for them,—a demand which experience proves is only limited by the ability to purchase. England is exporting to Egypt, South America, and India, an annually increasing quantity of manufactured articles. In a few years, she may succeed in stimulating those countries into consuming manufactures in sufficient quantities to pay for their exports, and thus establish the balance of trade.

Again it is urged, that the system of culture is so rude in those new fields that high prices are necessary to remunerate the cultivator of cotton; and that systematic industry is so little developed, that nothing but high prices will stimulate production.

This objection seems plausible, but experience has furnished an answer. We know that those fields did furnish cotton in considerable quantities, at the old prices prevailing before the War. And experience has taught us what prices were sufficient to stimulate production. India cotton was always two cents per pound lower in the English market than the American. It was found that, whenever American cotton was worth fourteen cents a pound in Liverpool, or eleven cents in our own ports, production was stimulated in every foreign field. Sixpence a pound in the English market always produced a large export of cotton from India. It is a mistake to suppose that their rude culture enhances the cost of cotton to any great extent. The chief expense in cotton culture is, not the cultivation of the plant, but picking the cotton. In this operation, the cheap labor and the manual dexterity of the Hindoos give them a great advantage. Experience proves that these fields, even in their old rude system of culture, were able to produce cotton as cheaply as we.

The facts in the case, so far from soothing our apprehensions of

rivalry, give us grave cause of uneasiness. Under favorable circumstances, nothing improves so rapidly as husbandry—nothing develops so rapidly as industry. Forty years ago, our own system of husbandry was rude. Our agricultural implements were of the most primitive model, and our system of culture was little in advance of that which now prevails in India and South America. Nor was systematic industry much further advanced. Their system of culture has already been much improved. The lavish use of British capital, and four years of extraordinary prosperity, have enabled them to adopt improved processes in every part of the cotton culture. If, under the old system,—with imperfect implements for culture, primitive machinery for ginning and packing, no roads, and a bad government,—India was able to sell cotton for twelve cents a pound in the Liverpool market, that price will certainly suffice, now, when such improvements have been made.

The question with us is, not whether those fields will maintain their standard of production when cotton falls to the price of 1860;—the past proves that!—but, whether they will not, as their system of husbandry continues to improve under the fostering care of England, be able to export cotton at a price cheaper than we can afford. If their industry continues to develop, we may expect them to compete with us in the Liverpool market, with cotton worth only twelve cents a pound, and perhaps even lower than that.

But it is urged as a last resort, that the cotton market is unlimited, and that the industry of all is not more than sufficient to supply it. This is a grave mistake. That the demand for cotton is advancing, and will continue to advance, is unquestionable. But the increase of the crop in our own country more than kept pace with it. In 1860, we had glutted the market. If our production, alone, sufficed to glut the market, how will it be when the United States, South America, Egypt, Turkey, India, and China, are all competitors in the market, and all annually increasing their crops? The market will be glutted to the gorge, and the fields which can produce cheapest will drive others from competition.

It will then come to the test of cheap production. And when those fields shall have improved their system of agriculture, what

advantage shall we have over them? They have the conditions of cheap production in a more eminent degree than we. They have the low scale of prices based upon a specie currency. Their luxuriant soil and tropical climate enables them to grow life-sustaining products in the greatest abundance; and the distance of a foreign market keeps prices at a standard far lower than with us. In Brazil, beef is worth only a cent a pound; the distance of a market renders Egyptian produce extremely low; in India, the ordinary price of rice and wheat, the principal food of the population, is only forty cents a bushel. Moreover, the tropical climate of those countries produces cheaply products of luxurious consumption, which we must purchase at greatly enhanced prices. Furthermore, the clothing of the cultivators of Hindostan, Egypt, and Brazil, is much less expensive than with us. And finally, they have fewer of the expensive habits of civilization.—If it comes to the test of cheap production, they will, in the end, drive us from the English market.

Such are the elements of the industrial situation we have to face. England has fortified her position, and become independent of our supply of cotton, and even threatens to supersede it, altogether, with the production of foreign fields. The War has given her an immense advantage over her position six years ago. Then, we might, by a resolute, well-directed effort, have easily deprived her of her cotton manufacture. Now, with her factories supplied with staple from those new fields, Britain is a formidable competitor.

Sect. 2.—The War has Weakened Us.

The War has not only enabled Great Britain to strengthen her position, and fortify her centralization of industry;—it has diminished our resources for competition, in even a greater degree.

I. The War has Weakened us, by the Devastation of the South, and the Prostration of Southern Industry.

Who can estimate the losses it has entailed! In the usual ratio of progress, the Southern States ought, now, to be advanced far beyond the status of 1860. In the ten years preceding the war, millions of acres were added to farms. The value of the farming lands more than doubled. Instead of the usual rate of increase, the

present condition of the Southern States presents a most deplorable contrast with their prosperous state, in 1860. The track of armies is marked with desolation; the condition of the country is one of general poverty,—resources wasted, property ruined, labor demoralized. Of the negroes who cultivated our great staple, vast numbers have perished, and a great part of the survivors are subsisting in comparative idleness, a burden, rather than a benefit to the community. The supply of cotton has greatly fallen off, with no prospect, from present indications, of a change for the better. Large districts in Georgia and South Carolina are being forsaken by the negro population; in the Mississippi delta, the country is threatened with desolation by the destruction of levys, and the bankrupt landowners, disheartened by the unpromising circumstances of their condition, are almost ready to abandon their lands to the river.

Six thousand million dollars will not cover the losses of the South from the War. The loss of property,—representing accumulated capital,—will amount to nearly or quite five thousand millions; and one thousand million dollars will not cover the losses from the stagnation of industry during the war.

The devastation of war, the dismantling of plantations, the destruction of property and stock, the demoralization of labor,—have reduced the Southern states to a condition the most unfavorable for competing with the new cotton fields developing under the intelligent patronage of Britain.

II. The War has Weakened us by the National Debt it has Accumulated.

The war has imposed on us a national debt of almost unexampled magnitude. The recognized debt of the country amounts to $2,500,000,000. Bounty grants, and the assumption of state war debts, increase it by several hundred millions. Besides this, there are said to be outstanding claims to the amount of $3,000,000,000 more. Leaving this aside, the recognized debt will involve an annual taxation of $150,000,000 for the payment of interest.

This debt entails upon us another serious disadvantage, pregnant with danger to our prosperity. While the British debt is owned by capitalists at home, a considerable portion of ours is in the hands of foreign capitalists. It has been estimated that the payment of

interest on American securities abroad requires the annual exportation of $100,000,000 of gold, or its equivalent. This is hardly an exaggerated estimate. The foreign debt is sufficient to keep us drained of the precious metals. The produce of our mines is insufficient to meet the draft. In default of a large cotton production, the balance of trade has, for years, been heavily against us; and this, with the payment of interest, necessitates a large annual exportation of our bonds, with increasing drafts upon the resources of the country for the payment of interest. The existing tendency, unless soon arrested, will have caused, at no distant day, the exportation of the entire debt, mortgaging us to a ruinous extent to foreign capitalists.

The effect of this state of things upon our competition with Great Britain is apparent. It places our credit at the mercy of English capitalists; and London bankers, acting in the interest of British manufacturers, may, upon occasion, by a turn of the screw, prostrate the national credit, and bring upon the country a ruinous financial revulsion.

But these evils, however great, would not prevent us from engaging in successful competition with Great Britain. Under a wise and conservative administration of the government, the Southern states would soon repair the ravages of war, and regain their former prosperity. Nor would the debt, under a prudent financial system, endanger the prosperity of the country.

III. But the War has inflicted upon the country an evil worse than military ravage, or the burden of debt. IT HAS SEATED THE LATITUDINARIAN CONSTRUCTIONISTS,—*the party whose ascendancy in former periods produced such great industrial, and political evils*,—FIRMLY IN POWER; *and they are carrying out to the uttermost their crude and ruinous theories of government.*

But the extent of this subject demands a separate chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

POSITIVE EVILS—CONTINUED. RUINOUS POLICY OF THE RADICALS.

THE worst infliction of the War is its having given the country over to the domination of a radical, revolutionary party. They are no longer merely Latitudinarian Constructionists of the Constitution;—they have boldly adopted the policy of disregarding the Constitution, trampling its restraints under foot, and forcing, by violence, the adoption of such changes in the instrument as they see fit to dictate.

The policy of the Radical party is both subversive of our republican system of government, and ruinous to our industrial interests.

SECT. I.—THE POLICY OF THE RADICALS SUBVERSIVE OF REPUBLICANISM.

I. THEY ARE ESTABLISHING A CENTRALIZATION.

The Radical party has at length thrown aside the flimsy vail which masked its principles and its purposes, and has boldly inaugurated the policy of Revolution.

Having obtained uncontrolled possession of Congress, by the exclusion of representatives elected from Southern states, they are using their congressional majority, thus obtained, to pass unconstitutional and revolutionary laws, having for their sole object the perpetuation of their power.—The vote in the Northern states at the last Congressional election* filled them with uneasiness. In seven of the great states of the North, their majorities were so small, that a change of twenty-five thousand votes would have given all the states in a presidential election to Conservatism. It was apparent that a very slight change in public sentiment in the North would enable the Northern Conservatives, with the vote of the Southern states, to

* It may be necessary to remind the reader that this part of the work was written in the Spring of 1867, and is published without alteration.

elect the next President. The Radicals were resolved to prevent this consummation at every hazard. To this end, they determined to adopt measures the most revolutionary, in order to revolutionize the Southern state governments, and bring them to the support of the Radical party.

Many obstacles were in the way.

The citizens of the Southern states were almost unanimously opposed to the Radicals, and regarded their measures with the utmost abhorrence. The negroes of the South might be relied on; but they were not invested with the right of suffrage; and the people of the states, who alone had jurisdiction of the matter, were most resolutely opposed to investing them with the franchise. Moreover, the negroes, even if enfranchised, were, in most of the states, a minority of the population, and could not control elections.

The Radical leaders grappled resolutely with all these difficulties. They devised a scheme of policy that would overcome all obstacles.

As the state governments would not invest the negroes with the franchise, they resolved to reduce the states to a territorial form of government; to invest the negroes in these inchoate governments with the right of suffrage; and to place the states under military domination, until the population should establish state constitutions investing the negro with the franchise, ratify certain amendments of the Federal Constitution, and send such representatives to Congress as the Radicals should approve.

But the white population of those states would prefer to remain under military domination forever, rather than adopt these measures; and the white vote in most of the states would overbalance the negro vote, and defeat the programme. They resolved to overcome this obstacle by ordering an election, in which none should vote but those whose names were registered by officials appointed in the interest of the Radical party;—these registration officers to have the power of rejecting whom they would, with no appeal from their decision. By this means, a majority of negro and submissionist votes might be secured, without difficulty.

Having devised these measures for revolutionizing the governments of the Southern states, the leaders of the Radical party found

several obstacles in the way of carrying them into execution. The first was the repugnance of the more scrupulous Radicals in Congress, to vote for measures so plainly unconstitutional, so palpably revolutionary. The next obstacle was found in the foreseen opposition of the Executive, and the adverse decision of the Judiciary. The framers of the Constitution provided safeguards against unconstitutional and revolutionary measures, by requiring the co-operation of all three departments of the government for their execution. It was known that the President disapproved of the revolutionary policy they contemplated, and though, by their exclusion of the Southern representatives, their Congressional majority was so great as to render his veto a nullity, yet he might refuse to carry out their acts, until the Supreme Court should pronounce upon their constitutionality. And it was known that, if the question were ever brought before the Supreme Court, that respectable bench of judges could not do otherwise than pronounce the measures unconstitutional and revolutionary.

The Radical leaders resolved to overcome these obstacles. They began their programme by subjecting all the congressmen of their party to a thorough party drill, whipping in the reluctant and the conscientious, and forcing them to go with the majority. Having thus secured the requisite majority, they resolved to override the opposition of the executive and judicial departments of the government, if possible, by intimidation, if necessary, by the impeachment and removal of the President, and the reconstruction of the Supreme Court.

Having taken these preliminary measures, the Radical leaders pressed through Congress the Military Reconstruction Bill, followed by a supplementary act; both embodying the details of their plan for revolutionizing the governments and the politics of ten States of the Union.

The policy of the Radicals is revolutionary, throughout. The Reconstruction act is revolutionary, in reducing the states to territories—in subjecting them to military domination—in enfranchising the negro population in opposition to the will of the people of the states—in forcing the states to ratify constitutional amendments against their will, thus changing the Constitution by revolutionary violence. Not only is the law revolutionary, but it was carried by

revolutionary violence. The requisite majority to pass it was obtained by the revolutionary exclusion of Southern representatives. Its execution was enforced by the revolutionary intimidation of the co-ordinate branches of the government.

But the policy will succeed. The President, overawed by the fear of removal, is executing the Reconstruction law; the Supreme Court, with the fear of reconstruction before its eyes, has declined to consider the merits of the law, when brought before it for adjudication. The Southern people are preparing to submit to the inevitable. The train is laid which must inevitably force the reconstruction of those states under the Radical programme, in defiance of the opposition of the citizens. The negroes who have a voice in the election of members of the conventions to form state constitutions are of course eager to vote themselves the franchise! The great mass of the population, overawed by the presence of soldiers, discouraged by the helplessness of their condition, and apprehensive of further Congressional oppression, cannot venture to offer any opposition. The Southern states will be reconstructed upon the negro and Radical programme.

The Southerners are indulging the delusive hope that they may control the negro vote, and thus prevent the States from being revolutionized into Radicalism. In that hope they are endeavoring to fraternize with the negro. If the negroes were left to their own impulses, the impressible nature of the race would probably induce them to vote in the interests of conservatism. But it is a part of the astute Radical programme to prevent the black race in the South from harmonizing with the white.

The party leaders have already taken their measures with profound sagacity and foresight, to secure to their own party the solid negro vote. They began their propitiation of negro favor by the constitutional amendment declaring them citizens of the United States,—one of the amendments they are now embodying by violence in the Constitution, through the coerced ratification of the Southern states. They have taken other measures to propitiate the negro vote. To this end, Stephens introduced his bill into Congress, providing for the wholesale confiscation of Southern property for

their benefit. Sumner's bill enfranchising them by law of Congress in all the states, had the same object in view. Those measures could not be passed in the present constitution of Congress. They were therefore merely offered, as indicative of the purposes of the Radical leaders, to propitiate the Southern negro vote, and secure their allegiance to the party. Those bills summon the negroes of the South to the aid of Radicalism, and urge them to send representatives to Congress who will strengthen the ultra Radical party, and enable it to pass those measures over the veto of the President and the opposition of Conservatism.

The appeal will not be in vain. The negro population of the South will give* a solid vote for the Radical party. The trickery of the irresponsible Radical registration officers, and the presence of soldiers at the polls, will give the states to the domination of negro and Radical voters. They will follow the lead of Tennessee and Missouri in passing disfranchisement laws that will give them undisputed control of the states. They will send such representatives to Congress as will urge on Stephens' confiscation bill, and the bill of Sumner giving suffrage to the negroes in every state in the Union.

When the Southern states shall have been revolutionized, and brought to the support of the Radical party, the first act in the drama of Centralization will be over. What next? Will Radicalism pause in its career? Will it retrace its steps?—A fate attends crime which always prevents the criminal from returning to the path of virtue. New forces are forever arising, which urge him onward to the consummation of his career. In summoning the Southern negroes to their assistance, the Radicals have invoked a spirit that will not down at their bidding. The Southern negroes have had Confiscation, and negro suffrage in all the states, held out to them;

* John Sherman, of Ohio, in a recent speech expressed the views and expectations of his party. He said: "Within a few years from this time the Southern states will be, I believe, the most Radical states in the Union. We have some illustration of this in the history of Missouri and Tennessee." And they evidently expect the same means to be employed in the Southern states, as have delivered those two bound into the loathed embrace of Radicalism.

and when they are represented in Congress, they will demand the fulfillment of the bond. A refusal to comply with their wishes would leave the negroes to go eventually with the Southern Conservatives. The Radicals have not taken so many unconstitutional and revolutionary measures, already, in order to secure the negro vote in the South, to flinch from the final acts necessary to the achievement of their object.

The confiscation and distribution of Southern lands is a necessary part of the Radical programme. The enfranchisement of the negroes in all the states is equally essential to their scheme of power.

But it will be urged that the Congress has no constitutional power to enfranchise the negroes of the Northern states. How many other things has Congress done it had no constitutional power to do! The power can easily be manufactured out of the new constitutional amendment that is being carried by the bayonet in the Southern states,—an amendment which invests the negro with citizenship. No government is Republican, is the dogma, which deprives citizens of the right of voting; the Federal government is bound to secure to the states a republican form of government; *ergo*, the Federal government has the right to force the states to admit negroes to the suffrage. Congress will not blink at the question of constitutional power. It will only ask the question, Is it expedient for the achievement of party power?—In Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, the negro vote holds the balance of power; and, in a closely contested election, the 56000* negroes in Pennsylvania, the 50,000 in New York, the 36,000 in Ohio, the 24,000 in New Jersey, the 10,000 in Indiana, the 7000 in Illinois, the 6000 in Michigan, would carry those states for the Radicals. Mr. Sumner is pressing the question through the press, seeking to leaven the public mind. The New York Tribune, in many respects more moderate in its tone than the Massachusetts Radical, yet agrees with

* These numbers are taken from the census of 1860. The number of negroes in the Northern states has considerably increased by emigration from the South since that time, so that the influence of the negro vote in those states is really more important than is here represented.

him in the advocacy of this* measure. It only remains to educate the Radical party up to the issue,—a less difficult thing than many already achieved,—and Congress will pass the law. It will be easy to carry the measure, when Northern Radicalism is infused with fresh ardor by the Radical representatives from the South, who, themselves elected by negro votes, will aim to carry out the wishes of their constituents, by placing Northern representatives upon the same basis as themselves.

The party in power have established what the old Federalists aimed at,—a Centralization ruling the states with autocratic power, and dominating the country by the armed rule of force. They have carried out the dogma of Hamilton, "The Constitution is a thing of nought which must be changed." It is now boldly avowed that the Constitution must give way to the wants and ideas of the age, and its restrictions are haughtily put aside whenever they impose a bar against the will of a dominant majority. The Federalists were insidious in their usurpations of power by means of construction; but, now, the mask is cast aside, and the Radicals trample the Constitution, trample the Executive, trample the Judiciary, trample the States; and they boldly bring bayonets to bear to force the states to adopt such changes in the Constitution as they choose to suggest, and to submit to usurpations in opposition to law, to justice, and to right. Hitherto the Southern states have been the chief objects of this coercive rule. But already the principle is avowed that in the Northern states, also, the Federal government will pronounce upon the qualification of voters, and overrule the states at will.

The trampling of the Southern states is the inauguration of the sway of a Centralization resting its power upon force. The force is now applied to the Southern states, to compel them to revolutionize their governments, so as to give the Radicals control of their elections. This is the initial step in the programme, by which the Radicals are determined to rule the country by violence, in opposi-

* In a recent issue the Tribune says: "Men who hold that none but whites should vote may be very well in their place; but there is no room for them in the Republican party. Every one who stays in it keeps at least ten votes out of it."

tion to the will of a majority of the American people. They use a temporary victory in the Northern states, to revolutionize the Southern states by force, and bring them to the support of their tottering party; then, when reaction comes in the North and West, the people of those sections will find themselves controlled by the votes of Southern negroes, and New England fanatics and manufacturers.

Their scheme for maintaining their power is a bold one; and it is so well devised, that, once on foot, it can hardly fail of success. In all the states in which slavery recently existed, the negro holds the balance of power. In a presidential election, New England and the Southern states including Kentucky and Missouri, will cast one hundred and sixty nine* electoral votes; while the Middle, North-

---

* The following is the electoral vote of the several states for 1868. The vote of the Northern states is taken from the election returns of 1864; the vote of the Southern states is calculated upon the census of 1860, counting the negro population as voters and, consequently, entitled to full representation, instead of three-fifths as formerly.

Maine	7	New York	33
New Hampshire	5	New Jersey	7
Massachusetts	12	Pennsylvania	26
Rhode Island	4	Delaware	3
Connecticut	6	Ohio	21
Vermont	5	Indiana	13
Maryland	8	Illinois	16
Virginia	10	Michigan	8
North Carolina	10	Wisconsin	8
South Carolina	8	Iowa	8
Georgia	11	Minnesota	4
Florida	3	Kansas	3
Alabama	10	Nevada	2
Mississippi	9	California	5
Tennessee	11	Oregon	3
West Virginia	5		
Kentucky	12	Total	160
Missouri	12		
Arkansas	6		
Louisiana	8		
Texas	7		
Total	169		

western, and Pacific states, all combined, only cast one hundred and sixty votes. New England manufacturers and Southern negroes will maintain the Radicals in power, against the votes of all the rest of the country, combined.

Radical domination would thus be very much simplified. As the party stands at present, its sway is continually threatened by the just dissatisfaction of the West with the protective policy dictated by New England. But, then, the votes of Southern negroes would be secured by the confiscation and distribution of Southern lands; while they lived in lazy indolence upon homesteads received from Radical beneficence, the negroes would vote with the party to which they owed their lands, without perplexing themselves with regard to the policy of the government: the manufacturers of New England, by coercing the suffrage of their employés, can easily control the vote of that section.—And it will be the constant policy of the Radicals to propitiate those two sections. The cunning which looks no higher than party aims will always enable them to present issues that will secure them the support of New England and the Southern negro population; and, assured of this, the party can rest its government upon the bayonet, and bid defiance to the rest of the country. Let them once firmly establish their power, and the Middle and Northwestern states will be the objects of their oppression, as the South is, now. Let the West remonstrate against negro suffrage, and the oppressive system of legislation that will end in the prostration of its prosperity—the only answer will be the bayonet.

A measure has already been proposed in Congress* which provides for the organization of a standing army of half a million men completely devoted to the interests of the party controlling the centralized government,—a force that will enable it to crush out all opposition to its power, by force of arms. The measure was laid aside for the moment, having met with bold exposure of its dangerous tendencies. But its suggestion shows that the Radical leaders contemplate a government resting upon military power. It was no

* The bill organizing a national guard of half a million men is referred to. It has been boldly exposed by Doolittle and others, as an attempt to form an immense military force, devoted to Radicalism, and fit to maintain its domination over all the states by the bayonet.

doubt offered in accordance with their usual subtle policy of preparing public sentiment gradually for the adoption of startling innovations. The measure is the natural and necessary sequence of the policy of violence inaugurated by the party.—Military force is the essential support of all centralizations. Let the Radical scheme of power* once be fairly established, and the country will be placed under the rule of the sword. The Middle and Western states, having assisted in placing the yoke upon the neck of the South, will find, in turn, the subjugated South become the instrument of tyranny, to fix the yoke upon their own necks. The retribution denounced against Ahab will be theirs: "*In the place where dogs licked the blood of Naboth, shall dogs lick thy blood, even thine.*"

II. Radical Centralization Policy Ruinous and Oppressive.

Radicalism—like all Centralizations—administers the government in the interest of its two constituencies, the Southern Negro, and the Northern Capitalist; to the ruin of the national industry, and the oppression of the Northern industrial class.

The Radical party is devoted to the principles of centralization. They have conformed the public administration to their model. Centralization is already inaugurated under their rule. The party is resolved to maintain their possession of the government at all hazards,—if necessary, by the exhibition of force. They remove with inflexible resolution every obstacle from their path. They have overawed the executive by the threat of impeachment; the Supreme

* The result of the recent Northern elections has given the Radicals pause. They dare not, on the eve of the Presidential election, continue their high-handed course in the face of this expression of public opinion, so far as to carry out the policy of impeachment, of confiscation, and of negro enfranchisement in all the states by Congressional law. They now wait the result of their past revolutionary policy toward the South. Let the Radicalized Southern states come in, and let the next Presidential election go in their favor, and the Radicals will then carry out their entire plan of revolution and Centralization. They now pause in view of the expression of sentiment in the Middle and Western states; but, then, power will have passed from those sections, and they must submit to the will of New England manufacturers and Southern negroes. The coming Presidential election is the "crisis" in the political destiny of those sections.

Court, by menace of reconstruction; the Southern states, by despotic military sway. They propose soon to place the whole country beneath the domination of a national guard. Like all preceding Centralizations, the sway of the Federal government under the Radical programme must be based upon an army.

But an army, alone, will not suffice to maintain a Centralization. Such a government must always be based upon class support. In the continental monarchies of Europe, the government reposes upon the support of a privileged aristocracy; and this coalition of throne and nobility is propped by a standing army. In England, the king and nobility have been compelled to take into their alliance the Aristocracy of Trade; and the three rule the country with the aid of a military constabulary, to keep the people in check. These Centralizations are invariably administered, not for the public benefit, but in the interest of the class, or classes, which support and administer the government.—The centralized government of the United States will not be exempt from the force of this general law; it also must rest upon class support, and be administered in the interest of its privileged supporters, in defiance of public opinion, and in antagonism with the general welfare of the country. The Radicals have already made election of their chosen supporters. They have based their power upon the support of the negro population of the South, and the capitalists of the North. These factions will maintain the Radicals in power, in opposition to the will of a majority of the people of both sections: the majority of Southern population will be disfranchised; while, in the North, the capitalists will control their employés, and compel them to vote contrary to their wishes in the interest of Radicalism. Securing in this manner a majority in Congress, they will rule, like all other centralizations, with the aid of an army, and will crush out the opposition of the great mass of the people by military force.

Radicalism has already begun its administration of the government in the interest of its chosen supporters. The Constitutional amendments lately passed consisted of a bonus to each of its several constituencies. They linked the Northern capitalist and the Southern negro in the amendments, bestowing the franchise upon

the one, and guaranteeing the payment of the public debt owned by the other.

The Radicals, like the old Federalists, are an aristocratic party, but tinctured with the fanaticism of the age. They, on all occasions, sacrifice the public interest to party advantage. Their policy is guided by crafty leaders, who direct it with consummate skill and singleness of purpose to the attainment of their party aims. Resting their party upon the support of Northern capitalists and Southern negroes, all their measures are taken in the interest of these two classes. They do not inquire what is necessary for the public welfare, but what will subserve the interests of their chosen supporters, the capitalist, and the negro. Analyze their policy throughout, and it will be found to be directed to the patronage of these two classes, and that the best interests of the country are sacrificed to them.

1*st. They are Ruining the Country in a Desire to Court the Negro.*

In view of the fact that the South is the producer of our most important staple, upon which the prosperity of the whole country in great measure depends, sound policy requires that the public administration should be so directed as to enable the South to recuperate its industry as rapidly as possible. But the Radicals seem resolved that the South shall grow no more cotton. They strain their ingenuity to devise new methods of oppression. From their measures, one would suppose that they were seconding the policy of England, and striving by every possible method to prevent the industry of the South from recovering its wonted vigor.

The planters are crushed and bankrupt: instead of devising some method of reviving their drooping energies, or, at least, leaving them to recuperate their prosperity by steady, hopeful industry, they oppress them by a special tax upon cotton, harry them with military rule, and propose to ruin them altogether by general confiscation.

Southern labor is demoralized by the freedom of the negro: instead of promoting mutual confidence between the laboring class and the planters, and encouraging the blacks to engage in steady labor as the only means of bettering their own condition and re-

establishing the prosperity of the country, they are assiduously engaged in demoralizing the negro population. They unsettle the minds of the negro race by making them the center of political agitation; they prevent the adoption of wholesome laws aiming to check vagrancy and promote steady industry, by investing them with the franchise, and making them the ruling power in the Southern states. Political emissaries are traversing the South, inspiring the negroes with discontent at their condition, and exciting feelings of animosity toward their employers, and, to this end, encouraging them to aspire to social, as well as political equality. Instead of encouraging them to labor, they encourage them to sit in idleness and expect the patronage of the government. As if anxious to put the finishing stroke to Southern industry, they release the negroes from the necessity of labor, by bestowing upon them all the vacant lands in the South; and when these are inadequate, they propose a general confiscation of lands for their benefit. Upon these homesteads, the negro population may luxuriate in idleness, after the manner of their race in the West Indies and South America, merely laboring enough to produce the necessaries of life for their own subsistence.

How long a continuance of this policy will it require to deprive us entirely of the cotton market? How long before the South will cease altogether to raise cotton! How long before the negroes are scattered as idle squatters over the country, leaving the upland plantations to relapse into wilderness, and consigning the Mississippi delta to the dominion of the river!

Radical misrule is ruining us in this, the hour of crisis to ourselves and to the world. It is destroying our energies when they are most needed: it is strengthening the British centralization of commerce: it will enable British capitalists to establish the cotton culture on a firm basis in the new fields they are fostering: it will wrest from us the last opportunity to save ourselves from bankruptcy, and rescue the world from the dangers which menace it.

The misrule of the Southern states is alone sufficient to consummate our ruin. But the Radicals are not content with one leak to the sinking vessel. They seem bent on hastening the catastrophe.

Their entire governmental policy rivals in fatuity their treatment of the South.

2*d*. *Their Revenue System is Ruining the Country for the Benefit of the Northern Capitalist.*

Burdened as our country is by an enormous debt, every means should be adopted to lighten the public burdens. But the Radicals are having a hey-day of extravagance. They have multiplied public offices, and largely increased the salaries of incumbents. They are making lavish and reckless appropriations of public money, as a means of making political capital for the party. They are maintaining a large military establishment in time of peace, whose only use is to overawe the states, and maintain the Radical party in the establishment of a Centralization. Under their system of reckless extravagance, our annual expenditure is greater than that of Russia, with its population of eighty millions, and its standing army of a million men.

To maintain this inordinate expenditure, the Radicals have adopted an odious and unjust revenue system. Such a system of taxation! No government in Europe, not even the most oppressive, levies taxes in a manner so oppressive of the industrial and laboring classes. Our system of taxation seems devised for the purpose of benefiting the capitalist, while it levies merciless exactions upon the industrious and the poor. The British government is controlled by the aristocracy, who administer it for the benefit of their class interests; but they dare not protect their own interests by the oppression of the laboring class, to the extent the Radicals now favor their protegés, the Capitalists of the country. Their system of taxation is far more oppressive of industry than the financial system of any other country. They raise by taxation one hundred and fifty million dollars more annual revenue than Great Britain; and the system of taxation by which they levy it, is more oppressive than even that of Austria.

The true system of taxation is to raise revenues by an equally adjusted property tax. This system of taxation bears more lightly upon community than any that can be devised; and, indeed, (as will

hereafter be shown,) it is productive of benefits to productive industry which go far toward counteracting its burden.

The political economists of England are apprised of the benefits of raising revenues by a property tax, and have long desired to bring it about in that country. But the English nobility, who are the chief property holders, resist this tendency with all the might of their class and political influence. For a time, they ruled the country, and levied its taxation exclusively upon the industrious and laboring classes, as is now done in this country. The progress of enlightened opinion has forced them to give way, to some extent, and suffer the amelioration of the system of taxation; but they still resist the property tax, and cause the greater part of the English revenues to be levied upon the industrial and laboring classes. The Radicals are following the lead of the British aristocracy, from a similar desire to propitiate the American aristocracy of wealth.

In following out the English plan, the Radicals tax everything except property. They raise our revenue,

(1.) By a Tariff upon imports.

(2.) By direct taxation upon the industry of the country. This internal revenue is derived from,

[1.] A direct tax upon the manufacture of malt and spiritous liquors; and upon other products and manufactures of the country;

[2.] A tax for licenses upon every kind of business;

[3.] A stamp tax upon all business transactions;

[4.] A tax upon incomes left after paying the other taxes.

It is evident that this system of taxation benefits a favored class of capitalists, and property holders, at the expense of the general industry of the country. It is in keeping with the general policy of the Radicals, oppressing the mass of community for the benefit of a favored aristocracy.

The tariff is designed to enable certain manufacturers to charge the rest of community an enormous price for their commodities. So far, therefore, from levying upon *them* a part of the public burdens, the tariff actually increases their profits at the expense of the rest of community. As the tariff question will be discussed more at large hereafter, it is alluded to in this connection, only in illustra-

tion of the system of favoritism which is the basis of Radical legislation.

The system of direct taxation is equally or more oppressive of productive industry. The property of the country pays nothing; productive industry, everything. A privileged aristocracy is released, in great measure, from public burdens. The capitalists who hold the public debt are released from taxation; and the capitalist who holds his estate in speculative property investments, is as perfectly exempt from public burdens, as the nobility of England. He goes scot free, provided he chooses to live in idleness, and hold his estate in some safe investment, rapidly enhancing in value, but yielding small annual income.—Contrast the condition of the wealthy property holder with that of the active man of business. The former seeks a safe, rather than a profitable investment, and leads a life of leisure or fashionable dissipation; the latter, by dint of personal energy, makes his capital yield a large income. The active man of business pays the government four several taxes,—the license tax, the stamp tax on every business transaction, the direct tax upon the article he produces, and the income tax on all the profits left him at the end of the year. His income tax alone is more than double the whole tax of the speculative property holder of equal wealth. If each has $100,000, the one is content with an investment that is safe and enhancing in value, and yielding an income of $5,000, or less; the other, after paying license, stamp, and direct tax, has an income of some $10,000, the result of his energetic application to business—and, besides his other burdens, pays double the income tax of the former.—Again, a man worth one million dollars invested in lands and city property, may pay less tax than a man of business whose capital is but ten thousand dollars, or even the clerk whose industry is his only capital. The unjust discrimination of this system of taxation might be illustrated at great length. It is manifest that it releases the property aristocracy from their due proportion of the public burdens, and makes them a privileged class.

It is equally manifest that it levies upon productive industry an undue proportion of taxation. Indeed, it compels it to bear the entire burden of the public administration. The taxes of every kind

fall at last upon the industrious population. A few favored interests receive from the government tariff a bonus far greater than the sum exacted of them by direct taxation. These excepted, the productive industry of the country is weighed to the earth by the burdens heaped upon it, for the benefit of a favored aristocracy. This subject will again demand attention, when the systematic oppression of industry will be traced in detail.

But the laboring population, who constitute the great mass of consumers, feel most severely the burdens of this system of taxation. As if to reach the numerous class of poor laborers, while the rich in great measure escape, our taxes are all laid upon consumption. They are levied in the first place upon the business class; but the business man levies his tax upon the price of his goods, and thus transfers the burden to the consumer of his products. The tariff levies a tax upon the merchant in the first instance; but he transfers the burden to the consumer of his goods. So the internal revenue tax is levied upon the business community; but the business community levies it, in turn, upon the commodities of their business, and it is paid at last by the consumer.—The laboring class which constitutes the great mass of population, are the chief consumers, and they pay the chief part of the public taxation.

Let us trace the operation of this system of taxation.

The Tariff raises the price of all imported articles which enter into general consumption. Sugar, coffee, tea, are nearly doubled in price by excessive duties;—they are more than doubled by the Tariff, and the internal revenue taxes. Heavy taxes are laid on every article of food and clothing consumed by the great mass of laboring population. There are taxes upon the farmer's produce—taxes upon slaughtered animals—taxes upon leather, and upon shoes—taxes upon wool, and upon woolen goods—taxes upon cotton, and upon cotton goods—taxes upon tobacco, upon fermented liquors, upon distilled spirits—taxes upon lumber, brick, glass, nails.—In a word, we realize the prediction of Sydney Smith,—"taxes* upon every article that enters the mouth, or covers the

* Sydney Smith to Brother Jonathan.

back, or is placed under the foot,—taxes upon everything which it is pleasant to see, hear, feel, smell, or taste,—taxes upon warmth, light, and locomotion,—taxes upon everything on earth, and the waters under the earth,—taxes upon the sauce which pampers man's appetite, and the drug which restores him to health,—taxes on the ermine that decorates the judge, and the rope which hangs the criminal,—on the poor man's salt, and the rich man's spice,—on the brass nails of the coffin, and the ribbons of the bride,—at bed, or board, couchant, or levant, we must pay."

Nothing escapes taxation. The British aristocracy, in mercy to the poor, and to the productive industry of the country, selects a few articles on which the burden of taxation is laid. But the Radicals show no mercy. They tax everything—except property, the one thing that ought to be taxed; and they tax almost every article from five to thirty times, before it reaches the consumer.—Take, for example, the meats sold our laboring class. The farmer who sells the stock cattle to the grazier pays five per cent. tax upon the profits of the sale, besides his stamp, and his indirect taxes;—the grazier* who sells to the speculator pays five per cent. upon the profits of his sale;—the speculator transports them to market by railways which pay five per cent. upon the profits of transportation;—the speculator pays taxes both upon his business, and his profits;—and, finally, the butcher who slaughters them pays two taxes,—a slaughter tax, and a tax upon his profits. And all these six several taxes are laid upon the price of the beef, and levied upon the consumer. So, pork pays the farmer's tax—the tax of the railway that carries the hog to the slaughter house—the income tax and the slaughter tax of the pork merchant—the tax of the railways that transport the pork to market—the tax of the provision merchant who buys it—and the tax of the grocer who sells to the consumer;—and these seven taxes are levied on the consumer. Wheat is taxed six times in its

* It may be objected that the exemption of small incomes from taxation contradicts the view of the case here presented. But taxation establishes the general price; so that it does not matter in any particular instance, whether the stated number of taxes have actually been levied or not: the result is the same,—that number of taxes is usual, and it fixes the market price of the commodity.

passage from the farm yard to the consumer; and other articles are taxed in like proportion. The taxes upon articles of clothing are still heavier. Taxes are levied ten times upon shoes before they reach the wearer; seventeen times upon cotton goods; twelve times upon woolens; twelve times upon liquors.

These taxes oppress the laboring class in every quarter of the country. The negro upon Southern plantations and the operative in New England factories, the farm laborer and the colliers, the mechanic and the clerk, the industrious poor, of every class, in our cities,—all are crushed by multiplied taxation to the earth.

The laborer who dwells in the untaxed house of the capitalist is borne down with accumulated taxes, levied upon everything he consumes.—He awakes from slumber, to array himself in his coarse work-day clothes, consisting of twelve times taxed pantaloons, seventeen times taxed cotton shirt, ten times taxed shoes, and twelve times taxed coat. He washes himself with taxed water, in a fifteen times taxed tin pan, and wipes his face upon a coarse seventeen times taxed towel. He sits upon a ten times taxed chair, at a ten times taxed table, covered with a seventeen times taxed cloth, and from a five times taxed plate, with a five times taxed knife, eats his frugal breakfast of seven times taxed pork, and six times taxed bread, together with a five times taxed cup of six times taxed coffee, sweetened with seven times taxed sugar, stirred with a cheap eight times taxed spoon. He dons an old twelve times taxed hat, and goes forth to his labor. He eats his noon day lunch of his six times taxed bread and four times taxed cheese, together with a five times taxed mug of twelve times taxed beer. He returns at night, to sleep upon a ten times taxed bed, covered with twelve times taxed blankets.—When at last his overtaxed frame yields to disease, a taxed doctor drenches him with taxed physic, until death comes to his relief. He is then arrayed in a seventeen times taxed shroud, and placed in a cheap twelve times taxed pine coffin, ornamented with sixteen times taxed brass nails, to be drawn in a thirteen times taxed hearse, to the cemetry; where, as he is too poor to have a clergyman in a seventeen times taxed gown, to read the burial service from a twenty-nine times taxed prayer book, the sexton

without ceremony, with a twelve times taxed spade, covers his tax-wearied remains to untaxed repose at last.

Sect. 2.—The Radical System of Finance Maintaining an Excessive Rise of Prices, which is Ruining our Productive Industry.

The financial system of the Radicals embraces three points: (1) A most oppressive and ill-adjusted system of taxation bearing exclusively upon the productive industry of the country; which enhances the cost of production, with a corresponding increase of the prices of all articles in our markets, requiring an increased amount of currency to carry on the business of the country. (2) An immense inflation of the currency, in order to lighten the pressure of taxation, and create a temporary factitious prosperity; but which still further enhances the cost of production, and inflates the price of labor and all articles of consumption. (3) The encouragement of the continued exportation of our national debt, as the only means of averting a crisis that would involve national bankruptcy and the paralysis of our industry.

I. The Rise of Prices.

It is the direct tendency of the entire system of finance to promote an excessive rise of prices. The inflation and depreciation of the currency, the exorbitant protective tariff, and the system of internal taxation,—all combine to increase the scale of prices to a ruinous extent. The influence of the scheme of internal taxation has already been incidentally glanced at, but it is necessary to observe more particularly the force of these three causes, to appreciate their ruinous effect upon the national prosperity.

1. Our currency is now nearly $800,000,000; when Great Britain is carrying on her vast industry, raising her immense revenue, and conducting the commerce of the world with a currency of only $235,000,000.

The state of the currency inflates prices in two ways; by its redundancy, and its depreciation. The redundancy of the currency would maintain prices far above the normal standard, even if it were at a par with gold. The past experience of the country affords

an apt illustration of this fact. In the extraordinary inflation of the currency in 1836, when the circulating medium reached $140,000,000, prices advanced beyond all precedent. Property, wages, and all commodities were enhanced to the ratio of inflation. Flour sold in New York at $10.25. In 1843, when the conditions were the same, except that the currency had been curtailed to $68,000,000, the price of flour had fallen to $4.69; and all other articles had fallen in the same proportion.

Besides the effect of the redundancy of the currency, prices are now inflated forty per cent. by its depreciation, alone. The conjoint influence of these two causes would, without any other, inflate prices to a ruinous extent.

2. But the Tariff also exerts a potent influence in raising the scale of general prices.

The duties now average over 56 per cent. in coin (equivalent to 78 per cent. in currency), upon the value of all imported commodities. Upon some important articles, they are much higher. These duties raise the price of foreign importations, and enable domestic manufacturers to increase their prices in the same ratio. This causes a general rise of prices: all the products of domestic industry are raised as nearly to the price of protected commodities, as the competition in business will allow. The farmer wants the advance he pays the merchant for his goods: every trade, and every kind of labor demands a corresponding advance; until the scale of prices is brought as nearly as possible to the cost of the goods protected by the tariff.

3. The system of internal taxation also, tends directly to enhance the general scale of prices. The business community account the taxes levied upon them as a charge upon their business, and they levy them upon the articles they sell, and thus convert them into a charge upon the general community. Thus, the direct taxation of the Federal government becomes an indirect tax upon community.

Let us trace the effect of these three causes, combined,—the Tariff, the redundant and depreciated currency, and the internal revenue taxation,—upon the prices of the country.

The price of imported goods is enhanced by these causes to more

than three times their value in the English market. In the first place, at the present value of our money, the prime cost of goods is 38 per cent., in greenbacks, over the specie invoice price. Then the tariff raises them 56 per cent. in gold, or 78 per cent. in currency. Consequently, the goods have cost the importer, when removed from the custom-house in New York, more than double the English invoice price. And this enhancement is caused by the depreciation of the currency and the tariff, without any allowance for commissions, freights, insurance, and the other charges of commerce. The following table shows the enhanced cost of goods, through the force of these two causes.

English invoice (specie) price of goods, . .		$100 00
Premium on $100 of coin, . . .	$38 00	
Average rate of customs, . . .	56 00	
Premium on $56 of coin, . . .	21 00	115 00
Total cost of goods, ...		$215 00

Add to this amount the commissions, freight, insurance, and other charges upon transportation,—and the cost of the goods will be enhanced to $250 00, as the prime cost when delivered at the merchant's warehouse.

And now the internal revenue taxation, and the redundancy of the currency, begin their work of enhancement. The importing merchant, besides his duties, is required to pay the government a license tax, stamp taxes, and an income tax; and he adds these to the price of his goods. The railroads add their taxes to the charge for freight. The western merchant adds his own taxes to the cost of the goods, when he sells to the retail merchant in the country towns; and the retail merchant levies his taxes upon them. Besides this, the various merchants and carriers who transfer the goods to the consumer, furthermore increase their prices, on account of the inflation and depreciation of the currency. By the time the goods reach the consumer, they cost not less than four times the English invoice price.—And, now, the farmer must raise the price of his produce as high as competition will allow.—Then, produce, as well

as imported goods being dear, and all manufactures protected by the Tariff having raised their prices to the level of imported commodities,—all other manufacturers raise their prices as nearly as possible to the same level. The inflation of prices becomes general.—And now, the laboring class feel the oppression of high prices, and clamor for an increase of wages; and, by means of combinations and strikes, they compel employers to concede their demands.

Now begins a struggle to obtain another rise of prices. Employers find their expenses increased by the inflation of prices and the high rates of labor, and set on foot combinations to effect another rise of prices. This advance, again, causes the laboring population to demand a commensurate rise of wages;—and so the ball rolls on, until prices reach a maximum limit, beyond which they cannot go without the destruction of industry. Employers raise their own prices, and yield to the demands of their employés until this limit is reached; then they resolve rather to stop business than to yield to further demands;—and prices at last become stationary at a point highly oppressive of the laboring class.

We see the effect of these causes in the general scale of prices prevailing in the United States. All imported manufactures, and all home manufactures in competition with them under tariff protection, cost the American consumer from four to six times the European price for the* same articles.

II. The Inflation of Prices Ruinous of every Branch of Productive Industry.

This inflation of prices is injurious to the industry of the country in many particulars. In this connection, we shall notice it under two aspects, only,—its oppression of the industrial class; and its ruinous effect upon our productive industry.

---

* A recent writer from Europe states that a man may cross the ocean by steamer, and visit London or Paris, and save the cost of the trip in the purchase of a single suit of clothes. A lady visiting Paris states that a silk, such as would cost in New York from $200 to $250, may be obtained, there, for $40 or $50. Other articles, worth in the French capital $2.50 and $5.00, cost in New York establishments $10.00, and $35.00, respectively.

1*st. The Inflation of Prices Oppressive of every Industrial Class.*

Its effect in this regard may be best illustrated by a comparison with the prices of 1860. Even at that time, our prices were inflated by a redundant currency and a faulty industrial system, much beyond the European standard. But they have, now, gone far beyond the standard rates of that date.

By a careful comparison of prices, it appears that the profits and expenses of the different branches of industry have, since 1860, advanced in the following ratio :—

(1.) Our imports, and the products of protected manufactures, are enhanced, upon an average, 115 per cent. over the European invoice price,—being 95 per cent. over the import cost of 1860. Some favored manufactures have been increased by the Tariff much beyond this limit; while many manufactures, under the pressure of mutual competition, are below it.

(2.) Wages of laborers and operatives in the various mechanical employments have advanced 79 per cent. over the prices of 1860; the price of raw material has, upon an average, advanced 100 per cent.: making an average advance of charges upon mechanical employments, of at least 85 per cent.

(3.) The price of food and clothing for all classes of consumers engaged in mechanical industry has advanced so as to increase the cost of living over 100 per cent.

(4.) The average advance upon the farmer's price for agricultural staples is only 47 per cent.

From these facts, it is easy to show that the enhancement of prices is ruinous to every class of productive industry,—to the class whose means are invested in mechanical production; to the agriculturist; and to the great mass of mechanics, and operative population.

1. It is oppressive of capitalists whose means are embarked in mechanical industry; even in those branches which receive the average tariff protection.

In 1860, our mechanical industry had the protection of a revenue tariff imposing an average rate of 20 per cent. *ad valorem* duties; they, now, have protection equivalent, upon an average, to 115 per cent. But their expenses for labor and raw material have advanced

85 per cent.—Where their expenses were $100, they are now $185: where they sold their goods for $1.20, they now sell for $2.15. If their profits were then $1.20, less $1.00—they are now $2.15, less $1.85; *i. e.*, where they then made 20 cents clear, above running expenses, they now make 30 cents. But the 20 cents profit, in 1860, was clear specie profit, whereas the 30 cents profit of 1867 has several drawbacks. In the first place, the government taxation must be deducted: this, in direct tax, license and stamp taxes, and income tax, will be at least 10 per cent. of the net profits—which will leave 27 cents profit in currency, equivalent to 19½ cents in specie; so that where the manufacturer made 20 cents in 1860, he now makes, after paying taxes, 27 cents, in currency. But the purchasing power of money, in 1860, was at least 90 per cent. greater than now: twenty cents, then, would go as far toward the support of a family, and the purchase of property, as 38 cents will, now. Hence, in 1860, with a tariff of 20 per cent., the net profits of the manufacturer were 11 per cent. more valuable than his profits in 1867, with a tariff protection amounting to 115 per cent.

Let us place this estimate in a business shape, that we may the better compare the profits of the manufacturer, then, and now. In 1860, according to our supposition, the manufacturer whose expenses for labor, and raw material, and running machinery, were $10,000, sold his goods for $12,000, realizing $2,000 clear profit, in specie. The same manufacturer, now, finds his expenses increased to $18,500, while he sells his goods at $21,500,—making a profit in currency of $3,000, which is reduced by taxation to $2,700. But the purchasing power of this sum, now, is only equal to $1,500, in 1860. If the manufacturer, in 1860, expended $1,000 in support of his family, the same expenses would now amount to $1,900; so that while he then saved $1,000 in specie, he now saves only $800 in currency. And, as property is now 90 per cent. higher than then, the net savings of the manufacturer, then, would purchase two and a half times more property than they will now.—But if the manufacturer then spent $1,500, leaving an annual savings of $500, the same expenditure would now exhaust all his profits. If he then spent his entire income in support of his family, his business would now leave him $1,300 in debt, every year.

There are a few favored interests which make profits far above this standard. Thus, the enhanced cost of cotton has not increased the relative expenses of the American manufacturer; since his European competitor pays prices equally high. And the systematized domination of the cotton manufacturers over their operatives has kept the rate of wages below the average scale of labor. Owing to these facts, the cotton manufacturers of New England are making enormous profits. The woolen manufacturers, also, are flourishing under the protection of government; the present duties on foreign woolens enabling them to raise the price of their goods 200 per cent. over the English invoice price for goods of the same quality. Some other manufactures, also, are flourishing under the patronage of government.*

---

* The question naturally arises, If these manufactures are so flourishing, why do they continually complain of stagnation and inadequate profits, and demand higher duties as necessary for the continuance of their business. There are several reasons.

1. They naturally desire to make greater profits, even when the business is already highly profitable. It is human nature to always want more, if asking will get it.

2. They do find the market full of foreign goods, and trade consequently dull; though sales, when effected, are at profitable rates. They demand additional duties, in the groundless expectation that they will exclude foreign goods. Of this more hereafter.

3. But the principal reason of this outcry of distress and demand for more protection, has its foundation in a politic desire to prevent home competition. Manufacturers fear two competitions—home, and foreign. They demand tariffs to protect them from the foreign competition; and they continually raise a cry of distress, to prevent more home capital from being invested in the business. It is very remarkable that these manufacturers never make accurate calculations, and lay the *facts* of their condition before the *people*. They always deal in generalities. If these general complaints do not suffice to coerce the government into granting more protection, they shut up their mills as evidence of their suffering condition. When meetings are necessary to obtain concerted action in bringing pressure to bear upon Congress, they do not meet in the presence of the public, but, secluded in hotels, in secret conclave. Thus, at a time when their mills are netting 400 per cent. annual profit upon the capital invested, they are urging Congress to increase their protection, merely from rapacity, and from a desire to give the public a false impression of their profits, and thus deter capitalists from embarking in their business. Their aim is to prevent the growth of our manufactures, and thus maintain for themselves a monopoly of our market.

But the above estimate presents in a light even too favorable, the condition of most branches of mechanical industry. Many of them have not obtained protection up to the average taken as the basis of the above estimate; while their expenses have been increased beyond the percentage of our estimate.

2. The agriculturist suffers more than the mechanical producer from the rise of prices.

If there were an active demand, farming produce would rise until it reached the general scale of advance. Marketing, for which there is a brisk demand, has so advanced. But this comprises but a small portion of the farmer's sales. The staple products of agriculture are depressed far below the average rate of prices. The Southern market is in great measure closed by the depressed condition of that section; and high prices shutting us out of the European market, the supply of agricultural staples is in excess of the demand. Upon articles which are grown in great abundance, as corn, rye, oats, etc., the price of 1866 was only 16 per cent. in advance of 1859. Wheat is the only exception to the general depression. The inadequate prices caused farmers to sow less wheat, year after year, until the failure of the crop of 1866 caused a scarcity which raised the price far above the general average of agricultural produce. Reckoning wheat at its present exceptional price, the average advance on produce since 1860 is 47 per cent. Leaving out wheat, the average advance is 42 per cent.

Let us compare the present and former condition of the agriculturalist. The surplus produce which, in 1860, sold for $1,000, now sells for $1,470. From this we must deduct five per cent. income tax, and at least two per cent. more for various stamp taxes on business transactions,—leaving a net income of $1,367. The expenses of the farmer have advanced fully 90 per cent.; for, though labor has not advanced so much, the advance of his other expenses will bring it to that point as an average rate.—At that rate, the $1,000 which he made clear, in 1860, was equal to $1,900, now. If, in 1860, he spent his entire income of $1,000—to live as well, now, would bring him $533 in debt, every year. The expenses which would now consume his entire income, would then leave him an annual savings of $281. The purchasing power of the farmer's returns

from his crops is 27 per cent. less than in 1860, and he is damaged by the rise of prices to that extent.

3. The Laboring Class suffers yet more severely from the rise of prices. The wages of mechanics, upon an average, have advanced 79 per cent. But the cost of living has advanced more than 100 per cent. The mechanic who, in 1860, earned one dollar per day, now earns $1.79,—while the dollar, then, was equal, in the support of a family, to two dollars, now. If the wages of a mechanic, then, just supported his family, he must now stint to the extent of 20 cents daily. This is no inconsiderable item to a man whose wages barely suffice for a support. It occasions a degree of painful economy of which the wealthy have no conception. It is, indeed, equivalent to striking out one-tenth of the mechanic's income.

But the great mass of unskilled and unorganized labor obtain wages very little in advance of old prices. The advance upon such labor has ranged from 25 to 50 per cent.,—which is wholly inadequate to comfortable subsistence, at present prices. The laborer who now receives $1.50, where he formerly received $1.00, is dreadfully oppressed by the rise of prices. Its effect has been the same as striking out one-fourth of his wages,—their purchasing power being diminished 25 per cent. Such a laborer is under the necessity of depriving himself of accustomed comforts to the extent of fifty cents a day.

Thus the agriculturalist, the laborer, and the capitalist engaged in mechanical production, all suffer from the present enhancement of prices. They all suffer, because the returns from their industry are not advanced in ratio with the general scale of prices inflated by tariff, internal taxation, and a redundant and depreciated currency.—Farmers never complain. They make economy of expense eke out deficiency of income. They are fortunately situated, in producing for themselves the necessaries of life, so that adversity only compels them to diminish the consumption of such luxuries or comforts as may, with more or less privation, be dispensed with.—Other industrial classes are less fortunately situated. They have everything to buy, and, with the greater number, expenses consume all their income. Any deficiency of income, and especially any falling off, is severely felt, and elicits grievous complaint. The

distress both of manufacturers and of operatives is seen in their clamor for relief,—the one, striking for higher wages; the other, demanding additional protection by an increase of the tariff. But neither can have their demands granted, without injuring the other; and to concede the demands of both, would simply maintain the present status,—the expenses of both being increased in the ratio of the increase of income.

Whither does all this tend?

2d. The Inflation of Prices Ruinous of Productive Industry.

This is the end to which every sign of the times points. Ruin is the gulf—the "end-all"—in which, without a speedy change of policy, the problem of our situation must find solution,—Ruin to our laboring class, to mechanical production, and to agriculture.

The strikes of the laboring class for higher wages, and of manufacturers for increased protection, are both bootless. If they should succeed, they would only raise the general scale of prices still higher, giving increased force to the agency which is causing the overthrow of our prosperity. It is useless to raise the dam,—that policy will only end in a crevassé, and a deluge that will sweep all our hopes away.

The only hope of better times lies, not in a further rise, but in a fall of prices.

While high prices continue, the operative class must endure their misery as best they may. Patient sufferance is all that Radical rule has left them. A thoughtful writer presents the following judicious reflections upon the condition of labor: "The only solution of this labor question is to be found in the melancholy fact that the laborer must learn to live in a more economical fashion. He must do without many of those luxuries he has hitherto enjoyed. He cannot help it; nor will any contrivance of the philanthropic enable him to avoid the result. The burden of increased taxation on the laborer will cut off from one who has no accumulated means, those expensive comforts he has enjoyed in common with the wealthy. Plain food, plain dress, and no surplus for superfluities will be the rule he cannot violate; and he will, henceforth, in the distinction of classes, re-

semble his fellow-laborer in other countries, heretofore less favored than ours. This law he cannot repeal, or violate with impunity; but its due observance will be the saddest lesson ever learned in this Western world."

And is it indeed true, that the great mass of our population are to be degraded by poverty to the condition of the pauper labor of Europe? Then, farewell liberty! farewell morality! farewell social elevation of man!

Equally bootless will be the efforts of manufacturers to find relief in a further increase of prices. Prices are now too high. Even at their present standard, the mechanical industry of the country is being prostrated. It needs no argument to prove the ruinous effect of the present exorbitant prices upon our mechanical production. A few facts will show it more forcibly than tomes of reasoning.

(1.) In England, a ton of pig iron can be made for $37.50; at the present rate of prices, its manufacture in the United States costs $104. Consequently, the owners of iron works declare that they must have additional protection—or their men must work for reduced wages—or their works must close. It hardly seems possible to reduce the wages of labor at the present cost of living, without frightful destitution;—an increase of the tariff will only raise yet higher the prevailing scale of prices, and increase the suffering;—the alternative is the ruin of this branch of productive industry.

(2.) A ship that in Canada can be built for $20,000, costs $50,000 in the dockyards of the United States. As the result, we have the official statement that "shipbuilding as a branch of American industry has, to a considerable extent, passed* away." A few small schooners are on the stocks in some of our ship yards,—but no large vessels are being built. Almost all the yards are closed; the little work going on in those yet open, consists chiefly of repairs.

(3.) In several branches of manufacture, factories have suspended operations, compelled to close by the excessive expenses incident to the prevailing scale of prices.

(4.) In consequence of the great advance in the cost of building,

---

* Report of the Secretary of the Navy.

the business has declined in all our cities, throwing thousands of operatives out of employment.

A continuance of high prices will cause a general collapse of mechanical industry.

Equally gloomy is the prospect before us, in consequence of the depression of our agricultural production. This threatens nothing less than the destruction of our export trade.

Our staple exports are chiefly agricultural products,—breadstuffs and provisions from the North; and the great Southern staples, cotton, rice, and tobacco.—If the existing financial condition of the country continues, our products will be cut off from foreign markets, and our export trade will cease. The cost of production, and the expense of living are so excessively increased, that our agriculturists cannot grow products as cheaply as they can be produced abroad.

The influence of this state of things upon our breadstuff trade is already apparent. Formerly, when the cost of production was comparatively cheap, our agricultural produce kept possession of our own markets, and, when exported, found a profitable sale at prevailing prices abroad. But, now, every country on earth can grow breadstuffs cheaper than we. Our breadstuff export trade is almost annihilated. In 1861, when old prices prevailed, our exports of breadstuffs in the four last months of the year, amounted to $42,500,000. In the same months of 1862, they fell off to $27,800,000; in the same months of 1863, they declined to $8,909,000; and, in 1864, to $1,850,000. Now, breadstuffs have been shipped from France and England to New York, and sold at a profit. It is a significant fact that in the last Congress, it was proposed to protect our agricultural interests from foreign competition in our own markets, by duties on importations. When this becomes necessary, we may expect to cease all exportation. Indeed, the exportation of farming produce is only possible, now, at a loss: either, the producer is forced to sell cheaper than he can afford, by the excess of supply over demand; or, our import merchants are meeting their liabilities abroad, by the shipment of produce even at a loss, and making up for it by higher prices upon their goods.

Our cotton will sustain itself with equal difficulty in the foreign market against the competition of new fields. While cotton continues to bear an exorbitant price, the planting interest may sustain itself, though with difficulty, under the burdens imposed upon it. But these prices cannot continue. The exportation of half a crop from the United States will cause such an excess of supply, as to lower the market to its old price of twelve or fourteen cents a pound. Foreign fields, as experience has proved, can grow cotton, and will grow it in large quantities, at those prices. But, in the present financial condition of the country, we cannot. The charges upon cotton between the gin and Liverpool, at the present exaggerated rates, amount to ten and a half cents a pound. This will leave scarcely any margin for the expenses of supporting a plantation, raising the crop, and preparing it for market.

Under the present condition of things, the actual cost of growing, paying taxes, and delivering a pound of cotton in Liverpool, is not less than twenty-eight cents* in currency, equivalent to a Liverpool

---

* The following estimate of the cost of producing cotton under the existing regime is made by a practical planter. The estimate assumes that all articles of consumption, except meat, are produced on the plantation. It also estimates the average product of cotton, under the existing condition of labor, at three bales to the hand. This seems a low estimate, but last year the average was only two bales to the hand.

50 hands, at an average of three bales to the hand, will produce 150 bales of 500 lbs. each, or 75,000 lbs. This, at 17 cents per pound, is worth - - $12,750

COST OF PRODUCTION.

Wages 50 hands, at $125 per annum - - - -	$6,250
Cost of bacon, (3½ lbs. a week,) $26 for each hand - -	1,300
Superintendent, board, etc. - - - - - - -	1,500
Blacksmith's work, keeping tools in good condition - -	500
Bagging, rope and twine, for 150 bales, at $3 - - -	450
Loss by death, and depreciation of mules and horses - -	1,000
Depreciation of lands, houses, gin, screw, etc. - - -	750
Sundries, including hoes, axes, traces, nails, hinges, salt, and other things - - - - - - - - - -	500
State and county taxes - - - - - - - -	400
	$12,650

This shows the cost of growing cotton, without counting interest on investment, is within a fraction of 17 cents a pound.

specie price of twenty cents. The Liverpool price has already nearly fallen to that standard. At present prices, cotton barely pays the expenses of growing and shipping to market, scarcely leaving any profit to the planter.—The present policy of the Radicals is rapidly destroying our cotton culture. Many planters are growing all their own supplies, and raising cotton only as an extra crop; while others, in discouragement, are suffering their plantations to lie* idle. Another year of experiment in the cotton culture under a continued decline of prices, will satisfy every planter that, under existing conditions, it is† a losing business,—and it will be abandoned.

Thus, unable to compete with either foreign breadstuffs, or foreign cotton, in the European market, we will be practically without exports.

The following table gives the expenses upon a bale of cotton weighing 500 pounds between the plantation and Liverpool. The items of charges are taken from the estimate of an experienced cotton planter in the interior of Mississippi:

County tax	$ 1 75	Freight on railroad to N. Orleans	4 00
Mississippi State tax	1 00	Drayage, storage, brokerage, and weighing	2 00
Louisiana State tax	1 25	Fire insurance	1 50
United States Internal Revenue tax	10 00	Commissions (2½ per cent. on $150)	3 75
United States Income tax	7 50	Freight to Liverpool and incidental expenses	15 00
Hauling to railroad	5 00		
Total			$52 75

This is a cost of 10½ cents a pound; making with the cost of production over 27 cents a pound which cotton costs the planter before it reaches Liverpool.

* Such announcements as the following clipped from a late paper shows the depression of the planting interest:

"A plantation of fifteen hundred or two thousand acres, in Wilcox county, Alabama, which produced before the war, from 8,000 to 10,000 bushels of corn, and from 350 to 500 bales of cotton, was rented last week for $130."

† Cotton has already (1868) fallen to a price which will not cover the expenses of production. Its culture is being abandoned. The anticipations of twelve months ago are already being fulfilled to the letter. At the present scale of general prices, cotton production is an impossibility in this country. Planters may continue to grow some cotton as an extra crop, to obtain money for necessary expenses; but cotton production is no longer a business in which capital will be embarked with a view to profitable returns. Prices must return to the normal standard before we can grow cotton in competition with foreign fields.

Indeed, our exports have already so declined, that a large annual balance of trade accrues against us, which we settle by the sale of bonds. The exportation of bonds is going on every year. Our foreign debt has already attained a magnitude that should give us the gravest concern. But still the exportation of bonds continues, encouraged by the government, as the only method of averting a crash that would otherwise occur at any moment. This, alone, has prevented our rotten financial system from falling with a crash, long ago. In the last four years, our imports have exceeded our exports by more than four hundred millions, and bonds sold at a discount have made up the deficit.

But let our exports continue to decline, as they must do under the present inflation of prices, and our bonds will soon be discredited in the foreign market, or else they will all be absorbed in paying for our imports and meeting the annual interest. Then will come such a crash as has never been witnessed under the sun. The ruin of the French Mississippi scheme, and the bursting of the British South Sea bubble, were nothing to it. The debts of those countries were owed to their own citizens, and they could rub out old scores and start anew. But we will be involved with foreign creditors; and the oppression of an inexorable debt that cannot be wiped out by repudiation will add to the horrors of universal bankruptcy.

It requires no argument to show that, under existing circumstances, the idea of competing with Great Britain in the cotton, or any other manufacture, is preposterous. We have none of the conditions of cheap manufacture,—neither cheap raw material, nor cheap labor, nor cheap provisions. Every thing is dearer with us, than in Great Britain. Even the currency, redundant as it is, has become dear; money is as scarce as in ordinary times. This seems anomalous; but with the enormous enhancement of all prices, our $800,000,000 of currency is hardly more adequate to the transaction of the business of the country, than $250,000,000 would be, in a normal state of prices. Before we can hope to engage in successful competition with Great Britain, our system of administration and of finance must be altogether changed.

The country is oppressed by the worst evils of misrule. The national industry is prostrated by a system of Administration so ill-judged that charity can hardly attribute the ruinous policy to folly. If the Radical party were actuated by absolute hatred of the country, and were deliberately resolved upon its ruin, they could not adopt a policy better adapted to accomplish the purpose. All their measures are characterized by an utter want of statesmanlike sagacity. They seem to have lost, if they ever possessed, the power to trace causes to their necessary results, and, as if possessed by a judicial blindness, they are driving the nation headlong upon the breakers which lie before us. It is blindness which possesses them! But it is the darkened intellect which God has, by an inevitable and benignant law of our being, affixed upon a nature convulsed by baleful passions. Did not passions blind their victims,—were the acuteness of the mental vision exalted in ratio with the mad passions which sway the soul,—the world could never escape the domination of evil. But it is mercifully provided that the reign of passions darkens the understanding of the individual or the party which cherishes them. They precipitate the adoption of a policy dictated by blind passion or narrow selfish craft,—a policy of cunning or of violence, rather than sound, far-sighted statesmanship,—a policy which always wrecks the prosperity of the country, and, mercifully to mankind, buries the party which adopted it beneath the ruin it has wrought. The policy of the Radicals is rapidly tending to this result. Unless their career is promptly checked, they will plunge the country into irremediable ruin, and wreck with it the cause of human progress.

The laws of industry lie beyond the control of despotic power. Every other opposition may be crushed by violence; but God has subjected Industry to immutable laws, whose violation inflicts upon Wrong merited retribution. Prosperity cannot be coerced by power; nor Ruin repelled. The laws of industry are mightier than the scepter of despotism. Tyranny must bow to their sway, or be crushed by their stern, inflexible reaction.—A profound thinker, indulging in reflections upon the causes of the French Revolution of 1789, offers a suggestion pregnant with meaning in the present condition of this country. Heed the wisdom of Carlyle:—

"Great is Bankruptcy; the great bottomless gulf into which all

Falsehoods, public and private, sink disappearing; whither, from the first origin of them, they were all doomed. . . . . With a Fortunatus' purse in its pocket, through what length of time might not any Falsehood last! Your Society, your Household, practical or spiritual arrangement, is untrue, unjust, offensive in the eye of God and man. Nevertheless, its hearth is warm, its larder well replenished: the innumerable Swiss of Heaven with a kind of natural loyalty gather round it; will prove by pamphleteering, musketeering, that it is a Truth; or, if not an unmixed (unearthly, impossible) Truth, then better, a wholesomely attempered one (as wind is to the shorn lamb), and works well. Changed outlook, however, when purse and larder grow empty! Was your arrangement so true, so accordant to Nature's ways, then how in the name of wonder, has Nature with her infinite bounty come to leave it famishing there? To all men, to all women, and all children, it is now indubitable that your Arrangement was *false!*—Honor to Bankruptcy, ever righteous on the great scale, though in detail it is so cruel! Under all Falsehoods it works, unweariedly mining. No Falsehood, did it rise heaven-high and cover the world, but Bankruptcy one day will sweep it down, and make us free of it."

These thoughts are as just in conception as forcible in expression. Bankruptcy, if no earlier deliverance comes, will free America from the yoke of Radical misrule. Stern, uncajolable Bankruptcy! Its knock is already upon the portal, and Radicalism is unbarring the door, to let the Giant in.

PART II.

OUR TRUE POLICY.

It is not too late to retrieve our fortunes. But to do so, will require a prompt and signal change of policy. The disorganization of Southern labor by the demoralizing interference of the government must be remedied; and our entire financial system must be reversed.

It should be the grand aim of our policy to deprive England of its centralization of manufactures and commerce. We should engage in a competition that would drive that country, not only from our own market, but from the markets of the world. As we have already seen, this is the only hope of securing our own prosperity, and of averting the dangers which menace the world, both from British centralization of wealth, and from the aggressions of Absolutism.

In this competition, we may expect all the great resources of England to be arrayed against us. Our own natural advantages, however, are superior to hers, and a wise policy will assure our success. Yet the occasion demands the utmost skill and prudence. We cannot afford to carry weight. We must discipline and train our energies for the competition, as the athlete of old, for the prize of the Olympic games.

We may consider our competition with England as an industrial battle, to be conducted in accordance with the scientific principles of military strategy.

An army which has overwhelming advantages, in numbers, discipline, and resources, may enter upon an engagement without plan or precaution, and win a victory by simply pressing forward at all points. But a force inferior in all these particulars must observe every precaution prudence can suggest, and avail itself of every advantage skill can conceive. Victory, under such circumstances, is

oftenest won by selecting the key to the adversary's position, and, remaining on the defensive at other points of the line, concentrating an overwhelming force to carry it.

The cotton manufacture is the key to the whole field of competition. The possessor of that is master of the situation.

Nature has given us great advantages in respect of this manufacture. But in fighting our battle of industry with England, we must display generalship. We must not attempt too much. We must not enter into competition with Great Britain in all branches of manufacturing, at once. That would divide our limited means, and fritter our efforts in puny, fruitless efforts. We must concentrate our energies, to carry the one vital point which, once gained, decides the contest in our favor. We must select the cotton manufacture as the channel into which the mightiest energies of the country must be turned; making other branches of industry, for the time, auxiliary to this grand aim.

Let us now consider the means necessary to be adopted, to insure success.—Our great aim must be to promote, in every possible manner, the growth and manufacture of cotton. To this end, three things are necessary:—

I. To make the Growth, and Manufacture of Cotton, Safe Branches of Business.

II. To make the Growth and Manufacture of Cotton Profitable, at the prices, to which British competition will limit us.

III. To adopt such Measures, as will Prevent England from Destroying our Industry, and, at the same time, cripple her Competiton.

We will elaborate the proper policy to be adopted, under these aspects.

CHAPTER I

MEASURES NECESSARY TO MAKE THE GROWTH AND MANUFACTURE OF COTTON SAFE BRANCHES OF BUSINESS.

SAFETY is absolutely essential to the development of our cotton industry. If exposed to dangerous contingencies, capital will never embark in it with the promptitude and energy necessary to a successful competition with England. Capitalists will not risk their means in a business exposed to dangerous vicissitudes. They will prefer to engage in other branches of business, where there is little risk, and where profits, if light, are sure.

The prime essential to the safety of investments, in cotton growing, and cotton manufacturing, both, is an abundant and reliable labor for growing the staple. No business man will invest capital in growing cotton, unless he can be sure of securing labor enough of a reliable character, to enable him to carry on his planting operations: nor will any capitalist invest money in factories for manufacturing cotton, unless there is a reasonable certainty of a regular supply of raw material. A reliable labor system for growing cotton, is the first and prime essential to success.

This was the greatest advantage of the former system of slave labor. The labor was perfectly reliable. The planter could pitch his crop with a reasonable certainty of being able to cultivate and secure it. And the capitalist could engage in manufacturing, with a positive assurance of an abundant supply of cotton.

Have we, now, a reliable labor system, in the South? Will capitalists readily embark means in plantations for growing cotton, and in mills for manufacturing it? Have they sufficient confidence in the negro labor of the South, under existing circumstances, to induce them to venture capital, in reliance on it?

The negro labor of the South is as well adapted to the cotton culture as any in the world. But, under the existing regime, no one will pronounce negroes reliable laborers.

All experience has proved that the negro, in a state of freedom,

is naturally indolent. In the island of Jamaica, the production of staples has greatly diminished since the emancipation of the negroes. In that luxuriant climate, the negro population has greatly increased, notwithstanding their idleness. But the exports, which, in 1810, amounted to the value of £3,303,579, in 1864, twenty years after the slaves were emancipated, had fallen to £403,520; while the imports, which, in 1810, were £4,038,397, had fallen, in 1864, to £932,316. Within fifteen years after emancipation, 600 sugar and coffee plantations, containing 350,000 acres, were abandoned; and within the five following years, the decline of industry continued, until 573 other plantations, containing 391,000 acres, were turned to waste. Emancipation has destroyed four-fifths of the commerce of the island, and has consigned over 1,000 plantations to waste, besides vastly diminishing the productiveness of those still in cultivation. The following is the picture drawn of the present condition of the island:—

"Shipping has deserted her ports; her magnificent plantations of sugar and coffee are running to weeds; her private dwellings are falling to decay; the comforts and luxuries which belong to industrial prosperty have been cut off, one by one, from her inhabitants; and the day is at hand, when no one will be left to represent the wealth, intelligence, and hospitality, for which the Jamaica planter was once so distinguished."

In all the South American states, emancipation has been the signal for a cessation of industry. Idleness among the blacks, is almost universal. The mildness of the climate enables them to dispense with clothing, and the luxuriant soil yields esculents without the labor of tillage. Blacks are to be seen all over the country—living in sheds without walls, merely covered with bamboo leaves, to afford shelter from the rain—luxuriating in the savage indolence characteristic of the race in Africa.

In St. Domingo, the colored race has enjoyed every facility for improvement. They are the ruling race; and we should expect to find, there, the highest development of negro industry and civilization. What are the facts? In 1789, the population was 600,000; in 1832, after forty years of freedom, it was reduced to 280,000: in 1789, there were exported 672,000,000 pounds of sugar; in 1832, none: in 1789, the export of coffee was 86,000,000 pounds;

in 1832, it was 32,000,000: in 1789, the island employed 1,680 ships, and 27,000 sailors; in 1832, only one ship, and 167 sailors.—An American from the Northern states, visiting the island in 1854, writes to Putnam's magazine the following sketch of the habits of the negroes:—

"To a large extent, the resources of this island are, at present, undeveloped, and it presents a wide contrast with its former wealth and productiveness. In 1789, it contained a population of 40,000 whites, 500,000 slaves, and 24,000 free colored. Not only its rich plains, but in many parts its mountains were cultivated to their summits. The cultivated lands amounted to 2,289,480 acres; which were divided into 793 plantations of sugar, 3,117 plantations of coffee, 3,160 of indigo, 54 of chocolate, and 623 smaller ones for raising grain, yams, and other vegetable food. Its exports, as stated by the intendant of the colony, were £4,765,229 sterling. An active commerce united it with Europe, and twenty ports of trade were filled with 1,500 vessels, waiting to freight home its rich productions. In riding over the island the mementos of this prosperity are everywhere to be seen. Large broken kettles, the remains of immense sugar houses, are scattered along the roads and over the fields. The remains of massive and magnificent gateways, and the ruins of princely dwellings, scattered over the island, are evidences of the highest state of wealth and luxury. But these rich plains and mountains, are now almost an uncultivated waste. A few coffee plantations are to be found, which are kept up with the greatest difficulty, on account of the impossibility of securing among the natives the necessary laborers. The most of the people out of the towns live in rudely constructed houses, unfurnished with the usual comforts of life, and but a few degrees above the huts upon the shores of their native Africa. The soil is so exceedingly productive, and there is so much that grows spontaneously, that very little labor indeed is necessary to secure the food necessary to sustain life; and the climate is such that, if so disposed, they need spend very little for clothing. Being thus under no compulsory necessity to labor, industry is the exception, indolence and idleness the rule.

They generally inclose around or near their dwellings a small patch of ground, which is cultivated mostly by the females, and where, with very little labor, they raise coffee, bananas, corn, and other vegetables for their own consumption, and a small surplus for sale, from the proceeds of which they procure their clothing and such other articles of convenience as they are able or disposed to purchase. I should judge that far the largest part of all the coffee that is exported from the island is raised in these small quantities,

and brought to market in small lots upon the backs of mules. The logwood, mahcgany, and other exports are mostly procured in small quantities in much the same way,—the men of course doing most of this heavy labor.

Bountiful as are the provisions for supplying the wants of man here, there is, incredible as it may seem, a vast deal of suffering for want of the very necessaries of life. Multitudes are so thriftless and improvident that they will not make any provision for the future—they will not even gather those productions that are everywhere so bountifully spread around them. I have rode through wild uncultivated woods, and seen on every hand groves of orange trees groaning under their delicious golden loads, as I have seen the orchards of western New York weighed down with their heavy burdens. A little farther on, I have come upon thickets of coffee bushes matted over with their rich purple berries. Besides these, tobacco, ginger, and other valuable products grow wild in the same profusion over these mountains, and year after year there waste away, and perish like the rank grass of our own prairies."

The facts in our own Northern states afford additional evidence of the disinclination of the black population in a state of freedom to a life of industry. In New England, idleness and vice are rapidly diminishing their numbers. Throughout the North, they huddle together in cities, obtaining a precarious subsistence by such chance snatches of labor as may offer. In the Western states, their villages are nuisances, from their idleness, and their propensity to pilfer from the neighboring farmers. As a rule, land is worth one hundred per cent. less in the vicinity of a negro village, than in sections remote from their depredations.

But, in none of these instances, has a fair trial been made of the capacity of the colored race for persistent labor, under favorable circumstances. In Jamaica, the perpetual interference of the British Parliament prevented the government of the island from adopting salutary measures for the promotion of industry; in the South American states, industry had never been sufficiently advanced and organized, nor had the white population the necessary energy, to influence the blacks to labor: the external influence necessary to overcome the constitutional tendency of the race to idleness, was wanting. Nor did our Northern states present more favorable con-

ditions for fostering the colored race into steady industry: the climate was unfavorable to the negro constitution; the labor did not suit his gregarious habits; and he was brought into competition with an abundant supply of white labor, which, from its superiority, was generally preferred.

The Southern states presented more favorable conditions for the development of the industry of the colored race in a state of freedom, than had ever been present elsewhere: the climate suited their constitutions; the productions are adapted to their gregarious habits; and the superiority of the negro over the white laborer, in the South, is as marked as the superiority of the white over the negro, in the North. Besides this, all the external conditions necessary to develop the industry of the black race, are present: their labor is a necessity to maintain the prosperity of the country; and an energetic white population is prepared to offer every stimulant, to encourage steady labor. Under judicious regulations, there is no reason to doubt that the free-black labor of the South would be almost as efficient as slave labor, previous to emancipation.

But the Radicals have done everything in their power to counteract efforts to promote the industry of the black population, and to disorganize them. From the beginning, persistent interference between the blacks and their employers has been kept up. Idleness and vagrancy have been encouraged: the intermeddling of Freedmen's Bureau officials has inflicted endless annoyance upon the employer, and has divested him of that influence with his employés which is essential to the maintenance of steady industry: transportation is furnished the colored population at the cost of government, whenever they become restless and wish to change their locality: proper state laws for the repression of vagrancy, and the encouragement of labor, are prevented by federal interference; and are forever precluded, by investing the blacks with the franchise, and making them the controlling power in the states: homesteads have been bestowed upon them, where they may subsist in idleness: Radical agents have been assiduously fomenting discord, and inspiring them with discontent: their minds are kept in a state of feverish excitement by political agitation; and a general indisposition to labor

is induced by the expectation of a general confiscation for their benefit.

Can we wonder that the simple-minded negroes of the Southern states should yield to these seductions, and tread in the footsteps of those of their race who have been emancipated elsewhere? The only cause for wonder is that, under the circumstances, they have labored at all. They have done better than could have been expected; but enough has already been seen of the effects of Radical intervention, to show that a continuance of the system will result in the utter demoralization of Southern labor. Complaints are general throughout the Cotton states, of the inefficiency of negro labor. Chapters might be filled with quotations from the published lamentations of planters, whose hopes of a profitable crop have been blighted by the indolence of their black employés. Two, and sometimes three negroes are frequently found, doing the amount of labor one would accomplish before the war. Energetic Northerners have rented plantations to be cultivated by freedmen, and almost all have lost money by the operation, through the inefficiency of their labor. The space cultivated in cotton has vastly diminished: in Mississippi, the land cultivated in cotton last year was only one-third as extensive as in 1860: with all the energy that could be exercised, the last year's cotton crop was only about one-fourth of that raised seven years ago.

The negroes are congregated in towns, living in idleness, and subsisting by pilfering. A growing disinclination is manifesting itself to make engagements for regular labor; the blacks preferring to work by the day, or month. Many plantations are standing idle for want of laborers. Planters are growing discouraged. The natural indolence of the negro character, seconded by the ill-judged policy of the government, is manifesting itself; and year by year, they grow more idle, and more unreliable.

The correspondent of the Cincinnati Commercial, writing from Alabama, himself a Radical, and not disposed to over-color the dark tints of the picture, speaks in the following pointed terms of the condition of negro industry under Radical influence. He says:—

"The labor question is a perplexing topic for the South, and *must so remain for some time to come.* The planters complain that, under

existing circumstances, the blacks will not work so that any profit can be made out of land. They have become 'demoralized' with politics and confiscation, and are bent on doing the least possible amount of labor, for the largest possible amount of wages, believing that there is a good time coming for them, when, under the benign influence of Thad. Stevens' bill, they shall cease to be hewers of wood and drawers of water, and may sit out the hot afternoon under the quiet shadows of their own vines and fig trees, none daring to molest them, or make them afraid." In another letter, the same correspondent writes: "The tendency of negroes to congregate in cities and towns, instead of remaining in the country districts where their labor is needed, is a subject of complaint, for which some remedy ought to be found. They come in flocks to a city like Montgomery, and lounge about the street corners, doing nothing, and unwilling to do anything, while they can live by contributions from the Freedmen's Bureau obtained through false statements, or by pilfering and stealing. You will see them in gangs, "standing round" in every city of the South. They do n't work; and, as it is presumable that they have not inherited any rich legacies, the question is, How do they live? The only solution I can find for the problem, is to be drawn from the number of petty thefts reputed as occurring in the South, just now."

A continuance of the policy hitherto pursued, will, in a few years, convert the entire negro population of the South into a mass of pilfering idlers, preying upon the* industrious portion of community.

What is to be done?

It is alike essential to the well-being of the negro, and the prosperity of the country, that the black race in the South should be steadily engaged in productive industry.

---

*These anticipations, written last Spring, are already realized. The worthlessness of negro labor, and the excessive cost of production, have rendered the cotton culture unprofitable. The planters, ruined by their past experiments, can no longer plant cotton, or make engagements with the blacks;—and the Southern States are filled with plantations going to waste, and negroes—in a state of destitution—plundering granaries, and killing the cattle, and even the mules of the planters, for food. A few years' continuance of the existing state of things will convert the South into a wilderness like St. Domingo.

Place the negro upon isolated homesteads, and he will vegetate in idleness, and relapse into barbarism. Suffer them to congregate around the cities, and vice and poverty will soon cause their extinction. Such is now their tendency. The natural increase of the race has almost entirely ceased, and, every year, vice and disease and want are rapidly diminishing their numbers. They are, everywhere, rapidly decreasing. Another generation, unless they return to habits of regular industry, will witness their almost entire extinction.

The public interest, also, demands that the negro population of the South be engaged in regular productive labor. It is absolutely essential to our prosperity, that they become reliable laborers, upon whose steady industry capitalists may rely so implicitly, as to invest money largely in the growth and manufacture of cotton. The introduction of coolie laborers would be our only alternative. But this will be too slow to save the country from the ruin now impending. Nothing can save us, but the steady, persevering industry of the negro population.

The writer is very far from advocating the re-establishment of a system of servitude, in name, or in fact. Nor is this necessary to the solution of the problem before us. It is not doubted that the negro will labor, as a freedman. But the Radical policy must be reversed. The negro must be left, like other laborers, to the operation of ordinary laws, and the general regulations of industry. Let this be done,—let the patronage of the Federal government be withdrawn—and the atmosphere of energy that pervades our country will envelop the negro race, and impel them on in a course of diligent industry. The normal laws of industry, in their unimpeded operation, will secure the highest efficiency for black labor, while they will secure the rights of the freedmen, and further their advance in civilization. Under their influence, the negro labor of the South will become so perfectly reliable, that both cotton growing and cotton manufacturing will be regarded by capitalists as perfectly safe branches of enterprise.

Protection is bad policy—both for negroes, and manufacturers. As the attempted protection of the one by the Federal government, in the last generation, wrought its ruin, so will the protection of the

government, if continued, work the ruin of the other, now. Leave the negro to the operation of the laws of industry, and they will secure his well-being; pamper him with government patronage, and extinction, brought about by indolent, vicious habits, at no distant day, awaits him.

CHAPTER II.

MEASURES NECESSARY TO MAKE THE GROWTH AND MANUFACTURE OF COTTON PROFITABLE.

THERE are but two ways of making a business profitable: increasing the price of commodities; or, diminishing the cost of production.

In this instance, we cannot increase the price of raw cotton, or of manufactured goods; for that will be fixed by the competition of Great Britain. Those branches of business must be made profitable within the limits fixed by British prices. Since we cannot increase the price of these products of our industry beyond the British standard, we must lower the cost of production. The Southern planter must be enabled to grow cotton cheaper than foreign fields can furnish the article to British mills; and the American manufacturer must be enabled to manufacture cottons cheaper than they can be produced by British factories. These are the conditions of our success.

SECT. 1.—THE FIRST ESSENTIAL TO CHEAP MANUFACTURES, THE LOCATION OF OUR COTTON FACTORIES IN THE WEST.

The advantages of the West over New England as the seat of manufacturing industry have already been enlarged upon. From careful estimates, it appears that, in the cheapness of raw material and provisions for operatives, etc., the West has over New England, an advantage of 20 per cent. in the cost of manufacturing.

The establishment of manufactures in the West might be greatly

promoted by the grant of aid by the State* governments to manufacturing companies within their borders. States now aid railroads, which are designed to transport State products, and thus give a market, abroad, to agriculture. On the same principle, aid might, with even greater propriety, be extended to manufactures designed to give a home market to agriculture.—Perhaps State aid may be necessary: for capital has accumulated in the East, and in the hands of Western merchants interested in the Eastern traffic; and both these classes may be reluctant to loan capital, to establish an enterprise which, however advantageous to the country, endangers "the craft by which they have their wealth." The Western farmers are especially interested in Western manufactures, and they should control the State governments, and cause them to aid enterprises so advantageous to every Western interest.

The establishment of manufactures in the West is essential, even to a partial resumption of our prosperity. Our abnormal system of industry, which occupies the West in the production of supplies for the other sections, can no longer maintain the prosperity of the country. The populations of the cities engaged in the transportation of supplies are depressing productive industry, by the charges they levy upon it. These populations must be employed in manufactures, before we can have any steady prosperity. The reader is referred to preceding pages of this work, in which this point has already been elaborated.

The establishment of manufactures in the West, however, must be left to individual sagacity and enterprise, and the fostering patronage, if necessary, of the State governments. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon it further in this connection. We pass to the consideration of the governmental measures necessary, to render these

* As a general principle, the extension of State aid to any branch of industry may be objected to, as tending to communism. But that tendency is not more apparent in the measure proposed, than in granting aid to railroads. The same principle obtains in both cases. Moreover, it must be remembered that the existing situation warrants the adoption even of unusual measures by the governments of the States. If a departure from a general policy is ever made, it should be in the circumstances which now environ us, when every thing is at stake.

branches of productive industry profitable, at prices fixed by British competition.

SECT. 2.—REDUCTION OF THE ENTIRE RATE OF PRICES PREVAILING IN THE COUNTRY, THE PRIME ESSENTIAL TO CHEAP PRODUCTION.

The necessity of a reduction of our present scale of prices, in order to manufacturing success, is evident upon the most cursory reflection. The operatives on cotton plantations cannot work at reasonable wages, while all the necessaries of life are at exorbitant prices: the cotton planter who pays exorbitant prices for all articles of necessary consumption, and exorbitant wages for labor, besides his personal taxes to government, cannot sell cotton cheap. The manufacturer must charge exorbitantly for his goods, when, besides his taxes, he pays high prices for cotton, for labor, for the necessaries of life, for investments. So if the farmer, and all other branches of industry engaged in furnishing supplies of every kind to the planting interest, and the population engaged in mechanical production;—all must have high prices for their products, while the general scale of prices remains at an exaggerated standard.

Prices must fall.

The only method of accomplishing this, is the removal of the causes which have induced the rise of prices. While they remain, no general reduction can occur. These causes, as we have seen, are:—

I. The excessive Tariff;

II. The ill-adjusted System of Taxation, which bears almost exclusively upon Productive Industry;

III. The inflated and depreciated Currency.

The manner in which these causes produce an inflation of prices has already been traced in detail. They must be removed by an entire change of the financial system of the government, before our Productive Industry can flourish in the congenial atmosphere of low prices.

It is necessary

I. TO REMODEL OUR TARIFF, AND CHANGE ALTOGETHER OUR SYSTEM OF PROTECTION.

Two objections will be urged against the abandonment of our tariff system: that it is necessary, as a means of protection; and as a source of revenue.

1. It will be maintained that a high tariff on imports is necessary to protect our home manufactures.—To this we answer, that our exorbitant tariff neither does, nor can afford such protection as will enable us to compete with Great Britain, even in our own markets. It is possible to protect a single branch of industry; because the exorbitant price of one article does not raise the general scale of prices, and enhance the cost of production. But when we aim to protect many interests, by a general tariff, the effect is to raise the general standard of prices to the same level, and enhance the cost of production to the full extent of the protection afforded by the tariff. This result can be prevented, only by the oppression of extensive branches of industry, and the great mass of laboring population. A general tariff on importations is either nugatory, or grossly oppressive.

It is admitted that our industry will, at first, need protection against the hostile competition of Great Britain. But this protection, a general tariff cannot afford. It exerts its influence in a wrong direction, and can never foster home industry into vigorous development. It is the expedient of a country confessedly inferior in natural advantages, and hopeless of ever achieving eminent success, to protect itself in its own markets against the superior advantages of foreign countries. A country whose natural advantages entitle it to aspire to industrial and commercial pre-eminence, should make it the aim of its policy, not to protect its industry by an enhancement of price, but to diminish as far as possible the cost of production. Provisions, and raw material, and labor, should be cheap. To this end, the farmer, the merchant, the laboring population, ought to be suffered to obtain their purchases at the lowest price, that all may do their office at the most reasonable scale of profits.

A tariff for revenue might properly be laid on wines, broadcloths, and other articles of luxurious consumption; but all articles consumed by the great mass of population ought, under the limitations hereafter mentioned, to be free of duty.

2. But again it will be urged that the Tariff is necessary to maintain the credit of the government,—that the customs, paid in gold,

are the only resource for meeting the interest on the public debt.

If the gold must be raised to pay the interest on the public debt, let it be raised by any other tax than the tariff. No tax falls so heavily upon productive industry as a tariff. Taxes can be so adjusted as not to inflate the rate of prices at all. But a tariff reacts directly upon prices, and is utterly incompatible with the low prices and cheap production which it is essential for us to attain. That the government needs revenue is no argument in favor of a tariff: let the revenue be raised by a different method of taxation.

And this brings us to our next point:—

II. The Public Revenue should be Raised chiefly by a Property Tax.

Property of every kind should be subject to taxation,—real estate, personal property, money, notes, and bonds. If a general property tax would not reach bonds, and money, and accumulated personal property, owing to the method in which the Constitution requires it to be levied, a special tax might be imposed on such assets, so as to make them bear an equal share of the public burdens.

1*st. Justice of a Property Tax.*

1. The justice of taxing *wealth*, not *poverty*, is evident.

Some hold that, as the poor man is protected by the Commonwealth in all his rights, he ought to pay something for the support of government. But the poor man makes a full return to the commonwealth for all the protection he receives, without paying any tax. He is protected in his rights of person; and he makes a return, in kind, in full equivalent of this protection. His *personal* service, in giving his labor for the promotion of the common weal, is full indemnity for the protection of his *personal* rights. The life and liberty which the public laws protect, are consecrated in toil, to the promotion of the general prosperity. The poor man's labor is an ample return for all the protection he derives from the government. He pays in kind. Let the rich man also pay in kind. As he is protected in his property, let him return in property,—*i. e.* in taxes,—the equivalent of his protection; and let him pay in proportion to the amount of property the laws protect.

The taxes of the poor man are an injustice, either to him, or to his employer. The wages of the laborer are never more than adequate to a comfortable subsistence. If he is compelled to pay taxes, he must either deduct the sum from his scanty means of subsistence, or he must exact the amount from his employer, in an increase of wages. In the one case, taxation reduces the poor man to a state of destitution: in the other, it is not really levied upon the laborer, but upon his employer; and the business class are compelled to pay, not only their own taxes, but the taxes of the laboring population, also.

The doctrine that poverty, not wealth, should bear the public burdens, belongs to the age of noble aristocracy which is now passing away. While the landed nobility were a privileged class, they claimed exemption from taxation, imposing it entirely upon the great mass of industrious population. This caused the French Revolution; and similar oppression in England, will, if not amended, cause a revolution there. The principles of our Declaration of Independence sapped the foundation of the system of taxation which levies the greater part of the public revenues upon the laboring population. When equality of rights is recognized, a system of taxation which makes the poor poorer by taxation, and the rich richer by exemption, cannot prevail. The converse of this proposition is also true,—that where such a system of taxation prevails, the principles of equality cannot long continue to exist. Taxation must either be conformed to the principles of democratic government, or it will soon sink the mass of population into wretchedness, and create a privileged aristocracy, who rule the government by the bayonet. This tendency is already strongly apparent in our government; and, unless it is arrested, we shall have a Centralization, resting upon the support of an Aristocracy, exempting them from the public burdens, and ruling the country with the sword.

2. The justice of taxing *wealth*, not *business*, is equally apparent. An individual ought to be taxed, not in proportion to his annual profits, but in proportion to his wealth. As a rule, every man ought to pay for the support of government, in proportion to the amount of property the government protects. It is not right that the man

of energy should be disproportionately burdened, while the man of indolent leisure is almost exempted from taxation.

In certain cases it might be necessary, in adjusting the basis of taxation, to take into consideration the productiveness of property, as well as its selling value. This discrimination might be proper in the case of widows, minors, and some other classes. But, as a general rule, property ought to be taxed in proportion to its market value.—If it be objected that this will bear hardly upon the holders of town lots, and wild lands, we answer: Let them, then, render their property productive, or sell it to those who will: they are holding property on speculation, with a view to future enhancement: it represents capital, and should be taxed as capital; it is an investment with a view to profit, equally with the investment of the merchant in goods, or the farmer in lands, and as an investment it should be taxed. The monopoly of city lots and wild lands on speculation, is a disadvantage to the country, and if an individual chooses to make such an investment of his means, with an eye to personal advantage, he should be willing to pay for the privilege. The commonwealth, at least, should never encourage such speculators, by discriminating in their favor against the business community, and exempting their speculative investments from taxation.

Our present system, which taxes industry and incomes, is utterly unjust. The speculator worth a million of dollars invested in fine lands, which he is withholding from market in the expectation of becoming a landed magnate at a future day, may pay no more taxes than the clerk whose industry is his only capital. Labor and productive industry are unduly taxed, for the benefit of a class which is aiming to become the Aristocracy of the republic at a future day, and which is now doing nothing for the public advantage, but is, on the contrary, an incubus upon the general prosperity.

2*d. Expediency of a Property Tax.*

The expediency of a Property Tax is as apparent as its justice.

1. It weighs more lightly upon every class of community than any other tax; and, indeed, after the first few years, it will not be felt as a burden, at all.

A property tax will, in effect, set apart a certain proportion of the wealth of the country for the support of the government. A person who buys property thereafter, will buy it subject to an annual charge by the government; and a percentage proportional to that charge will be deducted from the price. Consequently, the person who thereafter buys property will not feel the tax at all; the diminished cost of the property being equivalent to the tax. It will operate like the tything system in England; where land is sold subject to tythes, and the equivalent of the tythes is deducted from its value.

When this effect of a property tax shall once be effected, it will no longer operate as a burden upon the holders of real estate.

It may be objected that a tax upon money would increase the rate of interest, and thus cause the oppression of the business public. But an income tax is open to the same objection; as, indeed, is every mode of taxation. But, in point of fact, taxation has little effect upon the rate of interest. Money-lenders always charge, whether they are taxed or not, as high a rate of interest or discount, as the condition of business will allow them to exact. It might be well to encourage the loaning of money by chartered institutions having a fixed and moderate rate of discount, by discriminating in their favor, and exempting them from taxation.—But the only efficient means of promoting a low rate of interest is to promote a regular course of business, at moderate charges. We must promote a moderate scale of prices and profits,—which the measure now suggested will accomplish; and then, the rate of interest will be conformed to the general standard of business profits.

The influence of a property tax in promoting a moderate scale of prices is its chief advantage. Instead of injuring the branches of productive industry we wish to promote, as other systems of taxation do, it will farther their growth.—Two things are requisite to our industrial success: to lower the standard of prices; and to embark the capital of the country in productive industry. A property tax will exercise an important influence in promoting both these objects:

2. A Property Tax will exercise an important Influence in *lowering the Scale of Prices.*

Two causes lie at the foundation of every inflation of prices: in-

creased charges on business; and an emulous desire to enlarge profits.

A system of taxation which excuses Property, and levies heavy taxes on Business, tends to increase the force of both these causes. But a Property Tax tends to counteract both these causes of enhancement, and exerts a potent influence in keeping prices at the moderate standard, so promotive of business prosperity.

(1.) It *relieves Business from the Charges* incident to direct taxation upon it.

Taxes levied on business raise the price of labor and raw material, and increase the cost of all the necessaries of life; and they necessitate an advance of prices, to meet the increased outlay.

At present, the Business of the country pays the taxes, almost exclusively. Two billions of bonds, and over twenty (at present inflated prices, nearly forty) billions of property, are exempt. Of course, the taxes of the business community would be lightened, if the great mass of property now exempt, were made to share the burden.

But to come to a more circumstantial estimate: The property of the country was returned, in the census of 1860, at sixteen ($16,000,000,000) billions. At the present inflation of prices, after making proper allowance for the wasting of the South by war, the property of the country, including the public debt, is worth perhaps nearly forty ($40,000,000,000) billions.—The Secretary of the Treasury estimates the revenue for the fiscal year, ending June 1868, at $436,000,000. This amount, assessed upon the property of the country, at present values, would only require a tax of a little over one per cent. A business man having $40,000 invested in his business, would pay a tax of $436, and would then be done with it.—But under the present system, his taxes are more than double that amount. If he makes a profit of twenty per cent. upon the capital invested, his income tax, alone, is $400; and his license, stamp, and direct taxes, will average perhaps twice as much more. This is, perhaps, about the average ratio of the burden of the two modes of taxation;—except as respects the tariff, and excises upon liquors; in which instances, the tax exceeds the amount of capital invested in

the business—the excise tax being even tenfold greater than the capital invested. On the whole, our present system of taxation imposes upon business at least threefold greater burdens, than a property tax would exact.

If prices were reduced to a normal standard, the disproportion would be vastly increased. A property tax would carry on the government, even when prices came down to the normal standard, without imposing any injurious burden upon any interest. Making allowance for the falling off of Southern prosperity, the property of the country, inclusive of the public debt, is worth, at ordinary prices, about twenty-four ($24,000,000,000) billions. For an economical administration of the government, a revenue of $250,000,000, would be amply sufficient: this would require a tax of but a fraction over one per cent.,—a levy that would not at all disturb the equilibrium of prices.

But our present system of taxation would not raise that amount of revenue, without an inevitable inflation of prices much above the normal standard. Indeed, this system is inconsistent with a normal state of prices. It necessitates an inflation of prices, as the only means of enabling the public to meet the excessive exactions upon business. And when a crisis comes (as it must come, sooner or later), that will cause prices to tumble, it will fail to raise the necessary revenues; the people will be unable to endure its excessive exactions; and it must either be abandoned, or bankruptcy and repudiation will ensue.

The worst effect of the present system of taxation is its reactionary influence upon the standard of prices. It is levied in such a manner, as to react immediately upon business prices; it thus levies upon the people charges tenfold greater than the amount of taxes paid to government.

The importing merchant worth $100,000, invested in his business, makes probably a gross annual profit of twenty per cent. upon his capital. Out of this, he would not feel the $1,000 of property tax levied by the government. He would account it a tax upon his *wealth*, and submit to the diminution of his income to that extent, without levying the tax upon the price of his goods. But when the government assesses over $100,000 of customs upon his annual im-

portations, and $1,000 income tax upon his profits, besides his stamp and license taxes,—these taxes are levied upon his *business*, and he is under the necessity of adding them to the price of his goods. Again: The brewer or distiller worth $10,000, would not miss out of his profits $100 of property tax; but when the excise tax upon his liquors amounts to $100,000, he must add it to the price of his stock. The farmer worth $20,000, would easily bear his $200 of property tax; but now, when, besides his income tax, he pays for every thing prices enhanced by taxation, he must lay these increased charges upon his produce. A property tax would not touch the laborer; but when every article of consumption is enhanced by taxation, he must have an increase of wages for subsistence.—And so the ball rolls on, imposing heavy burdens upon every business, and necessarily increasing the general scale of prices.

Our system of taxation taxes the business community far beyond their ability to bear, and compels them to distribute the burden among their customers: a property tax distributes the burden to each according to his ability. Our present system of taxation concentrates taxes upon business only, leaving the great mass of property exempt: a property tax widens the basis of taxation, making it lighter upon each individual. Then, no one is unduly taxed; no one is oppressed; each person bears a proportion of the general burden allotted according to his ability, and, instead of trying to shift it to some one else, he charges it to profit and loss, as so much lost from his income, to be met by the exercise of economy.

A property tax never enters into business prices: it merely promotes economy. It does not lay its heaviest burden upon active, struggling business men. These bear the light weight imposed upon them, with ease. The property class, who pay the heaviest tax in proportion to income, are so situated that it is impossible for them to set the example of charging heavier prices. They are removed from the business of the country, living upon fixed incomes, ample for their support and the payment of taxes. Taxation will compel them to economize; but the law of supply and demand prevents them from levying their taxes upon others, by raising the dues from which they derive their incomes.

Thus far, the effect of the Property Tax is wholly *negative*. It has only been said that it does not enhance prices; that it levies upon the business community a much lighter tax than our present system; and that it exerts no reactionary influence in enhanced wages and prices.—But it exerts a *positive* influence in *lowering* prices.

(2.) A Property Tax Tends to Lower the Scale of Prices—by diminishing the percentage of Profits.

Two things stimulate the desire to enlarge the per centage of business profits: the high price of investments; and the wish to equalize the profits of business with the returns of speculation.—Business men measure their profits by their property value. They wish to invest them in real estate; in building houses; in establishing manufactures; or in extending their business. When investments are dear, they graduate their profits by the same scale.—So also, when speculation is rife, and yielding immense returns, they aim to raise their scale of prices, so as to equalize their profits with the returns of speculation.

The system of taxation which excuses property, and burdens industry, greatly stimulates this desire to enlarge profits. It diminishes the value of the profits; enhancing the price of real estate, and increasing the cost of all investments: it stimulates speculation in property; making it sought after and increasing its enhancement, through its exemption from taxes.—But a Property Tax diminishes the force of both these causes of inflated profits: it prevents the inflation of property values; and it discourages speculation in real estate. When there is no excited speculation, and investments can be had at reasonable rates, business men will be moderate in their scale of profits; for competition always reduces profits to the lowest rate the expenses of business, the cost of living, and the price of investments, will justify.

But, as the influence of a Property Tax in discouraging speculation and cheapening investments will be noticed at greater length in the next point, it is unnecessary to dwell further upon it, in this connection.

3. A Property Tax will cause *Capital to be Embarked in Productive Industry.*

It is always the tendency of taxation to lower in value the object on which it is laid, and to enhance that which is exempt. A tax upon business is a tax upon energy, placing it at a discount, and offering a premium to idleness. Its tendency is to withdraw capital from business, to be invested in exempted property;—while a property tax encourages industry, by directing capital to it, and compelling men of property to employ their wealth in some remunerative occupation.

There are, at present, millions of dollars invested in wild lands and city lots, by persons who are doing nothing to promote the public welfare. They are withholding their investments from market, upon speculation, in the expectation that the industry and enterprise of others will make their property valuable, at a future day. They are laying the foundation of future wealth, expecting to become princely landowners, and city millionaires.

This class of speculators in real estate, confer no benefit upon the country with their wealth. On the contrary, they inflict upon industry positive injury. They are an incubus upon the common weal. Their wealth, as by an algebraic process, is transferred to the *minus* column of the balance sheet, and is so much to be subtracted from the sum total of our prosperity. They keep eligible city lots vacant, or covered with miserable tenements, abodes of vice and squalor. They monopolize the best lands, along railroads, and adjacent to markets, which they withhold from sale and from culture, waiting for additional enhancement, by the labor of others. Millions of acres of fine lands suited to the growth of our staples are withheld from culture, that their owners may, at a future day, become landed magnates, living like the English nobility, and the New York landed aristocrats, upon the rents of their estates. Already, the great timber forests are all monopolized, and in coming time, our builders must pay a tax to these monopolists, who are getting into their own hands the lumber interests of the country. These speculators are an injury to productive industry, now, by withholding their property from profitable use: they will, in future, injure industry still more, by levying, in their monopoly, and their rents, a most

oppressive tax upon industry; thus enhancing the general scale of prices, for their benefit, at the expense of the rest of community, and to the injury of the national prosperity.

A system of taxation which levies the public revenues upon industry, offers a premium to this speculation in real estate. It encourages the withdrawal of capital from productive enterprise, to be sunk in this kind of property. The iron merchant, the master mechanic, the manufacturer, instead of investing their profits in increasing their business, are encouraged to place them on a speculation in untaxed and unproductive property. We can never have any industrial prosperity, while this tendency continues. Our industry will not grow, but the mania for speculative investments will ingulf all the profits of the country. There has always been too much disposition among us to invest capital in real estate speculation, instead of active productive business; and it is one of the chief reasons why our productive industry has not advanced in ratio with the increase of wealth and population. If our national debt is made to increase this mania for speculation, by the mode in which the government levies taxation, it will inflict upon us the most serious injury.

But it will go far toward lessening the evil of the debt, if taxation is so levied as to counteract this speculative disposition, and direct capital into productive industry. This a property tax will do. It will prevent business men from purchasing property beyond their own needs, and cause them to use their profits in extending their business. And it will compel these speculators in real estate, either to bring their property into productive use, or to sell it to those who will, and invest the proceeds in active business.

A Property Tax will do more to give business a healthy tone than any measure that could be devised. The light burden it imposes would not oppress industry: its conservative influence would give it a vigor never known before. Speculation and exorbitant prices are the weeds—the rank growth of an exuberant soil—which have, throughout our career, overgrown our industry, stunting its growth, and withdrawing from it the capital and enterprise of the country. A Property Tax will uproot these

weeds; it will place a check upon the erratic tendency which has always marred our business prosperity; it will turn Capital away from unproductive speculative investments, and turn it in a full tide into the channel of Productive Industry. A Property Tax will set the owner of vacant city lots, or tumble-down houses, to building, and thus lower rents, and give employment to those extensive branches of industry interested in building enterprise. A Property Tax will force the speculator in lands which he cannot sell, to subject them to culture, increasing our products, and affording active employment to thousands of agricultural laborers. A Property Tax will stimulate the indolent, give employment to the needy, and foster all our industrial interests into quick and healthy growth.

The only valid objection that can be urged against a property tax lies in the manner in which the Constitution of the United States requires it to be adjusted. By constitutional provision, direct taxes are to be assessed upon the states, not in proportion to their wealth, but in proportion to their representation in Congress. This causes a property tax to fall unequally upon the different states. Thus Illinois, with less than half the taxable property of Massachusetts, would pay 40 per cent. more tax: Pennsylvania, with one-third less property, would pay more than double the tax: New Jersey would pay more tax, with less than one-fourth the taxable property.

This objection, however, has no more weight against a property tax, than against our present system of taxation. A tax upon consumption, which is our present system, is really a tax in proportion to population, provided the population of the different states were equally economical. The states that have the largest population now pay the same disproportion of taxes, that the property tax would levy upon them. Indeed, Massachusetts gets off, now, with a smaller proportion of the public burdens, than she would have to bear under a property tax: the tariff is an actual bonus to her manufacturers; her people are so economical, that they do not pay an equal proportion of the taxes levied upon consumption; and the state, resolved to pay as few taxes as possible, has passed the Maine law, to keep her people from paying their proportionate share of the tax upon liquors. The property tax, though bearing too lightly

upon Massachusetts, will yet compel her to bear a much larger part of the public burdens, than she does, at present.

But, really, the property tax is much less unequal than it appears from the examples cited. Massachusetts is exceptional. With a large class of female population, the voting population of the state bears no proportion to its wealth. Elsewhere, the ratio of wealth and population is much more equal. Besides, the unequal distribution of wealth in proportion to population, has sprung from an abnormal condition of industry. Under a just administration of the government, these inequalities would soon disappear, and the constitutional distribution of taxation would become substantially equal over all the states.

This inequality, moreover, might be diminished, by making a discrimination between real estate and personal property. The value of real estate bears a nearly equal ratio to population in all the states, and a property tax, levied on real estate, would bear very equally upon all sections of the country. By levying the property tax upon real estate only, and by imposing special taxes upon personal property,—money, stocks, bonds, etc.,—in the ratio of the tax upon real estate, the public burdens would be equalized, while the principle of the property tax would be maintained throughout our financial system.

The measures already proposed are not sufficient to promote a moderate scale of prices. Manufactures may be established in the West; the tariff may be modified; a system of property taxation may be adopted;—still, while our currency remains inflated and depreciated, the scale of inflated prices will continue. An inflated and depreciated currency will countervail every measure designed to promote a return to moderate prices.

Before our Productive Industry can flourish, our currency must be reduced to the normal standard, and become equal to the value of gold. But the presentation of this measure, the most important of all, requires a separate division.

III. The Excessive Issues of Paper Money must be withdrawn from circulation, and a Specie Currency, or its Equivalent, be Established.

1*st. Necessity of Establishing a Specie Currency.*

The necessity of establishing a Specie Currency, or its Equivalent, will be apparent upon a brief review of our situation.

We will be excused for elaborating this part of the subject; for nothing but the most imperative necessity could warrant the measures, by which, only, in the condition to which Radical legislation has reduced the country, a return to a specie currency is possible. The adoption of the other measures is not difficult; but the establishment of a specie currency, in our present circumstances, is as difficult as it is important.

Without this all-important measure, everything else will prove of no avail.

We are in a position, where nothing but the prompt development of our Productive Industry will save us from the greatest calamities. Our Productive Industry cannot flourish without a decline of prices to a normal standard; and to a decline of prices, the contraction of our inflated currency and the establishment of a specie standard, is absolutely essential.

The establishment of a specie currency is the necessary complement of the other measures proposed. We can neither modify the Tariff, nor establish a property tax, without it. An inflated currency renders a high protective tariff necessary. To remodel the Tariff while the inflation of the currency still kept up the cost of manufacturing, would annihilate our manufacturing industry: and if we maintain a high protective tariff and an inflated currency, it is useless to establish a property tax, as a means of promoting low prices. The three measures must stand or fall together. If we remodel the Tariff, and do away with its features of monopoly, we must have a property tax and a specie currency, in order to lower prices, and cheapen the cost of production; so that our manufactures may be able to compete on equal terms with foreign goods, without protection. The two systems of financial measures are respectively homogeneous: an inflated currency and an injudicious system of

taxation find their complement in a high tariff; a modified tariff necessitates a property tax, and a specie currency.

A Specie Currency is a *sine qua non* to the establishment of the low prices and cheap production, without which we can have no flourishing productive industry. Without it, we may give up the hope of flourishing manufactures; of the continued growth of cotton; and of the cereal export trade. We may give up the hope of prosperity, and make up our minds to sweeping industrial, and financial, ruin. The question is, whether we shall have an inflated currency, high prices—and ruin; or a specie basis, low prices—and unexampled prosperity.

There are several errors on this subject which require notice. It is held that an abundant currency is necessary to our prosperity: *in that* it furnishes needed capital, thereby promoting activity of business, and stimulating enterprise; *in that* it lowers the value of money, and thus benefits the borrowing community at the expense of the owners of moneyed capital; and, *in that* it enables us to bear more easily the burden of the public debt, and pay the onerous taxation of government. Let us notice these errors in detail.

First Error: That an abundant currency is essential to promote activity of trade.

That trade will languish where there is not sufficient capital to carry it on, is not questioned. But it is a grave mistake to suppose that a redundant currency makes the money market easy, and causes business prosperity. It is essential that a country have currency enough to carry on its business. All above that amount is a disadvantage, from its inflation of prices.

We may take the currency of Great Britain, as a fair example of the amount of circulating medium necessary to transact the business of a country, and promote a healthy activity. The traffic of England brings annually into the country more than a hundred million dollars of gold, most of which is loaned again to foreign countries. England, therefore, might increase the specie currency of the country to any extent that were desirable. The present limitation of the amount of currency, is not a matter of necessity, but is the result of their having learned from experience that it is amply sufficient

for the public needs. Great Britain has only a circulating medium of $235,000,000, in specie and paper; and experience proves that amount of currency to be sufficient, to carry on her immense manufactures and her world-wide commerce, and to enable the government to raise $350,000,000 of annual taxation. Her manufactures and commerce are threefold greater than ours; and an equal amount of currency ought to be ample for all the wants of our business. It is probable, however, owing to our greater internal traffic, that $300,000,000 of currency would not inflate prices materially. But that sum would certainly be ample for all our wants.

It is a mistake to suppose that our present currency of $800,000,000 makes the money market easier than it would be with a currency of $300,000,000. We have more than double the money, it is true; but it has more than doubled prices also: at normal prices, $300,000,000 would be as adequate to the business of the country, as our present amount of currency is, now. If $100,000,000 will do a certain amount of business at normal prices, let prices be doubled, and the same amount of business will require $200,000,000 of currency; if prices are trebled, $300,000,000 will be needed—and the money market will be just as stringent, as at first. The money market was never so stringent in the South as when $600,000,000 of depreciated Confederate scrip was afloat. And our money market is more stringent now, with $800,000,000 of currency, than it was in 1860, when we had only a little over $200,000,000.

A certain amount of currency is necessary to transact the business of a country. With that amount of currency, the money market is as easy, as with double or treble the quantity of circulating medium. Any increase of the currency above the necessary amount, has no effect whatever in making the money market easier; it only operates an increase of prices, and injures, to that extent, the business of the country, by increasing the cost of production.

Second Error: That a redundant currency benefits the borrowing community at the expense of the owners of moneyed capital.

This idea is illustrated by the statement, that a money-lending capitalist, who possessed $50,000 when the currency was limited, with our present redundant currency, finds his capital equal only to

$20,000; and it is claimed that the debtor who owes the money is benefited to that extent. It is held that a return to a specie basis will benefit the capitalist, and injure the borrowing, or business class.

This, however, is a very imperfect view of the question. If we view it properly, it will be evident that a continuance of the inflation will operate to the benefit of the class of capitalists, and to the injury of the business class.

It is a fact that, sooner or later, the class of money-lending capitalists acquire the ownership of all the money of a country, just as the merchants become the owners of its goods, and the landholders, of its soil. The larger the amount of currency, the greater the opportunities of the moneyed capitalists to aggregate money in their hands. And the longer the inflation continues, the greater, the more complete the centralization of the moneyed capital of the country in the hands of money-lenders. The inflation did, in the first instance, injure the moneyed class. But it is now increasing that class in numbers and wealth, year by year. And if it continues many years longer, the centralization of moneyed wealth in the hands of capitalists will have reached a pass, at which a return to a normal currency standard will be impossible, without wide-spread ruin.

It is easy to say that we should keep up the expansion, until persons in debt can pay off their indebtedness. But in "flush times" the indebtedness of a community never is paid off. Some individuals may be liquidating their debts; but others are contracting new obligations. Capitalists never fail of finding borrowers. The willingness to borrow is always greater than the ability to lend.

We must return to a specie basis at some time. Inflation cannot continue forever. Why then defer it? The money-lender must at last receive gold, or its equivalent, for the sums he loans. It is better to close the account promptly, than to wait until, with thrice the capital to operate upon, that class shall have been able to mortgage the business of the country tenfold deeper than now.

A specie basis once established, the condition of the enterprising business man will be greatly better than at present. Nearly three times the capital is needed, now, to conduct business, that will then be necessary. Ten thousand dollars will establish a business, for

which twenty-five thousand is now required. The saving of interest will alone amount to a handsome profit.

The fallacious expectation of benefiting the business community and injuring moneyed capitalists, by prolonging the inflation, should not be suffered, for a moment, to prevent a return to a specie basis.

Third Error: That a continuance of the inflation is desirable, because it will enable us the better to bear the burden of the public debt.

That the public debt ought to be paid in the currency of the country, is unquestionable, whether that currency be specie or paper. But the question now before us is, whether it is advisable to maintain the inflation of the currency, for the purpose of paying off the debt in a depreciated medium. A few facts afford sufficient answer.

The inflation of the currency, through the increase of prices, is enhancing the cost of production in every department of industry, and is placing us at the greatest disadvantage in competition with foreign enterprise. The increased cost of production will require immense tariff duties, to protect our manufactures from foreign competition. Will paying exorbitant prices for all manufactured goods enable us to pay our taxes more easily?—The increased cost of production will soon drive our cotton from the foreign market; and it will stop our export of breadstuffs in competition with foreign products. Will the loss of our exports enable us the better to bear the burden of the national debt?—The falling off of exports will require increased shipment of bonds to meet the enlarged balance of trade against us. Will the exportation of our debt make the burden lighter?—And finally, this inflation of the currency—when it shall have shut out all our productions from foreign markets, and caused the exportation of all our bonds—will put a stop to imports, break down our commerce, annihilate our shipping, depopulate our seaports, and disorganize our entire system of industry. Then, how will we bear the burden of the public debt? It will be in foreign hands, and we will be equally unable to pay, or to repudiate.

The public debt is not all we have to consider. We have great industrial interests to promote. We must not sacrifice our industry.

That must be our first consideration. If the inflation of the currency were not so ruinous to our productive industry, it *would* be desirable to maintain it, for the purpose of eradicating our debt more easily. An inflated currency is good for the Debt, but it is bad for Industry. So arsenic is good for a cancer; but a physician will not apply it, when it will destroy the patient's life. We ought not to employ a nostrum for our Debt which will infallibly destroy our Prosperity.

Let us develop our prosperity, and the debt will be extinguished, without especial care. We have a diseased body politic, and an indolent ulcer. Treat the sore especially, and the diseased body will perish: build up the general health, and the ulcer will get well of itself.

Every objection that can be urged against the establishment of a specie currency is futile.

If we consider its necessity in order to a return to a moderate standard of prices, this alone is sufficient to overbear every objection. Establish a specie currency in connection with the other proposed measures, and, with low prices, we shall have cheap production. Then our cotton industry will flourish; our agricultural products will keep possession of the foreign markets; and our manufactures will no longer need the monopoly of exorbitant duties, to enable them to maintain themselves against foreign competition.

But—besides its influence in establishing cheap production, and thus developing our productive industry in every department, both agricultural, and manufacturing—there are other advantages of a specie basis too important to be omitted.

It will prevent the periodical recurrence of financial panics, which are always incident to inflations and contractions of an artificial paper medium. A specie currency has no inflations and contractions. Prices are fixed; the amount of circulation necessary to transact its business is retained in the country by the laws of supply and demand; the surplus, only, being exported. Countries which maintain a specie currency have no financial panics, no crises which unexpectedly ruin thousands. France has a specie currency; and during the first sixty years of our century, amid repeated wars

and political convulsions, France has not had a single financial panic. During the same period, the United States, lapped in peace and blessed with unrivaled resources, but cursed with an inflated paper currency, has been swept by five great panics, which overturned thousands of fortunes. In England, the currency is composed in part of paper money, but it is carefully kept within prescribed limits. There is sometimes an excessive exportation of the precious metals, incident to speculation, which would, if not checked, lead to a general crash. But, on such occasions, the Bank of England arrests the speculative tendency by contraction—a few firms break—and in a few weeks, business has resumed its wonted tone. In consequence of this careful regulation, business has a stability in England, unknown in this country. Business descends from father to son, for generations. But in the United States, under the paper system, ninety-seven out of every hundred merchants become bankrupt at least once during their lives, in some of the periods of alternate speculation and panic incident to inflations and contractions of the circulating medium.

But the establishment of a specie currency is especially essential in the crisis of our competition with England. It will require the use at home of the specie products of our mines, for several years.—Checking the exportation of specie will diminish our importation of foreign goods to that amount, and thus afford a much more efficient protection to our manufactures than a tariff can do.—Furthermore, the cessation of the export of coin will have a most important influence upon our competition with England, by depriving our rival of the means of stimulating the production of cotton in foreign fields. This point will be presented at greater length, in another connection.

In every point of view, the establishment of a specie currency is absolutely essential to our successful competition with England.

2d. Measures Essential to the Establishment of a Specie Currency.

The establishment of a specie currency must, of course, be gradual, that the business of the country may accommodate itself to the new scale of prices, without any revulsion. With judicious man-

agement, it may be effected without any business crisis; being attended only with a gradual and steady decline of prices to the normal standard.

There would be no difficulty in effecting a *contraction* of the currency, if this were all we proposed to accomplish. Gradually withdraw the "greenbacks" from circulation, and we will have $300,000,000 of National Bank notes. If we are to have a paper currency controlled by Banks, nothing further will be necessary. But our present banking system, with its reserves of currency and system of double redemption, is a cumbersome arrangement: it is also objectionable, from its incidents of breaking banks, attended with fluctuations of the currency and of public credit: furthermore, it is open to the very serious objection of requiring a bonus from the government of $18,000,000 of annual interest upon the bonds which secure the bank circulation. The whole arrangement may be very much simplified, by withdrawing the present bank notes, and issuing to the Banks "greenbacks," instead, which shall be received by the Banks in payment of the bonds they have now on deposit with the government as security for their present circulation.

This arrangement will obviate many of the objectionable features of the present system: it will liquidate $300,000,000 of the public debt, and save the country $18,000,000 of annual interest: it will simplify the Banking arrangements, obviating the necessity of their keeping a reserve in their vaults: it will give an uniform currency secure from fluctuation, based, not on the solvency of an individual bank, but upon the credit of the government.

If we are to have a paper currency, based, not on specie, but on government credit only, no better arrangement can be effected. And it is possible that this arrangement may be preferred, as it will allow us to dispense with a specie currency, and suffer the continued exportation of gold in the future, as in the past.

But the plan is liable to very serious objections.

(1.) It is unconstitutional,—in continuing the connection of the government with banking institutions, which have a monopoly of the capital of the country, and are sustained by government patronage.

(2.) It leaves the currency entirely at the control of the banks,

which may at any time contract their issues and cause a stringency in the money market, for the purpose of exacting a higher rate of interest.

(3.) It involves necessarily an inflation of the currency.—The payment of interest will compel the government to demand the payment of a part of the taxes in gold: at least $150,000,000 of specie must be held in the country for this purpose; so that, when the bank issues amounted to three hundred millions, the entire circulating medium would be four hundred and fifty millions,—an inflation of fifty per cent.

(4.) It necessarily involves a depreciation of the paper currency.—Its inflation alone would cause considerable depreciation; and the tendency would be increased by the continual traffic in gold, which the specie taxes would involve. Gold dealers would speculate upon the public necessity. Tax payers would be under the necessity of having gold for taxes, and gold speculators would compel them to pay a large premium. This speculation in gold would keep the currency depreciated almost to its present standard.

These objections are fatal to the plan. The inflation and depreciation of the currency would maintain prices at so high a standard as to continue the depression of our industry; and the fluctuations incident to bank contraction and expansion would be ruinous to productive enterprise.—The same objections obtain against any currency system which involves a mixed paper and specie circulation, and which leaves the control of the paper currency to banking corporations.

A contraction of the currency is not sufficient. We must have a specie currency, or its equivalent.

Difficulties many, and almost insuperable, environ every currency system that can be devised for a country in the financial, and industrial condition of the United States. The author has given the subject the patient and dispassionate thought its importance demands: several plans have suggested themselves to his mind; one or two of the more promising have been elaborated in detail, and afterward discarded, on account of grave objections. As the result of much thought, he presents a plan, the best he has been able to devise;—

a plan certainly open to fewer objections than any other;—and, as he believes, the only plan which, under existing circumstances, will enable us to return to a specie basis, and maintain a safe currency, free from fluctuations, both in quantity and value. If some objections may be urged against it, the ground of objection arises from the difficulties of our financial and industrial condition, which render the return to, and maintenance of a specie basis almost impossible. No other plan will meet these difficulties so effectually; none presents so few objectionable features.

It is proper to remark here, that, for the difficulties which render necessary the measures now suggested, Radicalism is responsible; and Radicalism, not Conservatism, is responsible for, and taxable with the decisive measures its policy necessitates. Were our body politic in a healthy state, ordinary means would suffice; but in our present diseased condition, sharp remedies are needed, to avert impending ruin, and restore us to a healthy condition. If our financial condition were sound, no interposition of the Federal government would be needed. But in our present condition,—a condition Radicalism has brought about, and for which it is responsible,—the interposition of the government is absolutely essential. To pierce a healthy man with a knife is felony; but the surgeon's knife, which eradicates the fruits of disease, is guided by benevolence: so the action of government which would be indefensible in a sound financial condition, is right, is imperative, in our present dangerous state.

Let us in the first instance, dispassionately consider some of the obstacles to our return to, and maintenance of a specie basis.

The obstacles in the way of the establishment and maintenance of a specie basis may be classed under two general heads: the continual drain of specie, in payment of interest on the foreign debt, and in liquidation of the adverse balance of trade; and the existence of the national banks.

The drain of specie constitutes the chief obstacle to a return to a specie basis. We have only a little over one hundred millions of specie in the country, and it does not accumulate. The annual product of our mines is estimated at about seventy-five million dollars;

which leaves the country, in payment of foreign interest, and in settlement of the commercial balance against us, as fast as it is obtained from the mines. We have a foreign* debt of $1,400,000,000, requiring 84 million dollars in gold, to meet the interest; and we have an annual balance of trade against us, of $100,000,000, which has to be settled.—Now the question stares us in the face, How can we, with $100,000,000 of gold in the country, and an annual product of $75,000,000, establish a specie currency of $300,000,000, when there is an annual drain upon us of $184,000,000, for foreign interest and an adverse balance of trade? How is our stock of specie to be increased, when the drain for exportation is twice as great as our annual production? We may cut down the adverse balance of trade, by limiting our imports to the amount of our exports: still, there is the $84,000,000 of foreign interest, to be paid in specie,—$9,000,000 more than the annual product of our mines. How, with this drain for specie interest, is our stock of specie to increase?

This is the stubborn problem that must be met—and solved. What is the solution? Shall we give up the hope of a specie currency, until we can increase our exports to such an extent as to pay for our imports, and have a balance left sufficient to meet our foreign interest? This will not answer; for we cannot increase our exports until we establish a specie currency; on the contrary, they are declining, and will continue to decline, year by year. We must establish a specie currency, before we can increase our exports. We must establish it in the face of the deficit. How can we do it? How can we increase our stock of specie, with an annual supply of only $75,000,000, and an annual drain of $184,000,000? There is but one way. We must put a stop to the drain of gold, both the drain to meet the adverse balance of trade, and the drain to pay foreign interest. In other words, we must put a stop to the exportation of specie from the country.

This is the all-important point,—the object to which we must aim. By what means can we best accomplish it?

The gold exportation proceeds through two channels: the pay-

---

*See page 590–3.

ment of foreign interest, by the Federal government, states, municipalities, and corporations; and the remittances of specie by merchants, in payment of foreign goods. How shall these channels of exportation be closed? How prevent the drain of specie in payment of interest? Shall we refuse to pay our interest in specie? No; the public faith must be kept inviolate.—How shall we prevent our merchants from buying gold and shipping it, in payment of goods? They will buy and export, as long as they can find it in the market. When it comes into their hands as currency, they will certainly ship it abroad. How prevent it? By an export duty? That is unconstitutional. By a direct prohibition? That would be nugatory—it could not be enforced.

We thus perceive some of the difficulties of our position. We can have no prosperity without a specie basis: we cannot have a specie basis without increasing our stock of specie: we cannot increase our stock of specie without stopping the export of gold. We must stop the export of gold; and we must stop it, without violating public faith, without breaking over the limits of constitutional power, without arresting industry or injuring the general prosperity.

This is the difficult problem we have before us.

The second obstacle hardly presents fewer difficulties.—The National Banks are in existence, with charters to run for sixteen years. It is held that the public faith is pledged to them, and that we cannot honorably crush them out of existence before their time, by unfriendly legislation. And their continued existence, it is maintained, is irreconcilable with a specie currency.

The advocates of the banks furthermore uphold them, on the ground of expediency. They say that a specie currency is too cumbersome to meet the wants of a commercial community; that its use is attended with a considerable waste of the metal; and that, worst of all, a mere specie currency, left without control, will be subject to ceaseless fluctuations in quantity, from alternate ebbs and flows of exportation. They maintain that the only method of obviating these disadvantages is, to retain the banks, and gradually place them upon a specie basis; when they will afford to commerce a convenient and unwasting currency; and maintain an oversight

of the currency, preventing by judicious contractions any excessive export of the precious metals.

There is much justice in this view of the question. The banks, as chartered, are organized upon a false principle, having debt not capital, poverty not wealth, as the basis of their circulation; and, like all institutions hitherto established upon the same basis, they must, sooner or later, come down with a crash, unless they are placed upon a different foundation. The French Mississippi scheme, the crash of our free banks in 1857, and in 1861, show the radical unsoundness of a banking system, where currency is secured by bonds. Still, it would be a violation of public faith to crush the banks by hostile legislation: no currency system can be established, which does not recognize these banks, and permit their continued existence; but a judicious currency system will remove them from their present condition of precarious and unconstitutional dependence upon the government, and place them upon a stable and independent foundation. These must be essential conditions in any currency system that is proposed.

There is much force, also, in the objections urged to a metallic circulation. It *is* too cumbersome for business purposes, and the wear of the metal *is* a serious consideration.—But the most serious objection to a metallic currency is, that gold, while floating in circulation, will continue to be exported. In the first place, if we keep our specie in circulation, it will be exported so rapidly by merchants, that we will never have enough to suffice for the currency needs of the country. Besides, if we once had enough—it would be exported, until the contraction of the currency and hard times checked trade and exportation together—it would then accumulate, until the abundance of money stimulated trade into activity, and renewed exportation—this would again cause contraction and panic, which would check exportation—and so on in endless succession. A metallic currency could never be controlled and regulated, from the fact that it would be impossible, at any time, to know how much of it there was in the country. The first indication of redundancy would be excited traffic and exportation; the first indication of scarcity, panic, and a financial crash.

It has always been found necessary to have some central financial

head, to regulate the amount of coin, and the extent of circulation. European countries vest this power in a great mammoth bank. We must not deposit the power in such an institution: for it is unconstitutional; and our past experience proves that a bank is a very unsafe regulator. In periods of undue business excitement, even a mammoth bank is more apt to be carried away with the prevailing intoxication, than to check it by contraction: it is utterly impossible for a multitude of mutually independent banks, such as ours, to regulate the specie circulation. In our government, the treasury department is the only place in which to lodge the control of the currency. Lodged even there, it must be so arranged as to leave nothing discretionary with the official; the whole system must be regulated by law.

But, as we have seen, it is impossible to regulate a metallic currency, from the impossibility of knowing its amount at any given time. Our circulation must be of such a character as that the Secretary of the Treasury can know its amount at any moment, and be able to keep it, invariably, at an equable standard.

The foregoing observations enable us to outline, very clearly, the currency system we need. To recapitulate:—

The prime essential is a plan which will stop the further exportation of specie;—but which will pay the interest of the public debt in gold; which will not necessitate the destruction of existing banks; which will give us a paper currency, upon a specie basis,—a currency representing specie, and equivalent to it, dollar for dollar, and convertible into specie, at all times, and in any quantity,—a currency which can be easily regulated by the treasury department, and kept, without fluctuation, at an equable standard.

From this analysis we are able to sketch the outline of the currency system we need.

First. We want a paper currency; because a metallic currency is cumbrous, wasteful, and impossible of regulation.

Second. But this paper currency must be the full equivalent of specie, based upon coin, dollar for dollar.

Third. The specie securing the currency must be on deposit in the treasury of the United States, and the paper currency must be

issued by the treasury department; this being the only method, by which the Secretary of the Treasury can know its amount, and be able to regulate it.

Fourth. As the paper currency is issued by the government for the public benefit, it is but just that the public shall furnish the specie upon which it is based. The specie on deposit in the Treasury ought, therefore, to consist of individual deposits; and the paper circulation ought to consist of "certificates of deposit," bearing no interest, but convertible into coin at every branch of the treasury.

Now, it is evident, that the only plan which will accomplish these ends is one that will cause all the specie in the country to be deposited in the Treasury of the United States, in exchange for "certificates of deposit."

The question that remains to be solved is, What is the best means of inducing the general deposit of specie, in exchange for certificates of deposit? If the community, convinced of its expediency, would do it of its own accord, no governmental action would be needed. But the general community is indifferent to such things; and the gold speculators who monopolize our specie, will be opposed to a system that will destroy their business and put a stop to their gains. It will be necessary for the government to take such action, as will necessitate the withdrawal of specie from circulation, and its deposit in the treasury.

To this end, it will be necessary to adopt the following measures:

(1.) A prohibitory stamp tax of, we will say, 20 per cent., to be levied upon every business transaction in which specie is paid for any species of property whatever—whether the transaction be between citizens of the United States—or between citizens and temporary sojourners in the country—or between citizens or temporary sojourners and foreigners resident abroad: And every transmission of specie (except to some branch of the public treasury), to be sufficient evidence of such transaction, made or intended, and the tax to be paid upon the transmission, under penalty of forfeiture upon any attempt to evade the law.—The only exception to this law should be in favor of the residents of gold-producing states and territories,

who should have the right to conduct their internal traffic with a gold currency, but not their traffic with the people of any other state or country; and the transmission of specie from such state or territory should be sufficient evidence of such a transaction made or intended,—the tax to be payable upon such transmission.

(2.) Branches of the treasury to be established at important points in the different states, and one at least in every gold-producing state or territory; at all which, specie is to be received and certificates of deposit given in exchange, and gold paid out for certificates, upon demand.

(3.) This tax to continue until $300,000,000 of specie deposits are in the treasury; then the Secretary of the Treasury to give notice of the fact, and announce that the tax upon specie payments and specie transmission is suspended; but whenever the amount of deposits in the treasury shall be less than $300,000,000, the tax to be re-established by proclamation, until the deposits are raised to the standard.—It will be seen from this, that it is proposed that the plan shall be the permanent currency system of the country. When we once have the system established, and the requisite amount of "certificates," in circulation, the tax will be put in force only when the exportation of specie is diminishing the quantity in the country below the standard; and it may be so reduced as not to arrest the exportation altogether, but only to discourage it until the specie in the treasury is increased to the normal standard. In this way, the currency might be regulated with precision. The instant the exportation of specie became excessive, it would cause the imposition of the tax, to check it; the moment the check was sufficient, the tax would be withdrawn.

Once on foot, the currency system would be the most perfect that can be devised.

But other measures will be necessary, to enable us to effect the change from our present currency system: our inflated currency must be contracted; the attitude of the banks must be modified; the payment of our interest must be provided for.

The entire system of financial measures proposed, may be presented in the following order:—

First: The deposit system, as already presented, to be established.

Second: The present "greenback" circulation to be withdrawn in exchange for bonds, at the rate of, we will say, $50,000,000 every three months, so that the whole will be retired at the expiration of two years.

Third: The present circulation of the banks to be gradually withdrawn, as the certificates of deposits increase, the bonds now on deposit by the banks being returned to them; until, when the "certificates of deposit" shall be sufficient in quantity for the currency wants of the country, the present bank notes will all be withdrawn.

Fourth: The present banks either to wind up, or to strengthen themselves with "certificates of deposit" as their notes are retired, at their option.

Fifth: As many banks may be established as the public may choose;—but under the following limitations. (1.) All charters, hereafter, to be granted by the state legislatures. (2.) All banks must bank upon "certificates of deposit" only; the banks incurring no responsibility for their redemption, they being convertible into specie at any branch of the treasury;—and any bank issuing any other currency than certificates of deposit, to be taxed out of existence. (3.) No bank to withhold from circulation more than one-twentieth of its capital stock, at any time, under penalty of a tax of fifty per cent. upon such suppressed capital. This is necessary to prevent a combination among the banks, to withdraw money from circulation, for the purpose of creating a stringency in the money market, that they may obtain a higher rate of interest.—Under these regulations, banks could do no harm. They could neither inflate nor contract the currency. They would be merely co-partnerships of capitalists combining their funds for banking purposes. They might exist in any number, and with great advantage to business, without affecting the currency in the slightest degree. Indeed, under this system, banks might advantageously multiply, until all the loaning capital of the country were through them rendered accessible to the business community.

Sixth: It only remains to make provision for the interest of the public debt.

In a few years, gold will have accumulated in the country in sufficient quantities to suffice for the wants of currency; when the annual product can be exported. Furthermore, a wise system of administration will soon re-establish our industry, and vastly increase our exports. Then, our increased exports and our shipments of specie will enable us to meet the interest of the debt, without any special care. But at present, when our exports are less than our imports, and we can spare no specie from the country, the payment of our interest requires special attention.—Until we have gold enough for our currency, we must adopt two regulations:

(1.) That no gold interest shall be paid to any public creditor, except at the federal treasury. Then the gold cannot be shipped from the country, either by the native or the foreign holder of bonds. They can keep the gold if they choose; but they cannot ship it abroad, nor buy anything with it, without paying a tax of twenty per cent. Under the circumstances, both classes of public creditors will prefer to re-deposit their gold in the treasury, receiving in exchange "certificates of deposit," which they can use. The foreign bondholder will purchase with these certificates American produce, which will give him his interest in gold, when sold in the foreign market: the native bondholder can use his certificates in all the business transactions of the country.—Neither of these classes has any right to complain of this regulation. The government exercises no discrimination against them. The same principle applies to them that applies to every holder of specie in the country. The California or Idaho merchant who has gold, when he wishes to make any purchase, is compelled by the operation of the law to deposit his gold in the treasury, and receive "certificates of deposit," with which to conduct his operations: the Western gold dealer finds his gold of less value than "certificates," and is under the necessity of depositing it, and receiving "certificates" in exchange. The bondholder deposits his specie interest, just as other holders of specie do, because it cannot be used in circulation, except at a ruinous sacrifice. He has no right to demand that the government shall make a special exception in his favor. Moreover, all parties

aggrieved by the operation of the law must remember that its effects are only temporary. In three or four years, we shall have specie enough for our own wants, when the annual surplus product will be used and exported, as at present. Then, all depositors who wish, can draw their gold from the treasury, and use it. But no one will then wish to do so; for the "certificates" will be equally valuable as gold.

(2.) It will be necessary, at first, to require that a certain portion of the taxes,—enough to meet the gold interest,—shall be paid in "certificates." The reason for this is obvious: the gold deposited in the treasury belongs, not to the government, but to the holders of the "certificates." The man who holds a certificate is the owner of that amount of gold in the treasury. This gold is a sacred deposit, which the government has no right to use for its own purposes. But every dollar of certificates paid in for taxes gives the government ownership of a dollar of deposited gold. It must, therefore, require a sufficient proportion of the taxes to be paid in "certificates," to give it gold enough to meet the annual interest. This discrimination, however, need only last a couple of years; for, after that, the certificates will constitute a great part of the currency—and eventually, the whole currency will consist of certificates and gold: then, of course, enough certificates to meet the interest would come in by taxation, without any special requirement.

Such is the series of measures proposed. They will bring prices to their normal standard in two years; establish a specie currency, or its equivalent, in four years; and maintain, ever after, a self-regulating currency, subject to no fluctuations in quantity or value,—a currency, the equivalent of specie, and which may be kept, without difficulty, at any standard in respect of quantity, the business wants of the country may be found to require. The standard amount may be gradually raised as the expanding business of the country may demand; and if, at any time, inflated prices proved that the standard was too high, it might be lowered at once, until the contraction of the currency reduced prices to the proper standard.

Once established, it is unquestionably the best currency system that has ever been devised. It comprises all the best features of the English system, without its faults. It is essentially a specie

currency, freed from its objectionable features. It unites the stability of a specie basis, with the advantages of an unlimited banking system.

If any are disposed to object to the tax on specie transactions, which is the currency regulator proposed, we ask, what other regulator can be adopted? The usual method of keeping specie in a country is, to enhance its value: thus, the Bank of England, when it wishes to stop an excessive exportation of specie, raises the rate of interest, and makes specie so valuable as to prevent its leaving the country. But this system will not answer with us: Specie is already too valuable; yet high as the premium is, it does not prevent its exportation. We therefore propose to act on the opposite principle, and, by making specie of less practical value than "certificates," cause it to be exchanged for them and shut up in the treasury, where it is free from danger of shipment. This is, unquestionably, the true principle of regulating the supply of specie: it injures no branch of enterprise; whereas the mode of regulating it by raising the rate of interest, imposes a serious burden upon the business community. It is true that the measure does injure those who are speculating upon the exorbitant value of gold in proportion to our present paper currency. But it injures no one else: it does not affect the business community; and however we may sympathize with the anguish of the gold dealers, whose business will be destroyed, we cannot be expected to sacrifice the entire business interests of the country to the continuance of their speculative traffic.

But it may be urged that these measures will impair the public credit; and, by causing a reshipment of bonds to this country, bring on a financial crisis. This is impossible: the foreign bonds could not be thrown upon our market; for the operation of the law forbidding specie payment in business transactions, would prevent any American capitalist from purchasing them. Moreover, the foreign bondholder would have no desire to reship the bonds: the proposed plan of finance will tend to maintain the public credit, not to destroy it: it will enhance the value of our bonds in the foreign market. It is the constant exportation of bonds, to meet commercial balances, and payments of interest, that is ruinous to the public credit. This cause has already depressed our bonds fifteen per cent. lower than

British consols, though our interest is double. How long will our credit last, when it becomes evident that our exports are not sufficient to meet our extravagant expenditure, and the interest of our debt; and that, like an embarrassed spendthrift, we are constantly hawking our bonds in the market, as the only means of meeting the annual deficit? But let it be known that no more bonds are to be exported; that, during the next four years, the bondholder will receive his interest in gold, which he can either place on deposit in this country, or invest in commodities for export, at his option; and that, thereafter, he can ship his gold interest abroad annually, as it is received,—and our bonds now abroad will rise rapidly in value. It must be remembered that the measures proposed will restore cheap production: the foreign bondholder would find it as advantageous to invest his interest in cheap American products for exportation, as to export it in specie: commercial arrangements might readily be made, which would enable the foreign bondholder to realize his interest as readily, as if he shipped the gold from this country.

No solid objection can be urged against the plan. But if there were many, they must die away in view of the fact, that it is the only possible method by which, without violating the public faith, we can return to a specie basis, and resume our prosperity.

IV. Remission of Taxes.

The adoption of the measures already proposed will prove of decided advantage to our productive industry. With a specie currency, a tariff policy constructed on the principle of free trade, and a property tax,—our productive industry would outrival in cheapness that of all other countries. Our entire productive industry would be equally benefited by these measures. Every department of agriculture and manufactures would be benefited as much as the growth and manufacture of cotton.

But the circumstances of our condition require that we should direct the enterprise of the country especially toward the cotton interest. In this only have we such advantages as give us a decided advantage over British competition; moreover, its firm establishment will foster all other branches of our industry. Our cotton industry possesses advantages, under favorable conditions, over any

other branch of native enterprise, and might in the end, even without special advantages, take the lead of all others. But our position is too critical to admit of dilatory proceedings. It is important that we obtain a speedy and decisive ascendancy over the cotton manufactures of Great Britain. To this end, *we must give peculiar advantages to our cotton interest, which will make it the most profitable investment of capital, and turn into it, especially, the energies and capital of the country.*

The most legitimate means of advancing the cotton interest, as well as the most efficacious, is the adjusting of taxation so as to favor it. We should exempt from the property tax all lands cultivated in cotton, and all cotton factories.

This exemption would give to capital invested in these branches of industry from five to ten per cent. greater profits than any other business would yield. This would be sufficient, other things equal, to concentrate capital upon them, and enlarge them at once into the magnificent proportions the crisis demands.

The measures already mentioned leave nothing more to be desired as respects cheapness of production. With a specie currency, cheap imports, a property tax, and the exemption of cotton production and manufacturing from taxation, our cotton industry would, in equal competition, be able to surpass in cheapness the factories of any other country.

CHAPTER III.

MEASURES NECESSARY TO PREVENT GREAT BRITAIN FROM DESTROYING OUR COTTON INDUSTRY AND TO CRIPPLE HER COMPETITION.

We have just remarked, that the measures already proposed will enable our cotton industry to surpass in cheapness of production all other countries. But it is not enough to promote cheapness of

production. That, under ordinary circumstances, would be sufficient to our success, in competition with Great Britain. But in this case, the regular laws of industry do not obtain. We must take measures to counter a war waged against our cotton industry by Great Britain, with all the power of her immense accumulated capital.

British manufacturers and British capitalists will enter into a competition with our cotton manufactures, and endeavor to break them down, at whatever sacrifice. British manufacturers are not afraid of our iron, and woolen, and flax manufactures. These they can compete with, on somewhat equal terms; and they would not sell goods at a sacrifice, to break them down. But our cotton manufactures would threaten the entire fabric of British commercial supremacy. So unparalleled are our natural advantages for this business, that, once firmly established, our factories would distance their competition; and the business is of such transcendent importance, that its loss would subvert the foundation of British grandeur. A combination, backed by all the power of the accumulated capital of Great Britain, would attempt the overthrow of our infant enterprise, at whatever pecuniary sacrifice. They would flood our country with cotton goods, and sell them, if necessary, at a dead loss, and think it an excellent investment of capital, if they thereby crushed our manufactures, and gave themselves time to develop fully the industrial resources of the new fields they are raising up in competition with us. We must expect the expenditure of British capital poured forth in lavish streams, for the purpose of breaking down our cotton manufactures.

We must accept the gage of contest. We must fight England with her own weapons, and secure the victory in our industrial contest, by adopting vigorous financial and trade regulations. We must adopt measures, that will not only prevent her from crushing our industry, but which will take the offensive, and effectually destroy her power to compete with us.

The measures necessary to protect our own interests against British centralization of commerce, will operate directly to overthrow that centralization. As we enabled England to attain her centralization, so we now enable her to maintain it. It is upheld by the resources of the United States, which our position as the com-

mercial satellite of England permits her to subsidize. While we remain her satellite, her supremacy cannot be shaken. We break it down by taking our proper position in the commercial world. Great Britain will use every effort to keep our industry in a condition that will enable her to continue to subsidize our resources. The measures necessary to thwart those attempts, will necessarily tend to cripple the competition of England.

Sect. 1.—Financial Measures Necessary for Self-Protection.

Our chief point of weakness in a competition with England is our national debt. This injures us, both in a financial, and an industrial point of view.—(1.) The country has to pay $140,000,000 of annual interest; of which $100,000,000 is payable in specie, the greater part due on bonds owned by foreigners. This specie interest, under our present system, keeps the country drained of gold, and inflicts upon us a high tariff of specie duties.—(2.) Furthermore, our bonds are annually exported in large quantities, to pay for imports in excess of our exports; flooding the country with foreign importations, to the injury of domestic industry; and increasing our foreign debt, to an extent that will soon result in bankruptcy.

While this state of things is suffered to continue, it will effectually prevent any successful competition with England. The exportation of gold, as we have seen, prevents a return to a specie basis, and burdens the country with a high tariff; and the exportation of bonds is threatening bankruptcy, and flooding the country with foreign goods, notwithstanding the tariff. It is of the last importance to stop the exportation both of specie and bonds.

I. The Exportation of Specie must be Stopped.

The necessity of arresting the specie exportation, in order to bring about a specie basis, a reduction of prices, and cheap production, has already been discussed. As an additional proof of the imperative necessity of the currency measures suggested in the last chapter, we, in this connection, propose to show, further, the necessity of arresting the exportation of specie, as a means of protecting our industry against British competition.

1*st.* *The Exportation of Specie Assisting to Glut our Market with Foreign Goods, to the Injury of Domestic Manufactures.*

It is of the utmost importance, while we are endeavoring to foster home manufactures, to protect them against a glut of the market with foreign goods. A tariff, even as high as ours, cannot effect this. It can only be effected by means of the balance of trade. If we cut off excessive importations of foreign goods by means of the balance of trade, we afford our infant manufactures the most efficient protection, without inflating prices by a high tariff.

By stopping the exportation of specie and bonds, we accomplish this object, effectually. Our exportation of specie and bonds, in payment of interest and an adverse trade balance, amounts to an annual sum of $200,000,000. This gluts our markets with $200,000,000 of foreign goods, a great portion of which would be cut off by stopping the export of specie and bonds. The exclusion of these goods would give our manufactures the best encouragement to expansion,—brisk sales, at moderate profits.

At present we pay our interest with gold. This leaves all our exports to be exchanged for imports; and we take, besides, such additional quantities of foreign goods as we can pay for in bonds. Our imports, therefore, may now exceed our exports of produce by any quantity, provided we can pay for the excess in bonds. By prohibiting the export of bonds, we limit our imports to the amount of our exported produce: by prohibiting furthermore, the exportation of specie, we cause the foreign bondholder to invest his interest in our produce and export it in that form; and our importations will be less than our exports, by the amount of our foreign interest.—It will appear as we proceed, that our foreign debt is now more than $1,400,000,000, requiring $84,000,000 for the payment of interest. Therefore, by prohibiting the exportation of specie, we limit our importations to an amount less by $84,000,000 than our exports.

This limitation of our imports would have a double advantage: it would prevent a glut of foreign goods in our market; and it would increase the amount of our exported produce. For Britain would be unwilling to lose our market to so great an extent; and if British capitalists could not obtain payment for their goods in specie and

bonds, they would receive in exchange larger quantities of American produce. The amount of our commerce would probably be as great as at present; with the difference, however, of an increase of exports, and a decrease of imports.

It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the benefits this would confer, both upon our manufactures, and our agricultural production.

2d. The Exportation of Specie Strengthening England for Competition with our Cotton Industry.

In the emergency of our competition with her cotton manufactures, it is especially important to cut off her specie supply from England. The supply of gold Great Britain obtains from us, is absolutely essential to her cotton manufactures. All her new fields of cotton production require a large specie balance for their staple. England is endeavoring to bring them up to the industrial standpoint, at which they will take enough of her manufactures,—agricultural implements, hardware, and manufactured fabrics,—to pay for their exports. If their imports continue to grow in the ratio of the past few years, the object will be attained. But they now require over one hundred million of dollars of specie, annually. If the supply of specie is cut off from England, their production will at once decline, and British competition with us, in the cotton manufacture, will become impossible.

The chief supply of British gold is derived from the United States. From 1821 to 1861, inclusive, we exported 718 million dollars of specie; 431 millions being exported since 1849. From 1848 to 1865, the products of our mines amounted to over $600,000,000, all of which has now been exported; besides a considerable part of the production of the last two years. The balance of trade has always been against us, and we regularly exported, for the benefit of England, the specie products of our mines, contenting ourselves with a paper medium.

It is this American specie which has enabled England to stimulate the production of cotton so vastly, within the last five years. She has lavished specie, chiefly obtained from us, to stimulate an industry designed to break down our prosperity; plucking a plume from the eagle's wing to feather the arrow for its destruction.

India especially demands large remittances of specie, in payment for cotton. That country has always been the vortex, in which the specie of the world has been engulfed. Ever since the discovery of America, the specie obtained from the American mines has been poured in a full tide upon India. The mines of Mexico, alone, have given to commerce nearly three thousand million dollars. The silver of Mexico, of Peru, has all been engulfed in the East. The Hindoos consume all the specie they obtain, in jewelry worn on the person. Thirty years ago, the troubles in Mexico and the Spanish South American States interrupted the working of the mines, and the supply of specie grew scarce in Europe. The trade with India languished. But the mines of California and Australia gave it a new impulse, and it has grown into unprecedented magnitude. In the sixteen years during which those gold fields have been pouring their treasures forth upon the world, the specie currency of Christendom has hardly increased in an appreciable degree. The money has gone to the East. The London circular of Mr. James Lowe states that, in the eleven years from 1851 to 1861, inclusive, Great Britain shipped to India, by a single line of steamers, £89,856,758 ($449,283,790),—a sum nearly equal to the product of the California mines, during the period. Besides this, must be reckoned the supply of Australian gold, amounting in the last sixteen years to $750,000,000; much of which is remitted by British merchants direct to India, without being brought to England.—The shipments of specie to India were vastly increased, when it was designed to stimulate the production of cotton. In 1862, the export of specie from England to India increased $19,000,000 beyond the amount of the year before. It continued to increase, until, not only the California and Australian supplies were exhausted, but Europe was drained of the precious metals to an extent which threatened a financial crisis. The rate of interest in the Bank of England rose to the almost unprecedented standard of 9 per cent.; and a similar rise occurred throughout Europe, before the exportation could be checked. India still demands an immense annual specie balance. In the years, 1864–5, Great Britain imported, from India, produce to the value of £52,287,869 ($261,439,345), while India only received of British manufactures £19,895,145 ($99,475,725), leaving a balance of

$160,000,000, a great portion of which was paid by shipments of specie.

This is the fatal point of weakness in British competition with us, in cotton manufactures. If we continue to ship to her specie, she will continue to foster India cotton production, and will prove a most formidable rival; but if we prevent the exportation of specie, for four or five years, British competition will be placed at great disadvantage,* and we may achieve the monopoly of the cotton trade.

II. The further Exportation of Bonds must be Prohibited.

1*st. This Prohibition Beneficial to our Industry.*

It is unnecessary to dwell further upon the benefit our manufactures and our export trade will derive from the prohibition of the further exportation of bonds. It is sufficient to remark, in this connection, that when the export of bonds and specie stops, our imports will be less than our exports, by the amount of interest on our foreign debt. If our exports amount to $400,000,000, as in 1866, our imports, which were, in the same year, over $500,000,000, could not be, under this arrangement, more than $316,000,000. It may easily be imagined what an advantage it will be to our manufactures, to strike off the competition of $200,000,000 of foreign goods. In this way, the balance of trade will give them a far more efficient protection than the tariff now affords.

2*d. The Prohibition necessary to avert Bankruptcy.*

But the prohibition of the exportation of bonds is advocated especially on the ground, that it is necessary to save us from financial ruin, and national bankruptcy.

The amount of the National Debt now owned by foreign capitalists, is not accurately known. The estimate of the Secretary of the Treasury, which places it at $250,000,000, is, obviously, greatly

* The cessation of the American supply of gold would cause a ruinous financial revulsion in England. In 1857, the stoppage of remittances for a few months, owing to the financial crisis in this country, caused a dreadful panic; which swept over Great Britain like a tempest, bearing down many of the strongest firms in the country, and was hardly prevented from becoming universal, by the most energetic governmental measures of relief.

within the mark. Fortunately, we have the data from wnich an accurate estimate may be made. The transfer of our debt to foreign capitalists has been going forward during the last five years: (1) In payment of the balance of trade against us; (2) In the payment of the interest on state, railway, municipal, and national bonds, owned abroad.

The following table gives the balance of trade against us from June 1861, to June 1866. The column of exports includes all the specie exported from the country, together with the goods exported, reduced to specie value. According to the official returns our imports exceed our entire exports, including specie, by $260,000,000. But the Secretary of the Treasury states that these official returns do not show the true balance of trade against us: there is a systematic undervaluation of imports; much the larger portion of our foreign trade is carried on in foreign vessels; and there is a great deal of smuggling along our extensive land and ocean boundaries. He says, to make up for the undervaluation, smuggling, and transportation paid to foreign ship owners, we must add at least 20 per cent. to the official returns of imports. In the annexed table, the percentage for these items is accordingly added; but as they were not so great five years ago, as now, only ten per cent. is at first added, and the percentage is gradually increased in the probable ratio of the increase of smuggling, undervaluation, and freights to foreign owners. The following table gives a fair statement of the balance of trade against us:—

YEAR.	IMPORTS.	EXPORTS.	EXCESS OF IMPORTS.
1862 - - - -	$275,357,051	$227,127,556	$ 48,229,495.
1863 - - - -	252,919,920		
Add 10 per cent. - -	25,291,992		
Total for 1863 - -	$278,211,912	$252,419,203	$ 25,792,709.
1864 - - - -	329,562,895		
Add 14⅓ per cent - -	47,080,413		
Total for 1864 - -	$376,643,308	$218,489,252	$158,154,056.
1865 - - - -	234,339,810		
Add 20 per cent. - -	46,867,962		
Total for 1865 - -	$281,207,772	$194,175,382	$ 87,032,390.

1866 - - - -	423,975,000		
Add 20 per cent. - -	84,795,000		
Total for 1866 - -	$508,770,000	$415,965,000	$ 92,805,000.
			$412,013,650.

It thus appears that the actual excess of our imports over all exports, inclusive of specie, up to June 1866, was $412,000,000. But this does not yet show the balance against us. These annually accruing balances have been paid with national bonds, sold at a discount to foreign capitalists. Moreover, the interest upon these bonds has been annually met; and as our commercial balance has consumed all the specie exported, the amount of this interest has also been paid by the sale of bonds.* Furthermore, the interest upon state, railroad, and municipal bonds, has been met, and our only resource for this, also, has been the sale of bonds. The following table gives a fair exhibit of the growth and present amount of our debt, owned by foreign capitalists:—

Balance of trade against us, June 1862 - -	$ 48,229,495	
Requiring in bonds, at 40 per cent. discount -		$ 80,382,491
Interest on above, to June 1863 - - - -	$ 4,800,000	
Balance of trade against us, June 1863 - -	25,792,709	
Total interest and balance, June 1863 - - -	$ 30,592,709	
Requiring in bonds, at 40 per cent. discount -		$ 50,987,848
Total bonds abroad, on balance of trade, June 1863		$131,370,339
Interest on above, to June 1864 - - - -	$ 7,882,000	
Balance of trade against us, June 1864 - -	158,154,056	
Total interest and balance, June 1864 - - -	$166,036,056	
Requiring in bonds, at 40 per cent. discount -		$276,726,339
Total bonds abroad, on balance of trade, June 1864		$408,097,099

* It may be said that this interest has been paid by the exportation of gold. This may be, and yet the result will be the same; for if the gold exported has been applied to the payment of interest, it has left so much larger deficit in the commercial balance, to be paid with bonds. It makes no difference in the calculation, whether we apply the specie to the payment of the interest, or the commercial balance. The result is the same. For convenience of calculation, we suppose it to be applied to the latter, leaving the interest to be paid by the sale of bonds.

Interest, to June 1865 - - - - - -	$ 24,485,225	
Balance of trade against us, June 1865 - - -	87,032,390	
Interest and balance of trade, June 1865 - -	$111,518,215	
Requiring in bonds, at 40 per cent. discount - -		$185,863,691
Total bonds abroad, on balance of trade, June 1865		$593,960,790
Interest, to June 1866 - - - - - -	$ 35,637,647	
Balance of trade against us, June 1866 - -	92,805,000	
Interest and balance of trade, June 1866 - -	$138,442,647	
Requiring in bonds, at 27 per cent. discount -		$189,647,000
Total bonds abroad, on balance of trade, June 1866		$783,607,790
Interest, to June 1867 - - - - - -	$ 47,016,467	
Balance of trade against us, June 1867 - -	96,000,000	
Interest and balance of trade, June 1867 -	$143,016,467	
Requiring in bonds, at 27 per cent. discount - -		$195,000,000
		$978,607,709

Our adverse balance of trade, with discount and interest, has caused the sale of $978,000,000 of bonds to foreign capitalists.

But there remains still to be counted the principal of state, railroad, and municipal bonds, together with the interest which has been paid by the sale of bonds. In 1862, about $300,000,000 of these bonds were owned abroad. To meet the interest on this sum, bonds have been annually exported, and sold at the usual discount in the foreign market. At the regular rate of discount, this has required the sale of bonds to the amount of $175,000,000.

Estimating, then, the bonds sold to meet the principal and interest of the annual balance of trade against us, at $978,000,000; this with the $175,000,000 exported to pay the interest on state, county, and municipality, bonds, will make $1,153,000,000 of federal bonds, now owned by foreign capitalists. Adding to this sum the $300,000,000 of state, county, and municipality debt; we find the whole amount of our bonds in the hands of foreign capitalists, to be $1,453,000,000. To meet the annual interest on this, requires the exportation of $87,000,000 in gold, or the exportation and sale of $125,000,000 of bonds.

It may be that this amount of bonds is not actually in Europe.

A large portion of them are, no doubt, held in Eastern cities, by agents of European capitalists, and branches of English mercantile houses, who receive the interest. But this does not alter the state of fact. No matter where they are held, they are owned abroad, and the accruing interest goes into the coffers of foreign capitalists.—It is a part of the astute policy of British capitalists to hold their bonds in this country. They do not wish to awaken our fears, by displaying openly the full extent of our foreign debt. They prefer to draw the gold interest on this side of the Atlantic, when it can be transmitted without exciting alarm. But when the debt is all absorbed; and we have no longer anything else to lose, the mask will be thrown aside; the bonds will be transferred to the real owners, in Europe; and we shall be roused from fancied security, to find our debt all sold, our resources hopelessly mortgaged to foreign bankers, and the nation bankrupt.

If our foreign debt continues to accumulate as rapidly, in the future, as in the past, the entire debt will be owned by foreigners, four years hence. Even if we economize and import no more than we export, still, the interest on the debt now owned by foreigners will alone absorb all our gold interest bonds before three years are past; and the accumulated interest will absorb our entire national debt within nine years from this date.

This state of fact imperatively demands that we at once put a stop to the exportation of bonds. To this end, an act should be passed, prohibiting the further sale or hypothecation of bonds to foreigners, under penalty of forfeiture. The enforcing of the prohibition may be attended with some difficulty, inasmuch as foreign holders of bonds frequently keep them in this country, deposited with agents, or the heads of branch mercantile houses. Hence, it would not suffice to prohibit the *exportation* of bonds; their sale or hypothecation to foreigners should be prohibited, whether they are exported or not. The only method of enforcing the prohibition is to require all bonds to registered, and their transfer to be recorded like real estate. This registration would show what bonds are now owned by foreigners; and none should be paid, if hereafter sold to foreigners, even though again transferred to American hands.

Such an act is clearly constitutional. The Federal government has the right to regulate commerce with foreign countries in such a manner as to prevent it from involving the country in bankruptcy.

If it be urged that the measures necessary to prevent the exportation of specie and bonds are unusual, the fact is admitted. But war warrants many things inexcusable in peace. And the British policy of monopoly is waging an internecine war upon our prosperity, which has already progressed so far, that only the most energetic measures can avert impending ruin. The question to be decided is not, Are the measures usual? but, Are they essential to avert disaster? to promote our prosperity?

Of this, there can be no question. The exportation of specie is strengthening the centralization of England, preventing our return to a specie basis, and assisting to maintain a ruinous inflation of prices: the exportation of bonds is rapidly driving us on toward bankruptcy; both combined are flooding the country with importations to an extent disastrous to our manufacturing industry. While the exportation of specie and bonds continues to stimulate importations, we will vainly endeavor to raise our manufactures to a condition adequate to a competition with England. Active demand, and scarcity of supply, are the best stimulants of manufacturing industry. High prices are no compensation for a glutted market. A ready demand, with quick returns, and moderate profits, are the most favorable conditions for the development of manufactures. The only method of developing domestic manufactures is, to limit foreign importations within such bounds that they shall not oversupply our markets. A tariff cannot protect our manufactures from an oversupply of foreign goods, so long as our importing merchants can purchase unlimited stocks of goods, in exchange for specie and bonds. They will import all the goods they can sell, and thus effectually prevent any rapid development of our manufactures. England has always flattered us by calling us her "best customer." We must cease to be her best customer, if we regard our own prosperity. We must compel her to take our produce in exchange for every commodity of her commerce we import. The only means of effecting this, and protecting our manufactures against a flood of

British goods, is to take effectual measures to prevent, in future, the exportation of specie or bonds.

But these measures, alone, will not be sufficient to counteract the immense resources of Great Britain, all put forth in a desperate competition with our industry.—It must be remembered that the interruption of the exportation of specie would be only temporary. In a few years, our mines would afford us a metallic basis fully equal to our currency needs, and, afterward, the annual products of our mines would again be exported, as now. Unless our industry were by that time firmly established, Britain might resume her interrupted designs, and again use our gold to foster the cotton production of rival fields. If we adopted no other measures, Britain might easily counter our schemes of manufacturing competition. Intermitting, for a few years, her fostering care of rival fields, by consuming our cotton at high prices, she would enable us to buy her commodities as before, and would keep our markets so flooded with goods, as to stifle the development of our native manufactures. Then, when our exportation of specie was resumed, she might resume her policy of fostering rival production, and prosecute it, at her leisure, to a successful termination.

It is necessary for us to adopt vigorous measures, which will give our cotton manufacture a decided ascendancy within a few years after our policy is inaugurated.

Sect. 2.—Trade Regulations Necessary for Self-Protection.

The Government must regulate our commerce with foreign nations.

The first step to be adopted in this direction is,

I. The Entire Change of our Present Warehouse System.

We now allow foreign goods to be placed in warehouses in our ports, without paying any duty previous to their entry. The payment of duties is only required when the goods are removed from the warehouse, and thrown upon the market.

This system is ruinous to our own manufactures. It seems devised for the purpose of enabling the foreign merchant to keep our market glutted with goods, to the injury of domestic production.

It allows the British exporter to deposit his goods in our ports, instead of storing them at home, and thus keep them in waiting for the slightest opening in the market. By establishing branch houses in our ports, or, by making arrangements with American importers, in virtue of which goods are to be paid for only when withdrawn from the warehouse and exposed to sale, the British merchant may, without any expense, forestall our market to such an extent as to discourage the embarkation of additional capital in manufactures. So long as we thus *favor* foreign competition with our own productions, our industry will continue to be depressed by the presence in our ports of foreign goods greatly in excess of the demand. What American capitalist will invest his means in cotton manufactures, when British goods to the value of millions of dollars are stored in our ports, ready to take advantage of the slightest opening in the market?

If foreign capitalists wish to deluge our market with goods in excess of the demand, for the purpose of injuring our home manufactures, we must make them pay for the privilege. The bonded warehouse system is a great convenience to commerce, and ought to be continued in favor of all commodities whose importation we wish to facilitate. All dutiable articles which do not come into competition with any home product, should be admitted to bonded warehouses, and pay duties only when they are withdrawn and placed upon the market. But all foreign commodities which compete with our home industry, should be excluded from bonded warehouses, and compelled to pay duties upon their arrival in port. This would check the importation of such goods in excess of the demand, and prevent the glut of the market so discouraging to the increase of our home manufactures. Foreign merchants can afford to let their goods lie in storage in our ports; but paying duties in advance of the demand, would make the keeping an overstock of goods upon our market an expensive pleasure. Then, goods would be imported, only to supply an existing demand,—to complement the deficit in our own production. Our own manufactures would have the first chance in the market, and the active demand for goods would stimulate home production.

But the most important measure necessary for the protection of home industry against the oppressive competition of England is

II. The Regulation of Commerce with Great Britain, by means of a Discriminating Tariff upon all British Manufactures which come in Competition with our own.

In so far as the tariff looked to revenue, its duties ought to be imposed upon articles consumed by the wealthy class,—as rich wines and liquors, and fine fabrics of whatever material. For such articles, not being consumed by the laboring class, would not raise the rate of wages and enhance the cost of production. All articles of general consumption,—as tea, sugar, coffee, and coarse fabrics,—should, as a rule, be free of duty.

As a protective measure, the tariff should levy taxes on British manufactures, exclusively. We should admit all British commodities of moderate cost and general consumption, free of duty. But upon such British manufactures as come in competition with our own, duties should be placed so excessive, as to be practically prohibitory. At the same time, such articles should be admitted duty free, when produced by other countries. What we need is a *discriminating* tariff;—not a tariff on all articles, for revenue purposes; nor a tariff against all foreign goods, for purposes of protection: but a discriminative tariff;—a tariff levying duties upon luxuries for revenue; and upon British goods, exclusively, for protection.

1*st. Constitutionality of such a Tariff.*

That such a tariff is constitutional, is beyond question. It institutes precisely such a regulation of commerce as was contemplated by the framers of the constitution.

The regulation of commerce with foreign nations was one chief end, for which the Federal government was established. It is remarkable that this power has never been exercised in the manner contemplated by the framers of the Constitution.—Our commerce was at that time fettered by the prohibitory regulations of foreign powers, who shut us out from the markets of the world. It was proposed to confer the power to regulate commerce upon the Federal government, that it might, by retaliatory legislation against

particular countries, compel them to repeal their prohibitory enactments, and admit us to a reciprocity of traffic. It was not proposed to treat the entire foreign world as an unit;—but to discriminate between those countries whose commercial intercourse with us is conducted upon a fair basis, equally advantageous to both countries, and those whose commercial system based upon monopoly, operates our injury. It was not proposed to give the power, in order to protect our manufactures against all external competition, whatever, enabling them to put up prices to such an exorbitant standard, as to defeat the very end in view;—but to protect our industry against the unfavorable competition of countries, whose superior capital, and restrictive policy places us at disadvantage.

The present is one of those crises for which the framers of the constitution intended to provide, in conferring the power to regulate commerce upon the Federal government. The present exigency imperatively calls for the interposition of the government, to counter the commercial system by which England is pressing us on toward ruin.

2*d*. *Justice of such a Tariff.*

The course of England toward us demands retaliatory legislation.

That power claims to have abandoned its restrictive legislation; and it is loud in its call upon all other countries, to follow its example, and establish free trade. But these professions can only be characterized by the unclassical, but expressive word,—humbug! England has only abandoned its restrictive policy, in so far as it is its interest to do so. It is willing to establish free trade,—in such articles of manufacture as it produces cheaper than all other countries—in raw material for its factories—and in food for its operatives;—but in all else, its restrictive commercial policy remains intact. It is willing to import free of duty, wool, hides, cotton, and various other articles of raw material. It is even willing to allow shoes, cotton fabrics, and woolens, to be imported free of duty; for these are articles it does not buy, but offers for sale. But is there any manufacture we can offer cheaper than it can be made in England, which is suffered to be imported free of duty? Not one! England protects with a tariff—and a prohibitory tariff—every manufacture with which we can successfully compete!

A few examples will illustrate the repressive selfish policy of England. The people of England consume annually some $200,000,000 worth of malt and spiritous liquors, and about $75,000,000 worth of snuff, and manufactured tobacco. That country has no grain, above the wants of the people, for the manufacture of liquors; nor has it native grown tobacco. If free trade existed with England, with our natural advantages for their production, we should be able to supply the English market with both these commodities, making tobacco a staple of industry, and largely increasing the demand for grain. Our exports would be increased in value at least $150,000,000 in these two articles, alone. Our profits, also, would be greatly enhanced; since the cost of transportation upon manufactured articles would be diminished, while their value would be increased.—But Great Britain will neither buy of us manufactured tobacco, nor the manufactured product of our grain. It will buy our grain, and our crude tobacco; but it reserves the profits of manufacture to itself, in both instances. Moreover, the consumption of tobacco is curtailed by an enormous custom-house duty laid upon it. Only $13,000,000 worth is imported; this pays, in revenue duties, over $32,000,000; it is then manufactured, and sold for nearly double its first cost and taxes. Liquors are almost excluded by exorbitant duties, levied to protect the home manufacture, on which the government levies $90,000,000 of excise. The result is, that Great Britain only pays foreign countries some $25,000,000 for tobacco and distilled liquors.

The same policy characterizes the entire commercial intercourse of Great Britain with other countries.—For instance, it has neither the ashes, nor the waste grease, to make soap; but the importation of the manufactured article is discouraged, and the ashes and other raw material, which cost little, and yield little profit to the seller, are imported, that soap may be manufactured at home.—We might rectify our Petroleum at little cost, and send it abroad, at less charge, and in a more valuable form. But England will only buy the crude article, that it may be rectified there, and enough exported to pay for the cost of the raw material.—At least $50,000,000 of linseed oil is annually used in England in manufactures, and for paints; but, instead of buying the oil, $15,000,000 worth of flax-

seed is imported, and manufactured into oil, sufficient for the home consumption, and for export abroad.—The same policy extends throughout. Importations of manufactured articles from abroad are discouraged. England will allow no other country the profits of manufacturing industry. It sells all it disposes of in a manufactured form, while it is willing to buy nothing but crude commodities. And because it allows these to be imported free of duty, it plumes itself as the champion of free trade, and insists that other countries ought, by reciprocity, to admit its manufactures free!

But let this pretension be tested. Let the United States proffer to Great Britain mutual free trade between the countries;—and it will be decidedly rejected. Three reasons would prompt this rejection.

In the first place, the British government derives the greater part of its revenue from taxes upon articles, which free trade would admit free of duty. If the taxes upon tobacco, liquors, and other articles were remitted, the aristocracy would be under the necessity of making up the deficit by a property tax;—this they will never willingly do.

In the second place, we should then share with Great Britain the profits of her commerce. Under a free trade system between the countries, the English people would buy of us $250,000,000 worth of liquors, tobacco, soap, petroleum, and other cheaply made manufactures, of which we do not now sell to the annual amount of $60,000,000, all together. Under a system of free trade, the centralization of wealth in Great Britain would cease. That country would deal on equal terms with foreign nations, frankly receiving the products of their industry in exchange for its own. But, now, its taxation levied upon the manufactured products of foreign countries, has caused the importation of their products in a cheap crude form, and compels its people to consume them in lesser quantities; so that the expenditure of the country is always less than its income, leaving an annual accumulation of a specie balance, to be used in loans and purchases of foreign bonds. A free consumption of foreign products in a manufactured form, would keep the balance of trade equal between England and the rest of the world, and prevent the vast aggregation of wealth which is now going forward.

A third reason must be remarked: The same policy which is sheltering the British aristocracy from taxation, and amassing the wealth of the world in that country, is increasing the profits of the British aristocracy of trade. If free trade existed, the English people would buy of the United States manufactured tobacco; but, now, an English capitalist makes the profit of manufacturing. So, by purchasing grain instead of malt liquors, the British capitalist makes the profit of brewing; and by importing flaxseed instead of linseed oil, a Briton realizes the profit of manufacture; and so on throughout the circle.

These three results of the present policy will prevent the astute British aristocracy from adopting a system of free trade, while it is possible to avoid it.

It is needless to enlarge here upon the injustice of this commercial system to the world. It is sufficient to remark the manner in which it inflicts especial injury upon us,—injury so serious, as to justify, and demand, decisive retaliatory action.

From the character of our industry, this system of commercial repression has borne more heavily upon us, than any other country. The taxes upon tobacco, liquors, and soap, for instance, do not affect European countries; for their surface is too limited, and their population too dense, to permit them to produce, to any extent, the raw material for the manufacture of those articles. And so of other articles, whose raw material requires extensive surface to produce, but which are of cheap manufacture. The repression of the importation of these articles bears with peculiar and excessive force upon our industry. Our extensive surface of fertile soil enables us to produce the raw material in unrivaled abundance; and the cheapness of the manufacture makes it the best manufacturing investment, in a country where capital has always been scarce. In the production and manufacture of such articles, we might easily distance competition. But the repressive system of Great Britain has restricted our culture of tobacco, corn, and flax, up to the present issue. The Northern states have had no commodity, for which England would offer a steady and profitable market. With free trade, they would have sold several hundred millions annually of articles easily pro-

duced, for which England has denied a market. England has excluded products greater in value than those she has purchased of us; and she still, by her policy, deprives us of a market for commodities, that would double our exports.

As the British government is repressing our manufactured products, by denying them a market, we ought, in justice to ourselves, to retaliate, by refusing a market to the manufactured products of British industry. Great Britain is our great industrial rival. Its policy has, from the beginning, been adverse to our interests. It has never imported anything from us, it could do without, or obtain elsewhere. It has excluded everything it could exclude, without positive loss. Cotton has been the only exception to its illiberal policy; and it is now endeavoring to take the cotton supply from us!

Certainly the policy of England claims from us no forbearance. We ought to adopt, without hesitation, or compunction, the policy necessary to protect our interests. The Federal government ought to regulate our commerce with Great Britain, in such a manner as to retaliate its injurious policy, and protect our interests from the baneful results of its commercial supremacy.

3d. Expediency of thus Regulating our Commerce with England.

A discriminative tariff against the manufactures of Great Britain is not merely expedient,—that is too weak a word,—it is indispensable. It is the only method of crippling the industry of England, and protecting our own against it.

An indiscriminate tariff upon the imports of all foreign countries, alike, inflicts no injury whatever upon the industry of England. Under such a tariff, superior energy, enterprise, and capital secure to England the same superiority in our markets over the competition of other countries, she would enjoy in the absence of any tariff whatever. But levy high duties upon English iron and steel, while that of Germany and Sweden is admitted free of duty; and upon English cottons, and woolens, while those of France and Germany are admitted free of duty,—and we exclude her products from our market. We thus retaliate the injury her high duties upon tobacco, and liquors, etc., inflict upon us. The effect of the loss of her "best customer" upon the trade of England may easily be imagined. It

would exert a marked influence in diminishing her ability to compete with us in the cotton manufacture.

But this discriminative tariff is not recommended so much as an aggressive measure against the commerce of England, as a defensive measure of imperative necessity. It is, indeed, the only method of protecting our manufacturing industry against the aggressive competition of England.

There are three points of weakness in a general tariff, as a protective measure. (1.) It causes the manufacturers whose interests are protected to raise their prices to the limit fixed by the duty: this generates a general rise of prices, enhancing the cost of production to the extent of the protection afforded; and the tariff becomes nugatory, as a protective measure. This effect can only be prevented by the oppression of whole classes of community, in keeping their prices below the standard of protected articles.—(2.) While a general tariff is injurious to the general prosperity of the country, it really has no effect in excluding the goods of a foreign rival, and preventing a glut of the market. The rise of the home manufacturer's prices which it promotes, enables the foreign shipper to impose his duties upon the consumer of the goods, leaving his profits intact. Consequently, the tariff imposes no real charge upon the foreign shipper, whose profit is the same as if no tariff existed. The glut of foreign goods in the market is just as great with, as without a general tariff.—(3.) A general tariff cannot prevent a competitor possessed of superior capital from crushing the industry of a rival, by making a moderate sacrifice of profits for the purpose.

Now to apply these facts to the case before us.

(1.) In a competition with England a general tariff would be nugatory.—We wish to protect three interests at least,—cotton, woolen, and iron manufactures. These are all commodities of very general consumption; and a tariff placed on them all would so raise the scale of prices in the country, as to render the protection nugatory, through the enhanced cost of production. What we need is, a tariff which affords efficient protection, without promoting a rise of prices on the part of American manufacturers. We propose to promote cheap prices throughout the country, in order that our

manufacturers may be able to produce their goods at the lowest rate of cost: we do not wish to overturn our whole system, by enabling a few manufacturers to raise their prices to an extortionate rate. We want a tariff—not to enable a few manufacturers to make fortunes, by extorting extravagant prices for their goods—but to induce greater numbers to engage in manufacturing. Our desideratum is, a tariff that will afford efficient protection against foreign competition, and, at the same time, prevent our manufacturers from raising the price of their goods to an extravagant point.

This aim is attained in the discriminative tariff proposed. It will not allow American manufacturers to raise their prices immoderately; because, though British goods are excluded, the goods of other countries come in free of duty. The manufacturers of other countries than England cannot compete with ours in our own markets, when our prices are at a moderate cheapness. They are in the same condition as our own,—struggling with British monopoly for existence. Great Britain competes with them, as with us, in the home market, despite of import duties. They do not manufacture enough, or more than enough, for home demand; and they would not compete with us in our market, unless prices rose above a proper standard. If our manufacturers attempted to inflate prices unduly, then the countries of Europe would import British goods for their own consumption, and ship their manufactures to our ports. These shipments would bring prices down to a normal standard—when they would cease. Such a tariff would act as a regulator of prices, and maintain the cheapness of production so essential to success.

(2.) In the next place, a general tariff would not prevent Great Britain from glutting our market with goods; nor even from underselling us at a sacrifice, for the purpose of breaking down our industry. The immense capital of England will enable her to prevent the development of our manufacturing industry under any tariff we can devise, which allows her commodities equal access to our ports with those of other countries. She is able to offer advantages of credit to purchasers, our manufacturers cannot afford. As soon as English manufacturers should see a resolution to enter into resolute competition with them, they would throw their surplus stocks upon

our market,—stocks, which simply represent profit, the goods sent to other countries having paid expenses,—and which they could give away without absolute loss. They might store their staple goods in our ports in advance of the demand, and crush out our manufactures, by glutting the market with goods offered on a long credit, and at merely nominal prices. They would act upon the policy of opposition lines of stages and steamboats, where a capitalist or company will, for a time, carry freight and passengers at a dead loss, to drive a competitor from the trade, and maintain a monopoly. We must expect this;—and the accumulated capital of English monopolists would be irresistible. Their trade with other countries gives them an annual profit, which, if sunk in a competition with us, would overwhelm our industry.

We could not resist their hostile competition under a tariff which placed them on an equality with other nations: for we could not establish too exorbitant a tariff, without deranging all the prices of the country, and disorganizing industry; and a reasonable tariff would not shut out their determined competition. Indeed, where the American manufacturers raised their prices to the tariff level, as they always do, no tariff, however exorbitant, would afford protection against British rivalry. By sinking fifty millions of annual profit, Great Britain might, even now, crush our manufactures of wool, iron, and cotton; underselling them in our markets, in spite of our present exorbitant duties.

But the proposed tariff absolutely prevents British competition. Under a general tariff, the duties are limited by the fact that manufacturers will abuse it, by raising their prices to the highest limit. Consequently, the tariff scale cannot be fixed high enough to prevent a determined competitor from glutting the market with goods, or even making a sacrifice, and selling, despite the tariff, at prices so low, as to crush the protected industry. But under a discriminative tariff, the goods admitted duty free would prevent the enhancement of prices: consequently, the tariff against British goods may be placed at a point that would exclude them altogether. We have nothing to dread from the competition of other countries. They may regulate the market, but they cannot depress it. We need no protection against the iron of Germany and Sweden, nor their

cotton and woolen goods. We need protection against England alone; and the tariff ought to affect England alone, that the protection may be complete.

A discriminative tariff levied against the industry of the rival, affords the only efficient protection to home industry. It answers all the ends for which a tariff is framed, without any of the counterbalancing disadvantages of a general tariff. It excludes the rival altogether from the market, if necessary; while it prevents the home manufacturer from raising the price of his goods. It maintains an active demand, fair prices, and cheap production,—the three essentials to successful industry.

The measures already enumerated will be sufficient to enable us to outrival England in cheap production, and disappoint her hostile competition. Their adoption will enable us to bear away the palm in the cotton manufacture, and will, within a few years, secure to us commercial supremacy.

PART III.

THE ADVANTAGE, AND THE NECESSITY OF ADOPTING THE POLICY SUGGESTED.

CHAPTER I.

BENEFITS OF THIS POLICY.

THE adoption of all the measures suggested in the previous chapter is necessary to secure the full benefits of the policy. A partial change of our policy may prevent industrial ruin, and enable us to regain a degree of our former prosperity: we may perhaps resume our former position as satellite of the British industrial system, until Britain shall have fostered her "pet" fields into such flourishing production, as to enable her to dispense with our cotton supply. But this will only defer the evil day. And it will foster the British centralization of industry, so full of menace to our age.

Our only safety lies in wresting from England the cotton manufacture; and this can only be accomplished by the adoption of the entire series of measures proposed in the last chapter. We must suffer the South to re-establish a stable system of industry; we must build up manufactures in the West; remodel our tariff,—establishing free trade in all articles of general consumption, and levying prohibitory duties upon British manufactures that compete with our own; establish a specie currency; levy our revenues by a property tax; free our cotton industry from taxation; and prohibit the exportation of bonds.

The adoption of these measures will secure to us a career of prosperity such as we have never yet attained.

SECT. 1.—THE RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF OUR MANUFACTURES WOULD SOON WREST THE COMMERCIAL SUPREMACY FROM ENGLAND.

Our manufactures would have two eras of progress:

1. The first, in which they would be engaged in supplying our own market.

2. The second: where, our own demand supplied, they would be competing with those of England in the markets of the world.

In both these eras, the measures proposed would secure to our manufactures decisive advantages.

I. First Era: Advantages of our Manufactures in Our own Market, under Measures Proposed.

The conditions of the competition are,—free trade in our own markets with all countries except England; the goods of that country being excluded by a discriminative tariff.

The first fact to be noticed in this connection is, that our cotton manufacture would have the advantage of all others in this competition; and, consequently, capital would be invested more largely in it than any other.

Several causes would give the cotton manufacture greater advantages in competition with foreign industry.

The cotton manufacture would have greater advantages in respect of raw material. Continental Europe has native iron, and wool, and, in this regard, would compete on somewhat favorable terms with our woolen and iron manufactures. But European countries purchase our cotton in Liverpool, at an advanced price, which makes it cost at their mills four cents per pound more than it would cost delivered at our mills, located in the West. Consequently, their iron and woolen manufactures might be offered in our markets at a price relatively much lower than they could afford to sell their cotton goods.

Another fact would give the cotton manufacture an advantage over other branches of our industry. The countries of Continental Europe now export some iron and woolen manufactures; but their cotton manufactures are inadequate to the supply of their own wants. If they exported cottons, they would be under the necessity of supplying the deficit by importations from England. Prices would have to rise very considerably, before they would export cotton goods to the American market.

The exemption of cotton manufactures from taxation would increase their advantages over other branches of home manufacture:

the cotton manufacturer could afford to sell his goods at one per cent. lower profit than others, and yet realize the same net returns.

In effect, while he could afford to sell at a lower profit, his scale of profit would actually be higher than any other branch of manufacture, owing to his greater advantage in respect of raw material, and also to the more feeble competition of foreign countries. These decisive advantages would give the cotton manufacture the precedence over any other, and cause capital to embark in it rapidly.

Practically, our cotton manufactures would have little foreign competition. For, though free trade would exist with Continental Europe, the balance of trade would afford the most efficient protection. The increased home demand for cotton and breadstuffs, would diminish our exports of produce very materially. As we no longer exported bonds nor specie, our imports would only equal what remained of our exports, after paying the interest on our foreign debt: and this surplus would, in the first place, be invested in articles of prime necessity, as drugs, and tropical luxuries; next, in iron and woolen goods, which would yield a larger profit: so that little or nothing would remain to be invested in cotton importations.

Our cotton manufactures would be stimulated by an active demand and high prices, which would continue, until the embarkation of capital in the business regulated the price, by home competition. The rapid embarkation of capital in the business would increase this manufacture, so that at an early day it would supply the home demand.

As soon as the West became actively engaged in prosecuting the cotton manufacture, that industry would foster every other branch of enterprise. The iron and coal interests would feel the stimulus, in the increased demand for machinery: agriculture would find in the mills a home demand, that would yield to the farmer far better returns than the European market. Moreover, the increased home consumption of our products would so diminish our exports, as to secure all branches of our manufacture from active foreign competition: the balance of trade would prevent us from importing largely: all branches of home industry would be fostered by the almost exclusive possession of our home market. The development

of the cotton manufacture would foster every other branch of industry.

In a few years, our industry would be in a most flourishing condition. Our cotton industry would flourish pre-eminently, and our other branches of manufacture would have a vigor beyond all former precedent. Our cotton manufactures would soon oversupply the home market. They would then enter upon the second stage of development, and enter into competition with British goods in the markets of the world.

II. Second Era: Advantages of our Manufactures over those of England in the Markets of the World, under the Proposed Measures.

It would still be necessary to shut out British goods from our own market, by a prohibitory tariff. Otherwise, they would adopt Hannibal's policy of crushing Rome in Italy, and attempt to ruin our manufactures, by flooding our country with goods, even at an annual sacrifice of several hundred million dollars. We would have nothing to fear from fair and open competition; but everything from the hostile expenditure of accumulated capital, in a determined effort to break us down.

It may be asked how we could hope to compete with England in foreign markets, when we are under the necessity of protecting our industry from her competition in our own country. The explanation is simple. England might ruin our manufactures, by throwing her products at a heavy sacrifice upon our markets; and she could afford this sacrifice, in a single country. But, if prevented from striking us at home, England could not resort to the same tactics in foreign markets. British manufacturers could not afford to sell at a loss in all the markets of the world. If they should attempt it, the benefits would be found too slight to compensate for the sacrifice; for, secure in the possession of our own market, our mills would not be injured by a temporary check to the expansion of their trade. With our home market protected, British manufacturers would be under the necessity of meeting us in foreign markets in fair and equal competition. They would sell at the lowest scale of profits; but they could not afford to sell at a loss. The competitor that could manufacture cheapest would bear away the palm.

The following careful estimate of the comparative advantages of the English, and the Western manufacturer, displays clearly the great advantages of the American competitor.

1. The Western manufacturer could manufacture at less cost than his English competitor.

(1.) The two countries would both be upon a specie basis, and, in this respect, would stand upon an equality. But in every other particular, the advantage would rest altogether with the Western competitor.

(2.) The Western manufacturer would have a cheaper raw material. In making an estimate, it will be taken for granted that, when all his supplies are cheap, at specie and free trade prices, and he is freed from all taxation, direct, or indirect, the Southern planter can grow cotton as cheap as it can be grown in Brazil or India, and can furnish it as cheaply in the English market. Then, the cotton of the English manufacturer would cost him the price in the American port, with the charges thence to the English mill.

We have, here, reliable data from which to estimate the relative cost of cotton to the Western, and the English manufacturer. From 1840 to 1850, the Liverpool cotton brokers charged for cotton, an average price of 2.95 cents per pound higher than the cost in the American ports. This advance represents the cost of ocean freights and insurance; the Liverpool charges; and the profits of the trade. To this must be added the freight and insurance from Liverpool to Manchester; which will make the cost at Manchester over three*

---

* The comparative cost of delivering a bale of cotton from the Southern plantation to the English, and the Western mill, may be seen in the following table of charges, based upon the prices of 1852.

Cost of cotton at the English mill.

Net average value of a cotton bale of 500 lbs, at plantation - -		$45.95
Average charge, at former rates of freight and insurance on a bale, from the plantation to the seaport - - - - -	$2.00	
Drayage, storage, and extra labor for mending bales, etc. -	.80	
Commission on sale, 2½ per cent. on $50 - - - - -	1.25	
		4.05
Cost of bale in port - - - - - - - - - - -		$50.00

cents per pound higher than the price in the American ports. Then, if the cost of conveying cotton from the plantation to the Western mill were no greater than the freight to the seaport, the Western manufacturer would obtain his cotton three cents a pound cheaper than the English. But it costs somewhat more,—perhaps half a cent a pound, or $2.50 per bale; which makes the cost of cotton at the Western mill two and a half cents per pound cheaper than at the English. When cotton is worth ten cents a pound in New Orleans, it will cost 10½ at the Western mill, and over 13 cents at Manchester. The Western manufacturer would have an advantage of 25 per cent. in the cost of his raw material;—an advantage which, in the manufacture of 2000,000,000 pounds of cotton, would amount to $50,000,000.

(3.) The Western manufacturer would have the cheaper labor.

The Western operative might live at less than half the cost of the English; since he is in the midst of an agricultural region, and would be entirely free from government taxation upon the articles he consumes.

The price of wheat in England ranges from $1.10 to $1.60 per bushel: the average rate may be fixed at $1.30. In a normal con-

---

Ocean freight, insurance, charges in Liverpool, and profits on business, as represented in the average advance of 2.95 cents per pound	$14.75	
Freight and charges from Liverpool to English factory	1.00	
		15.75
Total cost of bale of cotton at mill		$65.73

This is 13 3-20 cents per pound.

The cost at the Western mill, is as follows:

Cost of bale at plantation		$45.95
Average cost of freight and insurance (at former rates) from the plantation to Western cotton depot	$4.50	
Drayage and storage	.60	
Commission on sale	1.25	
Freight, etc., from cotton depot to mill	1.00	
		7.35
Total cost of bale of cotton at Western mill		$53.30

This is 10⅔ cents a pound, being just 2 29-60, or 2½ cents a pound less than the cost at Manchester.

dition of industry, the English market regulates the price of our breadstuffs: wheat is worth in the West, the English price, less the charges of transportation and the profits of commerce.—Probably Detroit, in respect of distance from the coast, may be taken as an average of the points whence we ship; and the cost of freight from that city may be taken as the average rate of freight from the West to England. The cost of shipping wheat from Detroit to England is 54 cents per bushel; so that, if we make no deduction for the profits of speculation, when wheat is worth $1.30 in Liverpool, it is worth 76 cents* in Detroit. But wheat could be delivered as cheaply (from the farm) at the Western factory town, as at Detroit. Con-

*The following tables give the comparative charges upon Wheat, delivered in Liverpool, and at the Western mill:

Price of three tons, or 100 bushels of wheat, delivered by the farmer at the railroad depot		$70.00
Charges on same to Liverpool:—		
Commission of agent employed to purchase, at 2½ per cent. upon $70.00	$1.75	
Freight to Detroit, at average distance of 100 miles, at the old price of 1½ cents a ton per mile	4.50	
Fire insurance at Detroit, ¼ per cent.	.17	
Freight from Detroit to New York, at 29 cents	29.00	
Lake insurance	.37	
Brokerage, weighing, screening, etc.	1-05	
Freight to Liverpool, and primage	13.15	
Ocean insurance	.50	
British duty, and dues	3.91	
Master porterage	.65	
Fire insurance on quay	.04	
Carriage samples	.01½	
Porterage, weighing, use of sack ties, etc.	1.31	
Bank commissions	.15	
Commissions and guaranty	3.07	
Interest on cost, and charges	.67	
		$60.30
Total cost of wheat in England		$130.30

Price of wheat delivered at depot	$70.00	
Commission on purchase	$2.75	
Freight to factory town	4.50	
	6.25	
Whole cost at factory village	$76.25	

sequently it would be worth in the Western factory town but 76 cents, when worth in Liverpool $1.30. The provisions of the English operative (taking wheat as the representative of general prices) would be 70 per cent. higher than those of the Western.

Furthermore, the cheap luxuries of the English operative,—his tobacco, his beer, etc.,—are enhanced by government taxation to three* or four times their normal value.

The enhancement of all prices, by the charges of transportation, and by government taxation, compel the English manufacturer to pay his operatives, in order to their subsistence, much higher wages than would be necessary in America. The average rate of wages for men of ordinary industry employed in English factories, is $7.50 per week; for women $4.12½ cents a week. The rate of wages in New England—where prices have always been enhanced, by transportation, an inflated currency, and speculation—has always been much lower than this. Five dollars a week for men, and three dollars for women were the average rates. These rates, at low specie prices, would subsist Western operatives in greater comfort than has ever yet fallen to the lot of that class of labor. Those rates would be too low as a permanent standard; but they would answer in the crisis of our competition with England. When the victory was won they might be raised.

(4.) The western manufacturer would have lower taxes.

He would be entirely free from government taxes; while his English competitor pays taxes on every business transaction, and an income tax on his profits, besides heavy poor rates, and a tax for the support of the established church.

The English manufacturer, burdened with taxation, and paying 25 per cent. more for raw material, 70 per cent. more for provisions, and 50 per cent. higher wages, could not possibly manufacture so cheaply as his Western competitor.

2. But this does not show the extent of our advantages. If the cost of manufacture were the same in both countries, the Western manufacturer could still overbear his British competitor. For,

* For the oppressiveness of English taxation, see page 183–4.

owing to his freedom from taxation, the greater cheapness of living, and the lower price of investments, he could afford to work for lesser profits.

3. The same is true of American merchants, and shippers, and the entire industrial class engaged in transportation. These classes, being relieved by the property tax in great measure from taxation, and all articles of consumption being lower than in the English market, could afford to work cheaper than the same classes in England. The American laborer, with lower wages, could subsist in greater comfort. The American merchant, with a lower scale of prices, could yet realize the same clear profits.

The force of all these advantages would be decisive: British cotton manufactures would be driven by the American from the world's markets.

Our iron and woolen manufactures would have no advantage of the English in respect of the cost of raw material. If they merely maintained themselves in possession of the home market, they would be much more prosperous than they have ever been, heretofore. But they, also, would possess advantages which would enable them to compete successfully with British industry, in foreign markets. They would pay a lower rate of wages than prevails in England: the cost of living would be less: the burden of taxation would be lighter. They could manufacture cheaper than England, and could afford to sell at lower profits. They would at least be able to compete on equal terms with British goods, and divide with them the market.

Let a wise policy be adopted,—and it will not be long ere the United States, manufacturing its own raw material, will become the great manufacturer for the world.

Sect. 2.—Advantages of our Industrial Supremacy.

I. Advantages to Ourselves.

1*st*. *Industrial Benefits.*

Every business of the country would enjoy unprecedented prosperity.

Our agriculture would no longer be depressed, by selling low to a foreign market, and buying high from a foreign producer. The injurious industrial system now prevailing, which oppresses the agriculturist by compelling him to support out of his earnings a multitude of speculators engaged in carrying his produce to a distant market and bringing his supplies from a distant producer, would be done away. The agriculturist would sell to the consumer at his door, and would purchase his staple articles of necessity, almost at prime cost. Selling higher, and buying cheaper than now, our farming population would enjoy a prosperity now hardly conceivable.

Every section, and every interest, would partake of the general prosperity.

The South would whiten with fields of cotton; and active prosperous industry would soon heal the wounds of war.

Our Western prairies and plains would be covered with countless flocks and herds, supplying material for our continually growing manufactures. The farmer, the planter, the grazier, the miner of iron and coal,—would all find in our manufactures the ready and profitable market necessary to stimulate their industry, and convert farm, plantation, mine, and plain, into departments of the great national hive of industry.

The marine states would feel the impulse. The commerce of the world would soon be ours. Our sails would whiten every ocean. Our seaboard would be dotted with cities vocal with the hum of commerce, and dockyards ringing with unaccustomed activity.

Our forests would echo with the sound of the axe and the saw, preparing material for the improvements going forward in every part of the country. Cities, factories, farm houses, steamboats, ships, railways, would busy thousands with their construction. Stagnation would be forgotten. Every branch of industry, every department of enterprise would flourish with our new prosperity,—a prosperity that would know no reaction, be blasted by no crisis, and never wither into decay; for it would be founded upon the natural laws of industry, and the industrial development of the nations would enlarge it more and more forever.

2*d*. *Social Advantages.*

The new industrial era would correct the morbid tendencies which are now poisoning our social life. Business would flow in regular channels. Speculative excitement would cease with the abnormal industrial system which gave it birth. Producer and consumer would be placed in juxtaposition, and the multitudes engaged in speculative traffic would turn their attention to productive industry;—and with this industrial revolution, would die out the mania which is sapping the foundations of social life. Excitement would be succeeded by tranquillity, and we might hope to see again the sober thought, and calm purpose, which marked the life of our forefathers.

The new industrial era would also counteract the tendency so apparent now, to sink the laboring class in the scale of being, by reducing wages to a standard inadequate to the supply of their wants. Nothing so brutalizes man as extreme poverty. The bony touch of Destitution palsies Aspiration. Despondency dwells with Want, and Degradation and Vice soon become tenants of the dreary home of Penury. But then the standard of wages might be increased, while the price of all articles of consumption was lowered. Labor would receive better returns for toil than it has ever realized before. Comfort and home enjoyment would be within the reach of all. With abundant employment at adequate wages, Hope would revisit the hearts which Despair has plunged into indolence and debauchery, and awaken them to effort and diligence.

The tendency which is filling our cities with *miserables* would be counteracted. The massed population of cities is an indication of depressed industry. Men do not congregate in cities from love of their smoke; but because the stagnation of industry, elsewhere, drives them in desperation to those industrial centers. The unhappy beings—to whom agriculture and village life offers no employment, flock, by the natural gravitation of misery, to cities. There, unable to find steady employment from the oversupply of labor, they crowd into cellars and old dilapidated dwellings, living in squalor until death removes them, to make way for a new shoal of unfortunates. Let business grow active in village, town, and country, and

the tide of misery drifting toward the cities, will be stopped; and other thousands will be drawn away from the dens where they now are hiding in sin and wretchedness, to fill the many avenues of industry the new era will open to all. Let the business activity of our cities increase, as increase it would, and all who remained within their limits would obtain comfortable subsistence. The cities might, for a time, diminish in population; but they would grow in size and wealth. The depletion of the pauper population, inhabiting lanes and tumble-down houses, will be no loss to the cities they infest, nor to the property holders in whose houses they sty. Their tenements will give place to a better class of buildings, containing fewer occupants, but yielding better rents.

Cities are not necessarily hotbeds of sin. The wretched do not become outlaws from choice, but, first, from necessity. Work is sought in vain, before despair leads to crime. Want of employment causes destitution, and destitution vice. Wretchedness is the parent of Crime, and enforced idleness the cause of all.—Men are not more vicious for being massed in cities. It is not contact that produces demoralization. Were there work and a comfortable subsistence for all, cities might become the centers of virtue. The misery and demoralization of the poor will pass away with the vicious industrial system which has cradled together the twin sisters, Want and Crime.

Our manufacturing system, also, would be renovated. Hitherto, British competition has driven our mill owners to the almost exclusive employment of female labor. This system has promoted enforced virginity, and wrecked the happiness, if not the virtue of a large proportion of our female population. But then, our manufactures would no longer be cars of Juggernaut, immolating the happiness and peace of the victims devoted to their service. Their increased advantages would justify higher wages, and admit of the employment of whole families. Flourishing manufactures would consist with the well-being of the operatives, and the true principles of social life.

The regenerating influence of the new system of industry would be felt upon the whole face of society. Business, freed from excitement, would leave the rich thought and leisure for the cultivation of morals and intellect: the poor would have heart and means for

self-improvement. The factory would be the seat of cheerful, contented, virtuous labor: the cities, ceasing to be lazar-houses of wretchedness, would become busy hives of happy industry.

3*d*. *Our Political Benefits.*

The sectional animosities which have grown up out of our industrial system would be buried in its grave. Community of interest would link the West and South in cordial amity. Our commercial grandeur would satisfy even the grasping avarice, and boundless ambition of New England. Content to bestow its energies in their normal channel,—commercial enterprise—that section would no longer seek to stir up strife as a means of securing government patronage. As the commercial agent of the West and the South, it would cease to be the ATE of discord, becoming, instead, the cordial friend of both the other sections.

The constitutional questions which have distracted the country would be set at rest forever. EXPERIENCE, the sole teacher from whose judgments there is no appeal, would have decided the issue, and set its seal upon the verdict, from which man would never again appeal: Experience would have proved that the interference of the government in the internal concerns of the country is ruinous to the industry it aims to foster, and promotive of ceaseless bickering and strife. The errors, the crimes, the sufferings, which mark the past history of our country, and which we have endeavored to trace, would make the record an eternal memorial of the ruinous consequences of centralization, and win our country to the doctrine of State-rights Republicanism forever. The great Truth would be settled, that *Industry must be left to flow in its natural channels, undisturbed by governmental interference;* and, thenceforth, Republicanism would be safe from the jars and jealousies which Centralization must always promote.

II. ADVANTAGES TO THE WORLD.

The whole world would participate in the benefits of our commercial supremacy. Its industry, its social life, and its political condition, would all feel the impulse of our beneficent influence.

1*st. Advantages Derived to the World's Industry.*

1. The first advantage would arise from the breaking down of British centralization of commerce.

That commerce is based upon the exchange of raw produce for British goods,—in violation of the first principles of commercial* exchange. Our ascendancy would break down that system, and inaugurate a commerce based upon correct principles,—consisting of the exchange of manufactured products between countries of the Temperate zone, and of the manufactures of the Temperate zone for the luxuries of the Tropics. We should not need to import either raw material or provisions, as England does; and we should trade with other countries upon a fair basis, instead of oppressing their industry, by refusing to take any except raw products. The traffic in raw products exchanged for manufactures—so oppressive of the countries which engage in it, and so pernicious to social† life through the excitement it is generating—would cease.

2. We should also benefit the industry of the world by establishing free trade.

Free trade can never exist, while the commercial system inaugurated by England endures. That country seeks to monopolize the manufactures of the whole world. It leaves no branch of industry to the uninterrupted enterprise of other countries. It never asks whether it possesses natural advantages for prosecuting any branch of manufactures, but seeks, by dint of capital and energy, to monopolize it, and crush, even at a pecuniary sacrifice, the competition of countries which have greater natural advantages, but less capital. England thus comes in competition with the industry of every country, and seeks to supplant upon its native soil. She thus assumes the attitude of a public enemy,—the common adversary of every country. She is willing to receive nothing in exchange for her products, but raw products, gold, and promises to pay. She taboos the mechanical industry of every other country, and labors, not only to shut it out of the markets of the world, but to crush it even in the home market. Her career is an offensive war against the industry of all nations.

---

* See ante, pages 255–263. † See ante, pages 292–295.

The aggressive industry of England compels other countries to lay restrictions upon importations, in order to compel economy of consumption, and thus maintain, as nearly as possible, the balance of trade, and, in some measure, protect their own industry. Under the circumstances, protection of home industry against British competition is imperatively necessary. Any other policy is suicidal. The aggregation of wealth in the hands of Britain is so enormous, that the industry of no country can maintain itself against a competition in its own market, waged with all the might of British capital. But the nations have erred in not restricting their tariffs to British goods, instead of including all the world in restrictions, necessary against England alone.

The nations also find it necessary to restrict their commerce with England, in order to check as far as possible the centralization of wealth that is going forward, through the unfair system of traffic established by Great Britain. British free trade is all a pretense. The British government shuts out the commodities of all countries that would materially increase the national expenditure, and prevents, by high tariffs, her people from buying enough of foreign* commodities to equalize the exports of the country. The trade balance, consequently, is always in† favor of Great Britain; other countries are constantly paying their deficit in bonds, or in specie, which is loaned abroad;—and thus England is becoming the annuitant of the world.

But none of these reasons for jealousy would exist, as against us. We should not attempt to engross all manufactures in our hands, assailing all the manufactures of other countries in their own markets: nor would we centralize the wealth of the world in our hands, by checking our consumption of foreign commodities, so as to keep the balance of trade in our favor. We should inaugurate free trade, in fact. Our commerce would be based upon normal principles of equal justice. Our industry would complement the industry of other countries, by offering the mechanical products which we could

* See ante, pages 599–603.

† For an explanation of the causes which leave a trade balance in favor of Great Britain, while the value of the imports exceeds the declared value of the exports, see ante page.

manufacture cheaper than they; and we would receive in exchange commodities which they could produce cheaper than we. The many manufactures which it would be less profitable for us to engage in, we should leave to other countries, and let them constitute the basis of exchange. There would be no centralization, no rivalry, no conflict,—no necessity for other countries to protect their industry against us by enormous tariffs. By common consent, other countries would leave to us those branches of manufactures in which our position gives us pre-eminence: we should leave to them those branches for which nature gives us no decided advantage. An equal and friendly exchange would promote the prosperity of all.

Free trade is the true policy for all countries, and experience would soon make it apparent. We might, at first, be under the necessity of forcing free trade, by retaliatory legislation. Europe might choose to continue the policy of importing raw cotton and manufacturing it for home consumption; imposing prohibitory duties upon our goods, in order to maintain their feeble cotton industry. But we should soon break down this system, and obtain free markets for our goods. We might offer a free market to those countries which would admit our products free of duty, levying discriminative duties upon the commodities of those who refused our proffer. Such an offer would not be made in vain. The exclusive possession of our market would be of great advantage to any country engaged in close rivalry with others. Some country would readily perceive the advantage of sacrificing the insignificant and puny interest that came in competition with our industry, to the advancement of other, and far more important branches of enterprise. And when one country adopted free trade with us, others would be compelled, in self-defense, to follow the example. For the country which entered into a free trade treaty with us would have two advantages over its European rivals: it would be able to sell its commodities in our market much higher profits; and, by obtaining our commodities at a cheaper rate, the cost of manufacture would be so much lowered, as to give it a decided advantage over its rivals. Manufacturing cheaper, and selling higher in our markets, the free trade country would be able to undersell the competitors in every other market. The countries which maintained the

tariff system would soon find themselves falling behind; and ere long, the whole world would be compelled to adopt free trade, as the only means of maintaining the necessary cheapness of production.

The artificial restraints which tariffs impose upon commerce exert the most baneful influence upon commerce, and upon social life. They restrict commerce: they dwarf industry by inducing countries to engage in branches of enterprise, for which they have no natural advantages, under the stimulus of government protection; instead of concentrating their energies upon those branches of industry, for which nature has given them superior advantages: they oppress the laboring classes of every country, by imposing artificial prices upon articles of consumption wholly out of proportion to the standard of wages. The suffering and demoralization so universally prevalent, are, in great measure, owing to the restrictions upon industry, and the high prices, caused by tariffs. The establishment of free trade would be a most important step in the progress to a new era of industry, and social progress.

3. We should benefit the Tropical regions, by stimulating their industry, beyond all example.

The commercial supremacy of England stimulates Tropical industry very little. That country requires such quantities of breadstuffs and raw material from countries of the Temperate zone, that it can afford comparatively little demand for tropical products of luxurious consumption; and the depressed condition in which the British monopoly of manufactures has kept the industry of other countries, has prevented them from increasing greatly *their* consumption of tropical luxuries. Indeed, England has not chosen to stimulate Tropical production to a very great* extent; for, the ability of her

* This remark applies to the normal products of the Tropics,—articles of luxurious consumption. Britain has, of late, endeavored to subsidize the industry of the Tropics in aid of her manufactures. But this is turning their industry in a wrong direction, and employing them to strengthen her erratic system of centralization. As we have seen, every country should manufacture† its own raw material; and as the Tropics are not adapted to manufactures, they should never turn their attention to the production of raw material, but concentrate their industry upon the growth of luxurious articles of consumption. More-

† See Ante, page

customers to purchase being limited, she preferred to supply their markets, as far as possible, with the products of her own industry.

But it will be vitally important to our career to stimulate Tropical production. This, alone, can prevent the concentration of wealth in our hands, as now in England. We shall import neither provisions nor raw material; we shall also produce for ourselves almost all articles of ordinary consumption: articles of luxurious consumption must constitute our chief imports. We shall afford an unprecedented market for tropical luxuries. Our people will consume much larger quantities of sugar, tea, coffee, cocoa, etc., than at present. Other countries also, with industry stimulated by free trade, will consume many tropical luxuries now almost unknown to the great mass of their people. An immense demand will arise for tropical productions, and will give a great impetus to tropical industry. At first, the Tropics will continue, as heretofore, to demand large balances of specie; but soon the consumption of the manufactures of the Temperate zone will restore the balance of trade, and will render this grand system of interchange unbounded, save by the wants of the two great divisions of the globe.

2*d*. *Benefits to Social Life.*

1. We should benefit the world socially, by breaking down the excited traffic in raw products which is fostering excitement and demoralization throughout Christendom.

2. But especially would mankind be benefited by the new industrial system we should inaugurate upon the ruins of British centralization.

Free trade would increase the wealth of all nations. Selling manufactured products instead of raw material, their income would

---

over, the Tropics have never taken enough of the products of the Temperate zone to pay for their luxurious productions. To give them, in addition, the production of raw material, is increasing the balance of trade against the Temperate zone, and encouraging them to cease the growth of luxurious products. The true system of commerce will concentrate the labor of the Tropics on the agricultural products suited to their climate, and stimulate their industry, and that of the Temperate zone, by the mutual interchange of tropical luxuries and the manufactures of temperate latitudes.

be greater; and purchasing at prices lowered by the repeal of tariffs, the purchasing power of their profits would be increased. Labor, especially, would feel the benefit of the new era: wages would be increased; and the prices of all imported articles of consumption would be diminished: the poor man would enjoy comforts and luxuries far beyond his present means.—The increased production of the Tropics would be an important element in the advance of civilization. Under our lead, the Temperate zone and the Tropics would mutually stimulate each other into increased industry, and higher advancement in civilization, until they will be elevated to a degree of social advancement which we now find it difficult to realize.

Nothing elevates the masses of mankind so rapidly, as to bring within the compass of their wages, the comforts, and many of the luxuries of life. When the laboring man is able to clothe himself and his family so well, as to diminish the difference in external appearance between them and the wealthier class;—and when he is able to afford them from his wages many of the luxuries of life, together with educational advantages;—emotions of decent pride are implanted, and aspirations are encouraged, which will elevate them far above the atmosphere of vice. The germ of all social improvement for the masses of mankind lies in increasing the purchasing power of the poor man's wages, and thus bringing him nearer the social status of wealth, by placing within his reach the comforts and luxuries of life.

3*d*. *Political Benefits.*

This point has already been so fully presented, that a brief sketch, only, is needed here.

The policy that has been advocated would exert a direct influence upon the course of British politics. Long before we succeeded in supplanting England in the cotton manufacture, it would cause a political reaction there, that would unseat the Aristocracy, and give the government into the control of the Liberals.

Our retaliatory legislation would strike a fatal blow to the commercial supremacy of England. The cessation of our supply of gold would cripple cotton production in the new fields; and the deprivation

of our market would inflict serious injury, not only upon the cotton manufactures of Britain, but upon the woolen, and iron manufactures, also. Our own mills would monopolize our raw material, and British manufactures would receive such injury as to seriously impair the prosperity of the country.

The Liberal party are the advocates of a liberal commercial policy. They oppose the system of taxation which levies so large a portion of the public burdens upon foreign commerce, and the English poor, and advocate a revenue system which imposes taxation upon wealth. They would hail our retaliatory measures as a just rebuke of an iniquitous system, and demand the repeal of a policy always unjust, and then become impolitic. The public suffering would be potent arguments in behalf of their claims. In an issue so presented, the Whigs and Tories both combined, could not resist the Liberal party. The enfranchised, and suffering masses would throw off the shackles of aristocratic influence, and elect a Liberal Parliament. The British government would be revolutionized, and at last placed in harmony with Progress.

With the British government under the control of the Liberal party, the world would be safe from the machinations of despots. A cordial alliance with France, backed by the United States, would restore the balance of power to Progress. The despots would shrink from the pursuit of their unaccomplished designs. The overawed spirit of Advancement would be again in the ascendant; and, either by revolution, or by the peaceful progress of Opinion, would re-establish the Nationalities of Europe under Liberal governments, curb the ambition of Russia, and move onward uninterruptedly under the lead of America, to the culmination of liberty in Republicanism.

CHAPTER II.

RUINOUS CONSEQUENCES OF OUR PRESENT POLICY.

But why picture the blessings which a wise, constitutional policy will evolve! Why roll the stone of Sysiphus! why tantalize our people with the sight of the cooling waters they may not drink! We may be happy still, if we would return, at once, to the principles of the Constitution. But when did man ever heed remonstrance? When did a nation maddened with excitement, ever hearken to the admonitions of reason, until it had been chastened with suffering?

"*Except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh in vain.*"

And God does not pardon without chastisement. The nation that is faithless to its obligations, and fails to improve its opportunities, is left to learn wisdom in the bitter school of adversity.—America was the destined leader of the human race in the new era of progress. It ought to have marshaled the nations in a glorious career of advancement. But we have faltered in our career. Our derelictions have dishonored Liberty in the face of the world. It may be that offended Deity may compel us to honor the cause we have disgraced, in the sufferings brought upon us by our departure from the principles of Republican government.

In our example, the world is to learn political wisdom. Man never heeds the precepts of wisdom. As youth is regardless of the admonitions of virtue, and only learns from the bitter lessons of experience that vice causes suffering; so nations must try every form of false government before they will cleave to the only true system of Republicanism. If we experience to the uttermost the evils of Centralization, our example will be a salutary warning to future ages. The rocks that bruise our keel, future republics will shun.

States Rights Republicanism is the only practicable form of government for enlightened man. It is destined to become universal,—embraced by the common consent of mankind. The outline of the

American Constitution presents the system of government which is to give freedom and peace to the nations. But, from the constitution of human nature,—always preferring the wrong to the right, and only reversing the choice at the stern mandate of bitter experience,—States Rights Republicanism could only become firmly established through the temporary triumph of Centralization. The nations would never adhere to a strict construction of the Constitution, until they beheld the bitter fruits of Latitudinarianism.—In the very inauguration of our government the party of Latitudinarian Construction seized the helm. It was beaten down, and the government was wrested from its sway. But error is not easily vanquished: the party again rose under a new organization, and after a long and doubtful struggle, was again beaten down. It reorganized a third time, and rushed into the political arena, more vigorous than ever, to seize possession of the government.—Of what avail to crush it again! It would rise again, and again, perpetually, to maintain a ceaseless conflict with the true principles of Republicanism. Was this conflict between opposing principles to continue forever? Was Republicanism to be eternally agitated by the intrigues, machinations, and struggles of Centralization? No! this collision must cease: mankind must universally embrace States Rights Republicanism, and execrate Centralization. But nothing would make Centralization so odious as its triumph. Its temporary establishment was the only method of effecting its permanent overthrow. The party of Latitudinarian Construction must obtain possession of the Government, and sway it uncontrolled, that the results of their rule might stand forever, a damning commentary upon their principles of administration. "*When the wicked spring as the grass, and when all the workers of iniquity do flourish: it is that they may be destroyed forever.*"

If the ruin Centralization has already wrought is sufficient to warn future ages from its path, we may hope for an early triumph of Conservatism, and the re-establishment of the prosperity of the country. But if the lesson is as yet insufficient, the Centralizationists will retain possession of the government, until they ruin the country, and bring the cause of humanity to the verge of destruction. Then Radicalism will die amid the execrations of mankind,

and an Absalom's pillar, erected from the ruins of the broken temple of our Prosperity, will mark its grave, and stand a perpetual warning to the coming ages.

It is already easy to perceive the evils which a continuance of the present policy will bring upon the country. The deep shadows cast from the coming storm of ruin, are even now darkening our land. Let us rapidly sketch their sombre outlines.

Sect. 1.—The Ruin of America.

I. The Political Ruin of the Country.

1*st. The Political Ruin of the South.*

1. If Radical rule prevails, the white population of the South will be reduced to a state of political vassalage to the negro.

The measures already adopted secure this end. The registers who have been appointed exclude* the white population upon any pretense from the polls, while the suffrage is conferred upon all blacks. In many districts, former slaves are appointed registers, and have the power to admit or to exclude their former masters from the polls, without appeal. Throughout the South, the number of blacks registered exceeds the registered whites. In those states, negroes are made the ruling class.

They sit upon juries to try offenses, and hold in their hands the life and liberty of all whom it suits federal officials to arraign. And under negro domination, this state of things is to be perpetuated.

Never were a conquered people subjected to such humiliations as the brave people of the South.—Having taken measures to place all political and judicial power in the hands of the negro population, the most incendiary steps are taken to excite them against the whites. In the Southern cities, Radical emissaries are exciting them with the hope of confiscation; and, by means of inflammatory speeches, are inciting riots which increase the feeling of bitterness toward the whites into intense hatred. The blacks are instigated to arrogate social equality, by intruding into hotels, street cars, and places of business, and amusement, upon a footing of

* This, it will be remembered, was written in the Spring of 1867.

equality; that fiercer hate may inflame their minds from the repulse of their obtrusiveness. These collisions in cities, and towns, are employed to excite the colored population of country districts against the whites. Clubs are formed in every township, where white emissaries meet the ignorant freedmen in dark-lantern conclaves, to poison their minds,—repeating with exaggeration the details of every riot, pretending to sympathize with their imaginary wrongs, and exciting them with the hope of confiscation.

And these persons, excited to exasperation by the means employed to secure their adhesion to the Radical party, are to have control of the Southern State governments. Delegates elected by their votes will make laws for the government of the commonwealth. Black voters, fired with hatred of the whites on account of their superiority, will make the laws; and negro jurors will administer them, hanging and imprisoning, under color of law, the class whose superiority they abhor.

We see in Tennessee a specimen of the measures the Radicals will adopt all over the South, to maintain their power, when once the Southern state governments are under their control. The white population will be disfranchised *en masse*, as having sympathized with, or taken part in the rebellion: then, as in Tennessee, the governor will be authorized to set aside at will the votes of counties adverse to the dominant party, under pretense of inaccurate registration; and negro soldiers will patrol the states, to intimidate voters in such districts as are opposed to negro rule. Such is now the government of Tennessee. In that state, it is mitigated: the negro population is not the controlling element; nor have they been excited to hatred of the whites. But in the Southern states, they will have the uncontrolled ascendancy; and they will vent in accumulated oppression, the barbarian hatred with which they are now being inspired.

Fiendish ingenuity could not devise a system of torture more horrible than that the Radicals have set on foot in the South. Those states entered the Union of their own free will. Will any other people ever enter into a Confederation that may become the instrument of such intolerable oppression,—such overwhelming ruin?

Will not Republicanism be disgraced in the face of the world, and become a byword, a reproach!

2. Confiscation superadded to the Horrors of Negro Rule.

The Stevens confiscation bill professes to be a fine, enforced by confiscation in case of non-payment. But its real intent is wholesale confiscation, and that will be its result. It proposes to fine the seceded states $500,000,000 to be levied upon those whose property, in 1860, was worth over five thousand dollars. The sum might be met, were time allowed for its payment. But the object of the law is confiscation, and no time will be granted. The fine can only be met with borrowed money. And where can the Southern planters borrow $500,000,000, upon an emergency? What capitalist will loan money to bankrupt proprietors, living in states governed by negro rule, where labor is utterly disorganized? A few persons may succeed in obtaining, from friends in the North, money to meet their fine; but the vast number would be unable to compass it. In its practical operation, the Stevens bill will prove, what its author and his coadjutors designed it to be,—a measure of sweeping confiscation.

And that measure will be passed. It may be delayed, until the next Presidential election is over, and Radical congressmen from the Southern states demand it, in the interest of their negro constituencies. The Northern Radicals only want a pretext; and they will only too willingly accede to the demands of their Southern allies. The measure will secure them the negro vote, in the present; and, in the future, the unwillingness to undo the act and make restitution, will contribute to the security of their power in the North.

3. Ruin of the Negro Population of the South.

The aim of the Radicals in confiscation, is not the benefit of the negro. It is known that the negro will not labor, when freed from the influence of the white race; and the Radicals have resigned them to the fate which indolence, improvidence, and vice is surely bringing upon them. The prominent Radical leaders recognize the approaching extinction of the black race, as a certain fact. They expect them, when no longer shielded by the care of the higher race, to fade away before a competition with the superior energy of the

white man. The aim of the Radicals in confiscation is, not to provide permanent homes for the negro; but to obtain lands which will readily pass into the possession of Dutch settlers. The negroes are expected to die out, and they wish the Dutch to take their place. The unfortunate negro race is merely used by Radical craft, as the instrument to bring about their own ruin.

This aim is in perfect accordance with the entire policy of the Radical party. Theirs is a policy of cold-blooded calculation, looking to party aims, careless whom their car of triumph crushes. They never avow their ultimate aims, but, with consummate craft, proceed, step by step, to the accomplishment of their purpose. Hypocrisy is the right arm of their strength. Prodigal of professions to all, and keeping faith with none, they use various allies in succession, and, when they are no longer useful, crush the instruments whose confidence they have abused.

They first played upon the credulity of the Border states and the Northern Democrats, and won their support to a war for the Union. When public sentiment was ripe for it, they unmasked their purposes, and crushed the Border states and the Northern Democracy beneath the heel of military power.—They next demoralized the Southern armies by avowing that they only fought for the abolition of slavery; and, while resistance continued, they voted down revolutionary measures offered in Congress. When resistance was over, they still remained silent, until the promises of the President had induced the Southern states to adopt the Constitutional amendment abolishing slavery. No sooner was this accomplished, than, in violation of previous pledges, they refused admission to the Southern states, unless the right of suffrage were granted the negro. Their rallying cry now was the worthiness of the black race, their capacity for industry, and for self-government.—The support of the West was necessary to them, and they carried the West, through philanthropic impulse, in favor of their programme. The military reconstruction act was passed. Hitherto the Radicals have ruled by the support of the West, and they have cajoled the West with philanthropic professions. But now the time is approaching when they may do without Western support, provided they can obtain the more reliable adherence of the Southern negroes;—and their whole policy,

now, is designed to conciliate the Southern negro vote. Hence the confiscation bill; hence Sumner's negro franchise bill. The negro vote secured, the West will be whistled down the wind as the Border states were before: New England and the South can rule the country.—Then the negro will be used, and thrown aside like the other allies whose confidence the Radicals have abused. The support of the negro is desired only until the South can be filled up with Dutch. When confiscation shall have been effected by their assistance, it will be the aim of Radical policy to turn a stream of German emigrants upon the Southern states. These, it is hoped, will be equally faithful allies of New England as the negroes, and much more industrious. When the Southern states shall have been flooded with them, the negroes may shift for themselves, and die out as fast as they can. With their well-known improvidence, those of them who avail themselves of confiscation to secure homesteads will soon sell their lands; and then, in competition with Dutch industry, and Dutch thrift, they will be cut off from the labor market—and extinction will close the drama of Radical negro philanthropy.

Radical domination will not be firmly established until the Southern whites are ruined to make way for the negro, and the negro thrust into extinction to make room for the Dutch. If these aims are accomplished, all-destroying Radicalism will be safe;—but Liberty will be no more!

2*d*. *The Political Ruin of the West.*

Wrong reacts upon the wrong doer. Radical oppression will not stop with the South. The West, next, will suffer the worst evils of Radical oppression.

Let the people of the West continue a little longer to support the Radical policy,—let them assist Stevens and Sumner, the high priests of Protection, in the immolation of the bleeding South upon the altar of their idol—and their own doom is sealed. Protectionists, whether in Pennsylvania or New England, know that the West will not much longer endure their policy of monopoly;—they know that the industrial questions which have been lost sight of during the tempest of fanatical excitement and civil war, will soon reassert their

importance, and create a breach between the West and the monopolists of the East;—and they are casting about for new and more pliable allies, attached to the party by the strongest ties of interest. They find them in the Southern negroes, and the Dutch, to whom the South is to be given up. In enabling the Radical party to crush the Southern Conservatives and establish the negroes and the Dutch in their stead, the people of the West are plucking swift ruin upon their own heads. The Southern planters will be reduced from affluence to beggary—subjected to the domination of emancipated slaves—the beautiful land they rescued from the wilderness become their prison, instead of their home—and the government their fathers constituted, their worse than Egyptian oppressor. And these planters are the only true allies of Western interests. Let them be crushed, and the South is no longer the ally of the West against New England monopoly. The West will have stricken down its firmest friend, and will stand alone in opposition to the baneful policy of New England. The melancholy grace will be accorded it, of being the last victim the Radical Polypheme will devour.

The West may now arrest the progress of misrule. The measures necessary to bind the negro population of the South to the support of the Radical party have not yet been passed. The defeat of the Stevens confiscation bill, and Sumner's bill enfranchising the negroes in all the states, may yet save the South to Conservatism, and arrest the suicidal policy of the Radicals. The votes of the Western Representatives are necessary to admit the Radical negro representatives from the South, and carry those measures. *If the* PEOPLE *of the* GREAT WEST *will awake, and, by an unmistakable expression of public indignation, compel their representatives to defeat the Radical policy, the country may yet be saved from impending ruin.*

In the face of reaction in the Middle and Western states, the Radicals will not dare to press the measures of Stevens and Sumner. They will pause in their career, until after the Presidential election. If the Middle and Western states are true to themselves, that election will drive the Radicals from power, and save the country. If the Radicals triumph, then, the political ruin of the country is consummated. For, however they may defer, they will not—they dare

not—abandon their odious measures. However they may gloss over their purposes before the Presidential election, let them pass that crisis in safety, and they will boldly, unscrupulously, carry out their entire programme.

They will execute the will of their Southern negro allies. The irruption of Southern Radical Representatives upon Congress, will give a new impulse to the resolution of the party. Many Northern Radicals now shrink from the ultra measures thrust upon the party by Stevens and Sumner. But Southern Radicals will have no scruples. They will urge their adoption. Clamor and party drill will prevail; the adoption of those measures will make centralization an accomplished fact.

State constitutions will be set aside: State laws will be abrogated. The franchise will be regulated by Federal authority alone. The consequences of Sumner's bill cannot be better presented, than in the language of the eloquent Dr. Bacon, (himself a Republican,) in a letter to the *Independent* protesting against the measure. He says:—

"Suppose such a law be enacted—how shall it be executed? The national government has undertaken to say who shall vote, and who shall not in the State of Massachusetts. What next? The national government must make a registration of voters (as it is now doing in the Southern states) *by officers of its own.* What next? The national government must take care that no man whom it invests with this right of voting is in any way restrained from voting; and, therefore, the ballot-boxes must be under the inspection, and in the custody, of United States officers; and United States policemen, or soldiers, must keep order at the voting places. The national government, having taken this matter in hand, must go through with it, and must take care that no man's vote is thrown out in the counting, and that the returns are made, or the result declared correctly; and this, too, it must do by its own officers.—A few years experience of elections conducted by authority, and under regulations proceeding from the seat of the national government, would convince IGNOTUS that the destruction of THE RESERVED RIGHTS OF THE STATES, and the consequent *centralization of power* at the national capital, is identical with the SUBVERSION OF LIBERTY."

Equally forcible is the warning of Daniel Webster. In an oration delivered in 1843, upon occasion of the completion of the Bunker

Hill monument, speaking of the military republics of South America, he said:—

"A military republic, a government founded on mock elections, and supported only by the sword, is a movement indeed, but a retrograde and disastrous movement from the regular and old-fashioned monarchical system. If men would enjoy the blessings of republican government, they must govern themselves by reason, by mutual counsel, and consultation, by a sense of feeling, and general interest, and by the acquiescence of the minority in the will of the majority properly expressed; and, above all, the military must be kept in direct subordination to the civil authority.

"Whenever this lesson is not both learned and practiced, there can be no political freedom. Absurd, preposterous it is, a scoff, and a satire upon free forms of constitutional liberty, for forms of government to be prescribed by military leaders, and the right of suffrage to be exercised at the point of the sword."

Where will this centralization, once established, end?

The time for reaction will come,—when the Middle and Western states will grow dissatisfied with the reckless system of administration which sacrifices their interests to the impulses of New England fanaticism, and the grasping avarice of New England manufacturers. But their opposition will be unavailing: the government will be in the hands of a clique, who will govern the country by negro votes. It is not in human nature to endure injustice and misrule with patience. The Radicals will be under the necessity which compels all centralizations to rest their power upon a standing army. Discontent in the West, as in the South, will be suppressed by Federal soldiers: Western ballot-boxes, like the Southern, will be guarded by negro troops: our elections held under the shadow of the bayonet, will degenerate into a farce, by which the party in possession of the government will maintain its hold on power.

This oppression might endure for a time—but could human patience last forever? Will the great majority of the American people suffer themselves to be controlled by a faction insignificant in numbers, usurping the government by a trick, and maintaining, by force, the power won by fraud? The great body of the nation will, sooner or later, grow restive under Radical domination; and it is to be feared that our republic will tread the path of all preceding Centralizations, through civil discord, to repose in despotism.

Let the Radicals consolidate their power, and we follow the footsteps of Mexico, and the Spanish republics of South America.

II. The Industrial Ruin of the Country.

Industrial ruin may overthrow the Radical power before it has culminated in the destruction of our Republican institutions. Our best hope lies in the counteracting force of the various evils that reckless party has let loose, to blight our prosperity. A deluge which extinguishes a conflagration may prove a blessing: so this country may yet hail bankruptcy as the only deliverer able to rescue the Republic from Radicalism. The same course which threatens to establish Radicalism upon a firm basis, also menaces our industrial interests with Bankruptcy. It may be that in this double birth,—Bankruptcy and Radical Centralization,—the former may be the elder born, and destroy the latter.

Radical misrule threatens the country with industrial ruin from the combined operation of two infallible causes. The one cause is the inflation of prices induced by our financial system; the other is the demoralization of Southern industry. Either one of these is sufficient to bring on a grave industrial crisis; both combined, must cause utter, and inevitable ruin.

The ruinous influence of the present high prices upon our prosperity has already been traced. It only remains to trace, in more detail, its effect in combination with the overthrow of Southern industry.

Under negro rule, the Southern states can never re-establish their industry. An idle, thievish, dissolute black population will, at best, content themselves with producing the bare means of subsistence. And when confiscation demoralizes the labor of the South, and offers a premium to idleness, nothing can save Southern industry from annihilation.

Nor can the extinction of Southern industry be averted by the substitution of Dutch, for negro labor. It will require time to make the necessary changes,—to sweep away the Planters, to give place to the negroes, and the negroes, to make room for the Dutch. Besides, the Dutch are not suited to the Southern climate; nor is their industry adapted to the cotton culture. A generation, at least, must

elapse, before these disabilities would be overcome; and, meantime, the country would be plunged into irretrievable ruin. Our industrial condition is already critical, in the highest degree. We cannot afford to experiment, and wait the issue of such a revolution of our system of industry, as that proposed. A crew invites swift destruction, which, on the verge of the Maelstrom, cuts away the masts, hoping to replace them before the whirlpool engulfs the vessel: as surely as the present system of Southern industry is swept away, so surely the prosperity of the country goes down, before it can be replaced by another. We are already in the vortex, and nothing can save us, but the most prompt and decisive measures for regaining our lost prosperity.

The industry of the South is now in a most critical condition. Our present financial system is alone sufficient to work its ruin. A full cotton crop would reduce the price in the Liverpool market to 13 cents a pound,—a price at which, under existing circumstances, the culture in the South would be attended with loss. The present charges upon cotton would alone consume the entire price; for the charges upon a bale of cotton, before it is shipped to Europe, are now greater than the average price of the article,* twenty years ago. The wreck of Southern industry will be complete, when, to the ruinous influence of our financial system, is superadded the demoralization of the Southern labor system. From present indications, we shall soon be making cotton a regular article of import, and protecting our own feeble production, by a tariff upon the foreign article.

The manner in which our financial system is depressing Northern industry, has already been seen. Let us now trace the universal prostration of Northern prosperity consequent upon the paralysis of Southern industry.

The South has always been the center of our industrial system. Its exports have been the basis of our foreign commerce, and its consumption the soul of domestic industry.

From 1820 to 1860, the entire exports of the country amounted

---

*See ante, page 533, where the influence of the high cost of production upon the cotton culture is discussed at length.

to $4,856,863,368; of which, cotton comprised $2,574,834,000, or more than half the entire exports. The three Southern products, cotton, tobacco, and rice, amounted to $3,117,869,000, being nearly three-fourths of the whole.

Upon these Southern exports, together with the Southern demand, we may say that nearly three-fourths of the internal trade and foreign commerce of the country was founded. Let us note the ramifications of this traffic.

The South produced and sold $400,000,000 worth of produce annually, a great portion of it for export to foreign markets. Northern capitalists transported this produce, and imported foreign goods in exchange; and the traffic built up the Northern marine, and the great commercial cities of the seaboard. Moreover, the $400,000,000 which the South derived from its annual productions, were all expended in the North. A part of it was paid to Eastern merchants for foreign goods; part to New England, for home manufactures; part to Western farmers, for their produce; part to Northern cities, for farming utensils, for profits of traffic, for coal, and iron, and the thousand articles which the South, concentrating its labor upon a few staples, failed to produce, and obtained exclusively from the North. In this manner, the Northern states obtained their supplies of foreign goods. In effect, the South bought them with its produce, and paid a great part of them to the North in exchange for its productions. The entire traffic based on Southern production was carried on by Northern capital, and redounded to the prosperity of Northern farmers, merchants, manufacturers, miners, shippers, and transporters. The traffic built Northern cities, railroads, steamboats, ships, and factories.

The demand for at least three-fourths of the industry of the North was either based upon, or in some manner, directly or indirectly, connected with, Southern industry.—The cities on the Southern borders of the West grew up in carrying on the traffic between the West and the South. Half their business consisted in supplying the South with Western stock and agricultural produce, with agricultural implements, with iron, coal, and other raw products; the other half, in supplying the West with manufactures and goods, purchased by Western farmers with the returns from their Southern sales: and

these cities expended the profits of their traffic, in purchasing Western produce and Eastern goods, and in making improvements which afforded employment to thousands of mechanics, whose wants increased the demand for manufactures, importations, and agricultural produce.—The Eastern cities were sustained, by an export trade consisting chiefly of Southern products, and by an import traffic in goods chiefly purchased by the sale of Southern staples.—The cities engaged in conducting the traffic between the West and the East, though less immediately connected with Southern industry, were not less entirely dependent upon it for their prosperity. The imported goods they sold to the West were bought with Southern produce: the Western produce they shipped to the East, was purchased—by seaboard cities built up through the commerce based on Southern production—by manufacturers, miners, and mechanics, dependent upon the Southern demand for their market—and by the thousands obtaining subsistence in supplying the wants of those thus subsisting by the Southern trade.

Thus all the cities of the land were built up upon the products of Southern industry, to a greater or less extent. The seaboard cities were built up by the commerce in exports and imports; three-fourths of which consisted of Southern products, and of goods purchased with Southern products, and sold to individuals whose means where derived from sales directly to the South, or from business connected in some manner with Southern industry. The cities on the Southern borders of the West owed their existence to a direct trade—with the South—with the seaboard cities, three-fourths of whose traffic and population were based upon Southern industry—and with the Western farmers, three-fourths of whose means were derived from sales to the South and to cities flourishing upon the Southern trade.—The cities upon the Northern borders of the West owed their existence to a traffic between the seaports sustained by Southern products, and the Western population whose ability to purchase depended upon the demand of cities owing three-fourths of their business directly or indirectly to Southern industry.

In our grand system of internal traffic, the South was the common market of both the East and the West. The South bought everything of both, but sold very little to either. Its market was abroad. The

East sold goods to the South, and to the West which purchased with means derived from Southern industry: the West sold produce to the South, and to the East whose prosperity was derived from the Southern traffic. The trade of those sections with each other was based upon Southern resources, in hardly a less degree than their direct traffic with the South. Without Southern production, the West would have found no market for its produce in Eastern cities: the East would have had neither market for goods in the West, nor goods for the market. Southern industry was the necessary complement of Northern. The South afforded a market for Northern industry which foreign countries denied, and its productions were the channel through which the prosperity of the whole country drew aliment from the wealth of foreign nations. Foreign nations wanted scarcely anything the North could produce; and the North found compensation for its own barrenness in commercial products, by assisting the South to grow cotton, tobacco, and rice for export. These Southern exports were not the products of Southern industry, alone. The North was equally engaged in the production. The West which furnished farming implements, stock, and provisions, and the East which furnished clothing, supplies, and shipping,—were no less interested in the production than the South. It was really a copartnership between the sections for the production of commodities for the foreign market, in which the South furnished soil and labor, the North supplies and transportation. The nation was a flourishing oak: the South was the root of the tree—having no foliage—presenting none of the evidences of prosperity—but sending to the luxuriant branches the nourishment which it derived from the earth. Through it the flourishing North obtained aliment from foreign nations, to nourish its vigor.

Now, when the root is blasted, the trunk must decay, the branches wither. Destroy the vital industry of the South, and the prosperity of the North must perish. The tempest cannot uptear the roots of the oak without laying the green branches low. The fire that blasts the root of the tree may leave the top unsinged; but soon the foliage falls, and the bare, withered branches wail in the wind that erst made soft melody among their whispering leaves. What can compensate the North for the loss of Southern industry? How can it

dispense with the profitable partnership in Southern production? From this it derived its wealth, which missing, it must relapse into poverty. The oasis cannot retain its fertility, when the stream is dried whose waters caused its verdure.

It may be objected that the experience of the last few years has proved that the South is not indispensable to Northern prosperity; for the North has never known greater prosperity than during the period when Southern resources have all been cut off. Yes, but how has the North dispensed with the South? The government has, during the war, substituted the South. The immense demand arising from collossal armaments compensated for the want of the Southern market; and the lavish outlays of the government during those years of prodigal expenditure substituted the $400,000,000 which the South annually paid to the North. But what a difference between the old prosperity, and the present. The money derived from the South was money *earned:* the money lavished by the government was money *borrowed.* The prosperity of the last few years is factitious. It was derived from the hypothecation of the resources of future years. Those four years had well be prosperous, when they devoured the resources of half a century to come. The spendthrift who is mortgaging his estate always displays more of the bedizzened externals of prosperity, than the prudent economist who is improving his fortune. Our prosperity is only the boiling of the cauldron which wastes the liquid it seems to magnify.

But it is again urged, that the government has, for two years, ceased its immense disbursements—and yet the country is prosperous. Yes, and this seeming prosperity is derived from the exportation of our bonds! We are selling prodigally to foreign countries the treasures of the coming generation, which the government squandered upon the country during the war. The sale of bonds is compensating for the loss of the products of Southern industry. While they last, we are rich as ever. We do not need the products of the South! But how, when the bonds are all exported?—sold and gone? Then, when we have neither Southern industry, nor bonds, what will Prodigal do?

We can be prosperous without the South! And the last six years

prove it! The last six years prove how indispensable the South is to us. They prove that even a factitious prosperity can only be maintained by the Government squandering borrowed treasures, instead of the money the South honestly earned. They prove that our foreign trade can only be maintained, in so far as the partially recuperated industry of the South failed* to sustain it, by the annual sale of hundreds of millions of our debt! As these expedients cannot be carried much farther, the last few years prove that, without the early restoration of Southern industry, we are lost! The flush of seeming prosperity is but the hectic glow that is fed by drafts upon the fountain of life. Already the ruddy tinge is fading, before the pallor which announces that the strength is almost consumed.

1. The prostration of Southern industry will be first felt in the decay of Western agriculture, and the decline of the cities fostered by Southern traffic. Never was the business of any country mutually interconnected in such a manner as in ours. The system of internal traffic in which the sections were mutually dependent upon each other,—the South on the North for supplies, and the North on the South for a market—will make the paralysis of Southern prosperity felt immediately by every quarter of the other section.

The West, however, will feel it first. The Western farmers who have derived their incomes from Southern sales, will find their resources fail† with their market. The cities on the Southern borders of the West, whose population has been in great measure sustained by the Southern trade, will lose their accustomed business: all engaged in the manufacture or the transportation of goods and produce destined for the Southern market, will find their occupation gone; and equally unfortunate those engaged in the manufacture or the transportation of goods destined for the consumption of agriculturists deriving their incomes from the Southern traffic. A large number of merchants and manufacturers engaged in the Southern and Western trade, with their employés, will be compelled by th falling off of business to turn to some other occupation.

---

* Our exports for 1867 were $471,000,000 currency value; of this $328,000,000, or 70 per cent. of the whole, were Southern productions.

† The West is already suffering severely from the loss of the Southern Stock market.

What resource for these numerous classes thrown out of business, by the failure of the traffic between the West and South?

If the industrial and financial condition of the country were favorable, they might engage in manufactures. But with Southern industry demoralized, and no certainty of a regular supply of cotton, what capitalist would invest his means in factories? Besides, as we shall see, this revulsion in trade cannot but precipitate a financial crisis that will still further paralyze business, and prevent the possibility of embarking on a large scale in new branches of enterprise.—No; the cities of the West could offer no support to the thousands thrown out of business. To leave the cities, and engage in agriculture, would be their only resource.—But population does not readily adapt itself to vast changes in the industrial system. Men wait, in the expectation of some change for the better, hoping against hope that business may resume its activity. The mass of working men, however, could not wait long. Their savings would soon be expended, and gaunt want would stare them in the face. They would overcrowd every remaining avenue of trade. When the overdone traffic of the cities fails to yield subsistence, then will come bread riots, which the government must suppress by force. At length, this surplus population of the cities must submit to necessity, and remove to the country and engage in agriculture.

The evil will not stop here: The high price of labor and material will have already checked city improvements. When the emigration to the country began, of course all public improvement would stop. No more houses erected, no more streets and town lots graded. A multitude of workmen engaged in building,—carpenters, glaziers, painters, bricklayers, roofers and laborers employed in various departments of building,—will be thrown out of employment; furthermore, all engaged in supplying materials for building,—lumbermen, brickmakers, tinners, founders, miners,—will find no longer demand for their products;—and all these classes must, of necessity, seek subsistence in agriculture. The wave of ruin will spread, until the population of the cities on the Southern borders of the West shall be diminished in ratio with the contraction of their business. The population which the trade with the South has massed in cities must disperse, with the cessation of the traffic.

And all these various classes thrown upon agriculture for subsistence will increase production, in proportion to the diminution of consumption. The number of producers will increase, in the ratio that the number of consumers declines.

2. The tide of ruin will next spread toward the East.

The seaboard cities sustained by the export of Southern products, and the importation and sale of goods obtained in return, will find their business cut off. The importing merchants must curtail their business, from inability, both to purchase goods abroad, and to sell them in the South and West: the mercantile jobbers will lose their business: the transporters of goods to the South and West will find their warehouses empty, and their boats and cars standing idle. A steady stream of migration from the Eastern cities to the country must set in. With stagnation, all improvements must cease: the carpenters, roofers, bricklayers, and the many trades engaged in supplying materials for building, will find no employment; and when their little savings are exhausted, they must join the caravan of broken merchants and jobbers, in their movement to the only asylum,—agriculture.

Is it necessary to trace this course of causation further, and show how the cities on the Northern borders of the West will now find their business gone?—how the Western farmers, losing their Eastern market, will be unable to buy the products of Eastern industry?—how these cities must throw off their surplus population?—how the railways between the East and the West will lose their business? how the towns along the line of transit will be abandoned by their famishing population?—how the miners, founders, and the various branches of industry engaged in supplying material for, and building cities, towns, and railroads, must all abandon their present business, and seek subsistence in agriculture?

The North will be ruined. Its prosperity will share the grave of Southern prosperity. Grass will grow in the streets of its cities: steamboats will rot at the decaying wharves: the whistle will be unheard along the lines of deserted railway.

Simultaneously with this industrial prostration, will come a financial crash, and the downfall of the currency system. The crisis we

have described must necessitate the withdrawal of deposits from the banks; and a run upon them, once begun, will rise to a panic. The banks will go by the board: the government must either substitute a fresh issue of Greenbacks for their notes, as the only alternative of precipitating national bankruptcy, by throwing their deposited bonds upon the market at a ruinous sacrifice. The greenback circulation will also go down: the redundancy of the currency would soon make itself strikingly apparent, in the general stagnation of business: the currency which is absorbed in the present business of the country, would depreciate to one-fourth its present value, when three-fourths of the business of the country ceased. The depreciation once begun, will go on with an accelerated rapidity, until a discredited currency will deepen the shadows lowering over the business interests of the country, and hasten the coming of the final catastrophe.

The prostration of Southern industry must crush the shipping interest.

The increase of our tonnage has always borne a steady proportion to the increase of our cotton production. It has steadily averaged about one ton to every bale of cotton exported. When it has exceeded this proportion, the depression of the shipping interest checked ship-building, until the cotton production increased sufficiently to re-establish the ratio; and when our tonnage has fallen below the proportion, the activity in shipping has soon re-established the equilibrium. In this regular ratio, our mercantile marine increased, until, in 1860, our shipping engaged in foreign traffic amounted to 2,600,000 tons. In 1865, it had declined to 1,092,000 tons, a loss of more than* half.—It has been the fashion to attribute this decline to the dread of Southern privateers; but it was chiefly owing to the falling off of our cotton trade. When we had cotton to

* The following table shows the proportion of American and foreign shipping in the port of New York during a series of years. The amount is given in tons.

Year.	*American tonnage.*	*Foreign tonnage.*
1861	1,618,258	865,446
1863	986,713	1,395,634
1864	845,172	1,416,734
1865	774,458	1,473,815

export, we could force its shipment upon our own bottoms; for Britain was compelled to buy it, even at prices enhanced by our shipping profits: and then, our vessels having made a handsome profit upon the outward voyage, were able to bring return freight, at prices that distanced competition. But when cotton was no longer one of our exports, British merchants could dictate the terms on which they would take our other commodities; and, with characteristic shrewdness, they preferred to buy them in our ports, that their vessels might make the profit of transportation. The consequence was, our large marine could not find employment, and ship-owners preferred to sell their vessels, rather than suffer them to rot at the wharves. The same process diminished the number of our ships, which will soon diminish the population of our cities. Our shipping is continuing to decline. Old vessels are decaying, and no new ones are being built. Let our cotton production cease, and our imports and exports decline with the ruin of Northern and Southern industry,—and our shipping will be annihilated.

Finally, the prostration of Southern industry will lead to national bankruptcy.

How rapidly our debt is being exported, has already been shown; and how, in a few years more, it will all be owned by foreign capitalists. This will ruin us; but bankruptcy will not wait this slow process. In the general stagnation of industry, it will be found impossible to collect the necessary amount of revenue to pay the interest on the public debt, and carry on the public administration: the revenue from the tariff must fall off immensely; and, in the stagnation of trade, the internal taxation will scarcely yield any returns. The credit of the government will fail, and avowed bankruptcy will close the scene.

This is not idle speculation. The laws of cause and effect upon industrial relations, are immutable. Universal ruin must follow the prostration of Southern industry, unless a change in the government arrests the causes, before they shall have produced their ultimate effects.

It may be, that industrial depression in the North may lead to revolutionary measures looking to the adoption of the same policy there, that is now being inaugurated in the South. When the popu-

lation of Northern cities are starving—without the means of subsisting there, or of removing to the country—the masses may demand a redistribution of Northern property, for their benefit, such as the Radicals will then have made in the South, for the benefit of the negro! They may demand a redistribution of lands to give them homesteads! or a fine upon the wealthy, enforced under penalty of confiscation, to afford them means of emigrating to the vacant government lands! We cannot conjecture what course events may take, when universal ruin is falling upon the business interests of the country. If the Radical administration can enforce order with negro bayonets, it may compel the surplus population of the cities and workshops, to disperse quietly into the rural districts. If the famishing people obtain the upper hand, none can foresee the revolutionary measures into which desperation may hurry them.—The most favorable solution would be the displacement of the Radicals from power by the votes of the people, and the reversal of the policy which caused the suffering.

Unless this is done, utter industrial ruin seems inevitable. Already, the first fruits of Radical policy are seen. Business is generally stagnant in our cities. In Boston, hundreds of stores are inscribed with the ominous words, "To let;" and its line of ocean steamers have no freights to carry, and will probably soon leave the port which commerce has forsaken. Throughout the country, the goods' market during the last spring has been dull; drummers of city merchants vainly endeavor to sell upon the longest credits. Although Southern production has, to some extent, revived, and the activity of our foreign trade is maintained by the exportation of bonds, yet there is general complaint of business stagnation. Improvements have stopped. Thousands of mechanics and laborers are out of employment.

The tendency is already begun, that will, unless arrested, end in the depopulation of our cities. The Northern papers are already advising the laboring classes who cannot obtain employment, to leave the cities and engage in agricultural production. The New York *Tribune* estimates that the population of our cities is now too great, by one million souls, for the present amount of business. According to this estimate, one-third of the population of our cities

according to the census of 1860, ought now to remove to the country and engage in agriculture. In a recent issue, the *Tribune* urges an exodus to the country, in the following terms:—

"There are at least one million hanging on where they are not wanted, and not likely to be. 'Can't you give us something to do?' is their incessant whine, when there is work enough and good pay for all, if they will only go where it is, and do what is needed. They cannot find work on a few square miles of pavements, because there are too many people here, and too few on the farms, and in the rural factories and workshops. Thousands must be starved back into productive labor; and the sooner this is done, the better for all.

"Understand then, ye waiters on Providence! that there is no room for you in the cities, and that you ought to go out of them, at once. Do not say you have no means; for you have feet, and can get out of sight of paving stones, by using them. Do not plead the needs of your families; for you can do them no good by staying where you have nothing to do.—Tell us not of your ignorance of farming; it is high time you knew something that is wanted, and that will not go out of fashion. And besides, there are many things to do in the rural districts, other than farming; and if you are really good for anything, you will there find a chance to prove it."

It is not necessary to pause to expose the fallacy of this reasoning, by showing that both farmers and rural workshops have as many laborers as they can afford to hire, and that an exodus of famishing multitudes from the cities would both glut the labor market in the country, and cause a great excess of production over the demand. The home demand of the South, and of our cities and workshops, is the great market of our agriculture; and when this is lost, agriculture is ruined. The extract is only quoted in evidence of the fact that the causes are already in operation that will both ruin our cities, and our agriculture. Already, thousands of persons have left the Eastern cities, some going West, others South, in search of employment. But stagnation is equally prevalent in both those sections.

Trade is dull in the cities; and the country population, depressed by the state of business, is studying economy.

Public improvements have stopped, throwing thousands out of employment.

Our manufactures are depressed, except a few favored interests.

Nothing can more clearly show the stagnation of industry, than the falling off of the incomes of business men in our cities, and the diminution of the revenue from internal taxation. The published returns show that the aggregate incomes of one hundred and thirteen business men in New York city have fallen off, from $9,216,000 last year, to $3,617,000, this. These figures show more clearly than any other argument, the extent to which our industry is declining, under the policy of the Radical party.

We already see "the beginning of the end." The causes already in operation will, in a few years more, plunge the government into bankruptcy, and prostrate every department of industry.

III. The Social Ruin of the Country.

Little need be said on this subject, more than has already been advanced.

Social demoralization seems already approaching its acme.

Political corruption and bribery have been reduced to a system. Men high in position are charged with the corrupt use of their political power. The corrupt use of money in lobbying is notorious—not only in Congress, but in the state legislatures. Even the ermine is not free from reproach.

Society is agitated by a general excitement, inducing demoralization. Not one-twentieth of the population of our cities attend church. The press teems with accounts of vice in all its most hideous forms. Purity and gentleness would seem to have taken their flight, leaving the fiercest and most degrading passions to run riot through the land.

But the predominance of Radicalism threatens to engulf us in a yet lower deep.

What hope for social life in the South, when the negroes are made the ruling class?—when the present race of whites will be reduced to beggary, and a new class are made the type of Southern social life?—In the North, also, the old society will be equally submerged. The dearness of living is even now compelling the refined people of former days, to retire from Northern cities to country towns and villages. The palatial residences of New York city are chiefly oc-

cupied by the "shoddy" aristocracy, who bring to their position the pretension and arrogance of recent wealth.

The poor of the Northern cities are being degraded to the condition of the European pauper class. The inadequacy of their wages is lowering them in the social scale; as extreme poverty always blunts the sensibilities, and, in the end, brutalizes the population exposed to its influence.—When the ruin becomes general, what will become of the poor? When unable to subsist in the cities, or to remove to the country, what resource against extreme destitution? Thousands must famish with cold and hunger, and other thousands drag on a miserable, hopeless existence.

The state of general poverty will tell most severely upon those habits which promote refinement, and advance civilization. When absolute physical wants consume the income, nothing can be spared for what are considered the superfluities of life. Personal adornment, and the elegancies of social life, must be retrenched. The social party, the concert, the lecture, must be given up; and poverty will even retrench the educational, and religious advantages of community. Those classes whose services are necessary only to social and moral advanccement, are the first to feel the pressure of hard times.

It is to be feared that American society will be upheaved to its foundations. We may be on the eve of industrial, social, and political changes, almost as radical and as disastrous as those wrought by the irruption of the Northern barbarians upon the Roman Empire.

Were the ruin caused by the Radical policy limited to ourselves, it would admit of remedy. Sooner or later, it is to be hoped, the country would expel the Radicals, however firmly seated, from the power they abused; and so great are our natural advantages, that the adoption of a wiser system of administration would soon repair the temporary loss of our prosperity. And indeed, the philanthropist might regard a period of industrial stagnation as a corrective of the frightful social evils, into which the industrial excitement of the last thirty years has plunged us. The extravagance of thought, and impulse, and action,—the irreligion, and disregard of moral obligation prevailing among so large a portion of our population,—might

find a cure in the enforced simplicity of manners, incident to the gripe of honest, industrious poverty. The temporary loss of our riotous prosperity might not be regarded as an unmitigated evil, if it restored us to the hardy virtues of Republicanism, through the discipline of adversity.

But the evils of Radical misrule will extend beyond ourselves. They will involve the world in ruin.

Sect. 2.—The Ruin of Christendom.

It is unnecessary to dwell further upon the social excitement and the industrial evils induced by the Radical policy, which will prostrate America, and enable England to maintain its centralization of industry.

The most formidable evils that are to be feared are political. The great danger is the political reaction in Europe, which will be fatal to the cause of liberty and religion in the Old World.

In the present attitude of affairs, nothing can counteract the tendency to reaction, but the ascendancy of American influence. The loss of our prosperity, and the eclipse of our influence, will be fatal to the cause of progress. If events abroad continue to progress in the direction they have taken in the last few years, Europe will, before two decades have elapsed, be overshadowed by Russian domination. And events will continue to drift onward toward the crisis, if Britain is suffered to maintain its prosperity, and the commanding influence arising from its centralization of commerce.

The Reform Bill now* progressing through the English Parliament will blot out the Whig party, and leave only the Tories and the Liberals to struggle for the ascendancy. Though the Liberal party will be much stronger than before, a great majority of Whig boroughs will go over to the Tory party, and give it, for the time, firm control of the government. The domination of the party will continue, until some period of suffering shall so irritate the enfranchised peasantry, as to carry them beyond the control of the Aristocracy, and place the Liberals in power.

---

* Written in the Spring of 1867.

Before that shall occur, it is the hope of the Tory leaders that the progress of reaction may give Europe to the sway of Absolutism, and enable them to repose in peace beneath the shadow of Continental despotism.

The recent imbroglio between France and Prussia upon the Luxembourg question, that threatened to plunge Europe into war, has been peacefully settled. But it is only the lull in the tempest before it bursts forth with renewed fury. It did not suit the despots to submit their cause to the arbitrament of battle, while yet the Tories of England were in the crisis of their Reform Bill, and while the power of Prussia was yet unconsolidated over its newly conquered territories. When delay promised certain triumph, they were not willing to risk their cause upon the issue of a precipitate struggle. A war with France at the present time, could not, in any event, subserve the purposes of Russian and Prussian policy. A French victory over Prussia, won before Russia could bring her forces into the field, would have enabled Napoleon to re-establish the deposed German princes, and strip Prussia of all her recent acquisitions: on the other hand—if Prussia triumphed—in the present critical situation of the British Tory party, the victory could not be pressed to a triumph of Absolutism, in the complete overthrow of the French monarchy.

The reigning family of England are German in blood and sympathy. The British Queen would take no action, except in the interest of Prussia. Her intervention, which brought about the settlement of the French and Prussian imbroglio on the Luxembourg question, must be regarded as a movement of Prussian diplomacy, desirous of putting off the inevitable conflict to a more favorable moment.

The recent adjustment cannot be regarded as a definitive peace, nor as indicative of a pacific disposition on the part of Prussia and her sympathizers. There are open issues enough to bring on a conflict, whenever it may seem expedient. The despots desire to choose a more auspicious time. When the power of Prussia shall be consolidated, and when the British Tories shall have secured in Parliament a trusty majority of adherents fully devoted to their reactionary policy, then will be the time to bring the issue between Absolutism and Progress to a crisis.

Unless our national prosperity be restored, and in such a manner

as to wrest the government of England from Tory control before that crisis comes, Russia will have Europe under her dictation. Backed by the reactionary government of England, the Czar will be master of the situation. It is not impossible that, in desperation, the French Emperor may endeavor to outbid Prussia for the Russian alliance. By an alliance either with Prussia, or with France, the Czar might then carry out the traditional programme of a division of Europe.

Then America will stand, the sole barrier to the ultimate triumph of Despotism allied with the Papacy. Liberty and religion will hang trembling upon the issue of a desperate conflict. In that struggle, the chances will be all against us. If we triumph, we shall triumph through the destiny of Republicanism—of Christianity—and through the favor of the God of providence.

It may be, that in the inscrutable providence of God, the Radicals may be suffered to control the government, until their policy shall bring about this crisis. If the policy of the party is to meet with everlasting reprobation, the direr ruin it causes, the deeper the execrations heaped upon it. If the Radicals were hurled from power, now, and our country and the world were saved from ruin by a prompt return to Conservatism, the party might again lift its head, and its latitudinarian principles might continue to agitate Republicanism, perpetually. But if its policy be carried out, until it wreck our own prosperity, and place Europe beneath the domination of Russia, and necessitate a terrific struggle for liberty,—irrevocable judgment will be pronounced upon it. The hand of irreversible fate will write its doom, and it will fall, to rise no more forever.

Radicalism must go down. The doom of Latitudinarian Construction is sealed. The only question is—shall it fall while yet the safety and prosperity of the country and the world may be secured; or—maintain its power a little longer—and sink amid the convulsions of general ruin, branded with the eternal hatred and loathing of mankind.

The determination of this question makes the present time, THE WORLD'S CRISIS.

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
0 021 051 469 7